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‘The essays of this handbook dissect the trends towards creeping authoritarianism in South 
Asia. Even India, long a poster boy of “third world” democracy, appears to be catching up 
with its neighbours in a “non- democratic regime convergence”. However, instead of merely 
confirming Huntington’s deterministic pessimism regarding non- western democracy, or 
jumping on to wide- eyed bushy-tailed advocacy, authors of this important volume follow a 
third trajectory, based on fine- grained empirical analysis and empathy with their subject, within 
a comparative framework. This handbook should become an indispensable tool for the people 
of South Asia, as well as for outsiders looking in.’
Subrata Mitra, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Heidelberg 
University, and Adjunct Professor, Dublin City University.
‘Situating South Asia’s democratic trends in a broad historical context, this wide- ranging 
volume addresses a crucial, timely and policy- relevant question: why is democracy faltering in 
the world’s most populous region? While authoritarianism was the twentieth century’s histor-
ical norm, recent democratic improvements have faltered and even reversed. Assembling the 
best regional experts, this book exposes the proximate cause of regional democratic backsliding 
– leaders invoking cultural identities to legitimate non- democratic behaviour – while under-
scoring its deeper and more enduring institutional roots. It will serve as indispensable reading 
for regional experts, democracy watchers and policymakers alike.’
Maya Tudor, Associate Professor, Blavatnik School of Government, 
Fellow, St Hilda’s College, Oxford University.
‘Studies of democratic decline in South Asia tend to focus on just one country. This excel-
lent and timely volume brings together leading scholars of Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan and 
Bangladeshi politics and society to explore, across a range of issues, what’s similar and what’s 
different about recent democratic weakening in the region. Indispensable.’
Steven I. Wilkinson, Henry R. Luce Director, MacMillan Center, 





ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF    
AUTOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH ASIA
This handbook offers a comprehensive analysis of the processes and actors contributing to 
autocratization in South Asia. It provides an enhanced understanding of the interconnectedness 
of the different states in the region, and how that may be related to autocratization.
The book analyzes issues of state power, the support for political parties, questions relating 
to economic actors and sustainable economic development, the role of civil society, questions 
of equality and political culture, political mobilization, the role of education and the media, as 
well as topical issues such as the Covid pandemic, environmental issues, migration, and military 
and international security. Structured in five sections, contributions by international experts 
describe and explain outcomes at the national level in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. The final section analyzes conditions for democracy and autocratization and how they 
are affected by the interplay of political forces at the international level in this region.
 • India – building an ethnic state?
 • Pakistan – the decline of civil liberties
 • Bangladesh – towards one- party rule
 • Sri Lanka – the resilience of the ethnic state
 • How to comprehend autocratization in South Asia – three broad perspectives
This innovative handbook is the first to describe and to explain ongoing trends of autocratization 
in South Asia, demonstrating that drivers of political change also work across boundaries. It is 
an important reference work for students and researchers of South Asian Studies, Asian Studies, 
Area Studies and Political Science.
Sten Widmalm is Professor in Political Science at the Department of Government, Uppsala 
University, Sweden. He has carried out extensive research on crisis management, political toler-
ance, democracy and conflicts in a global comparative perspective. His recent publications include 
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a Handbook on Autocratization in South Asia was needed, in order to catch, describe, and to 
explain the ongoing trends. Six months later the Covid- 19 pandemic broke out, turning the 
situation from bad to worse in so many ways. Autocratization was mainly reinforced. As this 
foreword is being written, it seems the Covid situation for affluent democracies is about to 
improve. Yet democracy has suffered in those countries too. As for most parts of South Asia, 
and for India in particular, the Covid death rate there is still pointing upwards. There is no 
way to predict the effects of all this. Some speculate that authoritarian leaders will eventually 
be removed from power as a consequence of the pandemic in South Asia. One thing, however, 
is clear: a sharp focus on democratization and autocratization is needed more now than at any 
other time since independence. Once the pandemic has subsided, it will become more evident 
we have a new world order. Authoritarian China is now the most important power – not only 
in South Asia, but arguably also in the world. This will also decide the chances for the states 
studied in this book to get back on the democratic path once again.
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Sandra Grahn, Staffan I. Lindberg and Sten Widmalm
A pronounced trend towards democracy in South Asia is now in reverse. Not long ago, the 
picture was different. India was on a steady climb in democracy ratings for decades. Economic 
liberalization, which was the hallmark of reforms led by finance minister Manmohan Singh in 
the 1990s under the premiership of Narasimha Rao, appeared to be compatible with giving 
more space for political competitors in a landscape which had long been dominated by the 
Congress party. India’s neighbours were gradually taking steps to follow its lead towards greater 
democracy. In the early 1990s, Bangladesh showed great promise with political and substan-
tial liberalization reforms as Khaleda Zia became the first female prime minister. A long spell 
of military rule in Pakistan came to an end late in 2007. The tragic assassination of Benazir 
Bhutto, just after she had returned from exile and taken the lead as the country’s most popular 
civilian leader, marked the beginning of a first peaceful transition towards democracy. Pakistan 
then managed to pass Huntington’s two- turnover test (Huntington 1991) with no fewer than 
three elections (2008, 2013, and 2018) leading to alternations in power. Two of the three largest 
parties formed successive governments completing full terms in office. After decades of war, 
Sri Lanka entered a more peaceful era after the Tamil Tigers were brutally defeated in 2009. 
Since then, Sri Lanka had three general elections and peaceful power transitions. During the 
last three decades, South Asia clearly became part of the “third wave of democratization” along-
side many other countries around the world. Following the end of the Cold War, democracy 
seemed to be a natural gravitational point that states inevitably moved towards if unfettered. 
(In)famously, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed that in some respects history was coming to an end 
(Fukuyama 1992). This idea that liberal democracy was accepted as a supra- ideology seemed to 
find support in South Asia as well.
We now know that such perceptions were misguided for understanding democratic devel-
opment in most parts of the world. According to Freedom House, the level of freedom in the 
world is now in decline for the fifteenth consecutive year (Repucci and Slipowitz 2020). The 
Varieties of Democracy (V- Dem) Institute traces the beginnings of the increase in “autocratizing” 
countries further back, starting even before 2000 (Lührmann et al. 2020: 15). South Asia is a 
part of this “third wave of autocratization” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Over the last ten 
years, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has pushed Bangladesh towards becoming a one- party 
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India is rapidly sinking in reports on democracy and liberal freedoms provided by Freedom 
House, Reporters Without Borders, Pen International and Amnesty International. The most 
recent release of indicators of democratic performance from V- Dem shows that India in 2020 
moved from being an electoral democracy to becoming an electoral autocracy (Alizada et al. 2021). 
Although India’s democracy has since independence been exposed to severe challenges, it did 
achieve “a sufficient level of institutional guarantees of democracy such as freedom of associ-
ation, suffrage, clean elections, an elected executive, and freedom of expression”. However, 
India now falls “short of democratic standards due to significant irregularities, limitations on 
party competition or other violations” (Lindberg, Lührmann, Tannenberg 2018: 61) which 
motivates the downgrading. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to claim that South Asia is going 
through a democratic crisis.
Nonetheless, this does not automatically translate into proof that the region called South 
Asia is irreversibly transitioning to authoritarian rule. These processes are rarely linear in either 
direction. All countries included in this book have traversed trajectories towards democracy 
that have been all but straightforward. Democracy has been interrupted, suspended, and seen 
such severe backlashes that made it seem implausible that it could recover, yet it did. So, the 
question is, how severe is the autocratization trend? What are its characteristics? How deep does 
it go? This book aims at providing answers to such questions, to enable realistic assessments of 
the chances for a democratic recovery in the foreseeable future.
A broader discussion on trends in South Asia is included in Chapter 30. However, the focus 
in this book is mainly on the four countries with the most significant impact on the region 
as a whole, which is also the four with the greatest variation in regime trajectories. All four 
countries – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka – share the experience of some or even 
major democratic achievements since gaining independence from British colonial rule. But 
their paths differ greatly. Democratic take- offs have been interrupted quickly in some cases 
while India for a long time trod a more linear path towards democracy. Democracy survived 
or made comebacks in spite of severe constraints of economic resources as well as conflicts in 
and between countries, states, and provinces. Also, no sooner had the colonial rule come to 
an end, before the whole region became an important arena for the Cold War with adverse 
effects on both political stability and development. The paths towards democracy have always 
been rocky in South Asia. However, as Sheri Berman (2019) points out, this is more of a 
rule rather than an exception if we take a historical view on democratization in the world. 
Consequently, as analysts we must not overinterpret what could be temporary swings and 
keep in mind the democratic achievements of the past. This is to remind us that trajectories 
portrayed in this volume may defy the perspectives provided by various kinds of historical 
determinism that always awaits an endgame where civilizations will clash (Huntington 1993). 
Changes in developments may eventually transpire even if current trajectories – as we shall 
see – are disheartening.
The guiding motivation for this book is to complement previous contributions that have 
provided insights and knowledge on forces supporting democratization in South Asia. The 
focus in this volume is on the trends, factors, changes, and circumstances that support the 
opposite – autocratization. There is an urgent need to understand causes behind the reversal. 
For such a large region it is impossible to cover all relevant events and topics associated with 
autocratization. However, the authors offer their rich insights, perspectives, and knowledge 
on what they regard as central for understanding autocratization in the four countries that are 
represented in this book.
The natural starting point for an introductory chapter is to define more closely what the 
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studying, or saying that a country is experiencing, autocratization. Secondly, it provides a broad 
overview of the trajectories relating to democratic performance across all four countries, using 
data collected by V- Dem (Coppedge et al. 2021). This is followed by a look at the trends for 
the region as a whole. The final section of the chapter discusses the broader context in which 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are located. In order to understand domestic trends, 
it is also necessary to have perspective on how the trend for South Asia fits in with the world 
at large.
The following chapters provide more detailed and in- depth knowledge on autocratization 
in each country. The participating authors provide their analyses and perspectives on the major 
forces of autocratization in the four countries. The chapters stand as individual contributions 
in their own right. There is no attempt to provide a single standpoint synthesizing all the 
insights provided by the participating authors. However, in the final analysis, the chapters of 
Part 5 (“How to comprehend autocratization in South Asia – three broad perspectives”) draw 
on the contributions of this book and other research contributions to present commonal-
ities in, and divergent patterns of, autocratization in South Asia. It contains discussions of 
the role played by the recent expansion of China and ideas relating to nationalism and lib-
eralism that are being shaped and changed today. It is also argued that it is tempting to con-
clude that the observable patterns will be perpetual – as if South Asia is simply reverting to 
a trajectory that is common for most other parts of Asia where democracy has always had a 
bleak future. However, the chapters in this book point to an array of processes that cannot be 
reduced to an enduring path- dependency determined by economic, historical, and cultural 
factors. Even when deterministic patterns sometimes find empirical support, it is important 
to remember that such perspectives on causes may be palatable for political reasons. If it is 
concluded that forces of history for example led to autocratization in a country, or several 
countries, then this may function to absolve political leaders and the citizens voting for them, 
of their roles and responsibilities. In the trajectories described here, agency is visible and 
important.
Regime types and autocratization
Let us start by clarifying central regime- related concepts that have already been mentioned. The 
determination that India recently went from being an electoral democracy to becoming an elect-
oral autocracy, was based on the “Regimes of the World” scale with four categories (Lührmann, 
Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018). States which are de- facto multiparty carry out free and fair 
elections, and do so while also upholding the rule of law and liberal principles, are classified as 
liberal democracies. If the rule of law is somewhat in question and liberal principles are not fully 
guaranteed, a country slides down the scale and is classified as an electoral democracy. If the 
respect for democratic institutions is further in doubt, the country moves into the autocracy- 
sphere. If multiparty elections are still actually held but “rulers are not accountable to citizens”, 
then the country is an electoral autocracy. If even multiparty elections for the chief executive 
or the legislature are absent, then the state reaches the regime- type end station of closed autoc-
racy. A journey in the direction of this end- point but regardless of from what level it started, is 
referred to as autocratization.
Autocratization is the opposite to democratization, and both involve periods of sub-
stantial and sustained changes in levels of democracy, respectively (Lührmann and Lindberg 
2019). Following the literature, we use the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) to measure 
autocratization in South Asia. The EDI is based on Dahl’s conceptualization of polyarchy (Dahl 
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freedom of expression (freedom of speech and alternative sources of information combined) as 
well as conditions of a broad swathe of associational freedom (Coppedge et al. 2021). The third 
wave of autocratization sweeping across the globe is characterized by leaders who have come to 
power through free and fair elections but derail freedom of expression and associations once in 
power (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Among the ten most negatively affected indicators over 
the last ten years, nine are aspects of freedom of association and expression (Lührmann et al. 
2021). This also applies to autocratization in South Asia.
Episodes of autocratization capture periods with a definitive start and end date during which 
substantial and sustained declines in democratic qualities take place (Edgell et al. 2020, Wilson 
et al. 2020). As discussed above, regime transformations are typically nonlinear, and such 
declines may result in democratic breakdown, further deterioration under non- democracy, or 
the regime could avert breakdown by reversing the trend and sustaining minimal levels of dem-
ocracy necessary to be considered democratic. The new Episodes of Regime Transformation 
(ERT) dataset provides identification of episodes of both democratization and autocratization 
measured on V- Dem’s latest version of the Electoral Democracy Index (Coppedge et al. 2021). 
It identifies the onset and end dates, as well as the outcome, of both democratization and 
autocratization episodes (Edgell et al. 2020). This will be the natural starting point presented 
in the beginning of the next section which provides a broad portrayal of autocratization in 
South Asia. As the analysis proceeds at country level, the figures will focus on measurements 
of freedom of association and expression, and on variables capturing the characteristics of 
elections.
Autocratization in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka
Figure 1.1 depicts the overall level of democracy as measured by the EDI in Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka from the end of the Cold War in 1989 to the present (2020). The 
recent period with episodes of autocratization in South Asia, based on the ERT, is marked. 
This bird’s- eye view on democratic performance and autocratization over time in the four 
countries in focus in this book makes it clear that South Asia is currently going through a state 
of transformation characterized as autocratization. Since independence, the ongoing crisis is 
currently at least as severe as the situation was in the early and mid- 1970s (this is discussed fur-
ther in Chapter 28). Since the withdrawal of British colonial forces, Sri Lanka and India were 
the only countries to immediately achieve a successful democratic take- off. However, Indira 
Gandhi suspended democracy in 1975, and then also democracy started to decline in Sri Lanka. 
Nonetheless, India fairly quickly managed to get back on the democratic path in 1977. After 
three decades, democratic performance of the whole region appeared to be improving. Until 
recently.
While the onset of the global third wave of autocratization has been traced back to before 
2000, the countries in South Asia seem to have joined later and Sri Lanka counters the trend. 
While much of the world including South Asia register significant democratic regression, Sri 
Lanka has democratized and qualifies to be classified as a relatively decent electoral democracy 
since 2015. There is however, a decline in 2018– 2020, which corresponds to several worrying 
trends pointed out in the section on Sri Lanka later in this book. India’s piecemeal, uneven, and 
protracted degeneration into what is today a questionable borderline- case of just barely keeping 
electoral democracy started in earnest around 2006 to 2007. Yet, the more definitive descent 
arrived along with Narendra Modi coming into power as the 14th Prime Minister of India in 
2014. India’s episode of autocratization is ongoing at present and transformed its regime type 
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After the period from January 2007 to January 2009 under a military- backed caretaker gov-
ernment period, politics was somewhat democratic in Bangladesh for about five years until the 
current episode of autocratization started. The episode is ongoing with the outcome unknown 
just as in the case of India, with the difference that Bangladesh is clearly an electoral autocracy 
today. Finally, Pakistan experienced a military coup in 1999, which was followed by a politically 
violent decade. Some civil liberties were upheld, although General Musharraf reigned with 
support from the military up until early 2008. Although Pakistan then made a promising tran-
sition towards democracy and eventually even passed Huntington’s two- turnover test, another 
decline of democracy set in around 2015. Pakistan is since then in an episode of autocratization 
just like much of the region (and many countries in the world). Our first deeper insights to 
this episode of autocratization are provided by looking at how freedom of expression is present 
in the media, in academia and in cultural life, by taking into account the freedom to organize 
groups and activities in civil society and to form political parties, and how well elections are 
handled or restricted by various political forces.
India
It makes sense to start the analysis with the most populated country, the largest economy, 
and the strongest political impact in the region. The direction which India takes typically has 
a great influence on its neighbours. The episode of autocratization in India under 
Prime Minister Modi affects all measurements included in EDI, except the extent of 
suffrage. According to V- Dem’s Democracy Report 2020, India belongs to the top- ten group 
Figure 1.1 Electoral democracy (polyarchy), 1990– 2020
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of countries in the world that have autocratized the most over the past ten years (Lührmann 
et al. 2020: 16). Figure 1.2 depicts that the areas affected negatively first and by far the most 
are freedom of expression, association, and the media. Here the indicators for associational 
freedom include measurements of repression directed towards Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs), the way the state may regulate the entry or exit of CSOs “into public life”, and 
also to what extent opposition parties are autonomous in relation to the regime in power 
(Coppedge et al. 2021). The measurements of freedom of expression consist of variables 
measuring the extent of harassment directed towards journalists, an assessment of efforts 
made by the government to censor print and broadcast media, and the amount of freedom 
granted to academia and culture.
Evidently, the government led by Manmohan Singh (2009–2014) had a negative impact on 
democratic governance to some degree. It was in fact corruption scandals that paved important 
parts of the way for the BJP leading up to the 2014 election. There was, however, a more sig-
nificant and steep decline in almost all indicators when Modi and the BJP came into power, and 
this descent has continued since. Apparently, the Modi government has imposed severe de facto 
restrictions of liberal freedoms without directly attacking the autonomy of opposition parties. 
In fact, barriers to parties entering politics remain low, elections are fully multiparty, no signifi-
cant parties have been banned, and opposition parties retain a high degree of autonomy from 
the government and the ruling BJP party.
However, the Modi- led government in India has used laws on sedition, defamation, and 
counterterrorism to silence critics (Human Rights Watch 2019). By far the most dramatic 
change is the almost close to eradication of freedom from government censorship of media in 
Figure 1.2 Key indicators of freedom of association, expression, and the media, India 1990– 2020
Source: Varieties of democracy, version 11.1 (March 2021).
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India. Along with the dismal situation for journalists and civil liberties activists who actually 
write critically about the government and therefore get harassed, imprisoned, or subjected to 
abuse, this is a very concerning trajectory (Widmalm 2016: 211– 212). The arbitrary arrests of 
the civil rights activists and journalists accused in the so called “Bhima Koregaon- case” are just 
one dramatic example (Jaffrelot 2020).
Independent civil society organizations are especially hard hit in the ongoing autocratization 
episode. As will be discussed later in this book, the pressure is mainly directed towards 
organizations that have supported civil rights – especially for minorities and women. Civil 
society organizations aligning themselves with the Hindutva movement have rather gained 
more freedom (Basu 2015). What is severely affected is the freedom of independent civil society 
organizations to exist, and to organize activities autonomously from government interference 
and direction. The two civil society indicators included in Figure 1.2 have taken a steep dive 
over especially the past six years or so after the BJP assumed power.
Furthermore, the quality and fairness of elections have also deteriorated significantly over 
the past five to six years (The Wire 2021). Figure 1.3 shows variables that are commonly used 
to indicate to what extent elections are clean. The variable “Election free and fair” is a broad 
measurement taking into account the whole election process and its quality. “Election govern-
ment intimidation” measures more specifically to what extent opposition parties and their 
representatives were exposed to harassment or intimidation by the government. The freedom 
from government intervention in the Election Management Body (EMB) in the country is 
captured in “EMB autonomy”. Finally, a kind of residual category is included in “Election other 
voting irregularities”, which captures any kind of intervention in the elections and vote fraud. 
Figure 1.3 evinces a significant decline on all these indicators for India in the current period. 
Figure 1.3 Key indicators of the quality of elections, India 1990– 2020
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The autonomy of the election management body depreciates severely over the period since 
2013 signalling perhaps the most concerning aspect of decline. Government intimidation of 
opposition declined already with the 2008 elections but has not worsened further much since. 
Voting irregularities have been somewhat of an issue in India for a long time but got worse again 
in 2008 and again deteriorated further in 2019. The overall freedom and fairness of elections, 
finally, took a hard hit with the last elections held under Prime Minister Modi’s reign in 2019.
To sum up, the present episode of autocratization in India is affecting key areas of democ-
racy, and it particularly concerns freedom of expression, association and the media. There is 
undoubtedly a decline in the quality of elections, but it is the media and civil society that are 
curbed in the most dramatic ways.
Pakistan
Pakistan is different from the other countries in the region in that it has never qualified as an 
electoral democracy. Even with multiparty elections and increases in various freedoms, Pakistan 
has fallen short of ever crossing the threshold (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.4 shows, in a very similar pattern to India, that the main deterioration of associ-
ational freedoms in the last ten years or so, is due to increasing control of independent civil 
society organizations. The Pakistani government has progressively tightened their control 
of which organizations are allowed to exist to an extent where there are few independent 
organizations left to exist and repression is active even if moderate.
The developments in Pakistan over the past decade are also similar to India’s in the area of 
freedom of expression including alternative sources of information, but even more pronounced 
and to worse levels, as displayed in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4 Key indicators of freedom of association, expression, and the media, Pakistan 1990– 2020
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Academics’ and cultural workers’ freedom is also much worse in Pakistan than in India, and 
has fallen close to rock- bottom alongside journalists who now are almost always harassed if and 
when they dare to write critically about powerful actors in the country. It should be mentioned 
here also that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warn that the Government of Pakistan may 
now even be persecuting journalists in exile (RSF 2020). Government censorship of the media 
has gone from largely absent as late as 2012, to frequent and severe in 2019. There are additional 
similarities to India. The restrictions of CSOs and the deterioration of freedom of expression 
in various forms have been possible without restricting the autonomy of the opposition parties. 
And the decline of freedom for organizations working for civil liberties is matched by the 
opposite trend for organizations that are religious and anti- democratic (Widmalm 2016: 212– 
216). Yet, the recent episode of further autocratization in Pakistan is driven primarily by a 
deterioration in the freedom of expression.
Figure 1.5 demonstrates that electoral autocracy in Pakistan has had rather unusual 
characteristics. The quality and integrity of elections has been for a long time, and still is, the 
chief issue.
Voting irregularities are a recurring problem. Some of these seem to have become slightly 
worse since 2008. There are declining levels of autonomy of the election management body, 
there is a general lack of freedom and fairness in the elections, as well as a worsening of govern-
ment intimidation of the opposition in the last elections.
In sum, Pakistan went through an episode of very gradual and protracted liberalization of its 
electoral autocracy from 2007 to 2015 but never became a democracy. After that, the tide has 
turned into an episode of autocratization driven primarily by dramatic increases in government 
Figure 1.5 Key indicators of the quality of elections, Pakistan 1990– 2020
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control of civil society as well as a sharp increase in the government’s largely successful efforts 
to curb media freedom.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s trajectory – depicted in Figure 1.6 – over the past decade is typical for the 
third wave of autocratization as depicted by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) and Lührmann 
et al. (2020), with one particular exception. Bangladesh is one of the very few countries in 
the world where the integrity and fairness of multiparty elections are undermined almost 
from the outset. This happened in a dramatic fashion with the elections in 2014. The usual 
sequence is that media and civil society are suppressed before the formal institutions come 
under attack.
This somewhat unusual autocratization pattern is reflected in almost all indicators describing 
how elections are handled, shown in Figure 1.7. While the election management body’s 
autonomy has long been limited in Bangladesh, it was constrained further in a dramatic fashion 
in 2011 and 2012, then gradually deteriorated further over the last few years to be almost non- 
existent. Meanwhile the large declines in other election qualities such as absence of government 
intimidation, voting irregularities, and violence, came with the elections in 2014.
The indicators of associational freedoms in Figure 1.6 have remained at relatively democratic 
levels much longer than the election- related ones in Bangladesh, as shown in Figure 1.7. While 
Figure 1.6 Key indicators of freedom of association, expression, and the media, Bangladesh 1990– 2020
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the autonomy of opposition parties took a hit following the 2012 elections, civil society was not 
affected until around 2016 when also barriers to political parties forming were raised.
In comparison, freedom of expression displays a much more disparate picture in Figure 1.6, 
where some areas such as the level of harassment of journalists and media’s self- censorship 
have been much worse than media’s freedom to reflect varying perspectives and provide 
non- biased information, as well as the freedom of academics and cultural workers. But all 
aspects have been in a gradual and significant decline since 2012 in a pattern that is typical 
for the third wave of autocratization. The most dramatic change continuing to dominate the 
autocratization process in Bangladesh is a kind of breakdown of democracy in connection 
with the 2014 and 2018 elections (Riaz 2021). The Awami League government, guided by 
Prime Minister Sheik Hasina, pursued policies aimed at intimidating and harassing political 
opponents, which resulted in a massive boycott of the election then. Democracy has not 
recovered since.
Sri Lanka
In contrast to the other countries in this book, Sri Lanka’s political trajectory has from 2014 
to 2018 been in a democratic direction. Juxtaposed to India, which is in the top- ten of 
autocratizing countries in the world over the last ten years, Sri Lanka is in the top- four 
group of seeing the largest gains in democratic qualities among all democratizing countries 
(Lührmann et al. 2020: 23) and regained its status as an electoral democracy in this period. 
Figure 1.7 Key indicators of the quality of elections, Bangladesh 1990– 2020
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Figure 1.8 displays how the positive developments were spearheaded by improvements in 
freedom of expression and alternative sources of information already around 2010, followed 
by significant advances in the quality of elections and associational freedoms a few years later 
as shown in Figure 1.9.
Figure 1.8 demonstrates that the freedom of expression indicators follow a very similar 
pattern to the quality of elections but foreshadows those. From lows in the middle of the first 
decade of the 2000s, the pro- government bias in the media lessens significantly around 2008 
along with smaller improvements in a series of other aspects of indicators. These advances con-
tinue in a gradual but steady fashion over the following years, portending the transition back to 
democracy a few years later.
As illustrated by the indicator of opposition parties’ autonomy in Figure 1.8, most associ-
ational freedoms remained unaffected by the war and other dynamics that derailed many aspects 
of democracy in Sri Lanka off and on in the 1990s and 2000s. Just as in the other countries 
discussed above, more autocratic periods are associated with severe restrictions on, and repres-
sion of, independent civil society associations. With the end of the civil conflict, which was 
extremely brutal, there is an almost seismic shift in associational freedoms for this sector.
As shown in Figure 1.9, the improvements in the quality of elections are the results of almost 
across- the- board advances in all the indicators. Notably, the first change for the better comes 
for the autonomy of the election management board, a critical foundation for democratic 
elections. This is followed by a broad swathe of positive changes in the qualities of elections in 
2014, and then again a dramatic set of improvements in 2019.
Figure 1.8 Key indicators of freedom of association, expression, and the media, Sri Lanka 1990– 2020
Source: Varieties of democracy, version 11.1 (March 2021).
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Consequently, the development for Sri Lanka is from a democratic perspective very 
impressive. Nonetheless, the contributions later in this book will show that the democratiza-
tion process for Sri Lanka is to say the least fragile. The risk for backsliding is imminent. 
The decline in several indicators since 2018 that are included in Figure 1.8 suggests that such 
a downward turn may have already been initiated. The constitutional crisis in 2018, the fact 
that the previous prime minister refused to leave office after the election, and that afterwards, 
the president appointed his own brother as prime minister, and a dramatic increased militar-
ization of the state and society, are causes for concern (DeVotta 2021).
Autocratization in South Asia in a comparative perspective
A very broad and comparative perspective on what has been described here – using the EDI 
for South Asia, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, 
and Afghanistan – may not appear to represent such a dramatic decline (Figure 1.10). 
Undoubtedly 2020 is worse than 2011, but it is still far better than 2007. In what way are 
these numbers telling us that there is an ongoing episode of autocratization covering the 
whole region?
The level of the EDI for South Asia rose quickly in 2007, then starts to sink slowly –  
struggling not to slip too much below the 0.5 mark. For a short while South Asia almost 
managed to reach the average EDI  level of the world. Since then the EDI level in the world 
and South Asia have both been on a slight downward trajectory. If the trend is persistent, 
Figure 1.9 Key indicators of the quality of elections, Sri Lanka 1990– 2020
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South Asian countries will within two or three years pass the level of democracy of South-East 
Asia (Laos, Timor- Leste, Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Vietnam) which seems to have stagnated in a non- democratic equilibrium. The 
reason for this is that the recent EDI for South Asia is propped up by small countries such 
as the Maldives, which saw a dramatic improvement in democratic performance 2017– 2020. 
This masks a more general and continued downward trend for the region. It also needs to be 
repeated that when India moves downwards on the measurements provided here – when it 
moves closer to the democratic performance indicators of Pakistan as civil liberties are lost – it 
drags about three-quarters of the population in the whole region with it. When the govern-
ment of India stops protecting essential democratic freedoms, a large part of the whole world 
become citizens of a backslider region. The weight of India should be taken into account. 
Consequently we need to shed light on this with an alternative way of presenting the changes 
in democratic performance in South Asia. The effect is illustrated by looking at a comparison 
provided based on V- Dem data showing how many countries in the world are democratizing 
and how many are autocratizing.
In Figure 1.11, the graph to the left depicts the number of countries in the whole South 
Asia region that are democratizing and how many are autocratizing. In the graph to the right 
the effect is weighted in relation to population. The sharp upward turn of autocratization there 
is mostly influenced by the democratic decline in India since it has a population of about 1.4 
billion. Democratization in Sri Lanka is visibly affecting the trend for the whole of South Asia 
shown in Figure 1.10, while it completely disappears in Figure 1.11. So why not then only 
study India to describe autocratization in “South Asia”?
Figure 1.10 Electoral Democracy Index, the World and Asia 1990– 2020
Source: Varieties of democracy, version 11.1 (March 2021).
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The answer is that comparisons may reveal commonalities – including factors which may 
drive autocratization as well as democratization and that may have nothing to do with the size 
of a population. If we find factors that are steering both Sri Lanka and India towards less dem-
ocracy, then this may suggest that such factors may be relevant threats to democracy in many 
other places in South Asia, and outside the region, as well. South Asia, even if we cannot fit all 
the countries in the region into the analysis here, undoubtedly provides what has inspired the 
name for the V- Dem project – varieties of both democracy, and autocratization. Some paths 
are very country- specific, and this will become evident when the four countries are discussed 
in their own sections.
Even if the impact of India is great in the region, the paths to and from democracy are 
interesting per se. Sometimes patterns are replicated so that an episode of autocratization appears 
to connect a whole region. However, even if several countries are moving in the same direc-
tion at the same time, they still may do so for different reasons. In this first chapter we have 
already seen here that the ongoing autocratization episode of South Asia is characterized by 
factors that all four countries have in common. Autocratization is observable in the areas of 
civic life, freedom of opinion, media, academia and cultural life. Nonetheless, this is the broader 
picture. As will be evident in the coming sections, all countries have unique traits too. Just as 
they in the past have taken different paths to democratization, they have individual features as 
well relating to the current autocratization episode. Here we need to add also that countries in 
South Asia are spurred by their unique relationships to neighbours in the region. And some-
times when one country gives up its support for democracy, a contagion effect is activated 
and neighbouring countries become encouraged to do the same. Therefore, the patterns we 
Figure 1.11 Electoral Democracy (Polyarchy), democratizing, and autocratizing countries 1972– 2020 
in South Asia
Source: Varieties of democracy, version 11.1 (March 2021).
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observe at the macro level can only be understood by going deeper into the country- specific 
cases. And when that is done, the more is learned about the varieties or uniformities in the 
processes leading to autocratization. For the future, this may provide insights and tools that can 
be used to employ counter measures to prevent a new autocratization episode – given that the 
will and power to do so is there.
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IN INDIA UNDER    
NARENDRA MODI
Growing force or critical discourse?
Devin K. Joshi
As the world’s largest electoral democracy in terms of population, India not only symbolizes the 
democratic potential of developing and post- colonial states, but also serves as a crucial test case 
for assessing the global influence of neo- authoritarianism. As India’s current Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi, has pointed out: “India is the largest democracy on earth. If you add up the 
next forty democratic countries you will just about reach the total of the electorate in India” 
(quoted in Price 2015: 14).
Within the Indian context, with its proud democratic heritage dating back to independ-
ence from British rule in the mid- twentieth century, the idea of authoritarianism is generally 
associated either with foreign countries, the pre- Independence colonial raj under which India 
was under the control of the British Empire, or the Emergency Decree of Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi (1975– 77). While the period of Congress Party dominance in Indian politics 
over much of the period from the 1950s to the mid- 1990s was seen by its critics as a one- party 
monopoly (and even a one- family monopoly), the rise of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) as 
the major opponent of Congress on the national stage since the 1990s has ushered in an era 
of increased political competition. However, the BJP itself has an ambivalent relationship with 
democracy. As Amrita Basu (2013: 81) notes, “the BJP’s relationship to democracy has been 
double edged. While it has deepened democracy in some respects, it has also undermined it 
through its explicit commitment to Hindu majoritarianism, its periodic engagement in anti- 
minority violence, and its close ties to non- elected undemocratic civil society organizations.” 
The leadership style of Narendra Modi has also been characterized as “authoritarian populism” 
which “seeks to harness popular discontent against elite corruption with majoritarianism to 
create an antagonism between the ‘Hindu people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’ that panders to minor-
ities” (Chacko 2018: 1).
Addressing these claims, this chapter examines whether neo- authoritarianism is truly on the 
rise in India or whether this is merely a claim made by critics. This chapter proceeds as follows. 
After first exploring the concept of neo- authoritarianism, it then focuses on media coverage 
of Narendra Modi’s centralizing leadership style, his control of other government institutions, 









to his rule as Chief Minister of Gujarat state, the transition period in 2014 when Modi first 
became India’s Prime Minister, and Modi’s re- election to that post in 2019. Noting how a size-
able number of democratic deficits were already present under previous Indian governments, 
the study nevertheless concludes that since 2014 neo- authoritarianism has been not only a crit-
ical discourse but also a growing force in India.
Neo- authoritarianism
Although multi- party elections are still regularly held in India, critics have questioned the 
democratic credentials of a country whose governing practices look increasingly authoritarian. 
To take just one indicator, India’s low ranking on the 2019 World Press Freedom Index (140th 
out of 180 nations) is hardly suggestive of a strong commitment to democratic flows of infor-
mation and communication (Reporters Without Borders 2020). But does this reflect a more 
systematic shift towards neo- authoritarianism? Answering this question requires us to unpack 
the concept of neo- authoritarianism. While traditional authoritarianism has been around for 
centuries and has legitimated its rule via historical myths and traditions, neo- authoritarian regimes 
are marked by the following four elements.
Firstly, they seek public legitimacy through ‘development’ and ‘nationalism’ (Sahlin 1977). 
The concept of neo- authoritarianism itself first emerged alongside decolonization in the 1970s 
from analyses of dictatorial regimes in sub- Saharan Africa, but this idea soon became prom-
inent during the 1980s and 1990s in post- Maoist China where neo- authoritarianism was 
conceptualized as a vehicle for modernization under which single- party rule and limits on 
political pluralism could accompany a focus on rapid economic growth and industrialization 
for an interim period of time in order to later set up a foundation for establishing a functioning 
democracy (Petracca and Xiong 1990; Perry 1993). By emphasizing state authority over society 
plus political stability while seeking to advance “the simultaneous construction of a free enter-
prise system and centralized state power” (Sautman 1992: 76), neo- authoritarianism is polit-
ically conservative on the one hand yet economically market- oriented on the other hand (Fu 
and Chu 1996).
A second component of neo- authoritarianism is the role of strong leadership. As Chinese 
scholar Wu Jiaxiang has argued, “neo- authoritarians do not stress political structure, but the 
political leader” who is an “authoritative,” “brilliant,” and “far- sighted” strongman who takes 
“resolute and decisive actions” to “enhance capital accumulation, dispose of resources effect-
ively and provide the law and order necessary for commodity trade” (Sautman 1992: 79). 
Leaders of this ilk embrace scientific and technological modernization while simultaneously 
resisting intrusions of Western cultural norms by identifying with traditional values “as the 
foundation of national spirit” (Petracca and Xiong 1990: 1106). To achieve these goals, the 
leader works to strengthen the bureaucracy and military and the leader applies severely coer-
cive means to suppress crime and corruption and to mute political opposition (Sautman 
1992: 86).
Thirdly, while the advent of neo- authoritarianism is often associated with ex- totalitarian 
regimes softening their degree of authoritarianism as in post- Communist Russia (Becker 2004; 
Umland 2012), neo- authoritarianism can also emerge in reverse fashion when democratic-
ally elected leaders introduce creeping centralization and strong- armed measures to neutralize 
opponents (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Either way, the primary legitimation of neo- 
authoritarian governance rests on prospective economic outcomes as opposed to a democratic 
procedural basis and it often appears to be driven by a logic of late industrialization since it is diffi-













competition vis- à- vis a large number of already advanced economies (e.g., Kohli 2004). For 
example, Rodan’s (1989) study of Singapore found its leaders were incentivized to adopt an 
economic strategy reliant upon high levels of state autonomy, civil servant loyalty, inducements 
to foreign capital, control over labour unions, and minimization of welfare expenditures. Yet, 
while economic objectives may be its primary drivers, a neo- authoritarian political state is 
compatible with either neo- liberal or developmental state approaches to capital accumulation.
A fourth significant feature of neo- authoritarianism is that the state’s prioritization of rapid 
capital accumulation inhibits its commitment to competitive political pluralism. Thus, neo- 
authoritarian regimes allow some space for civil society associations to organize independently 
and occasionally critique the government but they also use an array of direct and indirect means 
to limit the political capacity of autonomous organizations from being able to dislodge or 
challenge the ruling clique or coalition (Petracca and Xiong 1990). This involves both muting 
domestic rivals and going after foreign- funded non- government organizations who are depicted 
as “agents of influence” and portrayed as interfering in domestic politics (Umland 2012: 30). 
When it comes to the media, neo- authoritarian states also tend to use drift- net laws, libel and 
defamation suits, denial of press credentials, intrusive auditing, and condoning or tolerating 
violence against opposition journalists and editors to bring about “self- censorship, the most 
common and important limit on journalistic activity” (Becker 2004: 150). Neo- authoritarians 
also usually place stronger controls over electronic and broadcast media than print media which 
may be independently owned as well as “relatively autonomous, accessible to the population 
and highly critical of the regime” (ibid.: 150).
To sum up, neo- authoritarianism is a system that combines media management and intimi-
dation, civil society curtailment, centralization of state power, and prioritization of market- 
based economic growth over the promotion of social equality. Under this system, there is a 
limited degree of political pluralism combined with an unbalanced playing field as common 
under hybrid regimes featuring ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006) or ‘competi-
tive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2010). The neo- authoritarian justification for this 
imbalance, however, is that a meaningful democracy requires “a high standard of living and 
experienced officials” and that neo- authoritarianism is a means to eventually achieving this state 
(Sautman 1992: 94).
Chief Minister Modi
We now begin to address the question of whether neo- authoritarianism is on the rise in India 
under Narendra Modi by examining his leadership style during his long tenure from 2001 to 
2014 as the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat. Modi, a career politician who earned cor-
respondence Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in political science from Delhi University and 
Gujarat University respectively, had been involved with the state’s politics dating back to the 
1970s. Formerly a full- time missionary (pracharak) for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 
which is one of the most important organizations promoting Hindu nationalism in India, Modi 
ended up developing a reputation as a formidable behind the scenes political organizer. For 
instance, during Indira Gandhi’s 1975 Emergency decree, when
Tens of thousands of opposition leaders and activists were imprisoned and the RSS 
was again banned. Modi narrowly avoided going to jail himself and took to wearing 
elaborate disguises as he travelled around distributing clandestine propaganda and 









[Modi] set about compiling lists of contacts who could be trusted to carry out clan-
destine tasks and then used their knowledge of another wider circle of sympathizers 
and democrats to arrange accommodation for activists who needed places to hide. He 
also began raising money to pay living expenses of political refugees and activists, and 
arranged for disbursement of funds.
(Marino 2014: 42)
Continuing his work as a key operative for the BJP, Modi developed a “growing reputation as 
a back- room genius” (Price 2015: 37) and in October 2001 was appointed interim chief min-
ister of Gujarat. A few months later in early 2002, Gujarat became engulfed in massive rioting 
and violence after a train with Hindus aboard was set on fire resulting in about two thou-
sand people (mostly Muslims) being killed in retaliatory communal violence across the state of 
Gujarat (see Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Modi was repeatedly blamed by NGOs, politicians, and 
the media for not taking swifter and more decisive action to stop the violence and prosecute 
the perpetrators. As a result, for the next 12 years he “was refused entry to the United States as 
a religious extremist and frozen out diplomatically by Britain, the European Union and many 
other western countries” (Price 2015: 1). Yet, despite heightened controversy over Modi’s role 
during the carnage, a reputation for being anti- Muslim, and a perceived willingness to condone 
communal violence as a strategy to gain political popularity, Modi’s charismatic leadership style 
brought him repeated electoral victories in 2002, 2007, and 2012 sustaining him in the position 
of chief minister.
Whereas a growing number of supporters viewed him as a champion of vikas (development) 
referring to improved standards of living, Modi was labelled an authoritarian ruler and schemer 
by critics who alleged that under his rule land was being “sold to industrialists at throwaway 
prices” with life “a daily struggle for many Muslims still living in closed, segregated communi-
ties twelve years after the riots” (Marino 2014: 210, 223). In response, Modi’s supporters sought 
to reframe him not as a demon but as demonized. As one of his biographers noted,
Modi is an uncomfortable example for the Congress and other ‘secular’ parties like 
the SP, BSP, JD(U), and the Left. His programme of empowerment is a challenge to 
their own model of entitlement and an alternative development path for India…Few 
Muslims had voted for him in December 2002. But in December 2013, 31 per cent 
did.
(ibid.: 118, 162)
While not all agree on whether Modi was an authoritarian chief minister, he clearly ruled 
in a populist style and prioritized market- led and private investment- led economic growth 
over social equality and political pluralism (e.g., Joshi and McGrath 2015). As one biog-
rapher put it, “Modi operates with ruthless efficiency by appealing directly to the people 
over the heads of other politicians” and by transferring officials who did not work effi-
ciently or in support of his plans (Marino 2014: xix). While reportedly taking a strong stand 
against corruption, “the criticism that Gujarat’s administration was authoritarian remained. 
Critics said nothing moved without Modi’s go- ahead. He held several ministerial portfolios 
and, despite the attempt at empowering bureaucrats, micromanaged all important decisions” 
(ibid.: 175).
In a nutshell, while serving as chief minister in Gujarat, Modi’s apparent one- man domin-
ance over the bureaucracy, extensive efforts at information management, promotion of private 







point of appearing to tolerate communalism and discrimination against foreigners and minor-
ities (particularly Muslims) fuelled Modi’s reputation of being neo- authoritarian.
Prime Minister Modi
In May 2014, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the New Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
coalition campaigning in the parliamentary election with Modi as its prime ministerial can-
didate won a landslide victory over the incumbent Congress Party- led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government. The BJP was able to capture 282 of the 542 seats in the Lok Sabha 
(LS), the House of the People, while its broader coalition, the NDA got 336 seats. Congress 
won only 44 seats. Now holding an outright majority of LS seats, the BJP was able to form 
the first Indian government at the national level in nearly two decades without requiring the 
help of regional parties as coalition partners (Jaffrelot 2015). Yet, despite Modi’s popularity and 
decisive win at the ballot box – no doubt facilitated by a colonial relic, namely, a first- past- the- 
post (FPTP) electoral system generating a manufactured majority since the BJP had only won 
31% of the national vote – there were creeping accusations of Modi shifting India as a whole in 
the direction of neo- authoritarianism, depictions similar to those when he ruled in the state of 
Gujarat. Many feared Modi’s goal was to make the BJP the “natural party of governance” and 
to stay in power for a long time (Marino 2014: 274).
In the aftermath of the 2014 election, news media likened Modi’s leadership style to 
that of Indira Gandhi who famously pulled the plug on Indian democracy in 1975 with her 
“Emergency Decree” which ushered in two years of dictatorial rule as she was unwilling to let 
go of her position as prime minister. For instance, journalist Indrajit Hazra likened Modi’s role 
in the 2002 Gujarat riots to Indira Gandhi’s role in the 1984 attack on the Golden Temple in 
Amritsar.
The irony of Modi being in the same political mold as Indira Gandhi…Both are 
intensely popular politicians transcending the political affiliations of most Indians. 
Both are authoritarian figures, one blooming from the Nehru– Gandhi gene pool 
while the other stemming from the RSS factory…And both are associated today with 
two calendar years – 1984 and 2002 –  mentioned aloud only on the anniversaries of 
two respective carnages.
(Hazra 2014)
Jairam Ramesh from the opposition Congress Party likewise described Modi in ways similar to 
many descriptions of Indira Gandhi.
He is in complete command of both the administration and the party. His is the only 
voice that is heard and that counts. This may give an impression of cohesion and 
coherence in governance but it has already established an extreme centralization of 
power…He was cheered wildly by corporate India. But strangely, he has decided to 
choke its access both to himself and to his colleagues.
(Ramesh 2014)
Even a senior member of Modi’s own party, L. K. Advani, expressed similar views.
‘Forces that can crush democracy are stronger today,’ Mr Advani said in an interview 








was imposed on June 25, 1975. Congress and AAP leaders asserted that Mr Advani’s 
observations were targeted against Mr Narendra Modi, who, according to them, was 
not following democratic norms while running the government.
(United News of India 2015a)
As these excerpts reveal, news media reported on Modi’s style of ruling as concentrating power 
in himself while disempowering countervailing forces.
Modi was also portrayed as exercising a strong degree of control over parliament and the 
cabinet due to many BJP newcomers joining the Lok Sabha in 2014. This influx of “inexperi-
enced candidates with little or no voter recognition” (Price 2015: 170) was seen by many as a 
deliberate tactical move to make the new MPs loyal only to Modi. Critics observed how legis-
lative bills were not being assigned to parliamentary standing committees for scrutiny plus items 
were smuggled into bills at the last minute (Ramesh 2015). Modi also introduced proposed 
legislation to amend the constitution, to change how judicial appointments are made, and his 
government was accused of interfering with state governments by not following basic norms of 
federalism, for instance, in appointing Tathagata Roy as governor of Tripura.
First, Mr Modi has undoubtedly centralized all authority and decision- making. In 
the process, he has reduced all but one or two ministers at most to non- entities. He 
operates directly with the top bureaucracy across ministries and departments, very 
often without the knowledge of the ministers concerned, and has now started direct 
interactions with top civil servants in the states as well.
(Ramesh 2015)
Other seemingly neo- authoritarian actions included efforts to sideline the cabinet and par-
liament through executive orders called ordinances which bypass ordinary parliamentary voting 
procedures. Such ordinances were related to land acquisition, increasing FDI limits in insurance, 
opening up coal mining to private companies, and regularizing illegal colonies in Delhi (Deccan 
Chronicle 2014). Though only meant for extraordinary circumstances, Indian governments have 
issued about ten ordinances per year since Independence, whereas Modi’s government passed 
nine ordinances alone in December 2014 (United News of India 2015b; see also Panda 2015). As 
one sympathetic biographer portrayed the situation:
Sloth in the bureaucracy has been replaced by punctuality…In the Modi govern-
ment, Ministers sort out inter- departmental queries promptly. Bureaucrats have spe-
cific timelines. Delivery and results are key. Once timelines and budgets are set by the 
PMO, strict adherence to both is monitored.
(Marino 2014: 283)
Another aspect of neo- authoritarianism is restrictions on civil society and an increasingly 
shrinking space for civil society activities. Shortly after Modi’s election, this became a prom-
inent issue of concern as captured in the following criticism.
Modi is a democratically elected authoritarian. Within a year of taking power, he is 
showing the same authoritarianism that marked his regime in Gujarat. His govern-
ment has attacked Greenpeace, Action Aid, Amnesty International and other inter-







are liable to go on a blacklist, and be blocked from receiving any foreign funding 
– even while their leader goes abroad touting for international investment.
(Chakraborty 2015)
Aside from intimidation and tighter regulations, others expressed alarm that civil society mem-
bership and discourses were being shaped by a government- led agenda. For example, the 
composition of the Indian Council of Historical Research and film censorship boards were 
altered by new appointees supposedly affiliated with the Hindu Right (Deccan Chronicle 2015). 
Meanwhile student groups such as the Ambedkar Periyar Study Circle (APSC) at IIT Madras 
experienced de- recognition supposedly for expressing critical views of Modi (Press Trust of India 
2015). Such actions have led to a palpable fear that “civil society activities will not be tolerated 
if they question the official establishment line. Most of these institutions are now on the defen-
sive and apprehensive” (Ramesh 2015).
There have also been suspicions that the Indian government has been intentionally cre-
ating or at least indirectly supporting divides within the civil society through communal 
mobilization (Deccan Chronicle 2015). As one observer has complained, “There is no question 
that the Prime Minister, for the most part, has resisted making incendiary and inflammatory 
statements, but then he has allowed his colleagues to do so as part of a deliberate strategy” 
(Ramesh 2015). Perhaps most irksome to his opponents has been Modi’s unwillingness to 
condemn communalist behaviour attributed to the Hindu Right (such as lynching and other 
forms of violence) and efforts by his fellow partisans to convert or ‘reconvert’ Indians to 
Hinduism (Yechury 2014).
There have also been accusations of neo- authoritarian practices in state– media relations. 
Notably, freedom of expression in the mass media and the expression of views counter to that 
of Modi have reportedly come under threat as documented by Reporters Without Borders, an 
international NGO. In 2017, they found:
With Hindu nationalists trying to purge all manifestations of “anti- national” thought 
from the national debate, self- censorship is growing in the mainstream media. 
Journalists are increasingly the targets of online smear campaigns by the most radical 
nationalists, who vilify them and even threaten physical reprisals. Prosecutions are 
also used to gag journalists who are overly critical of the government, with some 
prosecutors invoking Section 124a of the penal code, under which “sedition” is pun-
ishable by life imprisonment. No journalist has so far been convicted of sedition but 
the threat encourages self- censorship. The government has also introduced new for-
eign funding regulations to limit international influence.
(https:// rsf.org/ en/ india; accessed on April 1, 2018)
The threat of defamation suits has also provided the Modi government with a vehicle to intimi-
date and potentially retaliate against critics. As Liang (2015: 389) argues, there has been an 
increased use of tactics “by the religious right who has perfected the art of harassment by law” 
requiring those accused of defamation or incendiary speech to “incur extensive travel, time 
expenditure, harassment, and high legal fees to defend themselves”. In addition to perceptions 
of widespread practices of censorship and self- censorship especially in film, broadcast media, 
and social media (e.g., India Today 2015), there has been growing fear that the public sphere is 
becoming saturated with messages favourable to the government while drowning out or muting 










The Prime Minister has maintained an extraordinarily tight control on public com-
munication. He has displayed a pronounced bias in favour of social media in conveying 
what he wishes to convey. His chief ministerial tenure had been marked by a con-
spicuous absence of occasions on which he could be questioned and this tradition of 
a monologue has continued.
(Ramesh 2014)
Meanwhile, journalist Ajaz Ashraf has commented about Modi that
He is an excellent communicator, boasting a philosophy of his own. Its principal thrust 
is to saturate the popular consciousness with his images, leaving no space for others…
His twitter handle has 12.6 million followers, more than any newspaper in India boasts. 
He has a message out at every conceivable opportunity, communicating directly with 
people to tell them what he thinks is important, what his side of the story is.
(Ashraf 2015)
In similar fashion, the Aam Admi Party’s Yogendra Yadav proclaimed that “Modi today 
symbolizes three things, authoritarian rule and development at any cost and rule of the majority 
community” (Times of India 2014). As these passages illustrate, critics had become convinced 
that Modi’s government was overstepping the proper separation between the government and 
an autonomous civil society and media sphere while contributing to intimidation and harass-
ment of dissidents and people belonging to certain minority communities.
Discussion
After becoming prime minister, news media reporting on the incoming Modi regime’s 
treatment of parliament, civil society, and the media was clearly suggestive of neo- authoritarian 
practices exercised in multiple spheres of Indian governance. There were also quite a range of 
people depicting the Modi government as authoritarian although many of these figures were 
members of the political opposition especially from Leftist parties whom one might expect to 
be dissatisfied with an anti- secular right- wing government.
Against this background, it is worth considering whether the neo- authoritarian characteristics 
of Modi’s government are all that different from the previous UPA government. After all, some 
aspects of democracy were deficient or in decline in India prior to Modi becoming prime 
minister. For instance, the Lok Sabha had experienced “a sharp decline in sitting days and 
duration of sitting hours” plus high rates of absenteeism, lost working hours due to disrup-
tion, parliamentary questions ignored by ministers, and a declining number of bills passed 
between 1952 and 2012 (Verma and Tripathi 2013: 157; see also Rubinoff 2013). Scholars 
had also documented various democratic deficits in India including governments’ disregard 
for following proper parliamentary procedures (Verma and Tripathi 2013), intimidation and 
restrictions on civil society (Jaffrelot 2015), government influence over mass media and social 
media (Liang 2015), and severe underrepresentation in Indian politics of women, youth, and 
the working class (Joshi 2012, 2015; Kalra and Joshi 2020).
Relatedly, media commentators have pointed out how all governments in India (regardless 
of party composition) have exhibited authoritarian tendencies and that when given a chance 
whichever party is in control would try to suppress dissent in parliament and civil society (Chisti 
2015). As for mass media, broadcast media in India has long been subjected to censorship and 










during the period of Congress Party dominance from the 1950s through the 1980s. Others 
have also noted how the problem of “paid news” in India where “stories appearing in the media 
that appear to be independent but which have, in fact, been paid for” is “nothing new, and had 
been going on for years” (Price 2015: 161). However, as in other neo- authoritarian systems, 
Indian print media (unlike radio and television), is “not under the direct control of the govern-
ment” and arguably “enjoys a fair share of political freedom” (Karan 2009: 199) though this has 
also come into question in recent years.
In this respect, the Modi government may be simply continuing a variety of pre- existing 
trends, but the influence of neighbouring China over the past two decades should perhaps not 
be underestimated in shaping Indian thinking on governance amidst a rising trend of authori-
tarianism globally (e.g., Joshi and Xu 2017). As Twinning (2014) notes, “with an eye on the 
threat posed by India’s northern neighbour, Modi has increased defence spending by 15%. 
He has signalled his determination to revitalize India’s economic growth, not only to advance 
domestic welfare, but to provide the resources to propel the country’s military modernization.”
Moreover, since getting elected, more and more people (not just opposition party politicians) 
have also been labelling Modi as authoritarian. For example, distinguished historian Gyan 
Prakash has noted how compared to the previous UPA government, power concentration has 
taken place within the ruling BJP party, among institutions of government, and additionally 
Narendra Modi’s government has been able to deploy extremist Hindu nationalist forces “on 
the ground to intimidate the opposition” (IANS 2018). A federal minister who quit Modi’s 
government wrote him in a letter that “the Union Cabinet has been reduced to a rubber stamp, 
simply endorsing your decisions without any deliberation. Ministers have become figureheads 
as virtually all decisions are taken by you, your office” (Reuters News 2018). The former head 
of India’s state media has similarly noted the prime minister’s office exercising strong control 
over all personnel appointments resulting in “board positions at more than 70 state enterprises…
lying vacant for 2– 3 years because of the backlog of files in Modi’s office” (Reuters News 2018).
Reflecting a neo- authoritarian mould, intolerance has been on the rise and dissent (espe-
cially against Modi and his government) has been increasingly labelled as anti- national, defama-
tory or seditious with the “investigative agencies and security apparatus” seemingly deployed 
“to silence its critics” (Bhushan 2019). Moreover, government personnel working in or heading 
various public agencies such as the Reserve Bank of India and Central Bureau of Investigation 
have been apparently removed or prompted to resign for not being loyal to Modi (Reuters 
News 2018).
India’s 2019 parliamentary elections and their aftermath seem to have only reinforced these 
neo- authoritarian tendencies. Getting 37% of the votes, the ruling BJP increased its LS seats 
to 303 (56% of LS seats) compared to only 52 (10% of LS seats) for the Congress Party who 
received 19% of the votes. That year, the central government’s takeover of the Muslim- majority 
state of Kashmir, census registry in Assam state whereby nearly two million people (many of 
whom are Muslim) were not counted as citizens, and the Citizenship Amendment Act which 
would make Muslims (who cannot conclusively prove that they are already Indian citizens) 
ineligible to obtain Indian citizenship, not to mention police brutality against Muslim student 
protesters conveyed a strong impression of state- directed Islamophobia that is widely at odds 
with India’s post- Independence secular tradition (e.g., Mody 2019).
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the public discourse associating Narendra Modi and his government 











the cabinet as well as concerns that there has been shrinking space for civil society and changes 
in government– media relations which have imperilled the free- flow of public information. As 
demonstrated here, during his tenures as both chief minister and prime minister, there is no 
question that opposition party leaders have regularly framed Modi as authoritarian, especially 
around the time of the 2014 and 2019 national elections.
Thus, on the one hand, the findings here suggest that the current Modi government reflects 
“the conventional Indian belief that once your party was in power, you could get away with 
whatever you liked: rules were now for other people” (Marino 2014: 166). As a former chief 
election commissioner stated in 1980: “Political parties make strong demands for the conduct 
of free and fair elections to legislative bodies, but choose to ignore the application of the same 
principles when it comes to the functioning of their own party organs” (Kashmir Monitor 2014). 
While the Modi government has demonstrated clear signs of neo- authoritarian behaviour, one 
must remember that Indian politics has long been beleaguered by corruption, cronyism, crim-
inalization, nepotism, clientelism, caste- ism, sexism, and dynasticism, practices which many 
would view at odds with a well- functioning liberal democracy (e.g., Kohli 1990; Chhibber 
2012; Chandra 2016).
On the other hand, as this study has observed, while India today is not (yet) as authoritarian 
as it was during the 1975– 1977 Emergency Decree, India has clearly been moving in a neo- 
authoritarian direction under Narendra Modi. Thus, in the absence of strong and active resist-
ance, neo- authoritarianism may increasingly become a mainstay of Indian politics if Modi or 
other rulers with authoritarian tendencies are able to successfully perpetuate a climate of fear, 
intimidate civil society, neutralize political opponents, and flood the public sphere with their 
own particular self- serving discourses to the relative exclusion of competing discourses. Yet, 
there is also potential for a democratic resurgence like India experienced in 1977, after Indira 
Gandhi’s Emergency Rule ended and it is perhaps ultimately up to India’s masses and its elites 
to decide whether such a turnaround will be occurring again soon.
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Democratic dissent in contemporary India
Amrita Basu
A democracy that was once celebrated for its strong, autonomous institutions, vibrant civil 
society, and extensive civil rights and liberties, has sharply curtailed the peaceful expression of 
dissent. The Indian government has been censoring journalists and news outlets that criticize 
its repressive policies, disbanding progressive NGOs, and incarcerating critics without trial on 
baseless charges of sedition, defamation, and terrorism. Since assuming power in 2014, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has decreed major policy changes, some of which 
violate federal and constitutional principles, with little deliberation and consultation. It has 
combined pro- poor populism and pro- corporate policies and promoted Hindu domination and 
minority subjugation. Two protests against these measures are especially significant: first, against 
the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) (2019– 20), and second, against agrarian laws which 
render farmers more vulnerable to corporate exploitation (2020– present). An overview of the 
two protests will be followed by an exploration of how they challenge autocratization, through 
both their substantive demands and their democratic modes of organizing.
The most important of the many protests around the country opposing parliament’s 
passage of the CAA occurred in Shaheen Bagh, southeast Delhi. On December 14, 2019, 
about a dozen women organized a sit- in at a highway, launching a 101- day nationwide 
movement; on some days it attracted 100,000 participants (Kumar and Abi- Habib 2020). 
The Shaheen Bagh protest persisted, despite record low temperatures, several court petitions 
seeking to evict the activists, and vicious rumours about them. The women vacated the pro-
test site on March 24, 2020, when the government declared a lockdown to slow the spread 
of Covid- 19.
The CAA provides an accelerated path to citizenship for non- Muslim immigrants who 
arrived in India before 2015 from neighbouring Muslim- majority countries. The Cabinet 
approved the creation of a National Population Register (NPR), which will document all 
Indian residents, citizens and non- citizens alike. The legislation empowers government func-
tionaries to profile Muslims by requiring that they verify their citizenship. There is a clear link 
between the CAA and the government’s publication of a version of the National Registry 
of Citizens (NRC) in Assam in August 2019, which excluded approximately two million 
people, including many Hindus who have lived in India for decades (BBC News 2019). The 








become citizens. If the government pursues the implementation of the NRC, as it has repeat-
edly stated it plans to do, it can revoke the citizenship of any Muslim who lacks documentation 
(Shankar 2020).
Several months after the anti- CAA protests, farmers organized a massive movement 
demanding that the government revoke three farm laws which eliminate guaranteed prices 
for certain crops and increase their vulnerability to corporate exploitation. The protests 
began in August, escalated in September, when parliament hurriedly passed the farm acts, 
and culminated on November 26th in a Dilli Chalo (Let’s Go to Delhi) campaign; tens of 
thousands of farmers from Punjab and other north Indian states travelled to Delhi by foot, 
bicycle, and tractor to oppose what they called the black laws (Hollingsworth, Gupta, and Mitra 
2020). The BJP-controlled Haryana government ordered police to dig trenches, create road 
blocks, and attack the farmers with water cannons, batons, tear gas, and rocks, to prevent them 
from entering the state. Undeterred, the farmers breached the barricades and blockaded roads, 
railway lines, and highways with tractors. They created makeshift camps at six entry points to 
Delhi; the largest were on the Singhu and Tikri borders. Carrying food, water, bedding, and 
other provisions that they claimed would last six months, they vowed to sit  in until the govern-
ment repealed the laws. Large numbers of women farmers joined the protest; 20,000– 25,000 of 
them went to the Tikri border alone. By November 30, 2020, between 200,000 and 300,000 
farmers had converged at border points on the way to Delhi (Mahajan 2020). To support 
the protesters, 250 million people across India –  a global record –  staged a 24- hour solidarity 
strike on November 26 (Pahwa 2020). Thousands of farmers entered the national capital on 
January 25 in anticipation of Republic Day celebrations and organized processions on govern-
ment approved routes. Some protesters broke away, destroyed property, and injured hundreds of 
police officers. Movement leaders condemned this violence, which they believe was perpetrated 
by government supporters, and persuaded the farmers to return to the border sites. Relations 
between the government and the farmers’ movement have become increasingly fraught. The 
government removed protesters’ songs from YouTube, blocked their internet access, brought 
charges of sedition against journalists who have been covering the events, condemned inter-
national activists and celebrities who have supported the protests, and erected iron spikes on 
the entry points to Delhi. Mahapanchayats (congregations of village councils) in Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh have organized huge gatherings to support the farmers’ demands and condemn 
the government’s actions. Participation in the sit- ins at the border sites subsequently grew. As of 
March 21, 2021, around 40,000 people were camping out at Singhu and Tikri.
Public investment in agriculture has long been declining, farmers’ incomes and returns 
on investments have been falling, and indebtedness has been increasing (Ghosh 2020). North 
Indian farmers feel betrayed by Prime Minister Modi, who they voted for in the 2014 elections, 
because he promised to double their incomes in five years by increasing minimum support 
prices for agricultural produce. Instead, procurement prices under the current regime have 
been even lower relative to their costs than under the previous government (Himanshu 2019). 
Although the government claims that the reforms will free farmers from traditional wholesale 
mandis (markets), farmers allege that they will eliminate the safety net that minimum support 
prices provide. They oppose the weakening of regulated markets and public procurement and 
the vesting of authority to settle disputes in the central government and the bureaucracy rather 
than state governments and local panchayats. They also fear that private corporations, both 
domestic and global, will be able to determine what crops they grow and what prices they 
charge –  which will increase landlessness, pauperization, and indebtedness.
The Shaheen Bagh and the farmers’ protests have overcome the hurdles that single issue, 
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confine most protests to the localities where they emerge, both of these broad- based national 
movements inspired similar protests in numerous places in Delhi and around the country. Those 
who could not visit or remain in Shaheen Bagh staged sit- ins wherever they lived. In one of 
our interviews1, Ziya Us Salam, journalist and author, quoted a popular slogan, “every city, 
Shaheen Bagh”. Punjabi Sikh farmers have been at the forefront of the protests because of 
the strength of their agricultural unions, their vital contributions to national food production, 
and their anger at the government’s attempts to discredit them.2 Many cities created their own 
“Nation for Farmers” campaigns. Protests in support of the farmers’ movement have taken place 
across the world.
Notwithstanding several similarities between the two movements, the farmers’ movement 
is larger and organizationally stronger. It is the culmination of a long history of mobilization 
by agrarian unions in Punjab and other states. Whereas the Shaheen Bagh movement lacked 
resources and organizational infrastructure, 40 farmers’ unions created the Samyukta Kisan 
Morcha (Joint Farmers Front) to coordinate their efforts in November 2020. Compared 
to Shaheen Bagh, the farmers’ movement enjoyed greater support from political parties, 
women’s organizations, trade unions, and philanthropic groups. This is probably the result 
of several factors, including greater anti- Muslim than anti- Sikh sentiment. Farmers con-
stitute a large voting bloc. Because 70 percent of the population derives its livelihood pri-
marily from agriculture, farmers are considered indispensable to national wellbeing. For all 
of these reasons, the government was willing to negotiate with the famers, but not with the 
Shaheen Bagh protesters. However, the size and scale of the farmers’ movement is both an 
asset and the source of potential internal division. For example, although Rakesh Tikait, a 
leader of the largest farmers’ union, the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU), from Uttar Pradesh, 
had mobilized tens of thousands of people to participate in the farmers’ protest since January 
26, many activists distrust him because of his role in anti- Muslim violence in Muzaffarnagar 
in 2013.
Both movements challenged autocratization in four important ways, each of which will be 
analyzed in turn in this chapter. First, the Muslims who took the lead in anti- CAA protests 
and Punjabi Sikhs who spearheaded the farmers’ protest, refuted allegations that as religious 
minorities, they were anti- national, and proudly affirmed both their faith and their secular 
commitments.
A second way that activists challenged autocratization, and in particular, the regime’s hier-
archical, secretive character, was by forging egalitarian, inclusive, communities. I describe this 
orientation as prefigurative, in that activists demonstrate through deliberative, inclusive processes, 
a commitment to democratic means and ends. The Shaheen Bagh and farmers’ movements 
share the prefigurative orientations of many pro- democracy, anti- authoritarian movements that 
have emerged over the past decade in other parts of the world. Examples include feminist, 
square occupation, anti- globalization, and environmental movements (Berman 2019, Leach 
2013, Yates 2020). Like prefigurative movements and orientations in other contexts, these two 
movements are moral, cultural, and expressive (Epstein 1991) and challenge dominant cultural 
codes (Melucci 1996). Although scholars tend to depict prefigurative as opposed to instrumen-
talist or strategic approaches as reflecting different priorities and world views (see Gorz 1968 
and Boggs 1977), the two orientations need not be mutually exclusive. To the extent they 
diverge, this is related to differences in the movements’ class, ethnic, and gender compositions, 
which influence in turn the resources they command.
Third, women in both movements challenged the government’s populist claims to represent 
and protect them. Muslim women from Shaheen Bagh occupied public space and defied the 












Women farmers spoke out against being rendered invisible by landlessness and the lack of social 
recognition of their labour (Quint 2020b).
Fourth, if the movements’ democratic modes of activism challenge autocratization, so do 
their demands. Both movements have shown that the laws they oppose do not simply con-
cern particular groups and issues but are relevant to all citizens because they erode democratic 
principles and privilege corporate over people’s interests.
I. Linking secular and religious ideals
The BJP government conflates the Hindu majority with the “common people,” while vilifying 
some religious minorities and seeking to assimilate others. On the one hand, it has sought to 
discredit and intimidate Muslims in Shaheen Bagh and Sikh farmers by describing Muslims as 
Pakistani terrorists and Sikhs as Khalistani separatists (in reference to the Sikh separatist movement 
in Punjab). Popular conspiracy theories claimed that the protesting farmers were actually Muslims, 
not Sikhs, and that Bilkis Bano, a renowned Shaheen Bagh activist, was paid to join the farmers’ 
movement. (In fact, the police prevented Bilkis Bano from joining the sit- in.) (Jagga 2021, Pandey 
2020). On the other hand, the government and right- wing social media have engaged in greater 
demonization of Muslims than of Sikhs. Hindu nationalists claim that Muslims are outsiders, 
whereas Sikhism is part of Hinduism. For example, on Gurpurab in November 2020, one of the 
holiest Sikh holidays and the birth anniversary of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, Prime 
Minister Modi tweeted, “I bow to Sri Guru Nanak Dev Ji on his Parkash Purab. May his thoughts 
keep motivating us to serve society and ensure a better planet”(Modi 2020).
Both protests have resisted the government’s attempts to use religion to discredit and divide 
them. In opposing the CAA, Shaheen Bagh activists highlighted Muslims’ daily experience 
of fear because of their clothing, names, and other markers of identity. In response to Modi’s 
statement that you can identify those who engage in violence “by their clothes” (Quint 2019), 
women in burqas at Shaheen Bagh linked their faith to their democratic commitments. Ziya us 
Salam told us that many women felt that demanding constitutional rights was the will of Allah 
who believed, “…to fight for justice is the calling of every human being”. As Hilal Ahmed 
(2020) argues, the protesters showed that far from turning them inward, their religious beliefs 
were tethered to their nationalist commitments.
The Shaheen Bagh protesters drew on early understandings of Indian secularism that 
promoted equality among people of all religions. They recited scriptures from the Gita, the 
Bible, the Quran, and the Guru Grant Sahib (Week 2020), as well as revolutionary poems by 
Pash, Habib Jalib, Muhammad Iqbal, and Ramdhari Singh Dinkar (PTI 2020). Challenging the 
BJP’s allegations of their sectarianism, they demonstrated their support for another displaced 
group by organizing a meeting on January 19, 2020 in support of pandits (Brahmin Hindus) 
who were forced by militant groups to leave Kashmir in the 1990s (Ashraf 2020).
Sikh farmers resisted the government’s misappropriation of their religion by organizing their 
own celebration of Gurpurab on the Singhu border where they prayed to Guru Nanak to make 
the government revoke the black laws (Hindustan Times 2020). Farmers at the sit- ins quote 
scriptures like ‘sarbat da bhalla’ (welfare for all) and invoke kar seva (selfless service) to affirm 
Sikhs’ commitment to the dignity of labour and opposition to the caste system. The camps on 
the border sites embody Sikh principles of sewa (service) and langar (a community kitchen in 
Sikh temples which serves free meals to all visitors, regardless of their religion, caste, class, and 
gender).
Sikhs also contest the government’s attempt to discredit them as terrorists and Khalistani 
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angels; when we die to save the nation, we are martyrs; when we fight for our rights, we are 
Khalistani.” They invoke memories of Punjabi revolutionaries and chant “Inquilab Zindabad” 
(Long Live Revolution). Posters of the young Sikh anti- colonial nationalist, Bhagat Singh, 
adorn the protest sites; young men wear tee shirts bearing his image, and women wear yellow 
scarves, the colour of his turban. Repudiating what they term the “godi” (lapdog or compliant) 
media, the farmers’ movement has created its own YouTube channel, the Kisan Ekta Morcha, 
and the bi- weekly Trolley Times newspaper. According to Harinder Kaur Bindu, a leader 
of the BKU- Ekta Ugrahan, who we interviewed, the government’s attempts to discredit the 
movement have backfired and revealed its own sectarianism.
Remarkable expressions of solidarity among opponents of the CAA and the farm laws attest 
to some of their shared experiences as religious minorities. The BKU organized a large delega-
tion of Sikh farmers to travel from Malerkotla Punjab to join the protesters in Shaheen Bagh, in 
December 2019. The farmers brought posters which said in Urdu, “May brothers never fight 
again, may 1947 never be repeated” (Prabhu 2020). Recalling the horrific violence of Partition, 
but the ability of Sikhs and Muslims to prevent it in Malerkotla, they called for renewed unity 
in the face of the government’s attempts to divide them (Rawat and Sanyal 2020). Sikh farmers 
brought rations and equipment to provide free meals to the surrounding community. A Delhi- 
based Sikh advocate, DS Bindra, reportedly sold a flat to set up a langar at Shaheen Bagh and 
other protest sites. As a result, he has been harassed by right-wing social media and the Delhi 
police (A. Menon 2020).
Muslims from Malerkotla reciprocated by travelling to the farmers’ encampments at the 
Singhu border and preparing meals for them. Many women at the farmers’ sit- ins said they were 
inspired by Shaheen Bagh women. Amandeep Kaur Deol of the Stree Jagriti Ekta Manch, who 
we interviewed, said that participating in anti- CAA protests gave her the confidence to become 
active in the farmers’ movement. “We began to see that if women in Shaheen Bagh did not take 
the permission of their husbands, why should we?”
Both movements challenge autocratization by dispelling false characterizations of Islam and 
Sikhism, highlighting the way both religions promote equality, tolerance, and justice, and for-
ging solidarities based on shared histories and aspirations.
II. Prefigurative movements
A hallmark of a prefigurative orientation is the creation of expressive, non- instrumental modes 
of communication. Both the Shaheen Bagh and the farmers’ sit- ins became the sites of posters, 
murals, and art displays, that creatively challenged official narratives They were also the site of 
musical performances which forged composite cultural identities by drawing on diverse lin-
guistic, regional, and religious traditions. The songs keep alive memories of resistance to repres-
sion in other times and places. The most popular songs at Shaheen Bagh included Aamir Aziz’s 
Sab Yaad Rakha Jayega (We will remember everything, we will remember it all) and Faiz Ahmad 
Faiz’s poem ‘Hum Dekhenge’, which was popularized in Lahore in 1986 to protest martial law 
in Pakistan under Zia- ul- Haq (Singh 2019) and was translated amidst the sit- in from Urdu into 
numerous regional languages.
Some 650 songs that the farmers’ movement generated are inspired by rap, Sikh hymns, and 
folk melodies from Punjab and Haryana. They express the festivity associated with weddings, 
the faith evoked by religious hymns, and the revolutionary zeal associated with radical traditions. 
The songs of the Dalit poet Sant Ram Udasi (1939– 1986) have become extremely popular.
Another hallmark of a prefigurative orientation is that it fuses a commitment to transforming 








post- colonial societies between civil society, which is characterized by elitist, statist values, and 
political society, which  is the realm of subaltern politics (Chatterjee 2004), both movements 
demand accountability from the state and civic responsibility for community welfare (food, 
housing, and shelter). People of different backgrounds and identities share responsibilities for 
cleaning, cooking, and childcare. The sites include health centres where doctors prescribe 
medications and health examinations. The camps the farmers have created on the border sites 
have gyms, salons, blood donation clinics, and libraries. Volunteers distribute refreshments and 
meals throughout the day to visitors and poor people from the neighbourhood.
The citizenship rights Shaheen Bagh women demanded were intimate and emotive. Intimate 
citizenship, Kenneth Plummer writes, does not “imply one voice, one way, or one model”. 
On the contrary, it “…designates an array of stories and a multiplicity of voices, in which 
different lives, different communities, and different politics dwell” (Plummer 2003). Shaheen 
Bagh attracted people from a wide range of backgrounds and political affiliations. Strong bonds 
developed between older local residents and students from the neighbouring Jamia Milia Islamia 
University (hereafter Jamia). Punjabi farmers who joined the protest raised awareness about 
public policies that have contributed to the agrarian crisis. Trans activists joined the protest 
to oppose both the CAA and the new Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019, 
which requires proof of gender confirmation surgery for someone to be registered as trans-
gender (Sarfaraz 2020). Even some BJP supporters, like Saksham Mishra from Kanpur, joined 
the protest because the new laws were, in Mishra’s words, an “assault on the cultural fabric of 
the nation” (Mishra 2020).
The protesters at Shaheen Bagh promoted inclusive, pluralist citizenship. They exuberantly 
affirmed inclusive nationalism by reciting the national anthem at midnight on New Year’s Eve, 
hoisting the tricolour on Republic Day, and inviting Modi to celebrate the festival of love on 
Valentine’s Day. They distributed rose petals to the police. The most often read book at the site 
was the Constitution. Protesters read it aloud and displayed posters of its author, Dalit leader 
B. R. Ambedkar.
Compared to the Shaheen Bagh protest, the farmers’ movement was less inclusive of 
the most vulnerable groups. The farmers’ unions, which initially organized the protest, are 
dominated by Jat landowners in Punjab. They have not addressed questions that most con-
cern landless labourers, like the recent passage of labour laws which extend the working 
day and dismantle workers’ protections. Nonetheless, in early January, organizations of Dalit 
labourers, like the Punjab Khet Mazdoor Union and agricultural unions from Rajasthan and 
Maharashtra, which are more representative of landless and low caste labourers, refuted the 
government’s charge that farmers were simply seeking to protect their class interests, and 
joined the sit- in at Tikri (Singh 2021). By participating, they reject the government’s claims 
to champion Dalit rights, thereby demonstrating their opposition to autocratization. The 
Samyukta Kisan Morcha has welcomed their participation and called for broad class unity. Sikh 
gurdwaras (temples), which provide enormous support to the farmers’ movement, emphasize 
equality across caste and class lines.
Prefigurative movements generally favour grass roots mobilization over electoral orientations. 
In this respect the two movements are similar. To maintain the movement’s autonomy, the 
farmers’ movement has not included even supportive party leaders in the negotiations with 
the government or allowed officials to speak on their platforms. To promote transparency and 
prevent dependence on any one leader, representatives from 31 farmers’ unions alternate par-
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The pradhan (head) of the day chairs the meeting and later addresses the press about 
the decisions. No union leader should feel that because he is heading a smaller union 
he does not have the same say as the head of a larger union…This also makes it dif-
ficult for anyone to break the unity because in this kind of leadership everybody 
matters.
A comparison between the two movements suggests that a prefigurative orientation is born 
of both choice and necessity. The Shaheen Bagh movement defied instrumental logic in con-
tinuing the sit- in, despite the government’s refusal to consider its demands, and prefigured 
democracy by enacting inclusive citizenship. The farmers’ sit- ins were necessitated by the 
government’s refusal to allow protesters into Delhi. However, despite growing public support 
and the government’s increased willingness to negotiate, the movement refused to compromise. 
While engaging in a prefigurative approach, the farmers strategized, coordinated, mobilized, 
forged coalitions, marshalled resources, and determined how to frame their demands. The pre-
figurative orientation of both movements represented important challenges to autocratization.
III. Women’s activism
Women in Shaheen Bagh and the farmers’ protests have highlighted the detrimental impact of 
government laws and policies on their individual and societal roles. The government claims 
to promote women’s empowerment and honour women’s roles as wives and mothers while 
pursuing policies which undermine women’s rights and the wellbeing of their families and 
communities. It paternalistically speaks for and about women while rendering them invisible 
as workers and citizens. Women in both movements have claimed voice and visibility as indi-
viduals, wives, mothers, and widows, thereby demonstrating their conjoined commitments to 
their communities and to their interests as victims of gender inequality.
In sharp contrast to the state’s confrontational, aggressive, masculinist stance, the Shaheen 
Bagh sit- in reflected typically female values of nurturance, patience, and perseverance. Three 
local elderly women who are known as the Shaheen Bagh dadis (grandmothers) represent 
maternal strength, fortitude, and compassion. Nicholas Gill argues that those who experience 
temporary and shifting citizenship tend to value stillness in resisting exclusion (Gill 2009). 
The act of waiting patiently also offers a sharp contrast to the government’s hurried and 
secretive decision- making style. Having experienced frequent displacement both before and 
after Partition, women resisted by refusing to be uprooted from their homes and communities. 
As Lucy Jackson (2016) theorizes, groups excluded from state- defined citizenry attach strong 
affective value to citizenship. They experience what she terms “emotive citizenship”, that is 
“situated within their everyday intimate lives”, and rooted in the here and now of home.
By anchoring motherhood within democratic values, Muslim women engage in what 
Werbner terms “political motherhood” (Werbner 1999, 221). They have opposed police vio-
lence against their husbands, sons, and grandsons who the state frames as anti- national terrorists 
and sexual predators. The catalyst to the Shaheen Bagh women’s sit- in was their outrage at 
police attacks on students who were peacefully protesting against the CAA at Jamia. A video clip 
that went viral depicts four women surrounding a male student at Jamia to protect him from the 
police (Kuchay 2019). The protesters challenged Modi’s claims to empower women through 
programmes like ‘Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao’ (Save the Daughter, Educate the Daughter), while 











Several poems and songs challenge masculinist logic with symbols of feminine strength. 
Nabiya Khan’s poem, that went viral, begins, “the revolution will come wearing bangles, bindis 
and hijabs”. Darab Farooqui’s poem, The Name is Shaheen Bagh, reflects the ways feminine 
modalities of protest imbue the movement with the warmth, love, and support that is commonly 
associated with home and community (Quint 2020a). A poster at Shaheen Bagh says: “Women’s 
slogans will herald the uprising.” A frequently heard refrain, drawn from South Asian women’s 
movements, concerns azaadi (freedom). Its opening lines are: “My sisters demand freedom, 
freedom is our right, we will claim freedom, come what may.” Azaadi, of course, refers to 
freedom from both patriarchal and state oppression (Menon 2020).
The Shaheen Bagh protest fostered what Farida Ayub called bedari (an awakening) about 
women’s public roles. She told us: “People have understood that when women raise their 
voices, they strengthen communities and elevate them to new heights.” Maya Bhagat said, 
“Men have always treated women as objects, as people who have to be told what to do. They 
think women can’t have independent minds. This stereotype is so inbuilt that now we can’t 
believe that women are standing up.” Zaara Hashmi told us in an interview:
People began to understand and listen to us. When we’re in our homes, we can’t be 
heard, but on the streets we can. Women were already aware, that is why they came 
out to protest. The movement made society realize that a woman’s purpose is not just 
to have children and cook food. We can do a lot for this nation. We have capabilities 
that are suppressed, and (the protests) have created an atmosphere in which every 
woman can realize her potential.
Women have also played leading roles in the farmers’ protests. More than 40,000 women 
joined the BKU- Ekta Ugrahan, and thousands of women joined 30 other farmers’ unions 
in Punjab. The agrarian crisis has magnified gender inequalities and politicized women. The 
burdens on women have increased as a result of male migration to the cities rendering women 
increasingly responsible for what was traditionally considered men’s work. Most of the women 
who joined Dilli Chalo were from the Malwa region, which has witnessed the highest rate of 
farmers’ suicides in Punjab. Because more male than female farmers commit suicide as a result 
of indebtedness, the burdens of repaying debts at exorbitant interest rates fall largely on widows, 
who own little or no land. According to Kavitha Kuruganti of the All India Kisan Sangharsh 
Coordination Committee, although women conduct 75 percent of all farm work, they own 
only 12 percent of the land. She notes that the new laws will increase women’s susceptibility to 
exploitation and make their labour even more invisible (Shergill 2020). Amandeep Kaur Deol 
commented in an interview, “As it is, we don’t own land in our names and are paid half of what 
men earn. Unemployment is already so high. If we’re forced to migrate to the cities, the only 
work we’ll find will be as sex workers.”
Fewer women have achieved leadership roles in the farmers’ movement than in the Shaheen 
Bagh protests. Whereas Shaheen Bagh women organized within their own localities, female 
farmers must suspend their responsibilities to their families and cultivation and travel long 
distances to join the farmers’ sit- ins. They have devised a partial solution by developing a rota-
tion system whereby some women periodically return to their homes and other women from 
their villages replace them at the sit- in. Furthermore, some of the male leaders of the movement 
initially viewed women with suspicion and questioned why they were there (Kaur 2020). These 
women confronted the male leaders and persuaded them to allow more women to speak.
Farming women have been increasingly politicized over the course of the sit- in. They 
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They were outraged when the Supreme Court Chief Justice SA Bobde urged women and 
the elderly to return home and implied that they were being “kept” at the protest (Newsclick 
2021). Kavitha Kurungati commented, “One of the important points of concern is the pater-
nalism and patriarchy reflected in observations with regard to women farmers. We urge the 
respected institution of the Supreme Court to recognise and appreciate the agency of women 
in this matter” (Bajwa 2021). Harinder Kaur Bindu who we interviewed travelled to the Tikri 
border on November 26 and has returned there intermittently. She said, “This was the first- 
time women travelled such long distances, often 300– 400 kilometres. When there was no one 
to take care of our children and elderly relatives with us, we took them along. Men have come 
to realize that we have to join the movement for it to succeed.” Men at the sit- ins have gained 
more respect for women’s activism; they have signalled that sexual harassment will not be 
tolerated. Several women at the Tikri border commented that men did not assume that cooking 
and cleaning was primarily women’s work.
Through their occupation of public space and their public voice and visibility, women in 
both movements have simultaneously challenged repressive laws and demanded an expanding 
bundle of citizenship rights.
IV. Challenges to neoliberalism and democratic erosion
Through their opposition to particular laws, both the Shaheen Bagh and farmers’ movement 
engage in a broader critique of autocratization. Those who are excluded from citizenship rights 
are often at the forefront of struggles to achieve them. The Shaheen Bagh protesters are mindful, 
as Giorgio Agamben (2017) argues, that citizenship as a marker of political belonging supersedes 
social belonging in the nation- state. Agamben theorizes that the state’s inclusion of citizens is 
premised on the exclusion of the non- citizen (what he calls bare life). For Agamben, the exclu-
sion of non- citizens or stateless people ironically creates the foundations of citizenship.
For the Shaheen Bagh activists, demands for citizenship became a fulcrum for addressing a 
multitude of societal problems and state policies, including the threat of violent displacement, 
discrimination against Muslims, gender inequality, unemployment, poverty, and the lack of civic 
amenities in poor neighbourhoods. Amira Bashir told us that protesters criticized the govern-
ment for investing millions of rupees in the NPR and NRC rather than funding programmes 
for women and the poor: “There is no budget for tabdeeli (progress or change), so poor people 
will suffer…The government should use funds to support migrant workers, and rape and child 
abuse victims. They should improve rural healthcare; even today poor people are dying because 
there are no doctors in their villages.”
The Shaheen Bagh protesters show that, far from being empty abstractions, citizenship 
rights are crucial to the security and wellbeing of low income, marginalized communities. 
Their Citizens’ Charter states: “Our struggle has been for an inclusive and participatory form of 
citizenship based on values of mutual empathy, care, and dignity. Now that we are called upon 
to show our commitment to these values, we shall rise to the occasion” (India Legal 2020). It 
emphasizes that “enshrined alongside their right to life and citizenship, is the inalienable right 
to a life of dignity, and these seemingly smaller issues are also an indicator of how (they) are 
treated as lesser citizens” (Shaheen Bagh Official 2020).
The pandemic has widened the chasm between the rich and poor and revealed the tensions 
between the government’s populist and neoliberal policies. The farmers’ unions have challenged 
three key features of autocratization: the growing centralization of power, the state’s capitulation 
to business elites, and the violation of civil rights and liberties. In challenging the government’s 










principles that identify agriculture as the responsibility of state governments. This shows that 
the growing centralization of power undermines regional and local decision- making processes, 
while increasing corporate control (Singh 2020).
The farmers’ movement claims that the state is catering to the interests of two of India’s 
wealthiest families, Mukesh Ambani, the chair and managing director of Reliance Industries, 
and Gautam Adnani, chair of the Adnani multinational conglomerate. General secretary 
of the BKU- Ekta Dakaunda, Jagmohan Singh Patiala, commented, “We believe the newly 
enacted farm laws were passed to facilitate Reliance’s entry into the farm sector. This is 
the only business which will never incur loss as everyone needs food, fruits, and vegetables” 
(Vishwadeepak 2020).
Union activists have called for the boycott of Reliance and Adnani products through social 
media, slogans, speeches, posters, and bumper stickers. Farmers have been switching their 
phone service from the Reliance- owned Jio to other mobile phone providers. In small towns 
and villages in Punjab, people have engaged in violent attacks on Reliance property. They 
have burned Reliance Jio SIM cards, destroyed cell phone towers, forced Adani’s silos to close, 
disconnected power supplies to Jio mobile towers, and taken control of Reliance stores, petrol 
pumps, and a toll plaza (Bellman 2020). Leaders of the farmers’ movement have supported the 
boycott but called for peaceful protest.
The farmers’ unions have compared the government’s high- handed passage of the farm laws 
with its decisions to demonetize currency in 2016 and abrogate Kashmir’s special status in 2019. 
They charge that the government timed the passage of the farm laws amidst the pandemic lock-
down to prevent protest. They have refused to co- operate with the committee the Supreme 
Court appointed to resolve the dispute because its four members have been vocal advocates of 
the farm laws. They have demanded that the government convene a special session of parlia-
ment where the farm laws can be openly reviewed.
Activists point out that one frequently ignored aspect of the reform is that it denies citizens 
legal recourse to dispute government actions. Section 13 of The Farmers’ Produce Trade and 
Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020, better known as the APMC Bypass Act, 
states that no legal proceedings, prosecutions or lawsuits can be brought against the central or 
state governments or their officers with “respect of anything which is in good faith done or 
intended to be done under this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder”. This provision 
prevents any citizen from pursuing public interest litigation against the government and big 
business (Sainath 2020).
The farmers’ movement has taken a strong stand on the regime’s violation of civil rights and 
liberties. On Human Rights Day, December 10, 2020, photographs of people who the gov-
ernment had incarcerated, adorned the podium on the Tikri border. The BKU Ekta- Ugrahan 
condemned the government for using draconian laws to imprison intellectuals, artists, activists, 
and anyone accused of challenging the regime. It released a statement which said, “The state 
wants people to remain confined to their narrow identities and narrow interests so that no one 
resists people being subjected to repression and torture.” By demanding the release of polit-
ical prisoners, the farmers’ movement identified itself with a broader “people’s struggle” (Brar 
2020). In taking this stance, the farmers’ movement not only opposed the incarceration of its 
own members but of everyone who challenges autocratization.
V. Conclusion
Judged solely by their political effectiveness, prefigurative movements have had mixed results. 
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civil wars. However, sit- ins must also be evaluated relative to alternative possibilities. Under 
prevailing political conditions, opportunities for expressing dissent are relatively limited; institu-
tional channels are blocked and national political parties lack courage, power, and imagination. 
Although the activists at the sit- ins faced threats and harassment, their reliance on collective 
leadership and their sheer numbers, provided some protection from police violence and 
mass arrests. Unlike single acts of protest which by definition are of relatively short duration, 
prolonged sit- ins provide continual public reminders of popular discontent.
Regardless of their outcomes, prolonged- sits are often democratic acts. They educate the 
public about the dangers of government overreach and demonstrate the importance of active 
citizenship. They redefine who is a legitimate political actor and what is a legitimate form of 
political participation. They enable women to increase public awareness of the invisible labour 
they perform and to transgress the public– private divide (Sasson- Levy and Rapoport 2003, 
399). As Asef Bayat notes, urban street occupations symbolically transcend “the physicality 
of the street, to convey collective sentiments of a nation or a community” (Bayat 2010, 212). 
Even when they fail to achieve their goals, they foster activism among other groups. The 
farmers’ movement followed nation- wide protest against discriminatory citizenship laws. Other 
movements will surely follow.
The protests challenge the Indian state’s attribution of political discontent to disaffected 
political elites who want to divide the country (the so-called “tukde- tukde gang). The sit- 
ins are not only the work of a broad swathe of society but their demands affirm broad- based 
nationalism and citizenship rights. People at Shaheen Bagh wore images of the flags on their 
bodies and continually read and posted passages from the Constitution. Punjabis expressed 
pride at serving in the army and feeding the nation. Popular slogans at the farmers’ protest 
sites included “Hail the nation, Hail the farmer”, and “No farmers, no food”. Supporters 
of the protest refer to the farmers as India’s “food soldiers”. In reciting prayers as well as 
revolutionary slogans, both movements demonstrated the potential complementarity of faith, 
tolerance, and secularism. In cooking and eating together, participants rejected the caste and 
gender hierarchies that dietary practices create and sustain. In feeding police officers and the 
poor in neighbouring locales, they repudiated the discriminatory and opportunistic bases on 
which Hindu nationalists provide social services. Mothers and grandmothers showed that far 
from confining them to their homes, their domestic work and invisible labour fuelled their 
opposition to gender inequality.
In describing the historical memories that inspire occupations of public squares, Atef Said 
writes, “Spaces carry meanings that are constructed over time, redeployed and reconfigured in 
the present, and carried forward as inspiration for the future” (Said 2015). Both movements 
linked their attachment to the land to their identities, histories, and imagined futures. Older 
people shared stories about partition and anti- colonial nationalism while younger people 
described their experiences in students’ and women’s movements. Activists said that as important 
as their immediate goals were their legacies for future generations. Zaara Hashmi commented 
in an interview about Shaheen Bagh: “When our children ask us, ‘where were you all when 
this was happening?’ we can say, ‘we were sitting on the streets fighting for you.’ In this, we were 
successful: that we can look the next generation in the eye without shame and know that with 
whatever life we had in us, we fought.” Amandeep Kaur asked, “What can we leave behind for 
our children other than a record of our struggle?”
Both the Shaheen Bagh and farmers’ sit- ins draw on past memories to overcome fear and 









 1 In addition to my own observations when I visited Shaheen Bagh in December 2019, Barkha Bhandari 
interviewed several students, activists, and journalists, in August 2020. And Ghazala Khan interviewed 
members of the farmer’s union, women’s organizations, and other activists in Malerkotla, Punjab 
in July– August 2020 and in February 2021. I use pseudonyms for many of the people who were 
interviewed. I’m grateful to Joan Cocks, Cynthia Enloe, Jayati Ghosh, Dipankar Gupta, Zoya Hasan, 
Mary Katzenstein, Mark Kesselman, Amna Pathan, Pritam Singh, Sten Widmalm, and Elisabeth Wood, 
for very helpful comments on this chapter.
 2 For complex reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter, farmers’ unions in other parts of the 
country have had mixed responses to the protests; Maharashtrian unions have opposed it whereas unions 
in southern states have joined the sit- ins.
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This chapter will discuss the process of autocratization that has taken place in the Indian- 
controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir since the early 1950s to the 
present day. The central argument of this chapter is that such an evolution has transpired largely 
because the Indian state, regardless of the government in office, has entertained deep misgivings 
about the irrevocable integration of the state into the Indian Union. As a consequence of these 
widely shared doubts a range of governments in New Delhi regardless of ideological dispos-
ition have tolerated political chicanery in the state, have given leeway to the use of undemo-
cratic procedures and have, on occasion, resorted to questionable means to oust legitimate 
governments in the state. They have also passed draconian legislation that has substantially 
curtailed civil rights and personal liberties. Most recently, on August 5, 2019, the right- wing, 
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) abrogated the special status that the state had 
long enjoyed under the aegis of Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The writ of the Indian 
Central (national) government had been limited to defence, foreign affairs and communications. 
Furthermore, the state had its own constitution and its own flag. It had also enjoyed the right 
to forbid permanent settlement of non- residents in the state.
Background
Jammu and Kashmir had enjoyed these privileges owing to the particular circumstances of its 
integration into India. A brief discussion of the conditions under which it joined the Indian 
Union is in order. When the British Empire in India ended in 1947 it was divided into the two 
sovereign states of India and Pakistan. During colonial rule two classes of states had existed in 
the Indian Union. The states of British India were ruled directly from New Delhi, the cap-
ital of the Indian empire. Additionally, there were the “princely states” which were nomin-
ally independent but recognized the paramount status of the British. Under the terms of this 
arrangement the rulers of these states enjoyed a degree of autonomy but ceded control over 
defence, communications, and foreign affairs to the British (Ramusack, 2007).
As Independence approached, Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, decreed that these 
states had a choice: they could either join India or Pakistan but could not declare their inde-
pendence when the British withdrew from their empire in India. Predominantly Muslim states 








accede to India. Furthermore, he had argued that certain “geographic compulsions” would 
have to be taken into account as the monarchs chose to cast their lot with either India or 
Pakistan. A kingdom well within the borders of one of the two nascent states could not opt to 
join the other.
A unique situation confronted the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was a princely state with a 
Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh, but with a Muslim- majority population. It also abutted 
the two emergent states. To complicate matters further, Maharaja Hari Singh had little interest 
in joining either India or Pakistan. As a Hindu monarch who was not especially well liked by 
his subjects, he had no desire to join a Muslim- majority state, Pakistan. By the same token, he 
was unwilling to join India because he feared that India’s socialist- minded leader, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, would seize his vast estates.
Yet both countries were keen on merging the state into their respective domains. For India, 
which was founded on the principles of secular nationalism, integrating Kashmir was key to 
demonstrating that a predominantly Muslim region could thrive under the aegis of a secular 
state. Pakistan, in turn, was equally keen on acquiring the state because it saw an adjoining state 
with a mostly Muslim population as critical to the completion of its identity as the homeland 
for the Muslims of South Asia.
With the maharaja unwilling to accede to either country and in the wake of a tribal rebel-
lion in the southwestern portion of the state, Pakistan’s political leadership in connivance with 
the military launched a clandestine attack on the state. Maharaja Hari Singh, now in a state of 
complete panic, turned to India for military assistance as his forces proved to be completely 
powerless to stop the Pakistani onslaught (Whitehead, 2008). India agreed to provide assistance 
as long as two conditions were met: first, he would have to accede to India and second, the 
accession would need the imprimatur of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the lar-
gest, secular and popular political organization in the state, the Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference, which had played a vital role in opposing the rule of the Maharaja Hari Singh 
(Sisson and Rose, 1990). In the event, he agreed to both conditions and Indian forces were 
inducted into the state but not before the Pakistani intruders had seized as much as a third of 
the state.
The Delhi Agreement and after
Given the special circumstances of its accession to the Indian Union, Sheikh Mohammed 
Abdullah sought to forge a special relationship with the Indian state. This came to be codified 
in the agreement that he reached with Prime Minister Nehru in 1952. Under the terms of 
this agreement the state was allowed to have its own flag, draft its separate constitution, and 
also have a nominal head of state, known as the Sadar- i- Riyasat. Furthermore, the fundamental 
rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution were abridged at the insistence of Sheikh 
Abdullah because their wholesale extension to the state would require it to compensate land-
owners whose properties had been subjected to land reform legislation (Das Gupta, 1968).
The autonomy that Abdullah had so zealously carved out would not prove to be long- 
lasting. In 1953, when Indian intelligence sources concluded that he was toying with the idea 
of declaring independence, he was deposed from office and incarcerated (Korbel, 2016). The 
same year a new constitution for Kashmir was adopted and under its terms Kashmir became an 
integral part of India. By 1960 the Indian Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the state 
(Brines, 1968).
Apart from these legal changes New Delhi had already chosen to overlook the question-









in office he proved to be utterly high- handed in his ways and had displayed a strong streak of 
authoritarianism. As Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, a noted and early scholar of Kashmir’s domestic 
politics, had astutely observed:
Time has now come to pass judgment on Abdullah’s government. Internally, it was 
hardly democratic. Opposition was suppressed, and civil liberties existed only in 
name and for those who shared his views. His economic views were radical but he 
combined them with a contempt for democratic practices in such a way as to invite 
comparison with the working of the like- minded totalitarian Governments elsewhere. 
He enjoyed tremendous popularity, yet resorted to questionable means to gain an 
electoral majority.
(Das Gupta, 1968, 209)
It is evident from this description that the process of autocratization had started early in 
Kashmir and with the imprimatur of its principal leader. With this early resort to non- 
democratic practices and attendant norms it is hardly surprising that the National Conference 
would continue these measures even after Abdullah’s removal from office. The formal reasons 
for his dismissal, however, were that he had lost the support of his Cabinet, that he had failed 
to mend differences within his Cabinet and that his policies had led to economic hardship in 
the state (Das Gupta, 1968, 208). His deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, replaced him as 
the Prime Minister. Shortly after assuming office, Bakshi declared Kashmir’s complete fealty 
to the Indian Union. Bakshi, who enjoyed the complete support of the government in New 
Delhi, proved to be equally disrespectful of democratic norms and principles. New Delhi, in 
turn, allowed him to act with impunity as long as he and his supporters did not raise the issue 
of secession.
Crucial choices and their consequences
For well over two decades, the Central (national) government in New Delhi had long 
overlooked the malfeasances of the National Conference governments in Srinagar. Electoral 
malfeasances in the state were rampant and the NC maintained a stranglehold on the politics 
of the state (Bhattacharjea, 1994). Political opposition in the state was anaemic and made little 
or no headway against the dominance of the NC. The NC steered clear of secessionist senti-
ment and all Central governments proved willing to overlook any and all electoral shortcomings 
in the state. Furthermore, New Delhi, in turn, provided substantial amounts of economic 
assistance to the state to ensure political quiescence.
In 1975, after over a decade in political exile, one of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s key pol-
itical acolytes, Mirza Afzal Beg, reached an accord with one of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
principal political lieutenants, G. Parthasarathy. Under the terms of the Beg– Parthasarathy 
Accord the Sheikh was allowed to return to normal politics in the state with the understanding 
that he would not raise the secessionist bogey again. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Gandhi 
lost a national election and a coalition government under the banner of the Janata Dal assumed 
power with a former Congress leader, Morarji Desai, as the prime minister. In 1977 Desai 
committed himself to a free and fair election in Kashmir. Accordingly, the first election free 
of any electoral shortcomings since the 1950s took place in the state (Ganguly, 1997). Even 
though Sheikh Abdullah had suffered a heart attack three weeks before the election and was 








Even as normal politics returned to the state, the process of autocratization that had long 
dogged the state continued apace. Even after Abdullah’s return to power the state passed the 
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act in 1978. It is ironic that the legislation did not ori-
ginally have an explicit political intent. It was, instead, designed to curb timber smuggling, a 
rampant problem in the state (Ramachandran, 2019). Its underlying motivations had significant 
implications for civil liberties as it allowed detention without trial for up to a period of two 
years. With the onset of the 1989 insurgency, it has been used quite extensively to incarcerate 
political leaders (Duschinski and Ghosh, 2017). Most recently, in the wake of the abrogation of 
Article 370, it was also used to detain Farooq Abdullah.
In due course Abdullah anointed his son, Farooq Abdullah, as his chosen successor in 1981. 
In 1982, following his father’s death, he became the Chief Minister of the State. In 1983, 
state- level elections were held and were also considered to be mostly free and fair. Within a 
year, however, factionalism within the National Congress led to the fall of the government. 
However, within two years, Farooq with the support of a Congress government in New Delhi 
was returned to office as the Chief Minister. Farooq’s reliance on the Congress to return to 
office proved to be most consequential for his political fortunes. Many in the state and especially 
in the Kashmir Valley now saw him as an errand- boy of New Delhi.
Worse still, when the state went to the polls in 1987 the National Conference resorted to 
widespread electoral fraud. Earlier generations of Kashmiris may well have grudgingly accepted 
the outcome of the election. However, the generation of the 1980s who were far better 
educated, more politically conscious and better informed found the results to be unacceptable. 
Lacking a viable, alternative model of protest, substantial numbers of disaffected youth espe-
cially in the Kashmir Valley resorted to political violence.
The onset of the insurgency
The turning point, of course, came in December 1989 with the kidnapping of Rubiya Sayeed, 
the daughter of the Home Minister of the State, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. To obtain her 
release the government caved in to the demands of the kidnappers. In its wake a full- scale insur-
gency erupted in the Valley.
Initially, a local, professedly- secular organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) spearheaded the uprising. However, within months Pakistan quickly entered the fray, 
transforming a regional issue into an externally supported, religiously inspired extortion racket.
Fearing that it might lose effective control over significant parts of the state the central gov-
ernment in New Delhi unleashed a harsh, unyielding, and crude counter- insurgency strategy. 
It involved widespread cordon- and- search operations, the use of coercive interrogations of 
suspected insurgents and virtually unrestrained use of force. In considerable part this regime of 
repression took place under the governorship of a former civil servant and previous governor 
of the state, Jagmohan Malhotra. While he had proven to be a reasonably able administrator 
during his initial stint, in his second innings he proved utterly unsuited to the task.
Much of this approach was legally permissible because of the passage of suitable legislation. 
To begin with the Indian state was already armed with the sweeping powers embedded in the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987. This legislation had been passed 
largely to cope with the rise of terrorist activity in the adjoining state of Punjab. However, its 
provisions were extended to all of India. Under the terms of this act designated anti- terrorist 
courts could hold in camera proceedings, and the act protected the Central and state governments 
from any form of legal proceeding for actions taken in “good faith”, permitted the use of the 






this legislation the government deemed it necessary to expand its legal writ. As a consequence, 
it resorted to more draconian measures especially designed to assuage the misgivings of the 
Indian Army about conducting counterinsurgency operations in the absence of a suitable legal 
shield (Ramchandran, 2015).
Among other matters it passed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (Jammu and Kashmir) 
of 1990. Some of the provisions embedded in this act granted sweeping powers to the Indian 
Army as well as the paramilitary forces in the conduct of their operations in Kashmir. Once a 
region is declared to be a “disturbed area” the provisions of the act drastically limit civil liberties 
and personal rights.
It is important to underscore that this legislation which has been in effect in Jammu and 
Kashmir since shortly after the onset of the insurgency has its roots in India’s colonial experi-
ence. It is based upon the Armed Forces (Special Powers) ordinance that the British colonial 
government had invoked in 1942 to crush the nationalist Quit India movement. And long 
before the AFSPA was applied to Kashmir it had first been promulgated in 1958 in India’s 
northeast against the Naga rebels (Mathur, 2012).
To that end, certain features of this legislation, in particular, deserve discussion. As any 
number of activists and analysts have argued, the legislation grants considerable leeway to mili-
tary and paramilitary personnel in the conduct of their operations. One or two features, in par-
ticular, deserve some discussion. First, as the following paragraph shows it virtually indemnifies 
any member of the armed forces from prosecution in the conduct of operations:
If he is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, 
after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use 
force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention 
of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the 
assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of 
being used as weapons or of fire- arms, ammunition of explosive substances.
(The Armed Forces Special Powers Act [Jammu and Kashmir] 1990)
The act also permits members of the armed forces to arrest:
Without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom 
a reasonable suspicion exists [italics added] that he has committed or is about to commit 
a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest.
(The Armed Forces Special Powers Act [Jammu and Kashmir] 1990)
Senior officials have defended these provisions on the grounds that they protect the armed forces 
from possible frivolous legal action in the routine conduct of their duties. However, in practical 
terms, the latitude that this act granted the armed forces led to extra- judicial killings, custodial 
deaths and fostered a culture of impunity in their ranks. Designed to cow the insurgents into 
submission this strategy proved to be almost entirely counterproductive. It successfully alienated 
segments of the population and especially Kashmiri youth who bore the brunt of these brutal 
tactics. If anything, the overall strategy only widened the scope of the insurgency as hapless 
individuals were caught in the counterinsurgency dragnet.
It was not until 1992, faced with a hardening and deepening of the insurgency, that the Indian 
state changed its strategy. The use of force remained under the legal aegis of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (Jammu and Kashmir). However, the tactics that the armed forces adopted 






Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a dedicated counterinsurgency force which could be deployed without 
a long logistical tail. Furthermore, intelligence collection improved and better efforts were 
made to prevent infiltration from Pakistan. All these measures enabled the Indian state to restore 
a degree of order if not law in the state.
The evolution of the insurgency and beyond
Most importantly, the Indian state made arrangements to restore a semblance of political nor-
malcy in the state through the conduct of reasonably free and fair elections. The first such 
election was held in 1996 and brought Farooq Abdullah of the NC back to power (Jones, 
2008). Subsequently, a spate of other state level elections were held with the last one in 2014. 
All of these, for the most part, were deemed to be free of electoral taint. Despite the return 
of electoral democracy to the state the repressive machinery that had steadily been put in 
place over the years, and especially after the onset of the insurgency, remained largely intact. 
Accordingly, it is entirely possible to agree with the assessment of Paul Staniland that the situ-
ation in the state reflects the “paradox of normalcy”. As he writes:
The Indian state articulates a goal of normalcy that it does not allow to come to 
fruition. The official aspiration is a Kashmir where free elections, non- violent pro-
test, and free speech replace the grim militarization of the 1990s. Yet, precisely as 
Kashmiris pushed forward such processes in the past half- decade, the Indian state 
cracked down on advocates because they articulated opposition to India’s current 
relationship with Kashmir.
(Staniland, 2013)
Of course, one of the most egregious strategies that elements of the Indian security forces have 
pursued even as legitimate governments have been in office is the practice of “fake encounters”. 
This has involved the staging of incidents where suspected insurgents and terrorists have been 
killed with impunity. Segments of India’s security forces have resorted to this egregious tactic 
largely because of the difficulties that they may have encountered in actually prosecuting these 
possible insurgents. Those capable of providing evidence against likely insurgents and terrorists 
may well have proven reluctant to serve as witnesses for fear of retaliation against themselves or 
their families. Under these circumstances, members of the security forces, on occasion, have 
resorted to this stratagem as a useful expedient. Despite the blatant illegality of this mech-
anism no member of the security forces has faced prosecution for these actions. Anthropologist 
Haley Duschinski has aptly referred to these extra- judicial killings as “regimes of impunity” 
(Duschinski, 2010).
Personnel drawn mostly from the paramilitary forces, most notably the Border Security 
Force (BSF) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) who constituted a Special Task 
Force (STF) and the Special Operations Group (SOG), have largely been responsible for 
these extra- judicial actions. In addition to these questionable methods various units of a range 
of paramilitary forces have been involved in “saturation tactics” that include the running of 
“checkpoints surveillance, cordon and search operations, human shields, prison detention, and 
torture” (Duschinski, 2009). These routine procedures have contributed to a widespread cul-
ture of repression and a significant constriction of civil liberties despite the persistence of elect-
oral democracy in the state.
And it also needs to be highlighted that nationwide legislation, such as the Prevention of 









Parliament in December 2001, which imposed severe penalties for involvement with terror, 
became applicable to Kashmir. Some of its key features underscore its anti- democratic ethos. It 
had an overly broad definition of what constituted terrorism, it allowed for detention without 
trial for 180 days and it allowed bail petitions to be postponed for an entire year. Faced with 
considerable opposition this act, however, was repealed in 2004. Nevertheless, a raft of other 
legislation which curtailed civil liberties both in Kashmir and elsewhere in India remained on 
the books (Roy and Singh, 2015; Ganguly, 2017).
The existence of this vast corpus of legislation aside, the military when frustrated with 
demonstrations that harried its routine operations but fell short of terror, again resorted to 
harsh (and potentially quite counter- productive) measures that showed scant regard for human 
rights. Specifically, in 2017, in the wake of a surge of popular protest including widespread 
stone pelting, the Indian Army picked up a Kashmiri man, Farooq Ahmed Dar, tied him to 
the bonnet of a jeep and paraded him through the locality as a warning to the protesters. By all 
accounts Dar had not participated in the protests and instead had been on his way to cast a vote 
in a national election. Not only was he subjected to this outrageous act but, worse still, the then 
Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General Bipin Rawat, defended the action of the major who 
was responsible for using Dar as a human shield. To compound matters, he suggested that using 
Dar as a human shield amounted to an “innovation” and awarded him a medal (Rowlatt, 2017).
This culture of impunity, to some degree, has also been sustained because with rare and 
honourable exceptions the Indian press has not vigorously sought to expose and question the 
use of extra- legal tactics in pursuit of counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. This failure 
to dispassionately probe the actions of Indian security forces in the state is an anomaly given 
that other lapses of policing in other parts of India are, for the most part, highlighted and 
commented upon at length. In this context, a careful quantitative examination of three major 
Indian metropolitan newspapers which enjoy a nationwide standing, The Hindu, The Indian 
Express and The Times of India, about the coverage of human rights in Kashmir arrived at some 
very revealing conclusions. Questioning official accounts of incidents in the state was deemed 
to be “anti- national” and the extent of civilian casualties was mostly overlooked. Worse still 
aspersions were cast about the reporting of human rights abuses on the part of global human 
rights organizations. Reports about the excessive or inappropriate use of force on the part of 
Indian security forces were treated as hostile propaganda. Most disturbingly, even an otherwise 
respected organization, the Press Council of India, appeared willing to accept the version of the 
armed forces when investigating allegations of a mass rape that apparently took place in 1991. In 
sum, it appears that much reportage of the state of human rights in Kashmir in the mainstream 
media has proven to be mostly state- centric in its orientation (Joseph, 2000). This willingness of 
a significant swathe of the Indian press to tacitly support the stance of the government in office 
has also enabled authorities to foster the culture of impunity that has long existed in Kashmir.
The end of Article 370 and its aftermath
On August 5, 2019, the Narendra Modi government passed legislation that formally abrogated 
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution (Ganguly, 2021). This move, of course, has been a long- 
standing demand of the BJP. Previous BJP governments had raised the prospect of its abrogation 
and had even included it in their election manifestos. However, in the end they had decided 
not to act. In considerable part, they had been inhibited from doing so because of the exigen-
cies of coalitional politics as well as personal predilections of the Prime Minister. Modi, who 
had enjoyed a slender parliamentary majority in his first term (2014– 2019) and had come to 







However, within months of assuming office for a second term using his parliamentary majority 
he decided to revoke the special status of the state.
Doing so involved a legislative sleight of hand as he failed to follow through on a consti-
tutional provision that required him to consult the state legislature before passing the legisla-
tion. Apologists for the government argued that it could not do so because the state legislature 
had been dissolved. That said, there is little or no question that the government was acutely 
aware that this move would be widely unpopular across much of the state and especially in the 
Kashmir Valley. It is reasonable to make this inference because prior to the revocation of its 
status the Central government had asked tourists to leave the region, it had blanketed the area 
with additional troops and issued a security alert claiming that militants were about to attack its 
troops (Jenkins, 2019).
The legislation bifurcated the state and created a legislature for the Kashmir Valley and 
Jammu but offered no such provision to the region of Ladakh. The two segments of the 
former state were now also made Union Territories under the control of the Central (fed-
eral) government. With this provision, along with Article 35 A, Kashmir will no longer have 
a separate constitution, its own flag, and all laws that Parliament passes will be applicable to 
the state and non- Kashmiris will now be able to purchase land in the state. The last issue is 
especially fraught because it raises the prospect of significant demographic changes. Even 
though this decision suborned constitutional norms and proprieties it was not entirely bereft 
of strategic logic. Having more firmly integrated the disputed areas into the Indian Union 
the government has undermined Pakistan’s irredentist claim to the state. Quite predictably, 
Pakistan has lodged protests but the global community has paid scant heed to them (Ganguly 
and Tarapore, 2019).
Along with the abrogation of the article the government in New Delhi decided to incar-
cerate significant segments of the political leadership in the state under existing preventive 
detention laws. Only some of them were released in late December 2019 (Press Trust of India, 
2019). Despite their release political activity in the state, for all practical purposes, remains at a 
standstill. While elections have been promised for the local legislature in Jammu and Kashmir 
the new constituencies have yet to be delineated and so the elections remain in abeyance.
The only elections that have been held thus are those for District Development Councils 
(DDCs). Organized and announced at very short notice they were conducted in late December 
2020 against the backdrop of the Covid- 19 pandemic. Non- BJP leaders vigorously argued that 
they had been given inadequate notice and thereby their ability to campaign had been severely 
hobbled. Their misgivings aside, the People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD), a con-
glomeration of six political parties including the two major local political parties, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the National Conference (NC), won a majority of the seats. The 
BJP, however, as a single party won the most seats. The Alliance performed best in the Valley 
and the BJP did well in Jammu. This outcome was hardly surprising given that Jammu is pre-
dominantly Hindu while the Valley is Muslim- dominated. Despite the success of the PAGD in 
the Valley and its hopes of restoring the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir, the likelihood of the 
BJP government resiling on its decision is all but slender to non- existent.
Conclusion
The exceptional terms under which the state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India explains 
a great deal about the Indian state’s dealings with it. Virtually from the outset it tolerated a 
large degree of political chicanery in the state, granted leeway to a range of anti- democratic 







civil liberties. It also tolerated a host of electoral malfeasances as long as local politicians did not 
raise the prospect of secession. All of these choices contributed to the erosion of democratic 
norms and procedures in the state.
Worse still, following the onset of the insurgency in 1989 and Pakistan’s subsequent role in it, 
the Indian state contributed to the steady militarization of the state. It needs to be underscored 
that the Indian military presence in the state far exceeded previous deployments of its security 
forces to protect its borders from perceived threats from both the People’s Republic of China 
and Pakistan. This process, in turn, led to a further denuding of civil rights and liberties even as 
the state saw the conducting of reasonably free and fair elections.
At this particular juncture it is hard to visualize a less autocratic dispensation for the bifurcated 
state in the foreseeable future. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, which 
the BJP spearheads, has shown scant regard for the protection of personal rights and civil lib-
erties within India (Ganguly, 2020). Given its propensity to shrink the scope of civil liberties 
across the country it is entirely reasonable to conclude that it will continue the repressive pol-
icies that have long been in place in the Indian- controlled portion of the disputed state.
Worse still, as long as Pakistan maintains its support for a range of terrorist organizations 
and they carry out random acts of terror, the BJP- led government will use them as a justifi-
cation of maintaining the vast web of existing repressive legislation that curtails civil liberties. 
Furthermore, the present government recognizes that beyond the occasional criticism no for-
eign government is likely to sanction India in any meaningful fashion for its human rights 
record in the state. Given that most great powers are clearly willing to overlook far more egre-
gious violations of human rights on a global basis the inference that the BJP- led government 
has made is hardly unreasonable. Consequently, the repressive apparatus that has existed in 
Kashmir for decades is likely to remain undisturbed.
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RE- POSITING GENDER IN THE 
NEW NATIONALIST PARADIGM
Dinoo Anna Mathew
India in recent times has witnessed an expanding role of the national (union) government, with 
the dominant discourse revolving around military might, national security and a redefining of 
nationalism, the latter tilting heavily on majoritarianism as a plank for current political engage-
ment and mileage. The increasing focus of the nation’s development paradigm is centred on the 
concepts of ‘oneness’, ‘one nation, one tax’, ‘one nation, one election’ that are mooted by the 
national ruling party – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Nationalism and national security are 
major platforms on which the nation’s progress and development are being charted. However 
these grand nationalist sentiments with a narrow ethnocentric focus obscure the everyday inse-
curities of local life and the chapter seeks to explain how. Three sets of issues viewed in the 
context of the current autocratization trends are especially highlighted here. The first relates to 
the narrow conception of security that has little worth for the rights and security of women and 
men especially among the marginalized groups. Their security as that of others is intertwined 
with their daily aspects of life and location in a particular caste, class or gender. The second 
relates to the various ways in which the space for autonomous functioning of local governments 
are shrinking due to the increasing centralizing trends by the union government and has the 
potential to hamper or even roll back the gender equality ideals envisaged and the gains on 
gender made through political decentralization. The third relates to how the insecurities and 
fault lines that already existed were magnified in the course of the pandemic.
Obscuring the local
The political vocabulary and its outreach in the past few years in the country have been 
dominated by the conceptions of military might, nationalism and national security, the core 
elements of the 2019 election manifesto of the BJP that sought to attract the electorate. 
This articulation of nationalism and the dominant narrative of safeguarding the nation from 
inimical neighbours found deep resonance with the voters in the past two elections to the 
lower house of parliament. However the question that looms large is: can the contours of 








The realist notion of security that is predominantly state centric has long been challenged 
by critical- security and feminist security studies (Steans 1998: 126, Tickner 2001: 43). Critical- 
security studies in broadening the conception of security from a traditional state centric and 
sovereignty analysis, have argued that security needs to be viewed from a bottom-up perspec-
tive, focusing on the individual with the goal of emancipation that frees people from social, 
physical, economic, and political constraints that restrain their free choice of doing what they 
want to do (Tickner 2001: 47). Deepening the debate, feminist security studies have over-
whelmingly stressed the reassessment of notions of security to move beyond its traditional 
notions that privilege territorial integrity to viewing the manifold sources of insecurity that are 
immediate threats to women and specific groups according to their particular situations (Steans 
1998: 126). Along with ecological concerns, feminist security studies therefore point out the 
insecurities posed to individuals and groups, especially women, by physical and structural vio-
lence (Terriff et al. 1999: 87). A broader understanding of security from a feminist perspective 
therefore entails locating women in their immediate environment, understanding the violations 
of their security while also assessing this from the standpoint of a patriarchal framework that 
promotes and sustains this violence (ibid. 86).
Viewed from this perspective, the insecurities faced by women in India are many and varied. 
Women continue to live in a society marked by patriarchal norms and attitudes and where 
there is a clear public– private distinction. According to the data from the National Crime 
Records Bureau, crimes against women have been steadily increasing over the years, with 
domestic violence against women the highest among them. This phenomenon of domestic 
violence which originates from and reifies the patriarchal norms in society denies women their 
fundamental security from violence. There is alarmingly high unemployment and abysmally 
low engagement of women in the labour market in India. The Economic Survey of India for 
the period 2019 to 2020 pointed out a decline in female labour force participation among the 
productive age group of 15 to 59 years, from 33.1 per cent in 2011 to 2012 to 25.3 per cent 
in 2017 to 2018, with a sharper decline evident in rural areas. The female worker population 
ratio also declined from 32.3 per cent in 2011 to 2012 to 23.8 per cent in 2017 to 2018 among 
the productive age groups. Unpaid domestic responsibilities and care work are disproportion-
ately skewed towards women in India. In the last two decades there is an increasing propor-
tion of working age women attending only to domestic duties and which in 2017 to 2018 
was around 60 per cent (Economic Survey 2019 to 2020: 290). This is to a very large extent 
shaped by the prevailing social norms and unequal gender hierarchies that identify women’s 
work with domestic responsibilities and care work and relegate them to a secondary status in 
the labour market. The devaluation of their contribution is compounded where their labour 
contribution is rendered invisible by viewing it as an extension of their domestic responsibil-
ities or attributing to the essentialist notions of women’s ‘natural’ care giving instincts. The 
critical aspects of their rights in terms of adequate wages and social protection are then not 
given their due importance. The agriculture sector, for instance, continues to be the main 
sector where women are employed, the nature of work is highly informal and women form 
the highest group of landless labourers (Chakraborty 2020: 289– 290). It was only recently that 
women in the agricultural sector were recognized as farmers both by farmers’ collectives and 
the state. With the decline in the agricultural sector, there has been an increased migration of 
men from rural to urban areas in search of work contributing to the high presence of female-
headed households and feminization of agriculture. With limited access to land rights, to 
technical inputs and assets, and with restricted mobility, the challenges to women are many in 
such situations. Another instance is of community health workers known as accredited social 
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The same social and patriarchal norms extend to other arenas that depict women as needing 
to be controlled and incapable of making decisions on their own account. Some of these 
issues have been carried over from the past decades. Yet not only are these challenges progres-
sively rising, currently there are disturbing trends that reflect a deepening of these concerns. 
Coupled with the interplay of caste and religion, an obvious manifestation of this phenom-
enon is the increasing incidence of honour killings and the calls to ‘save’ Hindu women from 
Muslim men through interfaith marriage or what the radical Hindu groups speciously call 
‘love jihad’. While some states in India already had legislation on freedom of religion, what is 
new is the increasing rhetoric around interfaith marriages with an overarching impulse to dic-
tate women’s choice regarding marriage, portraying them as defenceless and devoid of agency. 
To provide legal sanction, various states, especially those ruled by the ruling party at the 
national level, are rushing to bring in legislation regulating interfaith marriages focusing solely 
on religious grounds to decide the legality to the marriage. Other instances include the recent 
nonviolent protests, one led by women and formed against the backdrop of the amendments 
brought by the national government to the Citizenship Act. The other is the women farmers 
being one with their male counterparts protesting against the newly introduced farm laws by 
the national government. Both these agitations attracted participants across class, castes, and 
religious groups, lending a multihued articulation of their rights and insecurities. Despite the 
protracted nature of these protests, however, the state was and is found wanting in acknow-
ledging and addressing their concerns and insecurities.
Since 1996 there have been multifaceted efforts by various governments to successfully pass 
the women’s reservation bill providing for one third of the total number of seats in the lower 
house of parliament (Lok Sabha) for women. To date, the status quo on the women’s reservation 
bill continues, even though its promise makes its way into political party manifestos, including 
that of the current political party. With the increasing impact of climate change and nat-
ural disasters, women suffer disproportionately through displacement, loss of livelihoods, lack 
of food, and gender- based violence. These environmental security issues and socio-structural 
security concerns of gendered violence, limited political and cultural autonomy, sexual division 
of labour, and increasing unemployment faced in their everyday lives are far more detrimental 
to women. Most of these gender insecurity concerns relate to the core issue of the sustainable 
development goal five: freedom from all forms of violence and discrimination and the promo-
tion of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Hence, where women continually face 
insecurities arising from direct gender-based violence, socio-structural violence and environ-
ment concerns among others, and where this does not come into the rhetoric of security that 
is being advanced, then the latter seeks to address only a partial notion of security. This narrow 
perspective of security that is foisted on citizens divests itself of addressing the lived realities of 
women and marginalized groups, the lived realities that matter to them most and shape their 
experience and idea of security.
Shrinking space of local governments
With the increasing linkages of global and local challenges of rapid urbanization, climate change, 
migration, displacement, growing inequalities and the drive against gender equality, various 
international bodies have been calling for a multi- level governance approach to address these 
issues. The United Nations, in setting the roadmap for the localization of sustainable devel-
opment goals for instance, has underscored the significance of local governments as important 
partners in its achievement through promoting inclusion, diversity, and broad- based ownership 





for bringing together various government levels and different stakeholders to lead to a trans-
formative change at the local level. Other organizations and networks, such as the United Cities 
for Local Government and the Global Parliament of Mayors, have been advocating the import-
ance of cities engaging with global challenges and for multi- level governance frameworks that 
are inclusive. There is thus an increasing recognition of localization and local governments to 
design local actions involving local stakeholders and in ensuring the voice and decisions of 
women and marginalized groups to address global challenges.
Local governments, because of their proximity to people and the relevance of local ser-
vices to their constituents, have the potential to advance women’s participation and represen-
tation in their decision-making processes. Internationally local and regional governments 
have been calling attention to the imperativeness of increased participation of women in local 
governments. The worldwide declaration on women in local government by the International 
Union of Local Authorities in 1998, which has since inspired many other calls for gender 
equality, stated: “Local government is an integral part of the national structures of governance 
and the level of government closest to the citizens. Therefore it is in the best position both to 
involve women in the making of decisions concerning their living conditions and to make use 
of their knowledge and capabilities in the promotion of sustainable development” (IULA 1998). 
Other significant initiatives included the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in 
Local Life (2006), and the Paris Local and Regional Global Government Agenda for Equality 
of Women and Men in Local Life.
In India, given its size, vast population and the diversity of states that are held together in 
the federation, multi- level governance frameworks and localization assume even greater signifi-
cance. However, it has been argued that while India adopted a federal structure, it conforms 
more to a ‘quasi federal’ structure and embodies both federal principles as well as strong cen-
tralizing features (Singh N. 2016: 522, Singh M. 2016: 464). Autocratizing trends can therefore 
pose a clear and present danger. With regard to the legal constitution of local governments, 
even during the framing of the Indian Constitution, there were almost equal debates for and 
against inclusion of local governments as basic units of government with financial powers. 
Ultimately as a compromise formula, the provision for local governments was included in the 
Indian Constitution, under the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are non- enforceable 
recommendations for the governance of India (Sivaramakrishnan 2016: 562). It took another 
four decades for the passage of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment acts in 1992, man-
dating the creation of rural and urban local self- governments respectively. The responsibility of 
devolving powers and responsibilities to local self- governments were left to the individual states 
of India. Hence the progress of decentralization varied across states, with many states making 
huge progress and others lagging behind. At the union government level, in the early 2000s 
there were systematic efforts towards facilitating the transfer of functions and functionaries by 
states to local governments through activity mapping (a process by which functions of local 
governments are delineated into activities and sub- activities to enable functional clarity for ser-
vice delivery outcomes). Many states, in fact, progressed well in terms of activity mapping, yet 
the momentum kept varying.
The political decentralization process through the seventy-third and seventy-fourth con-
stitutional amendment acts was a democratic mechanism that not only provided legal space 
for women’s political leadership, but also a platform where the voices of women and men 
at the local level could be asserted, where they could stake a claim to democracy, and where 
the intersections of gender, caste, and class play out in the day- to- day lived realities. The acts 
provided 33 per cent reservation to women and proportional representation to scheduled castes 
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moved further and provided 50 per cent reservation to women in local governments. This 
assumes enormous importance given that the proportion of women fielded as candidates for 
the lower house of parliament and the state legislative assemblies by political parties has been 
very low. However, at present there are discernible centralizing trends by the union govern-
ment, leading to an incremental encroachment of the functional and financial space of the local 
governments. These put at risk the inclusive and equity issues sought to be addressed through 
the involvement of local governments.
The greatest trends are seen in the fiscal realm of local governments. It is evident that the 
presence of optimum amounts of funds at the discretion of the local government council is 
imperative to plan for locally relevant needs and priorities. In India, the revenue collected in the 
form of taxes and fees is a vital source for local governments with regard to funds at their dis-
posal. However, this revenue has been declining over the years. Further, with the introduction 
of the goods and services taxes (GST) by the union government in 2017, the local governments 
in particular lost out on some of their rights of taxation especially with regard to entry tax, 
octroi, local body tax, and advertisement tax, which were a significant source of revenue. In 
the present arrangement, the proceeds from GST are divided only between the union and the 
states (ICRIER 2019: 6). The local government does not receive any proceeds even though 
three major taxes that they enjoyed earlier were absorbed into the GST. The other source of 
major revenue for local governments in India is the union finance commission grants. The 
recent Fifteenth Finance Commission has recommended rupees 90,000 crore as total grants for 
local governments for the 28 states for the period 2020 to 2021. However, out of this, 50 per 
cent of the funds for rural local bodies and for fifth and sixth schedule areas are tied in nature, 
meaning that they can be used only for the basic services of (a) sanitation and maintenance of 
open defecation-free status and (b) supply of drinking water, rainwater harvesting and water 
recycling (Fifteenth Finance Commission 2019: 49). Similarly for urban local bodies other than 
million- plus cities (cities with a population of one million or above), 50 per cent of the allo-
cation is tied to drinking water (including rainwater harvesting and recycling) and solid-waste 
management. For the million- plus cities grants are allocated for the purpose of improving 
ambient air quality and for improving conservation, supply and management of water and effi-
cient solid- waste management. With only 50 per cent of the allocation unconditional in nature, 
the local governments will have restricted funds at their disposal for planning efficiently for 
projects for their felt community needs.
The previous Fourteenth Finance Commission had specified 90 per cent and 80 per cent of its 
recommended allocation for rural and urban local governments respectively to be in the nature 
of basic grant and the remaining 10 per cent and 20 per cent as performance basic grants for rural 
and urban local governments respectively. The rationale was to provide unconditional support 
in the form of basic grants to the village panchayats and municipalities to improve the basic 
civic services including water supply, sanitation including septage management, sewerage and 
solid-waste management, storm water drainage, maintenance of community assets, maintenance 
of roads, footpaths and street lighting, and burial and cremation grounds (Fourteenth Finance 
Commission 2017: 123). To be eligible for performance grants, the Finance Commission laid 
the conditionality for local governments to submit audited annual accounts and to show an 
increase in own revenues over the preceding year. The commission also recommended that 
the union government accept their guidelines without imposing any further conditions. This, 
however, did not happen as pointed out by a study commissioned by the Fifteenth Finance 
Commission. The study highlighted that though the recommendations were accepted by the 
union government, in the course of time, further conditionalities were imposed by union min-





ascribing them to spend the resources on specific sectors determined by the union government 
(Accountability Initiative 2019: 17).
In other words, the union government brings out policies that require certain conditionalities 
which put the local governments at loggerheads with the conditions of the finance commission 
and that of the union government. This, coupled with the overall trend of low absorptive cap-
acity of local governments that are unable to efficiently expend financial resources matching 
the needs or the priorities in their local development plans, leads to the situation where they 
are left in disarray. Low technical capacities and skills of local governments at financial and 
administrative levels has been a perennial problem which has not been given due and sustained 
importance. This impedes local innovation to address issues and challenges and to evolve alter-
native solutions.
Village panchayats are a microcosm of society in India. If viewed in that sense it is a platform 
where human interactions and frictions play out. Issues that have a direct impact on women 
(their freedom, independence, and safety) have a larger import in the local arena especially 
forums that are at the local level. Here the local councils are the immediate point of reference 
to articulate their issues. Where discretionary funds are limited, the scope for planning for 
women-specific needs and priorities diminishes. Issues of marital disputes, alcoholism, dowry, 
domestic violence, violence against women, gender impacts of declining agriculture, and rising 
unemployment among women then get lost or side- lined.
It was in 2005 to 2006 that a significant step towards including a gender budgeting statement 
in the Union budget was introduced. It was envisaged at that time that “the budget data will in 
due course be presented in a manner that the gender sensitivities of the budgetary allocations are 
clearly highlighted” (Gender Budgeting 2005 to 2006: 50). The budget statement has two parts 
which indicate budget provisions for schemes for the benefit of women: part A details schemes 
in which 100 per cent provision is for women and part B details schemes where 30 p er cent 
provision has been earmarked for women. According to the gender budget statement of 2016 
to 2017, “the purpose of gender budgeting is to monitor expenditure and public service 
delivery from a gender perspective, as a means of mainstreaming women’s concerns in all activ-
ities and improving their access to public resources” (Ministry of Finance 2016 to 2017: 97). 
In examining the gender budget statements from 2005 to 2006 and 2020 to 2021, it is seen 
that the Ministry of Panchayati Raj (ministry responsible for rural local governments) furnished 
allocations under part B from 2008 to 2009 onwards until only 2016 to 2017. Thereafter there has 
been no reporting of allocation. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation has 
furnished allocations from 2006 to 2007 until 2016 to 2017 under part B, after which there 
has been an allocation only in 2020 to 2021 by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs.
Another major centralizing trend is seen in the centralized provision of local services bypassing 
the functional and financial mandate of the local governments. As early as in 1993 the then 
Congress government had introduced a local area development scheme for members of parlia-
ment called the MPLADS. The scheme started with an annual allotment of one crore Indian 
rupees to each member of parliament to implement small works in his/ her constituency. This was 
against the spirit of decentralization and federalism as the funds that were given to the members 
of parliament were actually funds that could have been at the disposal of the local governments. 
Further, by spending on local area development in their constituency, they were encroaching on 
the functional space of local governments who were and are still grappling with the ambiguities 
and overlap of their functions. The annual allotment was later increased to five crores of Indian 
rupees. Following this scheme various states’ governments also initiated the local area devel-
opment scheme for members of state legislative assemblies. The centrally sponsored schemes 
funded by the Union government with a matching grant from the state governments and which 
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are tied to specific projects are yet another example of how national priorities get privileged 
over local needs and priorities. Over the years the scope of centrally sponsored schemes has been 
steadily increasing resulting in local governments being pressurized by imposed conditionalities, 
and a one- size- fits- all approach that goes against the grain of the 73rd and 74th constitutional 
amendment acts. The present BJP government had started yet another similar programme in 
2014 called the Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (model village). It delegated responsibility to each 
member of parliament to adopt one village panchayat of his or her constituency and develop it 
into a model village by 2016, followed by two more village panchayats by 2019 and five more 
village panchayats by 2024. According to the performance review committee meeting of the 
Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana in November 2017, 14 union ministries amended the guidelines or 
issued advisories with respect to 21 central schemes to enable priority for those panchayats that 
were identified under Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana 2017). All this 
points to how centralizing trends are autocratizing the spaces of local governments to function as 
de facto independent third tiers of government in the country.
There is enough evidence that argues for women to have an enabling environment in their 
homes so as to effectively exercise their responsibilities as locally elected members. However, 
critical aspects that still hamper women’s prospects in political decentralization are the social 
norms and patriarchal environment in which women elected members have to function. Society 
continues to have deep- seated male- dominated attitudes that subordinate women. Data from 
the National Crime Records Bureau point to the increasing cases of crimes against women 
over the years. In 2019, the latest year for which data is available, there has been an increase of 
7.3 per cent in cases of crimes against women (Crime in India 2019: xii). Evidently, it is 
domestic violence (cruelty by the husband or his relatives) that constitutes the majority of the 
cases registered under crimes against women.
Given the male- dominated political sphere, it is not surprising therefore that political 
representation of women in the parliament and state legislative assemblies has been very 
low. Political parties have for long restricted the number of women contestants to both the 
lower house of parliament and the state legislative assemblies. In fact, the percentage of 
women candidates contesting elections to the lower house of parliament was just 7 per cent 
in the period 2002 to 2019, some 4 per cent in 1977 to 2002 and 3 per cent in 1952 to 
1977, even though women’s winning strike rate is greater than men’s (Roy and Sopariwala 
2019: 242).
It is not that women are far removed from politics or are disinterested in the governance of 
the country. This is illustrated by the large numbers of women voters for all elections, which 
is highest for local government and state legislative assembly elections, followed by elections to 
the lower house of parliament. In fact, according to Roy and Sopariwala the greater turnout of 
voters, especially women in rural areas, has had an impact on the electoral strategies of major 
political parties (ibid. 49).
While arguing that the infringement of the financial and functional spaces of local 
governments is part of the current autocratization trends, this chapter also acknowledges the 
fact that just as other levels of governments, local governments too have their own challenges. 
However, this entails a separate discussion. Nonetheless, suffice to say that it cannot be assumed 
that local governments will be devoid of binding constraints and forces that negate the interests 
and rights of women and marginalized groups. What is required is for the national government 
and the states to provide the importance due to local governments as the primary sphere for 
local citizen engagement, a critical platform for realizing local aspirations and currently the 
only tier of government where mandated reservation is provided for women and marginalized 





them to work towards their potential of providing inclusive and accountable governance. It 
is true that local governments come under the ambit of the respective state governments and 
the latter in many states have shown reluctance to devolve functions and finances to local 
governments. However, the union government cannot shirk its responsibility towards enab-
ling local governments to evolve as a self- governing third tier of the government in the federal 
structure. To date there have been no efforts by the present union government towards incen-
tivizing state governments to devolve powers to local governments. On the other hand as the 
above discussion shows, there has been an incremental encroachment into the space of the local 
governments.
The Covid- 19 pandemic
Societies are prone to shocks, both from within and those that are extraneous which are beyond 
their control. It is when they face these endogenous or exogenous shocks that they are really 
tested. The risks and vulnerabilities of women and marginalized groups are amplified during 
these times, especially where adequate attention and institutional measures to address these risks 
and vulnerabilities were minimal during ‘normal’ times. The pandemic took the form of such 
an extraneous shock that challenged and out- manoeuvred governments as the former ramped 
up its destructive scope. In India, the onset of the Covid- 19 pandemic laid bare the lack of 
security and social protection for women and various social groups. Whereas such insecurities 
were rendered invisible during ‘normal times’ in the dominant narrative and discourses, it was 
only natural that they were exacerbated during the pandemic. The institutional measures to 
address these insecurities were severely lacking in their time-bound and sustained interventions. 
In April 2020 the United Nations Secretary- General called urgent attention to a “horrifying 
global surge in domestic violence” directed towards women and girls during the lockdown and 
importantly pointed out that violence is not just in the battlefield but “for many women and 
girls, the threat looms largest where they should be safest: in their homes” (United Nations 
2020). In India, according to the National Commission for Women, there was an increased 
surge in the incidence of domestic violence. The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, a 
leading business information company and an independent think tank, had highlighted that 
women had a pronounced unequal share of job losses (13.9 per cent) as early as April 2020 and 
by November 2020 compared to men, a higher proportion of women were unable to re- enter 
the job market (Vyas 2020). Due to the prevailing gender inequalities and norms, girls are more 
likely to drop out of school than boys, severely affecting their educational and life outcomes. 
The pandemic has worsened the situation pushing them back reluctantly into domestic and 
informal jobs. The pandemic further exposed the weak and infrequent focus by the govern-
ment on basic health care, especially primary health centres, impacting further the critical 
health care needs, especially of women in rural areas.
The above discussion reinforces the need for localized interventions that focus on better 
outcomes where factors of efficiency and equity are adequately addressed. The need for a sustained 
and enabling environment for local governments to be active and responsive in addressing 
these challenges cannot be overstated. However, during the pandemic, local governments were 
not considered as critical layers of government in responding to the overwhelming challenges 
thrown by the pandemic, challenges that at the same time were localized in nature and required 
localized approaches.
In response to the pandemic, the union government invoked the Disaster Management Act 
of 2005. While the act details the responsibilities of the union and state government, there is 
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March 2020 and was lifted through varying phases by end of May 2020. For the implementa-
tion of the disaster management plan, local governments are the appropriate level of govern-
ment, but they were never in the picture. In the initial stages as the lockdown eased, it was 
only the union government taking decisions. Later, the state governments were given directions 
within the overall framework set by the union government. The urban local governments 
came in last with the only exception being the Mumbai municipal corporation which took 
the responsibility for the Dharavi slum and to a large extent prevented the spread of the virus. 
Barring few state governments, like Kerala and Odisha that empowered local governments to 
work alongside them in addressing the pandemic, in many others there were hardly any formal 
powers that they enjoyed.
Conclusion
In India, since the overwhelming return of the BJP to power in the 2019 general elections, 
increasing trends towards undermining the power of states and a domineering stance of the 
centre has cast its shadow on the federal structure of the country. Politically this tension is 
manifest in the ways that the national government seeks to address issues without adequate 
deliberations and discussions. A recent case in point is the unilateral decision on critical farm 
law bills in parliament without reasonable discussion. Further, constraining the fiscal ability of 
states to spend on key priority areas, the national government’s increasingly parochial attitude 
is steering the states into a bind.
The significance of multi- level governance and localized approaches to meet the diverse 
challenges facing the countries of the world cannot be emphasized enough. There is a need to 
realign priorities that take into account the lived realities of citizens especially those who are 
left behind in the overall growth and development of political discourse and practice. As the 
above discussion points out, this is particularly relevant for India, in a context where there has 
been a faltering of federal principles, a gradual concentration of powers and functions and its 
impact on issues relating to equality. The invisibility of the local and lived realities of people in 
security discourses resurfaces with the slow de- legitimization of the local governments, demo-
cratic institutions that are closest to the people. What is paramount is the urgent need to con-
verse with people, especially women, the marginalized, the minorities, and those who feel left 
behind, building bridges with them and being responsive to their needs and securities; at the 
same time enriching and nourishing core democratic institutions such as the local governments 
that are invariably the first line of government that common citizens have access to. A diver-
gent move that tends to centralize powers and functions fails to resonate with the needs of 
common citizens leaving them to deal with the insignificance of political rhetoric. This runs 
the risk of situations emerging that are more autocratic in nature sidestepping the essence of a 
democratic process. As is argued, for the ‘real majority’, that is, the poor, women, minorities, 
and marginalized groups, a negation of democracy and their rights is then a reality that they 
reluctantly have to live with.
Glossary
basic grant: untied grant that may be used for core development activities of local 
governments
crore:  ten million









fifth schedule area:  constitutionally designated tribal majority area in certain 
states of India
Lok Sabha:  lower house of parliament
panchayat:  village council
performance grant:  a targeted grant made based on specific goals achieved during 
a specified period
Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana:  model villages
scheduled castes:  historically underprivileged groups of people recognized in 
the constitution of India
scheduled tribes:  tribes or tribal communities recognized in the constitution 
of India
sixth schedule area:  constitutionally designated tribal area in the north- eastern 
states of India
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Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on the autocratization of environmental governance in India since 
the coming to power of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. If we broadly understand 
autocratization to mean “democratization in reverse” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019), such 
a reversal has arguably occurred since 2014, as Modi’s authoritarian populist regime has 
consolidated (Widmalm 2019). Like other such regimes, Modi’s authoritarian populism is 
committed to the construction of a common sense that gravitates around a trope of economic 
growth and “development” that seeks to address frustrated subaltern aspirations in the context 
of rising unemployment while also opposing elitism and promulgating individual entrepre-
neurialism. This common sense is further wedded to a vitriolic rhetoric and politics of Hindu 
nationalism that expresses itself in autocratic forms through the policing of dissent, the targeting 
of “anti- national elements” both within and outside India, as well as communal and vigilante 
forms of violence targeting minorities (see Nielsen and Nilsen, this volume). This, in combin-
ation, pushes the Indian polity and public sphere in a majoritarian and authoritarian direction 
(Jakobsen et al. 2019; Nilsen et al. 2019) characterized by political unfreedom (Singh 2020).
In this chapter, we zoom in on the ways in which this autocratic turn has shaped envir-
onmental governance in fundamental ways. Earlier research on the linkages between polit-
ical institutions and environmental policies tended to affirm that democratic institutions with 
robust legal systems that ensured freedom of speech, access to information, and enabled eco-
logical lobbying generally improved environmental performance (Congleton 1992). While the 
opposite has been asserted for non- democracies, the relationship between political institutions 
and the state of the environment in fact varies across developing countries (Mak Arvin and Lew 
2011). In a context in which we currently witness a rise in authoritarian populist regimes and 
a weakening of existing democratic institutions in many countries, we note that scholarly ana-
lyses of the relationship between these emergent regime types and environmental governance 
has only recently begun to emerge (McCarthy 2019). This chapter seeks to contribute to such 
emerging work by unpacking the linkages between authoritarianism, populism, and environ-
mental governance in India under Modi. In doing so, we acknowledge the various positive 













important commitments to mitigate climate change and fight air and water pollution, and to 
invest in the transition to renewable energy. However, while such initiatives are undoubtedly 
important, we argue that Modi’s broader agenda of prioritizing economic growth, enhancing 
the ease of doing business, and cracking down on so- called “anti- national” dissenters, has had 
decidedly negative consequences for India’s environment and, indeed, for hundreds of millions 
of Indians.
The environmental stakes are high in India, a mega- biodiverse country that hosts about 
10 per cent of the planet’s biodiversity hotspots. The country’s seventy million hectares of 
forests provide invaluable ecosystem services including biodiversity, water resources and cli-
mate change mitigation. They also provide direct livelihood support to more than 200 million 
people living in forests and fringe villages through the supply of fuelwood and non- timber 
forest produce (Lee and Wolf 2018). Yet, the high economic growth that has consistently been 
prioritized over other possible goals in the political economy over more than two decades – 
and which admittedly brought more than 250 million people out of poverty from 2005 to 
2015, if only precariously so – has come about at the cost of significant degradation of natural 
resources and the environment. Indeed, in 2020, India ranked a lowly 168 out of 180 coun-
tries listed in the global Environmental Performance Index (EPI 2020). While the severe social 
and environmental challenges that arise from such “degradation- induced” development call 
for urgent interventions, we argue that what we witness under Modi’s authoritarian populist 
regime is, rather, a relative disregard for key environmental challenges and a firm and growing 
commitment to economic growth, from which the regime derives legitimacy. As Palshikar 
(2019: 113– 114) points out, Modi’s authoritarian populism depends both on the support of 
corporate interests pushing an aggressive corporatized economy, and on the ordinary citizen 
being convinced that their economic wellbeing is a function of a strong nation – and therefore 
that the hurdles in becoming a strong nation (such as “anti- national activities”) must be over-
come. In the domain of environmental governance, this has manifested in the twin strategy of 
harnessing environmental policy and law to turn the environment into resources that can be 
incorporated into circuits of capital, while simultaneously intensifying policing and criminal-
izing environmental activists who are increasingly branded as anti- national enemies.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin with a short historical overview of environ-
mental governance in India. We then briefly discuss the autocratic turn under Modi, before 
turning to its impact on environmental governance. We subsequently single out two domains of 
environmental governance that we are particularly familiar with, namely forest governance and 
land governance. Although these two domains do not constitute an exhaustive account of the 
configuration of environmental governance in contemporary India (which would also include 
air, water, energy, etc.), we believe that the trends and processes we identify in these domains 
are diagnostic of a more general autocratic turn. The last section proceeds from the assumption 
that the ways in which a country responds to ruptures such as the Covid- 19 pandemic can 
provide key insights into its governance context (Sareen et al. 2020). Against this backdrop, we 
analyze the autocratic undercurrent effecting significant changes to environmental governance 
during the pandemic. The conclusion summarizes our arguments about the autocratization of 
environmental governance under Modi.
A brief history of environmental governance in India
The first environment- related legislation in India was the Forest Act of 1865. The act consolidated 
state power to exercise exclusive control over designated forest areas, while the provision within 







Anwesha Dutta and Kenneth Bo Nielsen
72
paper. A subsequent Forest Act 1878 demarcated forests into “reserved forests” and “protected 
forests”. While protected forests were put under the sole control of the forest administration, 
within reserved forests, local populations were permitted limited usufruct access (Umashankar 
2014). The Indian Forest Act 1927 eventually replaced the earlier Act of 1878, but the focus 
remained on the revenue- generating aspect of forests.
The early postcolonial decades were characterized by an overwhelming policy emphasis on 
nation- building through large- scale state investments in infrastructure, agriculture and industry. 
Environmental conservation received little attention, and only in 1966, when Indira Gandhi 
became Prime Minister, did environmental protection become de rigueur with strict imple-
mentation guidelines (Dutta 2020). Subsequently, the Wildlife Protection Act was passed in 
1972, and in 1980 a committee was constituted which for the first time recommended the 
creation of a department of Environment in the Union government. Consequently, the Forest 
Conservation Act 1980 was passed, followed by the Environment (Protection) Act 1986. This 
act for the first time encompassed a comprehensive definition of environment as “water, air 
and land and the inter- relationship which exists along and between water, air, land and human 
beings, other living creatures, plants, micro- organisms and property” (section 2). Importantly, 
the act vested power in the central government to set environmental standards and grant envir-
onmental clearances for industries and activities.
While India thus expanded its legal framework for environmental protection from the 1980s, 
the liberalization of the economy simultaneously accelerated and led to increased industrial-
ization, investments in modern intensive agriculture and growing commercial exploitation of 
resources (Williams and Mawdsley 2006). This brought to light the potential conflict between 
the environment and economic growth, with most Indian governments both then and now 
leaning more towards growth. This included the Congress- led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government that preceded Modi, whose record on environmental governance was 
unimpressive. However, as we show below, this tilt towards economic growth at the expense of 
the environment has not only accelerated with the advent of the Modi government; it has also 
been pursued in a more autocratic manner than before.
Modi’s new clearance raj
Modi brought the right- wing Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) back from years 
of electoral decline to capture Parliament with a clear majority in 2014 (Jakobsen et al. 2019). 
The election campaign saw Indian capitalists rallying overwhelmingly behind Modi, including 
the likes of Mukesh and Anil Ambani, and Gautam Adani, who thrived under Modi’s business- 
friendly regime (Jaffrelot 2019). A key means through which Modi – during his tenure as chief 
minister – sought to turn Gujarat into a favoured investment destination was the speed with 
which he ensured that all permits, licences, and environmental clearances could be obtained. 
Hence, a major target of his campaign rhetoric in 2014 was the ostensibly “policy- paralyzed” 
nature of the incumbent Congress Party that he alleged was caught up in what he spoke of as 
“the clearance raj”, a euphemism for India’s national wildlife, forest, and environmental laws 
that – according to Modi – acted as a slog on investments and national economic development.
As several chapters in this book note, Modi’s style of governing is highly centralized. As 
Manor (2020: 109) argues, “most ministers in the central government learn what their policies 
are from their senior bureaucrats who transmit messages from the PMO”. In the domain of 
environmental policy and governance, Modi’s cabinet has worked to harness national policy to 
further the “ease of doing business” agenda, mostly by ensuring that permits and clearances – 










the first three months of assuming office in 2014, the Modi government issued environmental 
clearance to 33 out of 41 proposals diverting more than 7,000 hectares of forestland for the pur-
pose of mining, construction, and special economic zones. A major share of the diverted land 
was allocated to private corporations. The environmental clearance process was also digitalized 
to enable “ease of application” (Anon. 2014); within two years, the average time for securing 
environmental permits had been reduced from 600 to 192 days (Aggarwal 2016). The govern-
ment seeks to reduce this further to 100 days – and even less for specific growth sectors such as 
real estate, where the target is 60 days (Manohar 2019).
As Manor (2020: 97) reminds us, economic liberalizers need not be neoliberals by default. 
Nor are they by definition autocratic. However, we arguably detect an autocratic strand in 
Modi’s efforts at economic restructuring at the expense of the environment. Notably, the dilu-
tion of the environmental clearance regime was implemented with very little preceding debate 
with key stakeholders, and without taking any steps to strengthen monitoring or other key 
environmental governance mechanisms, thus allowing the diversion of forestland for non- 
forestry purposes to proceed apace. Similarly, the National Board for Wildlife (NBW), which 
has the power to review all wildlife- related matters and approve projects in and around national 
parks and sanctuaries, has been significantly reconstituted. With Modi as the chairperson, the 
number of independent experts on the board has been reduced from 15 to three, and the board 
packed with “subservient officials” (Kaul 2017). But more significantly, its role as a deliberating 
and statutory policy-level body has been weakened. Thus, whereas the 47- member board used 
to have regular monthly meetings under the previous government, the NBW has reportedly 
not held a single meeting during Modi’s prime ministership. All policy decisions and clearances 
have instead come from a much smaller standing committee (Kukreti 2020).
Comparably, a high- level committee established early on in Modi’s first term to review and 
overhaul the gamut of laws on protection of wildlife, forests, and environment was severely 
criticized by the opposition, civil society, and environmental actors for being undemocratic 
and non- transparent, leading to its recommendations being struck down by a parliamentary 
committee. Nonetheless, several laws that have a direct bearing on environmental governance 
have been changed or diluted. This includes the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, Wildlife Protection Act 1972, 
National Forest Policy 2018, Indian Forest Act 1927, and the Coastal Regulation Zone Act 
2018. In addition to causing an overall weakening of environmental protection, the changes 
to these laws have also partially undermined legally enshrined rights of vulnerable groups in 
society, including the dispossessed, indigenous people, and forest- dwelling communities.
In addition to harnessing the legal and environmental policy framework to further the eco-
nomic growth agenda, Modi’s style of governance saw an increase in policing of environ-
mental groups and activists. A confidential but “leaked” report by India’s internal intelligence 
agency labelled Greenpeace India and other environmental organizations and activists as “anti- 
national” and accused them of negatively impacting India’s GDP growth by several percent per 
year because of their opposition to environmentally damaging large- scale industrial projects. 
This was followed by what one observer called a “crackdown” on India’s green NGOs (Bidwai 
2015). The criminalization of environmental dissent under Modi entered the global spotlight 
when India entered the list of top contenders for the “deadliest countries for environmental 
activists” according to a Global Witness (2017) report, foregrounding India as one of three 
countries (alongside Colombia and the Democratic Republic of Congo) where the situation 
had considerably worsened. Killing of environmental activists had increased threefold from 
2015 to 2016, “against a backdrop of heavy- handed policing and the repression of peaceful 
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To summarize, the autocratic turn in environmental governance under Modi has combined 
“quick and decisive” and highly centralized action from above, mostly without popular delib-
eration, with increased policing of environmental activists. This has resulted in the dilution of 
environmental safeguards, violation of rights of vulnerable populations, and a much narrower 
space for popular participation and civil society engagement. In the following sections, we pro-
vide analyses of the authoritarian turn in environmental governance in the specific contexts of 
forests and land.
Forests
Since 2014, the Modi government has attempted to revise many of the existing forest and 
environment laws, while continuing to grant forest clearances in favour of development projects 
that adversely affect Adivasi, forest- dwelling populations and wildlife. The land rights granted 
to forest- dwelling communities via the Forest Rights Act 2006 – which, as stated in the Act, 
was introduced to undo the “historical injustice” caused by the seizing of forest areas by colo-
nial and post- colonial regimes – have been particularly targeted. The government has refrained 
from amending this Act directly, instead working with other laws towards the same end. Thus, 
amendments proposed in 2019 to the Indian Forest Act 1927 sought to confer more power 
on forest authorities at the expense of forest- dwelling communities. According to observers, 
the amendments bordered on bestowing a “degree of veto power with the forest bureau-
cracy over the Forest Rights Act, 2006” (Sethi and Shrivastava 2019). The Modi government 
has also promoted forest conservation through large- scale afforestation and forest restoration 
for carbon sequestration. While forest conservation and restoration may be environmentally 
beneficent, new clauses specifying enhanced penalties on “violators” are likely to adversely 
affect marginalized forest- dwelling and tribal communities who have historically depended on 
protected areas for livelihood. Momentarily, these proposed amendments have been stalled by 
nationwide protests from environmental groups, who argue that their passage would under-
mine the hard- won rights of forest- dwelling and tribal communities who have historically been 
subjected to often violent repression by the forest department.
Other governmental efforts that in effect undermine legally enshrined rights to forests 
and land have been enabled by India’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris 
Agreement to creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes through afforestation 
by 2030. India has sought to realize this goal through the Compensatory Afforestation Fund 
Act 2016 (CAFA) and Rules 2018. In short, CAFA seeks to offset the loss of forests cleared 
in one place for industrial, infrastructure, and other non- forest projects by acquiring an equal 
amount of land (including degraded forestland) elsewhere and creating new forests. In this con-
text, the law considers “plantations” as forest cover, meaning that many newly afforested areas 
are actually plantations. Species prominent in these plantations are invariably non- indigenous 
and commercial species – including rubber, eucalyptus, teak, and pine – that come with massive 
social and ecological costs, often alienating local communities in and near new “forests”. As in 
the other cases discussed above, these local communities are mostly tribal and forest- dwelling 
groups who are rarely considered stakeholders or consulted in the process.
Establishing afforestation and plantation activities under CAFA is usually done through fen-
cing targeted sites, posting guards, installing CCTV cameras, and fixing signboards that restrict 
the entry of tribal and forest- dwelling communities (Saxena 2019). Such coercive and non- 
consensual forms of exclusion have met with criticism from civil society organizations, and 
with active resistance from local communities. Such resistance can arguably be read as a reac-







the fact that this bureaucracy is authorized by law to access the considerable afforestation funds 
that the state has been accruing for years, means that the state bureaucracy effectively wields a 
firm control over much forestland (Lele 2017). This recentralization of power in the hands of 
the state in effect undermines the rights of Adivasi and other forest dwellers under the Forest 
Rights Act.
Local opposition notwithstanding, the Modi government also promotes large plantation 
programmes under its Green India Mission, launched in 2014. The target is to raise 5 million 
hectares of new green cover by 2024 (Ghosh 2017), but as was the case with the afforestation 
initiatives discussed above, no distinction is made between forests and plantations. Aside from 
state- run plantation programmes, big private investors such as the Indian Tobacco Company and 
JK Paper Limited have acquired hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural lands under 
the Green India Mission in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh, 
for raising plantations of mainly eucalyptus.
Transitions in the field of forest governance under Modi have clearly followed a path of 
authoritarian populism. This has been realized through centralized, top- down processes of 
implementing new policies; further re- centralization of political and economic powers in the 
hands of the state and private investors; and erosion of social, political, and ecological rights 
of marginalized groups, for example, through forced and even violent evictions or exclusions 
from forestlands.
Land
Changes in the domain of land governance have primarily been designed to facilitate the com-
modification of land and making it available for investors (Levien 2018). From the mid- 1990s, 
land emerged as a major factor in India’s post- liberalization system of competitive federalism. In 
a context in which India’s federal states have an increasingly free hand to attract private capital 
directly, the ability of state governments to offer affordable (or free) land to investors became 
an important component in inter- state competition. While a new Special Economic Zones 
Act 2005 ensured business- friendly conditions of operation, the colonial Land Acquisition Act 
1894 – which enshrined the state’s right of eminent domain – was used as a legal instrument 
by later governments to dispossess small farmers and Adivasi of their land, often for real estate 
(Searle 2016), mining, high- tech industries, or simply land speculation.
However, in many states such dispossessive practices were met with strong resistance as local 
communities refused to part with their land (Nielsen 2018). In response to the pressure of 
popular anti- dispossession movements, the incumbent UPA government in 2007 set in motion 
a process to introduce new legislation with enhanced rights for landowning and land- dependent 
communities. However, private developers in pursuit of land simultaneously pressed for legal 
changes that would make it easier to acquire land for private accumulation. The outcome of 
this tug of war was the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, a compromise piece of legislation that was strong 
on guaranteeing rights to rehabilitation and resettlement for the dispossessed, but weak in terms 
of limiting the potential for overt misuse of eminent domain.
With neither side enthusiastic (Nielsen and Nilsen 2015; 2017), industry groups started 
to lobby for legal changes (Verma 2015). In response, and in a manoeuvre that was arguably 
in line with his business- friendly outlook, Modi sought to amend the 2013 Act shortly after 
being elected. This was done in autocratic fashion by bypassing parliament and introducing an 
ordinance (in December 2014) that modified key provisions in the said Act. Several so- called 
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certain projects were removed. And, while the 2013 Act included mandatory social impact 
assessments – a key mechanism through which the negative local impacts of land disposses-
sion are assessed, in consultation with local stakeholders – for all projects except irrigation, the 
ordinance did away with this provision for several types of projects. Several other clauses that 
bestowed rights and protection on affected communities were also eliminated. For example, 
the definition of public purpose for which the state can dispossess people of their land was 
expanded to enable land acquisition for private hospitals and educational institutions; and the 
stipulation that acquired land lying unused for five years must be returned to its original owner 
was removed (Ramesh and Khan 2015: 124– 130).
In March 2015, the Modi government sought to turn the ordinance into law. In response, 
social movements and farmers’ organizations protested the bill as an infringement on their hard- 
won legal rights to be treated as stakeholders, as well as to compensation and rehabilitation. 
The proposed bill ultimately foundered, leading Modi to repromulgate the ordinance by decree 
three times, until it finally lapsed for good in August 2015. Nonetheless, the Modi government 
would continue to dilute protective clauses related to the right to consent, compensation, and 
resettlement, by encouraging the individual states to bring about state- level amendments in line 
with the lapsed ordinance (Kohli and Gupta 2017). In theory, such state- level legislation cannot 
override national legislation unless it has received the assent of the President of India. However, 
Modi’s Finance Minister in 2015 assured the states that such consent would be readily forth-
coming. Modi’s critics have likened this reduction of presidential assent to a mere formality to 
a “pernicious misuse of a constitutional provision” (Ramesh and Khan 2016).
As in the domain of forest governance, then, changes in the domain of land governance 
have followed a comparable autocratic modus operandi. Important legislations have been 
implemented via ordinances rather than through parliamentary procedure. The effect of the 
legal and policy changes discussed above has been to weaken a series of existing rights of land- 
dependent communities to enable the transfer of land to investors. Notably, efforts towards 
this end continue today. The government think- tank NITI Aayog continues to stress how land 
acquisition laws – that, as we argued above, ensure at least some measure of rights- based pro-
tection for small and marginal farmers and Adivasi – stand in the way of accelerated economic 
growth. Significantly, as Indian policy-makers and economists now debate how the economy 
can best recover from the damage inflicted on it by the Covid- 19 pandemic, “simplifications” 
to the central land acquisition law remain high on the list of prioritized reforms (Pandey and 
Arnimesh 2020). In the final section, we analyze further select changes introduced during the 
pandemic and the associated lockdown that affect environmental governance.
Under cover of Covid
In late March 2020, as the Covid- 19 pandemic spread worldwide, Modi introduced one of the 
strictest nationwide lockdowns in the world. It remained in place until 30 May, after which 
it was lifted in phases throughout 2020. Less than two weeks before the lockdown, the Modi 
government had put out a draft proposal to amend existing environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) norms. The draft proposal was roundly criticized by environmentalists and experts, with 
one scholar calling it “one of the most dangerous” of the many new laws and amendments 
introduced by Modi during the pandemic. The amendment, it was argued, would “deny citi-
zens the social, legal and political forums available to protect the environment from bad gov-
ernment decisions” (Menon and Kohli 2020). More specifically, critics pointed out that the 
draft notification thinned out the regulatory requirements across most project sectors, and 










thus reducing the level of public scrutiny. Additionally, the notification enabled projects which 
had begun construction activities – or were simply operating without obtaining a clearance 
altogether – to apply for post- facto clearance. The notification also centralized decision- making 
by doing away with the requirement that committees be set up in consultation with state 
governments, thus giving the central government more control over the constitution of regu-
latory authorities and expert committees. Importantly, the draft considerably undermined the 
importance of social decisions and public consultation with project- affected communities: the 
time period for the public to submit responses to project- related public hearings was reduced 
from 30 days to 20, and the timeline for completing the public hearing process reduced from 
45 to 40 days. This reduction of time is significant as it disproportionally affects marginal com-
munities in remote areas where information is not easily accessible. Moreover, in the draft noti-
fication, many projects now fall entirely outside the purview of public consultations altogether 
(Menon and Kohli 2020; Kumar 2020; Gupta et al. 2020).
Due to the lockdown, the meetings of the different panels, boards, and committees involved 
in granting environmental clearances were cancelled. However, they resumed in April over 
videoconferencing to “help clear proposals for seamless economic growth”, as the Ministry of 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) tweeted. During April and May, a full 
191 projects were up for clearance through videoconferencing, sometimes leaving as little as ten 
minutes for a given panel to deliberate on each project (Gokhale 2020). Indeed, on a single day 
in April, more than 30 proposals affecting tiger reserves, sanctuaries, eco- sensitive zones, wild-
life corridors, and other forest areas were cleared or discussed at virtual meetings (Ravi 2020). 
Among the many projects thus cleared were several big infrastructure projects and open cast 
coal mining in ecologically sensitive areas (Aggarwal and Ghosh 2020). This speeding- up of the 
clearance process in the context of a nationwide lockdown significantly reduced the scope for 
public deliberation insofar as affected communities could not send evidence or representations 
to the said panels, much less gather in public meetings to vent grievances or protest decisions. 
Nor could expert panellists do necessary field visits to verify facts independently.
This autocratic turn is further evident in how changes to environmental legislations and pol-
icies introduced under Covid- 19 have further centralized decision- making, weakened public 
consultation and participation, and intensified the persecution of environmental activists under 
lockdown. In July 2020, the government ordered that the websites of three environmental 
advocacy groups – Fridays for Future (FFF), Let India Breathe, and There Is No Earth B – be 
blocked. The domain name owner of the FFF – the Indian chapter of the movement initiated 
by environmental activist Greta Thunberg – was served legal notice from the Delhi police 
under sections of the draconian anti- terror law, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. 
The notice accused FFF’s site of containing “objectionable contents and unlawful activities 
or terrorist act, which are dangerous for the peace, tranquillity and sovereignty of India” and 
ordered it blocked. The three groups thus targeted were spearheading a public awareness cam-
paign and a petition against the changes introduced by the EIA draft notification discussed 
above (Huria 2020).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the autocratic turn in Indian environmental governance 
that has arguably occurred under Modi. This autocratic turn has been driven by the twin 
pillars of Modi’s authoritarian populism, namely aggressive business- friendly growth- oriented 
economic policies, coupled with a centralization of power and a strong fist to hold dissenters 
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that proactively works to enlist and weaken existing environmental laws and regulations to 
make natural resources available to investors: environmental clearances have been made easier 
to obtain, lands and forests made simpler to acquire, and monitoring mechanisms significantly 
weakened. The ways in which this has happened have had an evident autocratic undercur-
rent, as seen in recurring efforts to bypass parliament and the judiciary, weaken consultative 
forums, and dent existing legally enshrined rights to forests, lands, rehabilitation, and resettle-
ment. Activists and civil society groups who have “come in the way” of this policy approach to 
protect environment and marginalized communities have been subject to increasing policing, 
criminalization and persecution over the past seven years. This has taken place in the context 
of widespread suppression of peaceful protests and a shrinking of democratic space for civic 
activism. The apparent intensification of autocratization under the Covid- 19 pandemic does 
not, we believe, bode well for the future. Not only does it threaten to undo the advances made 
through years of post- colonial struggle by marginalized and tribal communities and environ-
mental groups; it also brings to a standstill future courses of green activism and progressive 
environmental legislation.
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The heartland heralds the new    
communal- authoritarian model    
of Indian democracy
Zoya Hasan
Indian democracy and its institutional structures face an unprecedented challenge. Elections in 
India are no doubt marked by high levels of political participation, political activity and voter 
turnout. But there’s more to democracy than the holding of elections at regular intervals. The 
greatest contemporary challenge to India’s democracy comes from majoritarian nationalism that 
seeks to reconfigure the Indian nation as one that belongs exclusively to the Hindu majority 
defined by a demographic trait. The landslide victory of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in 
2019 reinforced the majoritarian trajectory India has embarked upon since the 2014 election. 
The conflation between nationalism and majoritarianism is the foundation of the new political 
dominance reflected in the increasing mainstreaming of Hindu nationalism in the public arena.
This project has worked through two processes –  consolidation of Hindu dominance 
through authoritarian means and constant fear and objectifying of the other, defined in terms 
of religion, thus reminding people of a threat from an enemy within. This is the trope driving 
authoritarianism in Indian politics. More substantively, there is an attempt to redefine citizen-
ship on the basis of religion, not civic equality that respects diversity and pluralism, and in the 
process transform the very meaning of democracy based on equal rights. Furthermore, the 
space for public deliberation and dissent has been narrowed. Politically, the suppression and 
criminalization of dissent, curbs on opposition, and crushing of protests pose a grave threat to 
democracy. This has contributed to democratic backsliding in India, noted by several inter-
national assessments, most notably, the V- Dem Institute’s assessment which termed India an 
“electoral autocracy” (Lührmann et al. 2020). The political ecosystem has been vitiated by an 
erosion of public institutions which are meant to serve as checks and balances on the exercise of 
executive power. Although institutions have always had to negotiate with political rulers, and 
there have been periods in India’s past when things came to a flash point, Emergency (1975– 77) 
is an obvious example, never before have constitutional institutions had to function for political 
ends to this extent when there’s no formal declaration of Emergency.
The two principal elements of this tectonic shift are embodied in the acceleration of authori-
tarian control and stepping up of communalism since the BJP came to power at the Centre in 
2014. The coming together of both these elements has paved the way for the institution of a 






states such as Uttar Pradesh –  India’s weightiest state and a political springboard for the national 
stage. Nine of the country’s 14 prime ministers have been elected from constituencies in Uttar 
Pradesh. Narendra Modi, the current prime minister, is from Gujarat but chose to contest his 
first Lok Sabha election from the Varanasi constituency in Uttar Pradesh to underline the signifi-
cance of the state and the eagerness of both the BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
to signal its centrality to their strategy of establishing the dominance of Hindu nationalism. The 
BJP won a quarter of its 282 seats in 2014 from this state, helping it to an absolute majority in 
the Lok Sabha, and thus underlining the significance of the state in Indian politics.
Political developments in Uttar Pradesh fit into a more pronounced pattern of communal- 
authoritarian politics since the BJP was re- elected with a bigger majority in the 2019 general 
elections. Political shifts in this state are especially significant for what Pratap Bhanu Mehta 
describes as the wider process of creating “an irrevocably majoritarian state in all dimensions” 
(Mehta 2021). An examination of the working of the Uttar Pradesh regime and its politics 
would help to understand recent events that pose a challenge to Indian democracy and why it 
has increasingly become a host to aggressive communalism gradually morphing into an authori-
tarian order.
This chapter looks at the structural aspects of this project signified in the systematic attacks 
on dissent and the ways in which the checks and balances laid out in the Constitution for 
safeguarding fundamental rights have been compromised. This is attempted by looking at the 
state response to protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The government 
response encapsulates the problems of the communal- authoritarian model in a key state of 
the Union, where it has both a massive majority in the assembly and a chief minister who has 
demonstrated a penchant for extremism and vigilantism. By winning around 40 per cent of the 
popular vote in the assembly elections in 2017, the BJP mustered a huge legislative majority to 
go ahead with its political agenda virtually unopposed. In the rush to strengthen majoritarian 
consolidation, an authoritarian model of governing gained currency marked by erosion in civil 
and political rights and a wave of intolerance against dissenters and minorities.
Communal- authoritarian regime
The communal- authoritarian regime exercises power through majoritarian assertion, 
centralized control, curtailment of opposition, and suppression of individual freedom. The 
origins of this regime can be traced to the BJP’s decisive victory in the assembly elections in 
2017 in a campaign which openly pitted Hindus against Muslims with its top leaders insinu-
ating that the majority community had not received a fair deal under previous governments. 
The appointment of Ajay Mohan Bisht, generally known as Yogi Adityanath, head of the 
Gorakhpur temple, as chief minister was a defining moment in this process. His entire politics 
revolved around a militant brand of Hindutva, an ideology of Hindu supremacy and fuelling 
antagonism against Muslims as public enemies.
From his first days in office, the BJP interpreted its landslide victory as a popular mandate 
for its project to construct a Hindu state. Yogi Adityanath used the instruments of governance 
to prioritize Hindu interests and used the police to target minorities (Verma and Mander 2020). 
The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which offers pathways of citizenship to refugees 
aligned to religion (not limited to Uttar Pradesh), new laws regulating conversion as a way 
of deterring inter faith marriage, laws of cow protection, and also laws to empower vigilantes 
to take action on behalf of these laws are top priorities of the regime to reinforce Hindu 
supremacy. These are the various ways in which Hindu nationalism is inscribed in law. But not 
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This shift is based on two long-term projects: the first cultural and the second political. 
This joint project set the stage for the dramatic expansion of the Hindu right. The origins of 
the cultural project can be traced to the promotion of Hindi which played a key role in pro-
ducing a Hindi- Hindu socio- cultural construct in the politics of north India, and in particular 
the cultural development of Uttar Pradesh society. At the cultural level, the primacy given to 
Hindu identity is visible in the BJP– RSS’s efforts to play up Hindu fairs, festivals, and icons, and 
turning these into opportunities for political mobilization. The political project was embodied 
in the campaign for a Ram Mandir in Ayodhya which kick- started the rise of the current iden-
tity politics around religion. The construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya has redrawn the 
basic contours of state politics in favour of the BJP. Importantly, this movement laid the ground-
work for a communal majority in Uttar Pradesh which, given its huge size, helps the Hindu 
right to establish a strong base to offset its weakness elsewhere in India. The mass support 
garnered by this movement entrenched Hindu nationalism in the heartland.
The ideology of Hindu nationalism has succeeded in popularizing the idea that it is the 
nation, as defined by Hindu identities, that matters and no other identities such as caste. The 
nation is defined by Hindus, mobilized around their religious identity (and frequently a common 
language), which leaves little room for other identities. The BJP has used this broad- based iden-
tity to co- opt backward castes and Dalits who have been keen to align themselves to the cultural 
world of Hindi- Hindu nationalism. The consolidation of this identity has gone beyond caste, 
but this consolidation relies heavily on the exclusion of Muslims to neutralize caste.
Communal politics combined with longstanding problems of bias in the criminal justice 
system have created a pervasive climate of impunity, where minority communities feel inse-
cure, with no recourse when such crimes occurred. These fears have been compounded by 
targeted violence that takes a variety of forms, the most common being mass violence and mob 
lynchings. Several Muslims were lynched on allegations of eating beef or even just transporting 
cattle for slaughter. Most of those incidents were perpetrated by vigilante militias and were the 
direct result of the communal atmosphere that the Hindu right created with little scope for 
punishment of those who committed the crimes (Seema Chishti 2017).
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh have been marginalized and pushed out of the public sphere and 
from political institutions. The 2006 Sachar Committee Report had brought public attention 
to the backward socio- economic status of Indian Muslims, suggesting that in terms of such 
parameters as employment, education, and literacy, they were badly off, if not worse off, than 
the historically oppressed Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Most available official data 
and research suggests that there has been no substantive improvement in the condition of the 
Muslim poor (every third Muslim is multi- dimensionally poor, according to a 2018 UNDP 
report) and nowhere is this truer than in Uttar Pradesh (Friese 2018).
The politics of polarization has reduced Muslim electoral representation to an extremely low 
level in the state assembly. Christophe Jaffrelot points out, “in general, when the BJP conquers 
a new state that was ruled by a regional party, the number of Muslim MLAs drops” (Jaffrelot 
2019). This was dramatically demonstrated when the proportion of Muslim MLAs in Uttar 
Pradesh dropped from 17 per cent to 6 per cent in the 2017 assembly elections. The BJP didn’t 
field a single Muslim candidate in Uttar Pradesh even though Muslims constitute one- fifth of 
the population of the state. The basic idea is to push them out of the system, first by rendering 
them irrelevant electorally, and then marginalizing them in the public sphere through their 
electoral inconsequentiality. As a result, the BJP says it has ended the veto that Muslims had over 
a number of issues in Indian politics. This resonated with the Hindu base of the party which 
believed that Congress pandered to minority communities for electoral gains and that BJP was 







But the Uttar Pradesh regime is not only communal; it is also authoritarian in its attempts 
to exercise pervasive control. This regime brooks no dissent or protest. It targets anyone 
and everyone who dares to question the government, and this is not restricted to political 
Opposition alone. Public protests have been regularly stifled and a protest provides grounds for 
arrest and locking up protesters. The police can be sent anywhere to serve notice on citizens to 
stop them from participating in protests and journalists to stop them from covering them. More 
importantly, police have been given a free hand to detain and arrest people on any issue. On 
the whole, the politics of the BJP is both authoritarian and communal which tends to divide 
society by unleashing passions that relegate minorities to second class status. Communalism 
and authoritarianism are two sides of the same coin – the government was fomenting both 
processes (Mehta 2019). For this it creates the quintessential other, which communal politics 
continually needs to stoke hate and fear. Its aim is to corner minority groups by a constant focus 
on issues such as cow- protection, inter faith marriage, religious conversion, reconversion, and, 
most importantly, the CAA.
Citizenship Amendment Act
This brings us to the CAA and the public protests against it, the focal point of this chapter. 
In December 2019, Parliament adopted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which 
grants special access to Indian citizenship to non- Muslim immigrants and refugees from three 
neighbouring countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, on grounds of religious perse-
cution in these countries. The CAA seeks to fast track citizenship to non- Muslim minorities 
on grounds of religious persecution. It offers quick protection and citizenship by creating an 
exemption from the “illegal migrants” category for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and 
Christians from these three countries, but discriminates against refugees and immigrants who 
happen to be Muslim. The government claims that the legislation applies to those who were 
“forced or compelled to seek shelter in India due to persecution on the ground of religion”. 
The CAA is not, however, a stand- alone law. It is paired with a proposed National Register 
of Citizens (NRC) and the National Population Register (NPR). Many observers believe the 
national register’s purpose is to disenfranchise Muslim voters by effectively classifying them as 
illegal immigrants. These suspicions gained ground as BJP leaders publicly used the CAA to 
assure Hindus in other parts of India that they would be protected in the citizenship verification 
process and conspicuously omitting Muslims from the list of protected religions.
The CAA is illogical as it singles out one particular religion for exclusionary treatment. The 
assumption that Muslims cannot be persecuted in Muslim- majority countries and where the 
state religion is Islam is unconvincing. This assumption is belied by the ill- treatment of Hazaras 
Shias in Afghanistan and Ahmadiyas in Pakistan. This narrative would be diluted if it is shown 
that Muslims also face persecution in Muslim majority countries. There can be only one reason 
why a government would exclude ‘persecuted Hindu’ such as the Tamils of Sri Lanka from the 
list. It is because their oppressors are not officially Muslim or official representatives of Islam. 
Clearly, the idea is not simply to help persecuted minorities, but to demonize and isolate one 
group. Their exclusion furthers a political narrative that suits the right- wing ideology – that 
Muslims persecute non- Muslims. This narrative will be diluted if it were shown that Muslims 
also face persecution in Muslim- majority countries. This leaves no room for doubt that the 
CAA advances the government’s political agenda, which is to transform secular India into 
a majoritarian Hindu India. The CAA, in addition to making the naturalization of Muslim 
migrants from the neighbouring countries difficult, would, at an ideological level, establish the 
notion of India as a Hindu Homeland to which the BJP is doctrinally committed. The CAA 
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signalled a move towards the assertion of Hindu supremacy vis- à- vis people of other faiths, 
especially Muslims.
The attempt to create a stratified citizenship provoked a massive opposition, by far the 
biggest since Independence. It was the most sustained popular protest since the BJP came to 
power in May 2014. Since then, no action of the regime had provoked this scale of opposition. 
The ground of protest is clear: India cannot be a Republic founded on discrimination and a 
pervasive sense of fear. It cannot exclude or target anyone simply on the basis of their religious 
identity. Many people feared that the government could force citizenship reviews on all Indians 
and that Hindus without proper papers would be allowed to stay in India under the CAA while 
Muslims without proper papers would be asked to leave. Government denied this, affirming 
that they were merely seeking to address illegal migration and help persecuted minorities from 
neighbouring countries. Failing to convince many people, the government resorted to attempts 
to curb these demonstrations through widespread internet shutdowns, arbitrary arrests and bans 
on assemblies. In states like Uttar Pradesh the government responded with brute force.
Vilifying protests
The BJP government at the Centre launched a countrywide campaign to defend the CAA and 
to generate public support for it. The Uttar Pradesh government did nothing of the kind; it 
did not bother to explain the merits of the CAA and disabuse people of their apprehensions 
regarding its implications for them. Far from responding to legitimate concerns regarding the 
discriminatory aspects of the CAA, the state government went about vilifying and punishing 
those who criticized the new law. Several BJP leaders resorted to strange language to describe 
those who were protesting against the CAA. The deputy chief minister, Keshav Prasad Maurya, 
claimed that “Those who are opposing the Citizenship (Amendment) Act are mentally affected. 
Such people should get medical treatment” (The New Indian Express 2020). Another BJP 
leader, Raghuraj Singh, said that people raising slogans against Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
and Uttar Pradesh chief minister Yogi Adityanath “will be buried alive” (Outlook India 2020).
Citizenship protests and regime response
Major protests broke out in Uttar Pradesh. In fact this state was the epicentre of protests 
against the changes in the citizenship regime. Protests against the CAA were held at 102 
places across the state on 19 December (The Hindu 2019). The biggest demonstrations took 
place on the day of the all- India strike on 19 December called by various political parties and 
social organizations in the country under the common banner titled Hum Bharat Ke Log 
(We the People of India): National Action Against Citizenship Amendment (Clarionindia.net 
2019). Protests occurred in Firozabad, Bhadohi, Bahraich, Farrukhabad, Gorakhpur, Sambhal, 
Rampur, Moradabad, Meerut, Varanasi, Kanpur, Bijnor, Hathras, Saharanpur, Bulandshahr, 
Mahoba, Hamirpur, Lucknow, Allahabad, and Agra among others.
The protests were organized by a mix of civil society, local community and youth groups, 
and often just spontaneously to express opposition to the CAA. Many protest marches planned 
merely to hand over a memorandum to the local authorities but even this was frowned upon as 
the government was averse to any opposition to the CAA. It refused to allow any opportunity 
for people to express their disagreement with the Act. This was confirmed by a fact- finding 
report, which observed that “The police systematically attempted to prevent protests, then, 
when protests went ahead anyway, they used disproportionate and violent means to subdue 






to perpetuate the atmosphere of fear, with a longer view of breaking the economic spine of the 
Muslim community, the police destroyed and looted private residences” (Karwan- e- Mohabbat 
2020a).
From the beginning the government adopted a confrontational approach using strong arm 
tactics to curb and restrict protest. Public protests were harshly dealt with by selectively using the 
law- enforcement machinery to prevent people from protesting (Citizens Against Hate 2020), 
including the massive deployment of police, internet blackouts, and the imposition of curfews. 
Around 3,305 persons were detained by the police (Citizens Against Hate 2020). Even when 
there was no formal protest call, police forces were positioned in Muslim neighbourhoods to 
prevent people from gathering in groups making it effectively impossible for them to pro-
test. Section 144 was enforced all over the state ahead of protests on 19 December (Citizens 
Against Hate 2020). Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) of 1973 authorizes 
the District Magistrate to issue an order to prohibit the assembly of four or more people in 
an area. Section 144 is a serious restriction on the fundamental rights to expression, assembly 
and association and is expected to be invoked only in circumstances where concrete evidence 
is available of threats to public order (Yamunan 2019). It was later imposed in specific parts 
of cities, towns, and districts to prohibit people from gathering, especially in the western and 
central districts of the state which have a high concentration of Muslim population, and in the 
capital city of Lucknow, which also has a large population of Muslims.
The use of formidable new technologies for surveillance and control aided this process. 
These range from jamming the internet and cutting off mobile phone coverage, to using drones 
to closely monitor movement of people. Internet services were suspended in about a dozen 
districts. Public warnings, house arrests, and preventive detentions were then carried out against 
persons whom the authorities accused of coordinating protests, most often civil society notables 
and human rights defenders. Notices were issued to more than 3,000 people cautioning them 
not to participate or motivate others to participate in the protests (The Wire 2019).
Clamping down on dissent was manifest from the way the police were allowed to storm 
Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), a central, publicly funded university with a large number 
of Muslim students. State- wide restrictions against CAA protests had followed the initial pro-
test moves by AMU students. Protest marches, sit- ins, and debates on the university grounds 
had regularly taken place in AMU (Khan 2020). Both students and teachers led protest marches 
with memoranda to authorities to withdraw the CAA (The Indian Express 2019a). There were 
reports of harsh police action inside the campus, including in hostels; at least six students were 
hospitalized with grievous injuries (Karwan- e- Mohabbat 2020b). The police reportedly used 
stun grenades and fired tear gas canisters into student hostels.
Police crackdown to shut down protests had the opposite effect. People, horrified and angry 
at the violence, poured into the streets as never before. Overall, the state witnessed the harshest 
crackdown, making it something akin to a ‘war- zone’. Muslims were the main victims of state 
brutality and maximum casualties in the protests occurred in UP (Johari and Subramanian 
2019). At least 23 people were killed. Most of the dead were Muslim daily wage earners. 
Most of the deaths were caused by police bullets (Citizens Against Hate 2020). The police 
registered a total of 498 cases, took 5,558 people into custody, and arrested 1,246 people in this 
regard (DNA India 2019). The state government blamed the protesters for the violence while 
reports and videos indicate that the police attacked peaceful crowds with lathis, tear- gas, and 
bullets (Karwan- e- Mohabbat 2020a). These denials did not tally with accounts of local residents 
recorded in the various reports (Ahmad 2019). In some cases, police officers were captured on 
video breaking into people’s homes, roughing up the occupants, vandalizing private property, 
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No other state went this far in using punitive methods and encouragement of mobs to target 
legitimate protesters resulting in a widespread suppression of fundamental rights in the state 
during the anti- CAA protests (The Wire 2019). The Indian Express captured the adversarial 
character of the Uttar Pradesh regime in its editorial:
The right to assemble and protest peacefully is guaranteed by India’s Constitution. 
That thousands of people, particularly young people, belonging to diverse faiths, 
regions, ethnicity and language, have chosen to contest the CAA despite the tame 
response from political parties is a sign of the argumentativeness of Indian democracy. 
However, the state government was unmindful of democratic niceties. Its tone has 
been confrontational; it has refused to allow any outlet for people to express their dis-
agreement with the controversial Act.
(The Indian Express 2019b)
The excessive use of force was encouraged by the chief minister who issued threats of 
exacting “revenge” against protesters (Sharma 2019). Police action came after the chief min-
ister declared his plan to take revenge himself at a public rally (The Indian Express 2019c). 
As police violence in Uttar Pradesh made global headlines, his office posted a series of con-
gratulatory tweets: “Every violent protestor will cry now because there is a Yogi government 
in Uttar Pradesh.” These tweets posted from the account of the chief minister said: “Every 
rioter is shocked. Every demonstrator is stunned. Everyone has been silenced after seeing Yogi 
Adityanath government’s strict actions. Do whatever now, compensation will be taken from 
anyone who damages public property. Every violent protester will cry now because there is 
a Yogi government in Uttar Pradesh” (Deccan Chronicle 2019). Under his watch, the Uttar 
Pradesh police have acted as a “uniformed vigilante force” which has fired upon demonstrators 
with impunity, and especially during the CAA protests “behaved as if it were wearing khaki 
half- pants instead of uniform trousers” (Kesavan 2019).
Two days later, the chief minister said that “the cost of damage to property during the citi-
zenship protests would be avenged” with fines collected from those responsible. People across 
the state were served notices demanding monetary damages for alleged acts of vandalism of 
public property by arbitrarily confiscating people’s properties. Banners were put up at busy 
intersections in Lucknow displaying photographs and addresses of people who had been served 
recovery notices. The administration began proceedings by identifying and sealing properties 
of the accused (India News 2019). The action was part of the state- wide campaign to punish 
those allegedly responsible for violence (Hindustan Times 2020). The move to confiscate prop-
erty was illegal because it is not supported by any law and results in pre- judging people without 
a fair trial (Bhatnagar 2019). Confiscation of property normally occurs after a criminal trial. 
On 9 March, the Allahabad High Court ordered the Uttar Pradesh government to remove the 
posters and declared the action as “without having the authority of law”. The apex Court held 
that there was no law to support the actions of the state government. Rather than obeying the 
order, the government challenged it in the Supreme Court.
Many of those arrested were not even allowed legal help. Some advocates who reached 
out to victims were also arrested. The police excesses were a form of overreach that can only 
be characterized as repression (Citizens Against Hate 2020). The kambalchor (blanket theft) 
incident (18 January 2020) exemplifies this approach. Several women were protesting around 
Ghanta Ghar in Lucknow on a winter night in December (Business- standard.com 2020). Video 
footage shows the police turned up and snatched blankets and food leaving the protesters crying 







was done “in a legal way” and after following “due process”(Mathur 2020). There is no “law” 
that permits blankets to be stolen by the police from peaceful assemblies but the police brazenly 
claimed due process and even reprimanded people for spreading misinformation. This incident 
raises serious questions regarding the conduct of the police and state administration, and the 
degree to which their actions contributed to the escalation in violence (India Today 2019). 
It also raises questions about the use of law for unlawful actions. Furthermore, it indicates 
the institutionalization of discrimination within the state apparatus itself (Mathur 2020). This 
has resulted in police colluding with and outsourcing law enforcement to vigilante groups 
which has serious implications for the life and security of citizens. The government response 
to the CAA protests is indicative of how the BJP in Uttar Pradesh has institutionalized political 
repression.
Apart from some rulings by the Allahabad High Court, none of the public institutions have 
been effective in checking the excesses of the Uttar Pradesh police and administration. Indeed, 
powerful sections of society ranging from legal professionals and the media to bureaucracy 
and state law enforcement agencies have been only too happy to agree with the government 
in seeing every act of democratic dissent as an anti- national conspiracy to undermine the 
government.
The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh was elected with a huge majority and could have 
dealt with the citizenship protests more humanely but it didn’t because it lacks the demo-
cratic mindset to do so. The state government’s response was harsh, focused on isolating and 
punishing protesters (Ahuja and Singh 2020). The government refused to recognize the legit-
imacy of the protests, leave alone talking to or assuaging the misgivings of the protesters. This 
state stands out because its agencies were active perpetrators of violence. No other state has used 
the state apparatus and state violence to such degree to serve an ideological purpose.
The ideological signal it wanted to send out to the public was clear: the state and the 
nation belong to the majority (Bhushan 2019). India is a Hindu country and Hindus must 
have supremacy over its polity and society. Muslims have been given too much power by the 
Constitution and by political parties, especially the Congress, which ruled India for most of the 
years since Independence. The CAA is an attempt to change this. It is a political project that 
seeks to redefine citizenship in such a way, albeit legally, that Muslims become second class citi-
zens. The project’s objective is the eventual disenfranchisement of Muslims, and the CAA and 
the state government’s response to the citizenship protests is the clearest signal of this agenda. 
That this has found acceptance is an indication of the normalization of communalism at an 
ideological level and in political practice.
Divisive calculations and democratic backsliding
The authoritarian regime and its intolerance for dissent especially public protests have brought 
India’s democratic standing into question. The V- Dem Institute in its 2020– 21 report has 
faulted the performance of the Modi government on democracy and has said that India is no 
longer an “electoral democracy”, classifying the country as an “electoral autocracy” (Lührmann 
et al. 2020). Much of the decline which occurred after the BJP’s victory in 2014 was due to 
the restrictions on civil society and free speech and the crackdown against citizenship protests 
and government’s intimidation of critics. Many institutions that are meant to uphold the rights 
of citizens and society at large have been co- opted or subverted. Modern democracies rely on 
institutions to remain democracies. Institutions of democracy have proven to be weak. While 
every previous government is guilty of similar abuses, it seems that the nature and scale of 
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various democratic indices over the last few years noted above. The checks and balances of 
constitutional government have been weakened as the autonomy of major institutions has been 
seriously undermined. Institutions, which should be impartial, have been used in the service of 
the ruling party to stifle opposition.
Uttar Pradesh is the bastion of serious communal- authoritarian consolidation and penetra-
tion of civil and political society by the RSS which has changed the texture of civil society in 
that state. In consequence, Uttar Pradesh is well on its way to becoming a Hindu state. The 
regime’s political calculations have focused on maximizing power and outweigh any consid-
eration of how institutions should function in a democratic setup. An elected government is 
effective because of the moral authority it commands and the manner in which the govern-
ment exercises power. Institutions provide a framework of rights and wrongs, and governments 
function by persuading voters that they are doing the right thing. But in Uttar Pradesh, the 
moral authority to do so has been eroded by leaders who continue to steamroll norms associated 
with democratic freedoms and political decency. The courts and most of the media that usually 
provide checks and balances in a democratic system have been restrained.
The full force and brutality of the authoritarian state was demonstrated in the government 
response to the anti- CAA protests. The official response to the citizenship protests indicates that 
this regime is simply incapable of tolerating any criticism or dissent. The attempts to change the 
storyline into one of “violent, anti- national, separatist movement” are an indication of the disre-
gard of the democratic rights of people and follow a certain pattern of criminalizing protests. The 
communal axis has been used to divide society so that people cannot unite against the authori-
tarian state. To some extent the BJP has succeeded in consolidating a Hindu majority vote bank by 
co- opting lower castes into the saffron fold, based not on mobilization against the dominant castes 
but on the active subordination and subalternization of another population group; however, this 
cannot neutralize wider material and political discontents for too long. It is hard to imagine that 
there won’t be opposition against the way this regime has functioned to consolidate Hindu power.
There cannot be a democracy without debate and dissent, and where minorities do not have 
equal citizenship. In India the rights and freedoms relating to the voice of dissent are currently 
under threat whereas the voice which is consistent with the prevailing viewpoint enjoys the protec-
tion of the state and the majority. This has serious consequences for democracy. But this can change 
as there’s a growing reaction against authoritarian tendencies of the government and its policies and 
politics. The sizeable pushback from various groups and the numerous protests we have witnessed 
in the last few years indicate the limits of majority rule and the public resistance to redefining our 
democracy to make it majoritarian. Even if protests and dissent don’t have an immediate electoral 
impact, they do open the door for a more gradual erosion of the authoritarian regime.
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STATECRAFT AND MODI’S 
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM
Kenneth Bo Nielsen and Alf Gunvald Nilsen
Political scientists have rightly considered the government of the right- wing Hindu nation-
alist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which first came to 
power in the 2014 general election and then consolidated its position in the subsequent general 
election in 2019, as constituting a watershed in the political life of the Indian republic. Milan 
Vaishnav and Jamie Hintson (2019) argue that the 2019 elections ushered in India’s fourth 
dominant party system, centred on the BJP and its politics. Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles 
Verniers (2020: 143) go further, and argue that the 2019 elections brought about a new political 
system, as Modi 2.0 has “radically changed gears and used the legislative and executive route 
to transform India into a de jure ethnic democracy” (see also Nilsen, Nielsen and Vaidya 2022). 
“Indeed”, Achin Vanaik (2017: 29) writes, “the scale of BJP hegemony today can bear com-
parison to that of the Indian National Congress party in the first decades after Independence, 
under Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi.”
But how do we explain the politics of this new hegemonic order in India? In this chapter, 
we focus on how Modi’s authoritarian populism has come, increasingly, to mobilize the law in 
order to align the nation with the core tenets of Hindu nationalism. We see Modi’s authori-
tarian populism as a form of conservative politics that constructs a contradiction between 
common people and elites, and then uses this contradiction to justify the imposition of repres-
sive measures by the state (Hall 1988). We also see it, crucially, as a populism that draws a line 
between “true Indians” and their “anti- national” enemies, and subjects the latter to coercion in 
order, supposedly, to protect the former (Müller 2016). In line with the core tenets of Hindu 
nationalism, this line is defined in large part by religion – the ominous Other that authoritarian 
populism depends on in order to frame a unitary conception of the nation and national culture 
is, in Modi’s India, the Muslim (see Nilsen 2021a, 2021b). In this chapter, we analyze how this 
religiously defined dividing line is being codified into law in order to align the nation with the 
core tenets of Hindu nationalism. We refer to this particular enactment of the BJP’s political 
agenda as Hindu nationalist statecraft – that is, as a strategy centred on legally locking in claims 
that India is and should be a Hindu rashtra in ways that make it exceedingly difficult to reverse 
such claims in the future (see Nilsen 2020). In the hegemonic project of the BJP and the wider 
Hindu nationalist movement, we argue, this strategy allows religious majoritarianism to dictate 
law- making and override the precepts of secular constitutional morality, as well as the general 













violence, Hindu nationalist statecraft arguably poses the most serious threat that India’s secular, 
constitutional democracy has faced since its inception at independence in 1947.
The BJP from Ayodhya to Modi
The BJP first entered the arena of Indian politics as a minor player in 1980, when former 
members of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the political arm of the Hindu nationalist movement 
from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, established the party in order, as Christophe Jaffrelot 
(1996: 315) puts it, “to inherit the mantle of the Janata party” that had ruled India from 1977 
to 1980. Furthermore, this would require a relative side- lining of Hindu nationalism vis- à- vis 
socioeconomic interests, reliance on political leaders that could appeal to group and sectional 
interests rather than on ideologues, and a readiness to enter into electoral alliances with main-
stream political parties (ibid.: 315). However, it was not moderation that would propel the BJP 
from the status of a minor player to a force to be reckoned with in Indian politics – it was, 
rather, spectacular collective violence that drove this process.
In 1990, India was on the cusp of a dramatic political convulsion that unsettled the caste- 
based power relations that had prevailed since independence in 1947. In response to increas-
ingly militant demands from below, the central government – a coalition of non- Congress 
parties known as the National Front, with outside support from the BJP – introduced a 
comprehensive scheme of affirmative action, granting reservations of 27 per cent of all jobs 
in the public sector to lower caste groups, the so- called Other Backward Classes. This caused 
uproar among India’s middle classes and upper castes – the very same groups who constituted 
the core constituency of the BJP (see Hansen 1999). Responding to these developments, the 
BJP president Lal Krishna Advani launched a rath yatra – a chariot procession – that was to 
make its way across India to Ayodhya to lay claim to the disputed site of the Babri Masjid, 
a sixteenth- century mosque that, according to Hindu nationalist claims, had been erected 
on the birthplace of the Hindu deity Lord Ram. In doing so, Advani and other prominent 
BJP politicians aligned themselves decisively with the Ram Janmabhoomi (literally, birth-
place of Ram) movement of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) – a central 
node in the vast network of the Hindu nationalist movement – and its demand that the Babri 
Masjid should make way for a Ram temple. Advani’s goal was obvious, namely to shore up 
and consolidate middle class and upper caste support for his party (Hansen 1999; Jaffrelot 
1996:  chapters 12 and 13).
Beginning in late September 1990, Advani’s yatra mobilized thousands of volunteers – 
among them Narendra Modi, who at that point in time was a prominent Hindu nationalist 
activist – and crossed through hundreds of towns and villages. Deploying hard- line religious 
symbolism, the procession sparked violent communal riots, and Advani was finally arrested in 
late October as he attempted to cross into the state of Uttar Pradesh. Despite Advani’s arrest, 
large numbers of Hindu nationalist activists – estimates range between 40,000 and 75,000 – 
made their way to Ayodhya and laid siege to the Babri Masjid until they were dispersed after 
three days of running battles with security forces (Nilsen 2019). This, however, was not the end 
of the movement for a Ram temple in Ayodhya. On the contrary, in early December 1992, 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – the ideological backbone of the Hindu nationalist 
movement – organized a rally that attracted about 150,000 kar sevaks (activist volunteers) to the 
site of the Babri Masjid. After speeches by Advani and other central BJP politicians, the crowd 
attacked the mosque and demolished it. The destruction of the mosque sparked new rounds of 
communal violence, in which more than 2,000 people – the majority of whom were Muslims – 
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Whereas the demolition was a tragedy for India’s Muslim citizens, it was a successful stra-
tegic move on the part of the BJP, which had withdrawn its support from the National Front 
government after the violent end of the rath yatra. In the general elections that ensued in 1991, 
the party, which had now firmly established itself as a defender of Hindu values and interests in 
a changing nation, won 120 seats – up from 85 seats in the 1989 elections. And by the end of 
the 1990s – a decade that witnessed deepening communal polarization – the BJP found itself 
for the first time at the head of a national coalition government and decisively established as a 
force to be reckoned with in Indian politics (Hasan 2014:  chapter 1). In other words, Advani’s 
ploy to galvanize electoral support through religious mythology and violence paid off, and as 
such it constitutes a crucial prehistory to today’s political scenario in India, in which the BJP 
under Modi rules supreme.
The Emergence of Modi’s Authoritarian Populism
Modi’s rise to first regional and later national power was similarly lubricated by the kind of 
majoritarian collective violence that characterized Hindu nationalist politics in the 1980s and 
1990s. Modi’s trajectory began at an early age in the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and 
only shifted to the BJP in the late 1980s. In the BJP, he played an important organizational 
role in the series of marches that mobilized youth towards anti- Muslim violence, and which 
culminated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Indeed, Modi has been described as Advani’s 
“navigator” in his 1990 yatra (Kanungo 2019).
A decade later, Modi was installed as Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2001 to stabilize the BJP at 
a time of crisis. He had an unremarkable and not particularly popular term until events provided 
him with another opportunity to further Hindu nationalist politics by deploying extra- legal 
violence against minorities. In February 2002, a number of Hindu pilgrims were killed in a 
fire inside the Sabarmati Express train at Godhra station in Gujarat. Shortly afterwards, highly 
organized Hindu nationalist mobs who blamed Muslims for setting the train on fire unleashed 
an unprecedented anti- Muslim pogrom and attacked Muslim homes, neighbourhoods and 
businesses, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslims. After three days of silence during 
which violent Hindutva activists largely had a free run, Modi spoke only to apparently defend 
the perpetrators by calling the pogrom a svabhavik patrikriya, a natural reaction (Ghassem- 
Fachandi 2019). Modi’s association with the violence allowed him to reap electoral gains in 
successive state elections, to increase his grip over the state machinery and civil society (Shani 
2007; Basu 2015; Berenschot 2011), and even to establish a relatively independent position 
vis- à- vis the powerful RSS.
Between the anti- Muslim pogroms of 2002 and his ascension to the pinnacle of national 
political power in 2014, Modi was reinvented as a market- friendly technocrat and primary 
architect of Gujarat’s supposed development miracle (see Bobbio 2012, 2013; Sud 2012, 2020). 
This was the image that was front and centre of the BJP’s campaign for the 2014 general 
election: Modi was portrayed as vikas purush – a man of development who would extend the 
scope of the Gujarat miracle to the Indian nation (Nilsen 2021a, 2021b). However, although 
its articulation was more subdued, Hindu nationalism was never absent from the BJP campaign 
trail in 2013– 2014, and after the elections it became more and more central to the party’s 
agenda (Kaul 2017). A majoritarian cultural politics crystallized around issues such as cow pro-
tection, the communal policing of interreligious love and of women’s sexuality, the rewriting 
of school textbooks to bring them in line with Hindutva historiography, and the promotion 
of religious reconversion among Muslims and Christians (see Flåten 2016; Basu 2015). Hate 












Muslims and other marginal groups, such as Dalits. In fact, it was recently estimated that more 
than 86 per cent of all vigilante attacks on Muslims and Dalits since 2009 had taken place under 
Modi’s premiership (Abraham and Rao 2017).
Following the general election in 2019, this majoritarian violence has become intertwined 
with a systematic effort on the part of the government to write Hindu nationalist ideology into 
law in a way that is unprecedented in postcolonial India. Indeed, the 2019 election marks a point 
of transition in Hindutva politics under Modi. As argued in this section, during Modi’s first 
term in power, the majoritarian cultural nationalism that draws a line between “true Indians” 
and their enemies, and seeks to rally popular support for a crackdown on those enemies, was 
predominantly pursued through the vigilante violence of Hindu nationalist mobs. However, 
with the onset of Modi’s second term in power, we are witnessing an increased recourse to the 
law to further advance the project of turning India into a Hindu rashtra. It is this effort – the 
locking in of Hindu nationalist claims to the nation into law – that we refer to as Hindu nation-
alist statecraft, and to which we turn below.
The Politics of Hindu nationalist statecraft
In August 2019, the Modi government revoked Kashmir’s special constitutional status, rele-
gating what was then India’s only Muslim- majority state to a union territory. The abolition 
of Kashmir’s statehood was an act of territorial engineering designed to advance the idea of a 
Hindu rashtra in very tangible ways. Not only did it set the stage for an onslaught against insur-
gent citizens who are overwhelmingly Muslim, it also cleared the ground for changing the 
demography of the state. The revocation of Kashmir’s special constitutional status means that 
Kashmiri authorities no longer have the right to define who is a permanent resident with a 
right to own land in the state. This created the possibility of changing the make- up of its popu-
lation to such an extent that the aspiration among Kashmir’s Muslim- majority population for 
genuine freedom – for azaadi – would be rendered completely impossible (Nilsen 2020). As 
journalist Haris Zargar (2020a, 2020b) has noted, the subsequent introduction of new domicile 
land laws that discriminate in multiple ways against Kashmiris goes a long way towards redu-
cing Kashmir to a settler- colony of India and its Hindu majority. Indeed, as argued by Partha 
Chatterjee (2019), Kashmir may well be seen as the BJP’s laboratory for “developing the consti-
tutional rules of internal colonialism”. The symbolic politics of these legislative moves is abun-
dantly clear: the Hindu nation is to be built by purging India’s territory of the Muslim enemy 
within (see Nilsen, Nielsen and Vaidya 2022). But it may not stop there. As Chatterjee (2019) 
warns, the thrust of the majoritarian logic of Hindu nationalist statecraft nationalism may hit 
every minority – whether based on language, religion, caste, or gender – that appears to stand 
in the way of a homogeneous nationhood.
Subsequently, in November 2019, India’s Supreme Court passed its verdict in the Ayodhya 
dispute, in favour of Hindu plaintiffs who claimed the right to the land where the Babri Masjid 
stood until its demolition in December 1992. In doing so, the Supreme Court lent credence 
to Hindu nationalist mythology which claims that this land is the birthplace of Lord Ram, 
and therefore rightfully belongs to India’s Hindu majority. The verdict is troubling in itself. 
But even more worrisome, the verdict signalled that the Supreme Court, which is supposed 
to be an independent guardian of India’s secular constitutional democracy, and which had 
been hailed since the Emergency as the last resort of the oppressed and the bewildered (Baxi 
1985), had now been rendered increasingly “timid, tentative, fragmented and vulnerable, wary 
of hurting the central executive” led by Modi – who, tellingly, was the key speaker at the 
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trend for the Supreme Court to align itself with the political agenda of the Modi regime has 
intensified both prior to and after the Ayodhya verdict. This can be seen, on the one hand, in 
its non- confrontational stance on consequential legal interventions, including the abrogation 
of Article 370, and the Citizen Amendment Act and National Registry of Citizens that we 
turn to below; and, on the other hand, in the growing tendency – also prevalent in the lower 
courts – of citing “the national interest” to legalize the violation of citizens’ rights, thus tilting 
“the scales of justice…against those opposed to the Modi government” (Chhibber 2020). This, 
Jaffrelot (2020a) argued in late 2020, marks a striking departure from business as usual: “over 
the last four years, none of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions has come as a major embarrassment 
for the government. For these two power centres to be on the same wavelength for such a long 
time is unprecedented.” One expert on the Indian Supreme Court sees in this “the complete 
capitulation of the Supreme Court to the majoritarian rule of Prime Minister Narendra Modi”, 
reducing it to “a cheerleader for the Modi government’s agenda” (Bhuwania 2020).
The Ayodhya judgment, in turn, was followed in early December 2019 by the passing into 
law of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), mentioned above. The CAA offers expedited 
citizenship for persecuted religious minorities from India’s Muslim- majority neighbouring 
countries Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh who can prove that they have been living in 
India since before 31 December 2014. However, the CAA only extends this right to Hindus, 
Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis, but not to persecuted Muslims in these countries, 
such as the Ahmadis in Pakistan or the Hazaras in Afghanistan. Similarly, persecuted religious 
minorities from other neighbouring countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka or Myanmar cannot 
avail of the offer of expedited citizenship.
The CAA will work in tandem with a national population register and a National Registry 
of Citizens (NRC) under which the right to Indian citizenship is directly linked to whether or 
not individuals can prove that they were born in India between January 1950 and June 1987, 
or that they are children of bona fide Indian citizens. As people often do not have the kind of 
documents required by this process, many risk losing their citizenship. However, Hindus who 
find themselves in this situation can resort to the lifeline offered by the CAA. Given that this 
opportunity is not afforded to Muslims, the CAA –  NRC couplet is likely to create a hierarchy 
of citizenship graded along religious lines, in which Indian Muslims end up as second- class 
citizens (Nilsen 2020).
While the politics of Hindu nationalist statecraft is crucially enacted by the national govern-
ment, the division of legislative powers between the national parliament and the state assemblies 
means that Hindu nationalist statecraft increasingly also animates law- making at the level of the 
federal states – especially in states where the BJP is in power. One example of this is cow pro-
tection, which falls within states’ competence, and the related laws that have been introduced 
towards this end in different states since Modi came to power in 2014. Cow protection as a 
tactic to assert Hindu identity has deep roots among Hindu reform groups from the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, and was one of the core issues of the BJP’s predecessor, the BJS, imme-
diately after independence. Under Modi, it has acquired a renewed urgency. Modi is known 
to favour a national ban on cow slaughter (Andersen and Damle 2019: 179), but has so far not 
initiated the constitutional changes that would enable a national government to legislate on this 
issue. Instead, state- level legislative changes have systematically made the slaughter of cows or 
even the sale and possession of cow beef illegal in ever- larger parts of the country under Modi’s 
tenure (Jaffrelot 2019: 59). Modi’s home state of Gujarat, for instance, in 2017, amended an 
act from 1954 that criminalized cow slaughter, transportation of cows for slaughter, and the 
possession of beef, to extend the maximum sentence for cow slaughter to life imprisonment. 









2019) and Haryana have also toughened cow protection legislation by criminalizing beef con-
sumption in 2015. The former has imposed a total ban on the slaughter of all cattle (bulls and 
bullocks included) and has completely banned all transport of cattle out of the state (Ramdas 
2017), while in the latter, the state police has set up a “cow task force” (Jaffrelot 2019: 62). 
And Uttar Pradesh, under the hard- line Hindu nationalist chief minister Yogi Adityanath, 
recently imposed unprecedentedly strict legal punishments for various offences ranging from 
cow slaughter to “endangering the life of cows” by, for example, not providing them food 
and water. The Adityanath government is also known to publish the name and photograph of 
people accused of breaking the state Cow Slaughter Act if they try to evade the law enforcement 
agencies (Lalchandani 2020). Uttar Pradesh, along with Gujarat and Rajasthan, also recently 
introduced legal amendments enabling the confiscation of vehicles alleged to be transporting 
cattle for slaughter (Ramdas 2020). The southern state of Karnataka – ruled by the BJP since 
2019 – followed suit in 2020 by passing the Prevention of Slaughter and Preservation of Cattle 
Bill, 2020, a bill that not only bans the slaughter of all cows, bulls, bullocks and calves, but also 
outlaws the slaughter of buffaloes below the age of thirteen, makes smuggling and transporting 
animals for slaughter an offence and empowers the police to conduct searches based on suspi-
cion (Daniyal 2020).
These laws advance the project of Hindu nationalist statecraft in three interrelated ways. 
Most immediately, they criminalize the activities of entire beef eating communities, particu-
larly Muslims but also Dalits and Christians, and render everyday social, culinary and economic 
activities illegal. Second, this enhanced legal protection for the cow and higher sentences for 
offenders boosts Hindu nationalist cow protection vigilantes, who now feel that their vio-
lent actions are backed by the letter of the law and endorsed by the governments that passed 
them. Again, the victims of such violence are invariably Muslims (but also Dalits) accused of 
killing and eating cows or illegally transporting them for slaughter. Such violent “Islamophobic 
gastronomy”, Raj Patel (2018) argues, is in effect a way of adjudicating over citizenship 
that is becoming increasingly widespread within authoritarian populist regimes. Lastly, the 
consequences of the legal crackdown on beef have, in economic terms, hit Muslims and Dalits 
the hardest (Jakobsen and Nielsen 2021).
Another example of how Hindu nationalist statecraft that animates law- making at the level 
of the federal states is the recent introduction of laws by the Yogi Adityanath government in 
the state of Uttar Pradesh to prevent so- called love jihad. “Love jihad” is an Islamophobic con-
spiracy theory centred on the false claim that Muslim men marry Hindu women in order to 
force them to convert to Islam (Zargar 2020c). The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful 
Conversion of Religion Ordinance, which was passed into law in late November 2020, effect-
ively criminalizes interfaith marriages, and in doing so it extends Hindu nationalist statecraft 
into the intimate domain. Several other BJP- ruled states such as Madhya Pradesh and Haryana 
have signalled their intention to introduce similar legislation. Based on the ideological con-
struct of the Muslim man as a malevolent predator and the Hindu woman as a passive victim in 
need of patriarchal protection – a construct that has historically been foundational to Hindutva 
politics – the law echoes the foundational logic of Modi’s authoritarian populism, in which 
Muslims constitute an enemy within that must be defeated to guard the sanctity of the Hindu 
nation (Gupta 2021). Much like the case of cow protection laws, the Uttar Pradesh legislation 
against “love jihad” illustrates the proximity between Hindu nationalist statecraft and extra- legal 
majoritarian violence. The policing of interfaith relationships has been a staple activity among 
Hindu nationalist vigilante groups under Modi – indeed, as Jaffrelot (2020b) has commented, 
in promulgating this law, the BJP- controlled state apparatus is picking up the baton from these 
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Concluding remarks
There can be little doubt that India today is in the throes of a dramatic process of autocratization. 
Key pillars of the secular democratic order that came into being in 1947 are being eroded, and 
the driving force of that erosion is the politics of the Modi regime.
In this chapter, we have focused on the role that law and law- making has come to play in 
advancing a hegemonic project of authoritarian populism centred on a distinction between 
“true Indians” and their “anti- national enemies” within, embodied by Indian Muslims along 
with dissenters. Since Modi’s re- election in 2019, India’s BJP- led government has pursued what 
we refer to as Hindu nationalist statecraft – that is, writing the foundational claims of Hindu 
nationalism into law, and in so doing entrenching religious majoritarianism in the structural 
workings of the state. This obviously militates in fundamental ways against the secular fabric of 
India’s constitutional order, in particular by abrogating the democratic rights of minority citi-
zens in the country.
The turn towards Hindu nationalist statecraft must be understood as an extension of the 
strategies that the BJP has resorted to since it first made an appearance in India’s political 
arena in the 1980s, in which parliamentary politics is intrinsically related to extra- legal vio-
lence. Indeed, Hindu nationalist statecraft works to compound the vigilante violence that has 
proliferated in India since Modi first took power in India in 2014. The fact that democratic 
opposition to these developments – in particular the anti- CAA/ NRC protests of 2019 and 
2020 – has been curbed by coercive measures simply underscores the perilous nature of the 
conjuncture that the Indian polity and society are currently confronting.
Glossary
azaadi: freedom
Hindu Rashtra: Hindu state
Hindutva: Hinduness; ideology of Hindu nationalism
kar sevak: activist volunteer
rath yatra: chariot procession
svabhavik patrikriya: natural reaction
vikas purush: man of development
yatra: see rath yatra
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INDIA’S INEXORABLE PATH 
TO AUTOCRATIZATION
Looking beyond Modi and the populist lens
Soundarya Chidambaram
Introduction
The unlikely election of Donald Trump in the United States followed by the Brexit vote, contra 
extensive public opinion and scholarly research, brought into stark focus the rising appeal of 
populist parties and leaders across the western world. With similar trends manifesting in Eastern 
and Central Europe, Latin America, and Asia, populism has changed not only the landscape of 
global politics but also its lexicon (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018). While some scholars tend to assert 
that populist parties are synonymous with autocratization (Mudde, 2007), there are naysayers 
who highlight the intrinsic democratic potential of populism by examining movements such 
as Occupy Wall Street or populist parties like Syriza and Podemos. There are also differing 
perspectives on the causes of populism ranging from economic disaffection due to rising eco-
nomic inequalities, a backlash against neoliberal globalization, Euroscepticism, political dis-
enchantment with corrupt elite, to anti- immigration sentiments, and fear of loss of cultural 
status. One undeniable correlation though is that the electoral success of populist parties has 
also coincided with a decline of democracy across the globe (Günther and Lührmann, 2018). 
The focal point in this regard is the rise of populist demagogues and authoritarian strongmen 
who have caused democratic decline by cracking down on political dissent and curbing the 
autonomy of the judiciary and the free press, thus creating the conditions for democratic back-
sliding and decline (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018).
The path of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in India since 2014 seems to fit this description. 
The BJP’s hegemonic control of Indian politics has been coterminous with aggressive cultural 
nationalist rhetoric manifesting itself as routinized intimidation and killing of journalists and 
political critics, vigilante lynching of Muslims and general clampdown on dissent (Kesavan, 
2017). Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister and leader of the BJP, epitomizes the populist 
strongman with his charismatic appeal, centralization of power (Vaishnav, 2019), and ability to 
connect with the masses through clever use of media (Martelli and Jaffrelot, 2017; Vaishnav, 
2021). Not surprisingly, scholars and commentators looking at contemporary Indian politics 
converge on the idea that Modi’s populist leadership of the BJP is the reason for the havoc being 
wreaked on democratic institutions in the country (Kinnvall, 2019; Chatterji et al., 2019; Basu, 













However, crediting populist parties and leaders as the exclusive progenitors of authoritar-
ianism is to overlook the deeper societal churning that produces both authoritarianism and the 
rising appeal of populism. For instance in the US, Trump’s brand of populism is underpinned 
by a steady process of polarization and creation of echo chambers helping to entrench ethno- 
racially constituted “us” vs. “them” categories (Williamson et al., 2011). Admittedly, Modi’s 
unique hold over Indian politics and strongman style of politics has hastened India’s democratic 
decline, but we need to contextualize this within the broader trajectory of autocratization, and 
the chauvinistic nationalism of the radical right in India. Though there is an observed associ-
ation between the BJP’s populist trajectory (the posited independent variable here, or the “IV”) 
and autocratization (the dependent variable in this case, or the “DV”), I argue that grassroots 
mobilization by radical right organizations acts as a confounding variable that decides the rela-
tionship between these variables – that is, a third factor at play in the background that may affect 
the purported explanatory relationship between the IV and the DV. The Hindu rightwing 
movement’s targeted mobilization through civil society activism embeds majoritarian nation-
alism in public discourse, thus creating the impetus for autocratization while also helping the 
BJP’s political chances (See Figure 9.1).
This chapter thus provides a corrective to the predominant ways in which discussions about 
autocratization and radical right movements are often framed. The former is discussed as a 
consequence of a discrete event in time such as a populist win. The latter is perceived either 
through the lens of violent tactics or simplistically as a means to advance electoral goals. The 
chapter is organized thus. Section II defines key terms, reviews the literature, and provides the 
framework for understanding why and how civil society works as a transmission channel for 
majoritarianism and autocratization. Section III uses the case of Karnataka in south India to 
illustrate the central argument by looking at how grassroots mobilization is custom fitted to 
regional specificities in order to advance the cause of majoritarian nationalism. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the implications for the study of Hindu Right mobilization in India. 
The case study particularly illustrates the path forward to understanding why, despite the macro 
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Figure 9.1 Theoretical framework specifying the main argument as compared to conventional 
explanations through identification of the confounding variable.




Looking beyond Modi and the populist lens
103
across regions and states. The chapter ends somewhat pessimistically by forecasting a trajectory 
of further autocratization once the populist moment passes.
Understanding the trajectory of autocratization in India 
through the civil society lens
India’s path to democratic decline has come into stark relief recently. Varieties of Democracy 
now classifies India as an electoral autocracy (Alizada et al., 2021). Freedom House has 
downgraded India’s ranking from Free to Partly Free “due to a multiyear pattern in which the 
Hindu nationalist government and its allies have presided over rising violence and discrim-
inatory policies affecting the Muslim population and pursued a crackdown on expressions of 
dissent by the media, academics, civil society groups, and protesters” (Freedom House, 2021). 
In particular, these measures capture what the state does to hinder democratic foundations. 
However, autocratization is not merely the cumulative effect of state actions that erode 
macro- indicators of democratic functioning. Such a conceptualization would implicate pol-
itical parties of all ideological persuasions in India, and certainly, Modi’s rise to power in 
2014 would not then constitute the flipping of the democracy/ autocratization switch. I argue 
instead that autocratization should be understood as an incremental process of democratic 
erosion that, in India, has come about through the gradual mainstreaming of majoritarian 
ideas – a process mediated as much by grassroots radical right mobilization as it is by top- down 
political party actions. I use the term majoritarianism in this chapter, drawing upon Hansen’s 
(2019) definition: “Majoritarianism commonly refers to the idea that pre- existing ethnic, 
racial or religious majorities have a natural right to dominate a certain political entity.” In this 
sense, autocratization is as much a refl ection of people’s acceptance of the reversal of demo-
cratic principles in favour of chauvinistic nationalism and a narrow conception of citizenship. 
Viewed thus, authoritarian politics in India has a much longer history that predates Modi’s 
brand of populist politics.
This brings us to the radical right and the BJP’s place in this universe vs. the conven-
tional left– right spectrum. First, it is somewhat incongruous to equate the BJP with populist 
parties in the west. The latter, despite underlying nationalist and xenophobic elements, are 
essentially rooted in economic discontent and political disenchantment. In contrast, chauvin-
istic nationalism is at the core of the BJP’s ideological agenda (Dreze, 2020; Jaffrelot, 2019), 
while its economic positioning changes on a need- to basis (Basu, 2018; Mukhopadhyay, 2019; 
Roychowdhury, 2017; Sen, 2019; Sircar, 2020). While comparisons could be made to “nativist 
populist radical right” parties in Europe that have sprung from exclusionary nationalist ideolo-
gies like Sweden Democrats or Golden Dawn in Greece (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017), two 
factors that set the BJP apart are i) its relative electoral strength, and ii) its unique advantage due 
to its embeddedness within a larger established movement.
To illustrate the first point, parties such as the Sweden Democrats, UK Independence Party, 
Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and to some degree the National Front in France, 
were fringe/ marginal parties that only recently gained traction due to a unique confluence of 
economic crisis coupled with increased immigration (Larsson, 2016). In contrast, the BJP’s pol-
itical trajectory has always been much more mainstream. Secondly, the BJP is one constituent 
of the organizationally streamlined, well resourced, radical right social movement in India that 
targets diverse grassroots constituencies through group- specific initiatives vernacularized to 
appeal within local contexts. In this chapter, the term radical right is used to characterize 
parties and movements rooted in an ethnic conception of nationhood and that use nationalist 











For the radical Hindu right movement (referred to as Hindu Right in the text), the use of such 
chauvinist nationalist rhetoric is not merely a means to an end – an electoral strategy chosen 
for its political expediency – but rather the end itself in trying to bring its vision of the “Hindu 
Rashtra” to fruition. Modi himself is a product of the rightwing movement. He not only rose 
up the ranks of the Hindu Right but it was the latter that laid the groundwork for the appeal of 
Modi’s rhetoric (NPR, 2019). This theoretical distinction between right populism and trans-
formative radical right movements is important because while perhaps an electorally expedient 
populism can be resisted as we are seeing now in the US, the transformation of public con-
sciousness using the civil society route is more insidious and much harder to displace (Vanaik, 
2017). In India, what one may be witnessing is not just a temporary institutional decline of 
democracy but an ideological reckoning with democratic norms. For instance, Palshikar (2015) 
characterizes this phenomenon as the tilting of political culture in India towards Hindutva, 
while Harriss et al. (2017, p. 7) use the term “banal Hindutva” to describe this “steady spread of 
everyday forms of Hindu nationalism”.
This brings us to the key explanatory variable, the radical right movement’s civil society 
mobilization in India. For a long time, civil society was perceived to be an inherently pluralistic 
space that increases social capital (Fukuyama, 2001; Putnam et al., 1994). However, now there 
is empirical evidence highlighting the dark side of social capital (Berman, 1997; Bermeo and 
Nord, 2000; Carothers and Barndt, 1999; Diamond, 1994; Shirer, 1990; Whitehead, 1997). 
More broadly, it is no longer easy to dismiss the civil society sphere as a realm for non- state 
actors without political power or electoral impact. Civil society is neither epiphenomenal 
nor peripheral to national political developments. The Hindu Right’s positioning as a social 
movement acting through civil society outside of formal political mechanisms is important par-
ticularly since it can mobilize various constituencies through strategies that are not available to 
the political party.
Studies that look at the Hindu Right’s civil society activism often tend to focus narrowly 
on militant and provocative mobilization such as riots, religious processions, cow protection, 
or “love Jihad” as the route through which the rightwing primes its target audience and creates 
antagonistic narratives (Fuller, 2001; Kanungo, 2008; Spodek, 2010; Vijayan, 2018; Zavos, 
2001). However, contentious polarization is not the only mode through which the Hindu 
Right lays the groundwork for the spread of majoritarian rhetoric. For instance, Islamist social 
movements provide a good point of comparison for how targeted welfare provision is used to 
advance movement goals rather than narrow electoral gains (Cammett and Issar, 2010; J. Clark, 
2004; Clark, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2000). In similar vein, the Hindu Right uses seemingly 
innocuous social service provision activities to create opportunities to connect with local com-
munities in non- provocative ways that nonetheless come with socialization into the core agenda 
(Beckerlegge, 2016; Bhattacharjee, 2016; Chidambaram, 2012; Jaffrelot, 2008; Thachil, 2011). 
Beginning in the mid- 1990s, the Hindu Right strategically invested in welfare provision to 
local communities across India (see Figure 9.2). This was partly due to the backlash against 
the nationwide violence following the rightwing- led movement that led to the demolition of 
a 500- year- old mosque in northern India in December 1992. Welfare was also perceived as a 
means to counter lower caste mobilization that would hamper the movement’s vision of an 
undivided Hindu society (Jaffrelot, 2005).
However, many studies look at communities or regions in isolation (Baviskar, 2005; Dhar, 
2004; Fuller, 2001; Hansen, 1996; Lobo, 2002; Longkumer, 2016; Teltumbde, 2020), or at 
aspects of welfare provision such as education without evaluating the broader connections that 
come about through these initiatives within local spaces (Chaudhary, 2017; Froerer, 2007; 
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to understand the concurrent mobilization of disparate sections within diverse spaces. First, 
I look at how education- focused welfare provision is utilized beyond just the target audience 
as a means of community- wide mobilization. Additionally, I look beyond welfare provision 
to focus on how heterogeneous segments of society simultaneously become primed to lean 
towards majoritarian ideas despite their very different socio- economic needs and characteristics. 
To do this, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork from the southern Indian state of Karnataka. 
I examine two varied sections of the urban population in Bengaluru, Karnataka’s capital city –  
slum communities and young professionals in the IT/ BPO sector – using fieldwork conducted 
in the city in 2009 along with secondary literature.
Karnataka: an empirical case study
Karnataka is an interesting case study for grassroots mobilization and autocratization. The 
Hindutva movement was traditionally an important influencer of politics in the northern part of 
India. In contrast, the south, with its history of social justice movements and anti- Brahminical 
politics, was seen as impervious to rightwing ideological mobilization. The emphasis on a 
Sanskritized homogeneous Hindu identity in particular did not often mesh with the religio- 
cultural traditions of the south. Yet, Karnataka is the one southern state where the BJP has 
consistently done well in the last two decades, both in national and in state elections. The 
state has also experienced intense polarization, anti- minority violence against Muslims and 
Figure 9.2 Seva Bharati’s expansion of welfare projects in India over two decades
Source: Data from various print and web editions of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s publications, Seva 
Disha and Sewa Sadhana, which provide detailed records of welfare initiatives launched by the grassroots 







Christians, incidents of moral policing by vigilante Hindu groups, and riling up controver-
sies around wedge issues (Pinto, 2013; Sayeed, 2018; Kuthar, 2019). This ostensibly seems 
to confirm the hypothesis that the BJP’s rise to power legitimates the space for majoritarian 
mobilization and autocratization. However, organizations affiliated with the Hindu Right had 
been building connections with local communities in Karnataka long before the BJP achieved 
electoral success in the state. One could plausibly argue that the mainstreaming of exclusionary 
majoritarian narratives is the denouement of a steady process of rightwing mobilization of 
grassroots constituencies in Karnataka. I flesh out the micro- level dynamics of how this mobil-
ization takes shape differently depending on the audience.
Service provision in urban slums
Poor urban communities in India often face acute gaps in basic service provision. Forced to live 
in urban slums, they experience severe under-provision of basic services such as water, sanita-
tion, and health services (Bapat and Agarwal, 2003; Zerah, 2000). In addition, they often lag 
behind in terms of access to education. Relying largely on government- run schools that suffer 
from poor infrastructure, teacher absenteeism, or staff shortages, puts students coming from 
poorer communities at a disadvantage (Agrawal, 2014; Desai et al., 2014; Kingdon, 2007). 
Neoliberal reforms pushed many such urban communities into precarity by forcing them 
into the informal sector (Harriss- White and Gooptu, 2001; Hensman, 2001; Roychowdhury, 
2003), while exacerbating the gaps in public service provision. The absence of an organized 
union or civil society response leaves them without adequate representation or social safety 
nets. This was also the period when Seva Bharati (an RSS affiliate organization that caters spe-
cifically to urban slum communities) began investing significant resources in social services, 
particularly free educational services to children such as tutoring and/ or offering alternatives 
to government- run schools across India (refer to Figure 9.2 above). The neoliberal economics 
of the 1990s provided the rightwing organizations a captive audience as it were for the uptake 
of this welfare strategy. This welfare provision trend was mirrored in Karnataka as well where 
there was a significant expansion in welfare provision by the Hindu Right (see Figure 9.3), and 
great emphasis on education initiatives in urban slums as revealed below.
My fieldwork revealed that Rashtrothana Parishat (RP), a rightwing affiliate organization 
which helped administer education- related welfare projects on behalf of the Seva Bharati, 
managed 150 non- formal tutoring centres in 109 urban slums in Bengaluru. The initiative 
employed 200 teachers, who were overseen by supervisors and provided monthly training 
sessions. I observed two such tutoring centres in two slums in the city to understand the 
dynamics and impact of community mobilization. First, these centres used education as the 
first step in the path towards more rigorous ideological immersion for schoolchildren (Sagar, 
2020). This was done through the medium of curricular content but also participation in 
other activities. These centres were informal and were not forced to adhere to any approved 
models of coursework or monitored by any regulatory body. They developed their own cur-
riculum using textbooks published by the RSS and the RP. The daily lesson plans helped 
disseminate majoritarian narratives through an emphasis on religio- cultural rituals and Hindu 
samskara (traditions) such as prayers and songs. Lessons about Hindu mythology were then 
seamlessly connected to historical events and patriotism, thus grounding nationalism in Hindu 
beliefs. My interview with a senior functionary of the Karnataka branch of Vidya Bharati (an 
RSS affiliate organization working in the field of education) provided interesting insights into 
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We insist on religious prayers, shlokas (Sanskrit religious chants), worship of Hindu  
gods at our educational centres and schools. Our philosophy is that teaching only  
school subjects is not enough. Emotional grounding is needed. We do not just teach  
geography, we emphasize religious geography. We want children not just to be able to  
mark the Ganges on the map of India, but truly understand why the Ganges is sacred  
to Hindus. We want to create amongst children an emotional attachment to the land.  
Some communist organizations and media people allege that what we are doing is  
“Saffronization” of education. To such skeptics, my answer is yes, we are providing  
religious education in the business, because we believe that education should be spir-
itually rooted and because this is giving us success.
(Interview with Assistant Organizational Secretary,    
Vidya Bharati, 12 August 2009)
Teachers interviewed at the centres revealed that teenage boys good at sports and physical 
activity (the instructors were supposed to monitor this and report to the Parishat) were asked 
to attend weekly training camps at the Parishat premises on Sundays to learn martial arts, watch 
patriotic films and have conversations about nationalism and Hindu values. Periodically, trainees 
from all centres across the city would be invited to attend state RSS meets where prominent 
national and state level RSS leaders were invited to talk. For instance, during the course of 
the fieldwork, I was able attend one such public meeting in Bengaluru addressed by Mohan 
Bhagwat, the national leader of the RSS, on 22 November 2009. Newspapers estimated that 
around 15,000 RSS activists had gathered to hear the meeting. I was able to ride with a group 
of RSS workers and trainees from one such training centre. As we rode past a mosque or a 
church, the RSS workers started shouting slogans about Hindu unity, perhaps revealing the 
exclusionary and majoritarian way of thinking emphasized by these centres.
Figure 9.3 Seva Bharati’s expansion of welfare projects in Karnataka over two decades
Source: Data from various print and web editions of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s publications, Seva 
Disha and Sewa Sadhana, which provide detailed records of welfare initiatives launched by the grassroots 






Second, the centres played a significant role in creating legitimacy for the Hindu Right 
within communities, paving the way for the uptake of other initiatives. The centres immersed 
themselves in the local social dynamics of the neighbourhood, and recruited instructors and 
volunteers from the local community, often providing much needed employment avenues as 
well as opportunities for upward social mobility, thus gaining acceptance and support within 
the communities. My interviews with the two instructors at the two centres revealed that both 
of them viewed their position with the Parishat as appealing long- term opportunities because 
of the lack of other channels of mobility/ employment and the lack of linkages with local pol-
itical patrons to advance their cause. One instructor specifically mentioned the apathy of the 
local councillor of the neighbourhood, responding to whether there had been any local pol-
itical resistance to the setting up of a tutoring centre there, thus indicating why such service 
provision gains credibility quickly (interview with instructor, 1 December 2009). The other 
instructor told me that they had been promised a permanent teaching position (interview with 
instructor, 5 December 2009).
Third, the centres used their space for community celebration of Hindu festivals. This 
had two effects, both of which aligned with the Hindu Right’s movement goals. Since these 
centres were often situated in religiously heterogeneous communities, the celebrations created 
local flashpoints used to drive a wedge between different religious groups, thus constructing 
ethnic antagonisms (this insight came from an interview with a professor of urban policy who 
had extensively studied Bengaluru’s urban slum dynamics. The interview was conducted on 
3 August 2009). Secondly, the celebrations served as platforms for political mobilization. It 
gave centres the opportunity to involve parents and the broader Hindu community in ongoing 
conversations about religion and culture, and building connections between communities and 
movement leaders who were periodically invited to speak at these occasions. Women, in par-
ticular, were incentivized to participate in Hindu religious rituals at temples and bhajan mandalis 
for religious prayers by employing games and competitions with cash prizes [interviews with 
centre instructor and two women in the neighbourhood, 5 December 2009]. I interviewed 
two journalists from two different newspapers who had reported about these centres and they 
corroborated this fairly standardized pattern of mobilization. “The first contact is through 
women and children. Free summer camps provide huge incentives for parents. Bhajan classes 
draw in the women. There is subtle inculcation of Hindu- centric rhetoric”, reported one jour-
nalist (interview on 10 August 2009). “Educational manipulation has always been at the top of 
the RSS agenda. That is the way to promote cultural nationalism. Women are an untouched 
electorate and the RSS is cashing in on this advantage. The RSS has been operating clandes-
tinely at the grassroots here for a long time”, confirmed another journalist (interview on 12 
August 2009).
On the one hand, the curriculum subtly created a synergy between Hindu religio- cultural 
traditions, patriotism and nationalism. Simultaneously, the centre mobilized the wider com-
munity beyond the intended audience of schoolchildren. They used the centres to create 
tangible rewards for the local community such as employment. They also mobilized women 
through activities that strategically straddle the middle ground between “traditional” and 
“modern”, thus creating culturally/ ideologically appropriate public spaces for women to serve 
within the local community without transgressing patriarchal boundaries. Thus, education 
became a means to a larger end – the incentivized incorporation of the broader Hindu com-
munity within the movement fold. Overall, it helped establish homogenized narratives and 
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Modern- age shakhas for young IT professionals
At the time of the fieldwork, the RSS had also made a significant impact amongst young 
professionals that had become part of Bengaluru’s IT success story. The IT/ BPO sector was 
one that was traditionally ignored by trade unions for a long time. A Member of Parliament 
belonging to a left party told me that the left trade union movement had found it hard to 
unionize or mobilize IT professionals using traditional means. “The IT crowd is apolitical, 
and the trade union movement in Bengaluru has pretty much disappeared” (interview on 17 
November 2009). Yet, the RSS had creatively reached out to them using welfare provision. My 
interviews with RP and an associate affiliate, Youth for Sewa, revealed that many people were 
initially attracted to volunteering opportunities for Parishat- sponsored activities such as blood 
donation drives, mobile health camps, or teaching children at the slum tutoring centres on a 
part- time basis (interview on 14 August 2009). This was then converted into broader politically 
themed meetings about religious conversion, terrorism, and nationalism among other themes 
(Lulla, 2010; Nanjappa, 2007). They were then recruited to attend IT Milans – a weekly adap-
tation of the traditional RSS daily shakha meetings. These allowed for IT professionals coming 
to the city from different parts of India to become part of a like- minded community. It was an 
initiative that began in 2000 that within a decade had grown to over 134 such meeting groups 
bringing together 6,000 professionals on a regular basis (Aravind, 2016). The RSS was able to 
woo young professionals to these meetings via offering Yoga lessons as a means of de- stressing 
and invoking Corporate Social Responsibility to get them involved in volunteer activities.
It would be erroneous to argue that all public discourse reflecting majoritarian and anti- 
democratic ideas can be traced back to these grassroots right organizations, or discount the 
fact that BJP’s electoral wins helped reinforce these trends. However, one has to acknow-
ledge that such civil society interventions definitely helped move the needle on how major-
itarian ideas began to be perceived and debated and what kind of mainstream acceptance/ 
support they have garnered over the years (Lankesh, 2008). In Karnataka, majoritarian notions 
about the protection of Hindu religious traditions and idealized revisionist historical narratives 
were reflected in macro- level policies, leading to several controversial bills. The Karnataka 
Prevention of Slaughter and Protection of Cow bill was passed in 2010 in what Rao (2011) calls 
silent communalism and religio- environmentalism. Similarly, a draconian anti- terrorism law, 
Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes (Amendment) Bill, perceived as targeting minority 
groups, was passed in 2009 (Sayeed, 2009). Rightwing affiliate organizations were accused of 
trying to “saffronize” school textbooks by introducing revisionist versions of history and culture 
(Chopra, 2012). Mass protests using ground- level volunteers were organized to rile up contro-
versy around syncretic religious sites such as Bababudangiri (Menon, 2003). All these policies 
in a sense are a macro- aggregation of the kind of small- scale interventions initiated within local 
communities.
What the case study reveals markedly is the fact that these customized rightwing initiatives 
largely eschewed overtly negative, aggressive, or violent messaging in trying to draw two 
disparate segments into their network. Yet these actions were no less effective in how, over 
time, they changed broad attitudes towards minority rights and right- leaning policy agendas 
that were contrarian to secular democratic principles. Welfare provision allowed for inclu-
sion of marginalized segments of society. Yet, as the outreach towards Bengaluru’s IT sector 
demonstrates, the rightwing movement acts strategically by “vernacularizing” its initiatives in 
innovative ways to reach heretofore unmobilized constituencies. Overall, these civil society 













The previous section established that the propagation of majoritarian nationalist discourse and 
the unfolding of autocratization is not simply a top- down process set in motion by populist 
strongmen. What the Karnataka case study demonstrates is how rightwing grassroots priming, 
the confounding variable identified in this study, works. The subtle nuances and impact of 
local mobilization initiatives are often overlooked because of the spotlight on aggressive tactics 
employed by right vigilante organizations. Everyday exposure to exclusionary and nativist ideas 
via innocuous community initiatives gradually mainstreams narratives that are polarizing, and 
over time leads to ethnic antagonisms. It is this slow entrenchment of majoritarianism that 
helps lay the groundwork for both autocratization of society and polity, and electoral vic-
tories for the BJP. This process could not be comprehended if one were to take a narrow view 
of autocratization and the rightwing in India. How the rightwing movement works at the 
grassroots through the civil society sphere is key to understanding how public culture has grad-
ually transformed in favour of an ethnonational view of the nation.
The Karnataka case study reveals an additional important insight about the Hindu right’s 
grassroots strategy. It is not surprising that the Hindu Right movement constructs exclusionary 
ethnonational “us” vs. “them” narratives by reinterpreting local cultural leitmotifs in various 
vernacular contexts. What this chapter uniquely illustrates is how these narratives are packaged 
and targeted at disparate constituencies using the rightwing’s diverse network of specialized 
affiliate organizations. Moreover, grassroots mobilization is not monolithic. While there is a core 
emphasis on welfare, at the same time rightwing affiliate organizations are able to expand beyond 
this focus and customize strategies to appeal to various constituencies across different states/ 
regions. Locally relevant and resonant strategies of mobilization are a key part of the rightwing’s 
arsenal. For instance, grassroots mobilization using aggressive “love jihad” or cow protection 
discourses is more evident in rural mofussil areas in north Indian states than in say urban parts of 
Karnataka. Even these more overtly aggressive forms of cultural policing vary in intensity tem-
porally. Thus, from the perspective of future research, a fine- grained analysis is likely to reveal a 
significant degree of subnational variation in the kinds of themes and outreach activities that are 
used. It is also likely that there is significant variation in trajectories and timelines with respect to 
how quickly and deeply majoritarian discourses take hold and change political attitudes. For our 
current analysis, what appears then to be a macro trend that aligns with the global populist wave 
is essentially a cumulative process made up of smaller micro- level changes.
Historically, there has been a great ideological and strategic synergy between the rightwing 
movement and the party’s agenda. However, with the populist approach yielding dividends, 
the fulcrum of decision- making seems to have shifted to the Prime Minister’s office. However, 
there are also limits to constructing antagonistic ethnonational narratives for political mileage 
narratives and painting all political opponents as anti- national. Even with the decisive major-
ities in both 2014 and 2019, there are regions in the south and east that remain invulnerable 
to the righting mobilization that uses provocative cultural nationalistic messaging. Election 
losses in states such as West Bengal in the 2021 state legislative elections demonstrate this. The 
government’s handling of the nationwide protests on the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 
and farmers’ agitations against new farm laws passed in 2020 to restructure the agriculture 
sector has drawn political criticism nationally and internationally, sometimes even from its own 
affiliate organizations, thus denting Modi’s carefully crafted image. Similarly the downgrading 
of India’s democratic ratings as well as attacks on academic freedom have drawn both national 
and international censure. What does this mean for BJP’s brand of populism, the broader 
movement, and consequently autocratization of politics? When the populist moment inevitably 
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runs out of steam, the party may have to go back to its organizational roots as it were, and act in 
synergy with the broader ideological movement agenda to refresh its image. This portends not 
an abatement but rather an exacerbation of the authoritarian trends that are already in motion 
across the country. A final pertinent question is can this process of autocratization (populist or 
not) be reversed? Can the deeply embedded discursive hegemony be effectively challenged? As 
the powers- that- be curb the space for meaningful dialogue and contemporary public discourse 
views even legitimate protests as seditious dissent, it is hard to imagine how these opposing 
forces can be reconciled.
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The debate on democracy today has rather suddenly taken a turn for the worse. At no point 
in post- World War II history have so many democracies flirted with authoritarianism. While 
definitions of backsliding proliferate (Przeworski 2019), few would question that in many dem-
ocracies today the fundamental liberal pillars of democracy – the separation of powers, the pro-
tection of individual liberties and the autonomy of civil society – have been directly threatened. 
Cases range from older and supposedly more institutionalized democracies such as Trump’s 
United States, to post- Soviet Eastern Europe (Orban’s Hungary and the PiS in Poland), and 
the younger democracies of the post- colonial world including Bolsonaro’s Brazil, Duterte’s 
Philippines and Modi’s India. In all these cases, democratically elected governments, riding a 
tide of some version of ethno- nationalist populism, have sometimes by stealth and sometimes 
more openly sought to weaken the basic legal and institutional conditions that support a con-
stitutional democracy. As much as one might be tempted to identify a general phenomenon of 
reaction, closer examination reveals at least two types: those in which reaction has found a mass 
base in the disaffected ranks of lower socio- economic classes marginalized by globalization (the 
OECD cases), and others, such as India, that are clear instances of upper class revolts. It is cer-
tainly the case that across both types globalization is the common denominator, yet it has played 
out in very different ways, refracted by specific national histories and configurations of political 
forces. An increasingly rich literature in the OECD world has characterized these reactions as 
responses to the long- term effects of neo- liberal globalization that take the form of political 
closure, both by erecting new national boundaries of identity and belonging and repurposing 
liberal democracies, perceived to be increasingly ineffective, to be more decisive and represen-
tative of the “people”. But though globalization has also played a role in the driving reaction in 
India, the configurational sequence and the outcomes have been quite different. In India more 
than anything else, the authoritarian turn has been driven by a middle class seeking to consoli-
date its economic position and hoard its social privileges.
If the causes are different, so are the outcomes and the degree to which democracy is 
threatened. As Ziblatt and Levitsky (2018) have argued, democracies today are being 








specific regressions: an assertion of executive power that actively undermines the independent 
functions (checks and balances) of representative, bureaucratic and juridical institutions, a dis-
cursive assault on independent civil society (media, universities, NGOs and social movements) 
and discursive and sometimes legal efforts to redefine citizenship along narrow ethnic or 
nationalist lines. Trump’s presidency and failed coup is the prototypical case, but right- wing 
movements in Western Europe are animated by a similar logic. India and other democracies in 
the Global South – notably Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines (Heller 2020) – have all these 
regressive features, but the assault on democratic institutions and practices is much more severe 
because they are not just a response to perceived failures of liberal democracy but also efforts 
to reassert traditional configurations of elite power. Thus, beyond assaults on the institutional 
pillars of democracy, reaction in Modi’s India has extended to concerted efforts to marginalize 
and exclude Muslims and others defined as anti- nationalist. This has included open repression 
of civil society, efforts to de- certify specific socio- cultural groups and the use of state- sponsored 
vigilantism. Though Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines (Heller 2020) all fall into this category, 
the case of India stands out. There is arguably nowhere in the developing world where democ-
racy made such progress, particularly in redefining social power, only to be subjected to such a 
sharp counter- reaction.
The authoritarian turn in India
Those who have followed the rise of the BJP and its alliance of civil society organizations – the 
Sangh Parivar – have long detected sharp authoritarian tendencies (Fernandes and Heller 2006; 
Corbridge and Harriss 2000). Since the BJP came to power in 2014 the signs of an authori-
tarian agenda have been clear and by 2021 even the staid international guardians of quantifi-
able democratic bona fides were sounding alarms (Freedom House annual reports and V- Dem 
scores). The erosion of democratic institutions and practices predates the BJP’s rise to power. 
The last Congress- led United Progressive Alliance government (2009– 2014) was marked by 
widespread corruption and a downturn in democratic indicators (V- dem). The BJP’s rise to 
power however marks a critical juncture at two levels. The first (and the most discussed) is that 
a clear political realignment has taken place. Analysts have pointed to three distinct political 
developments: the increasing personal authority of Modi himself and a shift from the politics 
of accountability to the politics of trust (Sircar 2020), the rise of the BJP’s distinct brand of 
ethno- national populism (Jaffrelot 2019) and sharp electoral realignments driven in large part 
by the implosion of the once hegemonic Congress Party (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020). Beyond 
these conjunctural factors on the political plane, the focus of this chapter is on the deeper socio- 
cultural transformations at play. The authoritarian turn in India is only in part a story of insti-
tutional decline and the BJP’s electoral fortunes. It must also be understood as a social reaction, 
driven primarily by a middle class reacting to the democratic empowerment of popular classes 
of the last several decades. The contours of that reaction have been significantly shaped by both 
the economic and social forces of globalization.
To the extent that populism is a style and strategy of politics marked by plebiscitarian and 
personalist forms of leadership (Weyland 2001: 5), then Modi is a classic incarnation. But this 
personalization of power (Sircar 2020) is itself the instantiation of the BJP’s long- term Hindutva 
(making India into a Hindu nation) project of redefining the “people” in national- cultural 
terms. In government this has taken the form of marginalizing and demonizing Muslims as well 
as castigating and targeting rights activists (dubbed “urban Naxalites”) as anti- national. And if 
Modi’s persona was carefully cultivated at the sub- national level in the fertile terrain of Gujarat 
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the BJP’s Hindutva ideology has been long in the making, there can be no doubt that the BJP’s 
electoral gains were made possible both by the collapse of the Congress and the BJP’s own 
successes in broadening its appeal by building support among Other Backward Castes (OBC) 
and significant segments of the Dalit (previously referred to as “untouchable”) and Adivasi 
(tribal) populations. But this convergence of an autocratic style of politics (populism), new 
cultural- political ideological framings (ethno- national) and broadened electoral alignments has 
to be understood as the political expressions of a deeper process of social transformation.
The effects of this reconfiguration of class and social power can be detected in three patterns 
of reaction that have marked the BJP’s time in power. The first has been to redefine and to 
repurpose the welfare state from a right- based and universalistic logic to a logic of rationing 
and targeting welfare to those who “deserve” it. In an electoral context where being pro- poor 
is an electoral necessity, this is not a simple roll- back of the state, but rather a shift from public 
support and protection as a social right to benefits that are directly distributed by the central 
state (and often specifically in Modi’s name). The BJP’s language of moving from “entitle-
ment” (associated with the normative goal of levelling inequalities) to “empowerment” reflects 
its direct appeals to an “aspirational” middle class. The second is muscular state support for a 
dominant identity built on the cultural exclusion of others. Though the Congress party itself 
has all too often compromised its secular and pluralist credentials for electoral expediency, 
the BJP’s rise to political dominance has been forged largely on the strength of its efforts to 
redefine the nation in cultural- religious terms. This politics of cultural closure has been secured 
through state sanctioning of a dominant identity (especially curricular reforms in public educa-
tion) and demonization of an “other”, including the use of the police and vigilantes to enforce 
dominant cultural codes and contain the dangerous actors who threaten national values. The 
organizations of the Sangh Parivar (the group of voluntary associations that are the mass base 
of the BJP) have long aggressively promoted Hindu culture, but under the Modi govern-
ment they have escalated their efforts, including sponsoring “cow protection” associations that 
have lynched accused beef eaters and launching a notorious campaign dubbed “Love Jihad” 
to combat the alleged scourge of Muslim boys seducing Hindu girls. These state- sponsored 
cultural practices of exclusion have now been legislated with the passage of the Citizenship 
Amendment Act (CAA) which recognizes all refugees from neighbouring countries as citizens 
if they are of any religion except Islam. The third prong of the reactionary project has been the 
valorization of traditional social relations and institutions, specifically the patriarchal family, 
the military, religion and the traditional caste order. The BJP itself is culturally and socially an 
expression of Brahminical authority and Modi has assiduously cultivated his image of religi-
osity (Sircar 2020) and virile asceticism. Most notable, as in all hegemonic cultural projects, has 
been the BJP’s educational policies which have not only focused on re- writing textbooks but 
have also included direct assaults on the autonomy of the university that have specifically taken 
the form of targeting liberal rights and secular values as corrosive of traditional social and cul-
tural practices (Bhatty and Sundar 2020). Taking these three prongs together, we can say that 
to the social contract rooted in the constitutional rights and secularism once associated with 
the Congress, Hindutva counterposes an organic contract embedded in ethnic solidarity and 
traditional social structures.
Indian authoritarianism in global context
Much of the literature on democratic backsliding in OECD countries draws a direct line 
between increasing inequality and working class precarity associated with neo- liberal global-







between globalization and reaction is more complicated and refracted through a very different 
socio- class configuration in the case of India. The most immediate trigger of reaction and the 
most distinct and politically exploited point of opposition to globalization in OECD democ-
racies – immigration – is a marginal factor in India. Ethno- nationalism has been essentially 
inward looking. Second, there is no direct, mechanical link between the economic effects 
of globalization and reaction in India. Indeed, in the two decades that led up to reaction the 
Indian economy grew at a record pace and poverty declined significantly. Third, in contrast 
to Brexit and Trump, for example, Modi has not sought to leverage opposition to economic 
globalization and has in fact been closely aligned with domestic economic elites (professionals 
and corporates) that have a strong stake in globalization. Yet, having said this, globalization has 
played a role. The forces at work are however quite different from those highlighted in the 
OECD literature. As I hope to show, reaction has not been driven by working class discon-
tent with shrinking economic opportunity and security as in the OECD world but rather by 
elite revolts that are tied both to the ways in which increased global economic integration has 
reshaped emergent middle class interests and by how previous left- reformist efforts to manage 
global integration by expanding social protection fundamentally challenged traditional social 
hierarchies and privilege.
The specificity of the Indian case is captured in an electoral analysis of the social base of 
reaction. Electoral data (presented below) from the 2019 election shows that even as the BJP 
broadened its electoral appeal, including among Dalits and Adivasis, the core of its support is 
rooted in the fractions of the dominant classes (proprietary and professional) and the emergent 
neo- middle class (Heller 2020). This is also reflected in educational patterns, with the more 
educated being more likely to support Modi (the obverse of OECD populism). As with all 
ethno- nationalist movements, appeals to religion have played an important role, especially in 
mobilizing the neo- middle class, as have appeals to strengthening the patriarchal family. There 
is also a clear regional pattern to reaction. Most striking is that the BJP has limited elect-
oral traction in India’s South, long a bastion of anti- Brahminism and the region of India that 
has made the most progress on social issues, notably challenging traditional caste power and 
expanding the welfare state.
These regional patterns become even more pointed when one considers global cities. The 
BJP in India has long been a mostly urban party, with roots in the urban trading classes (the 
banias). In the past decade it has made inroads into rural areas largely through targeted patronage 
and selective caste appeals (Thachil 2014) so much so that by the 2019 election its support was 
evenly balanced across rural and urban. But if one looks at how cities voted, a striking pattern 
emerges. All of India’s most globalized and most cosmopolitan cities – New Delhi (the capital); 
Mumbai (home to Bollywood and finance) and Bangalore (IT) – voted overwhelmingly for the 
BJP. This is the exact opposite of the OECD pattern where global cities (London, New York, 
Seattle) continue to lean liberal- left, even as rural areas and more peripheral towns supported 
reaction.
I believe this difference reveals the particular nature of reaction in India. Upper- class groups 
who are concentrated in cities and especially those who have benefitted the most from glo-
balization, that is professionals and those who occupy management or strategic organizational 
positions in global commodity chains along with ancillary white collar workers, feel threatened 
by the progress that subordinate groups made in the past two decades especially with respect to 
expanding the welfare state and gaining access to historically class- rationed institutions, most 
notably schools and health services. These elites are determined to hoard opportunities that 
they have historically monopolized, opportunities whose returns have been amplified by glo-
balization. Those opportunities have been threatened not only by the expansion of the welfare 
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state, but also increasingly vociferous subordinate groups demanding rights. The basis of elite 
privilege is narrow, fragile and predicated on blocking broader socio- economic inclusion. The 
huge inequalities that mark India, which, if anything, are amplified in its global cities through 
spatial segregation and the confinement of large swathes of the poor to slums, present an exist-
ential threat to the middle class and to the neo- middle class that, as explained below, has joined 
the reaction coalition.
From restricted democracy to democratic deepening
The transition to democracy in India was marked by limited ruptures with colonial- era social 
structures. Though India is unique in the democratic world of having moved directly to uni-
versal suffrage at the time of independence, political parties were monopolized by upper caste 
elites and the rural poor remained politically dependent on local dominant castes (Frankel 
and Rao 1989). Well into the 1980s, class/ caste power continued to thwart genuine political, 
not to mention social, inclusion of the popular sectors (Heller 2019). Liberal and professional 
middle classes aligned with import substitution industrialization (ISI) interests (a nascent state- 
dependent bourgeoisie) to dominate politics all while protecting landed interests from threats 
from below. There were periods of popular mobilization throughout this period of restricted 
democracy, but dominant social and class interests prevailed and elite- led nationalist discourses 
of constitutionalism and modernity systematically misrecognized social hierarchy, suppressing 
the daily realities of class/ caste exclusion. In retrospect, it is remarkable that outside of the 
southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, lower caste mobilization in India remained episodic 
and did not disturb the political dominance of upper castes (Jaffrelot 2003). Second, limited 
mass incorporation underwrote a disarticulated developmental trajectory defined by a massive 
informal reserve army of labour sustaining a regime of labour squeezing accumulation.
The exclusionary pact began unravelling in the 1980s as India experienced an upsurge of 
lower caste mobilization that threatened the dominant pact. New political competitors emerged 
to challenge Congress party hegemony, expressing both regional and lower caste aspirations. 
As what Yadav (2000) has famously called the “second democratic uprising” saw lower castes 
and in particular other backward castes (OBCs) create their own political parties, the Congress 
lost its dominant position in a number of states and had to increasingly share power at the 
national level. The emergence of the BJP as a significant electoral force at precisely this time 
has been widely interpreted as an “elite revolt” and specifically an upper- caste response to 
mobilization from below (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). In an increasingly fragmented party 
system, the BJP and allies came to power in 1996. When a Congress- led coalition returned 
to power in 2004, the party was a shadow of its former self, more an assemblage of oppor-
tunistic rent- seekers and assorted political scions, than a party with a programme. A powerful 
faction of the party’s leadership however was close to leading figures in civil society, which 
itself had increasingly coalesced around demands for rights- based social reforms. This faction, 
with support from coalition parties, pushed through a remarkable set of rights- based laws that 
included the right to information (RTI), but also legislation and policies designed to uni-
versalize access to education, food and work (Chiriyankandath et al. 2020). Most notably, 
the second Congress- led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government pushed through the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), a rural right to work programme that 
guarantees government employment to all rural households. The programme has benefitted 
more than 100 million workers making it possibly the largest anti- poverty programme in his-
tory. A large body of research has clearly demonstrated not only that the programme has pushed 










traditional relations of labour domination (Veeraghavan 2017). Despite corruption scandals and 
a lack of party discipline, the Congress managed to get re- elected in 2008 in part on the popu-
larity of NREGA (Heller 2017). Though the Indian state still suffers from significant deficits in 
capacity and accountability (Evans and Heller 2018) there is little doubt that the UPA period 
saw an unprecedented expansion of a rights- based welfare state and marked a rupture with the 
elite- dominated patronage politics that had long defined India’s restricted democracy.
The reaction
The BJP’s Hindutva project has deep historical roots, is ideologically cohesive, supported by 
a highly organized and disciplined party and movement, and is being, as we speak, ruthlessly 
advanced by deploying every tool in the arsenal of democratic authoritarianism.
The Hindu right has always had a project of building a Hindu nation, but it was not until 
the late 1980s that this project took political form. In building a viable electoral majority, the 
BJP faced two formidable challenges. On the one hand, it had to overcome its identification 
as a party of the forward castes. On the other hand, it had to marry its project of nationalism 
and social harmony with growing support among its most powerful class supporters for more 
market and globalization- friendly policies. Modi resolved both tensions as Chief Minister in 
the state of Gujarat (2001– 2014) by completely communalizing the movement. He in effect 
unified the Hindu vote base by systematically demonizing Muslims and directly appealing to 
what he himself labelled the “neo- middle class” that is, aspiring and mostly rural other back-
ward castes (OBCs) (Jaffrelot 2019; Chacko 2019: 400). At the same time he championed 
Gujarat as a pro- business state attracting large scale investments from Indian corporates and 
multinationals, providing a new ideological home for class interests that had supported the 
liberalization of the economy in the 1990s. As Chacko has argued, Modi in effect overcame 
the inherent tension between the market and the social by “marketizing Hindutva with the 
positioning of the state as a facilitator of the creation of a middle class of consumers and 
entrepreneurs who are also disciplined by Hindutva values” (2019: 398). The “Gujarat model”, 
as it came to be known, produced high levels of growth but a dismal social development track 
record, with Muslims and Dalits largely excluded (Jaffrelot 2019). Building on his success in 
Gujarat and with the full- throated support of the business community, Modi rode to power 
at the national level in 2014 largely by portraying himself as Mr Development (Vikas Purush). 
As the 2019 election approached and it became clear the economy was sputtering, Modi 
reverted to the anti- Muslim playbook both by stepping up nationalist rhetoric against Pakistan 
and doubling down on traditional Hindutva issues (Varshney 2019). The electoral victory was 
resounding. During the first BJP government (2014– 2019) Modi was cautious in pushing 
his ethno- nationalist agenda, franchising the Sangh Parivar’s local cadres or sponsored vigi-
lante groups to exert extra- legal power, but refraining from direct use of state power (Jaffrelot 
2019). Since the BJP’s return to power in May 2019 there is no longer any pretence. The 
state has been directly and quickly repurposed as an instrument of de- secularization. First, 
the government revoked Kashmir’s special status and took direct control over India’s only 
Muslim- majority state. Second, a supreme court widely seen as increasingly subservient to 
Modi then ruled that India’s most disputed religious site where a mosque was torn down in 
1991 was Hindu, all but sanctioning the violent tactics of Hindutva forces. A third and final 
blow to India’s pluralist, secular and constitutional order was delivered in December 2019 
with the passage of the CAA, which introduces “religion as a marker of citizenship” … and 
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Explaining the reaction
Modi’s election in 2014 and re- election in 2019 represents an elite response to democratic 
empowerment from below. In India, democratic deepening was led by the rise of lower castes 
and a range of new social movements that coalesced into a loose but effective coalition under 
the UPA. Class interests are not given and building electoral coalitions is a messy and inde-
terminate affair. When and how coalitions produce electoral majorities is highly contingent. 
As Gramsci (1971) emphasized, historic blocs are formed of dominant classes that can exert 
hegemony over allied groups by actively coordinating interests. In India the period of restricted 
democracy was supported by a class alliance in which the three dominant factions of the prop-
ertied classes – business, professional and landed – were each guaranteed a share of public 
resources, much to the exclusion of the masses (Bardhan 1999). That began to change with the 
UPA government (2004– 2014). Though the government did continue to push the liberaliza-
tion of the economy, business interests became increasingly frustrated with the government’s 
determination to expand social programmes. NREGA in particular invited widespread attacks 
as a wasteful, anti- market policy, especially from landed elites who resented the government’s 
interference in local labour markets they had long dominated (Veeraraghavan 2017). But the 
opposition of these dominant economic interests alone was hardly enough to build an elector-
ally viable coalition and specifically to expand support from a growing middle class.
Sociologists have long argued that material interests are intertwined with cultural practices. 
The durable categories through which inequalities are reproduced are rooted in group practices 
that marshal cultural and social resources to protect privileges and hoard opportunities. This 
intertwining is sharply revealed in the ideological project of the BJP which has been framed 
by a new discourse of forming a reinvigorated nation based in an essentialist and singular iden-
tity, a nation of virtuous citizens standing in opposition to the undeserving poor, criminality/ 
corruption and the coddling or “appeasement” of minorities. In this casteless meritocracy, the 
virtues of an achieving and aspiring middle class have displaced the language of universalism 
and social rights. Traditional institutions of temple, the military, the nation and the patriarchal 
family have been resurrected. National capital and businesses are celebrated as champions of 
progress and the elan vital of a renewed national spirit is held up against the corrosive effects 
of human rights and a vaguely defined “globalism” as carrier of anti- cultural materialism and 
secularism.
The discursive shift has been critical to redrawing the boundaries and the self- identity of 
the middle class. The upper middle class of professionals has always had a fickle relationship to 
democracy, but lent significant support to the Congress in its hegemonic decades (Fernandes 
and Heller 2006). The professional classes had – per Bardhan – a clear stake in the expansion 
of the developmental state and secular nationalism, most notably state funded higher educa-
tion. If this class has defected, it is because the expansion of welfare policies to include the poor 
has threatened its privileged status position, especially with respect to educational institutions. 
In India upper middle class/ Forward caste opposition to caste- based affirmative action has 
been fierce (Heller 2018) and the same class that owes in global economic success to public 
higher education, is now pushing for privatization of higher education (Subramanian 2015). 
Though upper- caste mobilization crystallized around opposition to affirmative action policies 
in the 1980s, the BJP has supported “reservations” since the 1990s as a pragmatic concession 
to incorporating OBCs (Chacko 2019). But practices in institutions dominated by upper castes 
remain resolutely exclusionary (Vithayathil 2018). Economically, the upper middle class has 
grown and has come to depend less on the state than on globalization for its economic well- 








hardly sustain a winning electoral coalition. The pivotal shift has been the realignment of the 
neo- middle class.
The pattern of middle class reconfiguration in India has been dramatic, clearly delineated by 
caste boundaries. Historically, the electoral limits of the BJP were always its upper-caste identity. 
Yet by 2019 the BJP support base was resolutely and comprehensively Hindu, with every major 
caste category favouring the BJP over the Congress. The point spread went from a massive 
41 percent for upper castes favouring the BJP over the Congress, to 29 percent for OBCs and 
13 percent for Dalits with almost no Muslims (8 percent) voting for the BJP (Varshney 2019). 
In class terms, the income data is unreliable, but a survey that included occupational categories 
shows solid support for the BJP from white collar groups (services and professionals) and shop 
keepers and farmers. Unskilled rural and urban labourers aligned themselves with non- BJP 
parties (India Today 2019). In cultural terms, the BJP has mobilized the OBC neo- middle 
class by uniting Hindus against Muslims and by appealing to the social conservatism of a class 
that is “looking away from agriculture and towards the towns and cities” (Kaur 2014). In the 
northern states in particular, the BJP assiduously cultivated caste groups that aspired to forward 
caste status tapping into the deep aspirations of cultural distinction and upper caste/ class emula-
tion (sanskritization) that have always animated aspiring groups in deeply hierarchical societies 
(Bourdieu 1984). And it reconfigured the welfare state from universal entitlements such as the 
right to work (NREGA) to a series of discrete welfare programmes, often directly linked to 
Modi himself, that amount to the public provisioning of private goods (e.g., subsidized toilets 
and home cooking fuel). The BJP government has maintained NREGA because of its obvious 
populist appeal, a point Modi has made directly, but has also systematically reduced funding, 
centralized control and re- purposed the programme to appease landed interests (Narayan 
and Raja 2020). The government’s focus instead had been to redirect support to the middle 
class. Arguing that the neo- middle class “needs proactive handholding” (as quoted in Chacko 
2019: 401) new welfare programmes also included an array of micro loans, subsidies and labour 
deregulation to promote small business and reward entrepreneurship (Chacko 2019: 401). As 
Kaur (2014) has argued, this “emerging” middle class saw Modi’s policies that emphasized eco-
nomic growth over “entitlements” (coded as handouts for Dalits and Muslims) as opening the 
door to their aspirations, in contrast to the welfare policies of the UPA that largely benefitted 
the poor (and Dalits/ Muslims). The reconfiguration of the welfare state was also clearly tied 
to a project of cultural transformation. As Chacko shows, a range of financialization schemes – 
including incentives for brothers to use a traditional religious ceremony as an occasion to open 
seed insurance schemes for their sisters – in effect marry neo- liberalism to Hindu nation-
alism by conjoining the family, the individual, and the state in the advancement of the nation 
(2019: 403).
So what’s globalization got to do with it?
In explaining OECD reactions, commentators have pointed to how neo- liberalism has fuelled 
the politics of austerity, which in turn have triggered right- wing populism. But if anything, 
India defied neo- liberal globalization and witnessed an expansion of the welfare state in the 
run-up to reaction. The protagonist of the reaction has not been an ethnically and economic-
ally endangered working class but rather an urban middle class that in fact has benefitted most 
from economic globalization and an aspiring middle class hoping to ride its coattails.
On the economic front the impact of globalization has had much less to do with neo- 
liberalism and austerity than with the impact of a post- Fordist economy. The displacement of 
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fundamentally reconfigured class relations. Increased informalization and the decline of relatively 
stable occupational categories (including public- sector employment) has led to both fragmenta-
tion and precarization. This in turn has only increased the stakes of providing social protection 
and some compensation for job insecurity. The new services and information economy has 
also massively ratcheted up the returns to educational and organizational resources. The new 
premium on educational capital has fuelled new hoarding strategies, which has made global 
cities – where high-end educational institutions are concentrated – especially contested spaces. 
Simultaneously, and more directly linked to neo- liberalism, global commodification of urban 
land markets has driven up housing prices. The middle class’s reproduction strategy is one of 
opportunity hoarding (Ferndandes and Heller 2006). When the welfare state is well developed 
and extensive the middle class has a stake in it, and is less inclined to ration social provisioning 
including access to education and health. Across Europe, resurgent ethno- nationalist parties 
have only pushed for denying welfare to immigrants and have not challenged the welfare 
state as such. Urban class compromises forged in the Fordist era have for the most part been 
preserved in the post- Fordist cities that have benefitted most from globalization. The pattern 
of reaction in India is reversed. In rapidly growing cities where access to good neighbourhoods 
and good institutions is the key to economic success in an increasingly information-driven and 
networked global economy, an upper middle class and its newly minted neo- middle class allies 
feel increasingly threatened by the encroachment of the poor (Muslims/ lower castes). Hansen’s 
description of the retrenchment zeitgeist of urban elites in the gated communities of India 
captures this politics of social status anxiety: “it is inside such upper- caste and middle- class 
colonies, carefully separated from the other parts of society, that one finds the deepest mistrust 
and resentment of popular politics, the government and democracy – generally denounced as 
the root of all corruption in the country and dominated by undeserving men and women who 
have risen above the station because of reservations [affirmative action] rather than talent and 
merit” (2015).
This sense of threat has been further heightened by the second dimension of globalization 
that has directly contributed to the destabilization of the traditional social order, namely the 
overlapping of domestic and global political fields (Paschel 2016; Evans 2020). Over the last 
three decades, international governance institutions, a new human rights eco- system and an 
expanding global public sphere have universalized the legitimacy of human rights and provided 
domestic groups with significant points of global leverage to advance their claims (Santos and 
Rodriguez 2005). In India, the democratic and rights- based normative and policy repertoires of 
Indian civil society – including women’s groups, gay rights activists, right to the city movements, 
transparency movements, right to food campaigns and environmentalists – have strategically 
leveraged resonant global frames to make their demands on the Indian polity (Roychowdhury 
2020; Mander 2018). In a world where communicative structures of traditional and social media 
are increasingly globalized these frames have become inescapable points of cultural and political 
reference that interrogate nation- based identities and social hierarchies. These frames are clearly 
perceived as existential threats by the BJP which has aggressively repressed CSOs with inter-
national ties as “anti- national” and has been especially hostile to international human rights and 
environmental movements (Mander 2018). In this respect, the BJP is, in Castell’s sense, a quint-
essential “reactive movement” building “trenches of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethni-
city, family, locality, that is the fundamental categories of millennial existence now threatened 
under the combined, contradictory assault of techno- economic forces and transformative social 
movements” (1997: 2). Because Modi’s government represents a social class that is by and large 
better educated, more globally  oriented and celebrates itself as self- motivating and aspirational, 









sense of some deep primary identity, than with protecting accumulated privileges threatened 
by the destabilization of traditional social structures (Fernandes and Heller 2006). It is striking 
that while Modi has championed global technologies and global capital, Hindu nationalists are 
hostile to secularism and international human rights. When they denounce globalism, it is pol-
itical liberalism, not capitalism, that they are attacking.
Democratic resilience
The BJP government –  Sangh Parivar combine has shown itself willing to use any tools in 
the democratic toolkit to secure its power and push its exclusionary project. Most notably 
the combine has made concerted efforts to politicize independent institutions including the 
electoral commission and the judiciary, two institutions that displayed remarkable autonomy 
in the period of democratic deepening. But it has gone further than just violating norms 
or pushing the limits of democratic institutions. At the national as well as the state level 
where the BJP is in power, the combine has launched a broad- based assault on civil society 
including the media and universities, made concerted efforts to curtail the rights of those 
who do not fit their dominant national identity and outsourced intimidation and violence 
to surrogates.
But as dramatic and alarming as the current conjuncture might be, a full unravelling of 
democracy is highly unlikely. Electoral democracy will likely be preserved for four general 
reasons. First, Modi came to power through the ballot box and has invested his legitimacy in 
the expressed “will of the people”. Second, unlike during the period of restricted democracy, 
the popular sectors have tasted the benefits of political participation and are unlikely to accept 
a full reversal. The massive mobilization of farmers to protest the BJP’s ham-fisted efforts to 
neo- liberalize the agrarian sector are a sharp reminder that the popular sectors retain significant 
capacity for political action. Third, in highly diverse and pluralistic societies such as India, even 
elites understand that democratic contestation is necessary to preserving the social order. The 
middle class, to paraphrase Marx, will only be willing to go so far in giving up democratic rights 
for the right to maintain its privileges.
If there is unlikely to be a full reversal, what is at stake is the capacity of subordinate groups, 
both lower classes and historically marginalized racial/ ethnic/ caste identities, to effectively 
pursue their interests. The danger at hand is a contraction of the participatory and substan-
tive spaces of democracy, that is a hollowing out that would return India to its past condition 
of restricted democracy and exclusionary development. What outcomes are possible depends 
less on institutions than on how always volatile and malleable historic blocs get organized and 
reorganized. And there are clearly limits to the project of authoritarian hegemony. The middle 
class has always been a fickle political actor, and the neo- middle class in particular has aligned 
itself with reaction on terms that are inherently precarious. At the economic level, the problem 
is that populists promise much to the people, but hubris is no substitute for programmatic and 
sustained coordination of class interests. The sharp decline of the Indian economy even before 
the Covid pandemic may prove politically insurmountable. And on the ideological level pre-
serving right- wing populist blocs requires stitching together disparate identities and interests 
that are inherently unstable, especially in a rapidly changing economy. Finally, if India’s demo-
cratic institutions are in a cycle of decline that predates but has been accelerated by the BJP’s 
rise to power, the culture and practices of democracy, cultivated by decades of a wide range of 
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FROM HINDU RASHTRA 
TO HINDU RAJ? A DE FACTO 
OR A DE JURE ETHNIC 
DEMOCRACY?
Christophe Jaffrelot
India was long considered a fine example of liberal parliamentary democracy among countries 
of the South. In addition to a strong legislature and judiciary, as well as a vibrant free press, pol-
itical pluralism was nourished by federalism and cultural diversity, both linguistic and religious.
It is the erosion – even the obliteration – of the country’s religious diversity that this chapter 
describes. This evolution calls into question India’s secularism, a system for managing relations 
between state and religion that differs from what is known as laïcité in France, for instance. 
While in France the state is supposed to have no connection with religion, in India, the 
republic’s institutions acknowledge that religion has a perfectly legitimate place in the public 
sphere. What secularism and laïcité have in common, however, is the rejection of the dominance 
of any one religion in that sphere.
It is this very principle that is being challenged by the Hindu nationalist movement, its 
matrix, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Association of National Volunteers – RSS) and 
its main political force, the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party – BJP) which rose to 
power in 2014. Although this party was already at the helm of India’s government from 1998 to 
2004, this was the first time it enjoyed an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament, 
putting it in a position to implement its agenda.
This agenda derives directly from its ideology, Hindutva, which was codified nearly a cen-
tury ago, in the footsteps of European ethnic nationalisms – even emulating them (Jaffrelot 
1996). Like them, it accords a predominant role to the majority community, made up of so- 
called sons of the soil, over the minorities. For adherents of Hindutva, Hindus embody the 
Indian nation, and minorities whose religion originated abroad (Muslims and Christians) are 
mere outsiders who must assimilate by adopting the majority/ majoritarian culture.
After the BJP victory in 2014, this programme was primarily implemented by civil-society-
based  organisations within the Hindutva movement that act as vigilante groups specialized in 
cultural policing. But since Narendra Modi’s re- election to the prime ministership in 2019, the 
de facto ethnicization of India’s democracy has taken on a new dimension. The BJP has in fact 
passed more and more laws at both the level of the states it governs and at the central govern-
ment level, so that India is tending to become a de jure ethnocracy. India is thus in the process 







A de facto ethnic democracy or the rise of Hindu vigilantism (2014– 2019)
If the notion of ethnic democracy, theorized by Sammy Smooha, sounds like a contradiction in 
terms – in that democracy is theoretically based on the values of individualism – it is because it 
describes the contradictions of the regime where it originated: the state of Israel. Certain pillars 
of democracy there have shown great resilience: rather free and fair elections are held at regular 
intervals, the judiciary’s relative independence lends credibility to the rule of law, and a fairly 
free press provides a forum for criticism, all this in the context of a certain degree of pluralism. 
But not all citizens enjoy the same rights: as Israel is officially “the state of the Jews,” this popu-
lation imposes the symbols of its identity, lifestyle and social and political domination on the 
country’s minorities. Smooha points out that even if this power relationship is enshrined in the 
law, it is augmented through practices, most discrimination being rather covert, arising from 
(sometimes) unwritten laws that have unintended effects, such as conditioning eligibility for 
Israeli state benefits on military service – which is performed mainly by Jews (Smooha 2002).
In India as well, during Narendra Modi’s first term, the Hinduization of the public sphere 
developed to the detriment of champions of secularism and of minorities. The first victims 
of Hindu nationalists were none other than intellectuals, who were taken to task for their 
“liberalism” (which has become a derogatory term). The Hindu nationalists’ preferred targets 
were highly regarded universities – such as Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi – and 
progressive NGOs: Hindutva apologists were placed at the head of university administrations, 
and organizations were deprived of contributions from abroad (through the resurrection of a 
law that had been passed in 1976 during the Emergency (Jaffrelot and Anil 2021), the Foreign 
Contribution (Regulation) Act), forcing several of them to shut down operations.
This evolution has also resulted in calling into question the national narrative and especially 
the way the history of India had been taught in school. Textbooks have been rewritten so as to 
discard the idea of “Aryan invasions” (which deprived Hindus of their “sons of the soil” status), 
to depict the Muslim conquests and reign in a particularly violent light (ignoring the role of 
Sufism in mass conversions to Islam and a large degree of cultural syncretism) and, last, to tone 
down the role of great figures of contemporary history (starting with Nehru, and even Gandhi) 
and replace them with their own heroes, whose names have moreover been given to many 
avenues, universities, airports and so on.
Together with this Hinduization, which was also reflected in the noticeable presence of 
several Hindu dignitaries in the highest echelons of government – as can be seen in the choice 
of a priest, Yogi Adityanath, to head Uttar Pradesh following the BJP victory in the 2017 
elections in that state – have been mounting discriminatory practices against Christian and 
Muslim minorities. Vigilante groups in charge of harassment campaigns sometimes only had 
very loose connections with the BJP – enabling it to preserve an aura of respectability – but 
they were nevertheless part of the Sangh Parivar which is the network that the RSS (known as 
the “Sangh”) has created and that it coordinates as a “family” (parivar). Among these groups, 
the Bajrang Dal (BD), established in 1984, warrants special mention due to its involvement 
in heavy- handed operations such as, in 1992, the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the famous 
mosque built by Mughal emperor Babur in 1528 in Ayodhya that Hindu nationalists claim to 
have been erected on the birthplace of Lord Ram, where a Hindu temple allegedly stood and 
that they wished to rebuild. The Bajrang Dal had painstakingly recruited thousands of activists 
among a Hindu youth hard hit by unemployment, lacking self- esteem and for whom defence 
of Hinduism gave meaning to their lives, and even a job (Jaffrelot 2009).
This group, like so many others, became involved as of 2014 in campaigns targeting, by 
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in a campaign against so- called love jihad, BD members went on prowls to protect young 
Hindu women from Muslims supposedly out to woo them and trick them into marrying and 
converting. A remarkable example of investigative journalism by two news websites, Cobrapost 
and Gulail.com, bears testimony to the intimidation techniques used by Hindu nationalists 
(Cobrapost 2015). This strongarm intimidation campaign targeted Muslims as much as young 
Hindu women, even when they were of age and wanted to take a Muslim (or a Christian) for 
their husband.
Regarding conversions, the effort to fend off Muslim and even more so Christian proselyt-
izing resulted not only in violence (churches desecrated, priests and nuns attacked, etc.), but 
also in reconversion operations called ghar wapsi (homecoming). The initiative for this campaign 
lies directly with the RSS, which gathered together 1,200 of its members and sympathizers in 
Nagpur on November 7 and 9, 2014 (a few weeks after the campaign against “Love Jihad” was 
launched). The Sangh branch responsible for carrying out the actual conversion operations was 
the Dharm Jagran Samiti (Religious Awakening Committee). The RSS assigned 58 pracharak 
(full- time cadres) to the task, a considerable number for such a campaign (Yadav 2018).
As for cow protection, which was actually extended to all bovines, it primarily took the 
form of inspecting trucks suspected of transporting cattle to the slaughterhouse. Many of the 
drivers intercepted on the roads of India were severely beaten by vigilantes armed with cricket 
bats or field hockey sticks and even knives and firearms. The use of firearms has developed 
considerably in recent years. The Gau Raksha Dal (cow protection movement) emblem is 
composed of two AK- 4 type weapons wreathing the head of a calf. IndiaSpend estimates that in 
2017 there were 43 bovine- related incidents, compared to 30 in 2016, 13 in 2015, 3 in 2014, 2 
in 2013 and 1 in 2012. Twenty-four out of the 28 victims during the period between January 
and June 2017 were Muslim (Abraham and Rao 2017), probably the standard ratio.
Several dozen Muslims died of their injuries in lynchings, enough of them for the Supreme 
Court finally to turn its attention to the matter in 2018. The judges blamed mobs and social 
media (first and foremost WhatsApp) through which false information was spread to provoke 
and coordinate assaults (Ananthakrishnan 2018). By doing so, the Supreme Court shunned 
its responsibilities by not seeking the guilty parties, as Raheel Dhattiwala (2018) has pointed 
out, and played the game of the Hindu nationalists, who systematically legitimate anti- Muslim 
violence by referring to emotions and, more specifically, the “religious sentiment” that fuels 
champions of the faith who can quickly whip themselves up into a fury for a sacred cause.
The cultural policing carried out by Hindu vigilantes is a good illustration of the Hindu 
nationalist movement’s modus operandi and in particular of its historical matrix, the RSS. 
The RSS in fact assigned itself the mission of extending its influence over the entire society, 
Table 11.1 Cow- related violence in India, 2012– 18
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Incidents 1 2 3 13 30 43 31
Victims 2 0 11 49 67 108 57
Deaths 0 0 0 11 9 13 13
Source: IndiaSpend.org, “Database on Bovine- Related Violence (from January 2010 to 
September 2, 2017)” (https:// docs.google.com/ spreadsheets/ d/ 13REUhD4fW6olOy_ 
SjobWQRA1qQg3VY1pp87XMRJwJW4/ pubhtml. Last accessed April 9, 2018). This online 
publication ceased to exist in 2017 but it set up another website dedicated to lynching victims in 
connection with sacred cows called “Hate Crime: Cow- related Violence in India” (http:// lynch.










establishing its presence by setting up branches (shakha) in all of India’s towns and villages. This 
long- term project, by which the RSS sought to conquer India from the bottom up via unre-
lenting social and ideological engineering to bring about a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), 
moreover reflects a major characteristic of the Hindu tradition, which has never valued the state, 
but instead the social order born out of the caste system, an orthopraxy of which the upper 
castes were the custodians. RSS leaders, all of whom until fairly recently were of the Brahmin 
caste, had long adhered to this model that implied enforcing their order at a more societal than 
a political – or in any event bureaucratic – level. But recent developments indicated a certain 
evolution regarding this crucial element.
Towards a de jure ethnic democracy, or the triumph of state 
vigilantism (2019– )
The shift from a bottom- up strategy starting at the grassroots level to a top- down strategy 
involving the public authorities first became apparent in states governed by the BJP. In the 
mid- 2010s, Maharashtra, Haryana and Gujarat all toughened their cow protection laws. In 
Maharashtra, it was now prohibited to slaughter not just cows but also many other bovines. 
Even possession of beef was outlawed (Daniyal 2015). The crime became punishable by up to 
a five- year prison sentence and a heavy fine. In Gujarat, even more drastic legislation in the 
matter was accompanied by similar decisions in major cities to prevent the religious mixing of 
populations: in some districts/ neighbourhoods, the members of one religious community were 
permitted to sell or rent real estate only to people of the same religion (Jaffrelot and Laliwala 
2018). Such regulations provided a legal basis for those who wanted to combat “land jihad,” 
a new dimension in vigilante practices that aimed to dissuade Hindu landowners by force (or 
by intimidation) from renting or selling property to Muslims in mainly Hindu areas. These 
practices, together with new rules and the adverse effects of communal riots – which, in 2002, 
descended into a pogrom in Gujarat – have fostered the formation of veritable ghettos where 
Muslims both rich and poor are crammed together for lack of available housing elsewhere and 
for their own safety (Laliwala et al. 2021).
After the 2019 elections, several BJP- governed states announced the passing of laws official-
izing the practice of “love jihad” by making it virtually impossible for Hindu women to marry 
men of another faith. In Uttar Pradesh, the first state to go through with such legislation in 
2020, marriages were impeded by the police on the pretext that the husband- to- be intended 
to convert his wife- to- be (a “crime” punishable by a ten- year prison term) (Rashid 2020). BJP 
leaders made no secret that they now wanted to impose their perception of what was good 
for society, not only by resorting to street vigilantism, but by the law, that is state vigilantism 
(Jaffrelot 2020). The home minister of Madhya Pradesh, another BJP- ruled state – along with 
Gujarat, which passed an “anti Love- Jihad” law – declared: “Any love that heads towards jihad, 
we will oppose it. Any love that offends our sentiments, we will oppose it” (Siddique 2021).
The most independent media outlets have reported on the growing unease among existing 
interfaith marriages in which the Muslim party seeks to conceal his/ her given name or surname 
to mask his/ her religious identity (an evolution also evidenced by the trend of Muslim couples 
to give their children non- Muslim- sounding names).
In enforcing this policy to prevent interfaith marriage, the police now play the role previ-
ously assumed by vigilante groups – further evidence of the shift from a bottom- up to a top- 
down strategy mentioned above, although the latter has not entirely replaced the former. This 
progression towards a Hindu Raj is not being accomplished solely through state- level legisla-
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In 2019, it was reflected in the passage of a constitutional amendment to article 370 and 
an amendment to the Citizenship Act (CAA). The former revoked the autonomy previously 
enjoyed by Jammu and Kashmir – which in the process lost its status as a state to become merely 
a Union Territory (UT) and wound up split in two when Ladakh was made another UT. This 
reform was justified by the government by the strength of Islamist separatism and the economic 
underdevelopment affecting the province – in spite of the empirical evidence which said other-
wise (Dreze 2019). It was interpreted locally as an attempt to assimilate the only region with a 
Muslim majority into a Hindu- dominated Indian Union. Not only after the province became 
a Union Territory, its police now reported directly to the central government, but along with 
Art. 370, Art. 35A was also abolished. Under this article, the assembly of Jammu and Kashmir 
was empowered to define “permanent residents” of the state and to reserve for them certain 
rights, including the right to own land in the state and to have access to government jobs. 
Article 35A was one of the laws that was repealed after the abrogation of Art. 370 and then, in 
March 2020, the Modi government replaced “permanent residents” with domiciles of Jammu 
and Kashmir by a new provision: anyone who had lived in the region for 15 years, studied 
there for seven years or written school board examinations was eligible to own land and hold 
government jobs.
The Kashmiris’ fear of losing their land was stoked by the fact that land had already started 
to be reserved for outside investors and the armed forces: 70% of the new mining contracts 
have gone to non- locals (Siddiq 2020) and two laws (The Control of Building Operations 
Act, 1988, and the Jammu and Kashmir Development Act, 1970) were amended in July 2020 
to introduce some “special dispensation for carrying out construction activities in Strategic 
Areas” – in other words, some land could be easily confiscated and transferred to the army for 
its own use, a process that has started already (Zargar and Chakravarty 2020). Furthermore, in 
July 2020 as well, the government decided that army and paramilitary forces would not require 
a No Objection Certificate from its home department “for acquisition or requisition of land 
in favour of the Army, B[order] S[ecurity] F[orce], CRPF and other similar organizations” 
(Iqbal 2020).
These measures reflected the will of the BJP (which has never resigned itself to the fed-
eral structure of India’s institutions) to transform India into a unitary nation- state (Aiyar and 
Tillin 2020) and to change the demographic balance in the only Muslim- dominated territory. 
Indeed, a few days after the abrogation of Art. 370, Narendra Modi declared during his August 
15 address: “Today, as I address the nation from the Red Fort, I can proudly say that every 
Indian today can speak of One Nation, One Constitution …” (Business Today 2019).
The Citizenship (Amendment) Act turned out to have also momentous consequences. The 
law, advertised as proof of the Indian government’s concern for victims of religious persecution 
in the region, shows the selective nature of such concern. Indeed, only non- Muslim victims 
from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan were eligible to become Indian citizens through 
this law – via an expedited six- year procedure. Rohingyas, Shias, Ahmadis and Hazaras could 
not claim refugee status, nor could the victims of religious persecution from Sri Lanka, Tibet, 
Myanmar or Nepal. The law sowed panic among many Indian Muslims who were afraid they 
would not be in a position to prove their Indian nationality for lack of documentation, some-
thing that is very hard to produce in a country that never had a systematic register of citizens. 
This fear was fuelled by the establishment of the National Register of Citizens in the state of 
Assam, where there was a large number of Muslim migrants from Bangladesh. The fact that 
CAA and NRC worked in tandem was made clear by Amit Shah himself when he said during 
a press conference in West Bengal – the video of which was posted on the BJP’s YouTube page 










come, all the refugees will be given citizenship, and after that the NRC will be prepared” (ICF 
Team 2020). This meant that the non- Muslim undocumented migrants would gain access to 
some sort of naturalization procedure before the NRC was put in place and that this NRC 
could only affect Muslims. Moreover, in September 2019, the RSS chief, Mohan Bhagwat 
made it clear that “No Hindu will have to leave over NRC” (The Telegraph 2019).
Hindu militant WhatsApp groups gradually translated this message into their own idiom: the 
combination of the CAA and the NRC was a tool to “kick Muslims out of India.” A jour-
nalist who had infiltrated these groups explains that “One major theme that a majority of 
the messages echo is that bringing the CAA and, then, the NRC, will automatically imply 
that India’s Muslim population will be reduced. […]” They list a ‘four- step’ process for India 
becoming a Hindu nation – starting with the CAA, followed by the NRC, then a law to con-
trol population, ultimately followed by a Uniform Civil Code.
In reaction to the CAA, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in the fall of 
2019. Most of them were Muslims who were afraid of becoming “doubtful citizens,” but 
many students also took part in sit- ins, including in Shaheen Bagh, Delhi – by far the best- 
known place of protest where the Indian Constitution was eulogized in countless debates and 
speeches.
In reaction to this mobilisation, however, Uttar Pradesh was the state that saw the 
unleashing of maximum police violence in late 2019. The campus of Aligarh Muslim 
University, where the protest had gained momentum, was the first target. On December 15, 
the police and members of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) forcefully entered the university 
campus, breaking the iron gate at 10 p.m., and assaulted students. One student’s hand had 
to be amputated (Srivastava 2012). The AMU vice chancellor claimed (The Hindu 2020), 
retrospectively, that he had invited the police to intervene, but why, in that case, did they 
break the main gate? Elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh, the police used real bullets to crack down 
on demonstrators, leaving 24 dead in the space of a few days (Pandey 2020) – out of the 31 
casualties recorded throughout India (Sen and Singaravelu 2020). In addition, a large number 
of young Muslims, including minors, were arrested – and in many cases tortured (Indo- Asian 
News Service 2019).
But early in 2020 the epicentre of the crackdown was in Delhi, a state where the CAA was 
exploited by the BJP in the context of the election campaign that began in December 2019 and 
intensified in January 2020. There, too, the police – under the direct supervision of Narendra 
Modi’s home minister, Amit Shah – conducted the crackdown. While Delhi is a state of the 
Indian Union, it does not enjoy the same autonomy as full- fledged states and, in particular, 
the police report directly to the central government’s Home Ministry. First targeted was Jamia 
Milia University in December (The Economic Times 2019) where activists and the police 
joined forces. As the police habitually destroy CCTV cameras, their involvement in the clashes 
is attested primarily by amateur videos posted on social media.
The communal riots that took place in February 2020 in North- East Delhi – a very densely 
populated district where, according to the 2011 census, Muslims represented more than 29% 
of the population and Hindus, about 68% –  were primarily due to the BJP’s reaction to the 
anti- CAA movement in the context of the state elections. During the election campaign, BJP 
leaders targeted protesters against the CAA in Delhi – not only in Shaheen Bagh, but else-
where in the city, including in the North- East, where many sit- ins were held – in order to 
polarize voters along communal lines. A member of the Modi government, Anurag Thakur, 
raised a slogan in an election rally that was to be repeated many times: “Desh ke ghaddaron 
ko, goli maaron saalon ko” (Shoot down the rascals/ the traitors to the country) (Shamshad 
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On February 11, 2020, the BJP had a rude shock as only eight of its candidates, out of 
70, could win a seat, against 62 for the Aam Aadmi Party of Arvind Kejriwal. BJP cadres 
wanted to take revenge (Mubayi 2020). Their post- election meetings were as aggressive as the 
pre- election ones. On February 23, 2020, Kapil Mishra, a BJP candidate who had lost the 
election in February 2020, led a provocative rally in North- East Delhi. Mishra addressed 
the gathering in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner of Police for North- East District, 
Ved Prakash Surya, who was standing right next to him in full riot gear. It projected an unexam-
pled visual by associating an expert in communal provocation and a custodian of law and 
order. Thousands of assailants, led by Hindu nationalist cadres, including BJP former or sitting 
MLAs and municipal councillors (Singh 2020; Menon and Iyer 2020) forcibly entered houses 
to attack men and women (Shamshad et al. 2020, pp. 61– 69); 600 houses were burnt (Alavi 
2020) and shops looted with a remarkably accurate selectivity, as adjacent houses and shops 
were spared when they belonged to Hindus (Express News Service 2020); markets were razed 
to the ground as well (Shamshad et al. 2020); mosques were systematically targeted – they were 
looted, desecrated and burnt (Mody 2020). A businessman who happened to be a BJP cadre 
said that his factory had been burnt because he had a “Muslim name,” suggesting that, like in 
Gujarat in 2002, the rioters were using lists of residents – maybe the voters lists (Express News 
Service 2020). In Tyre Market the fire brigade, which had rushed to the place, was attacked 
physically (Shamshad et al. 2020, p. 48). After four days, the official toll was 55 dead, including 
13 persons with non- Muslim names (Shamshad et al. 2020, pp. 111– 118).
While Hindu nationalists initiated the riots, the police played an important role in them. 
Not only did they not come to the rescue of the Muslims, but they took an active part in the 
violence on many occasions. In the complaints filed subsequently, victims declare that the police 
also incited the activists to attack them (Singh 2020). Police officers also took part in the looting 
and destruction of mosques, sometimes while chanting “Jai Shri Ram” (Shroff 2020a; 2020b). 
Possibly in reaction to the attitude of the police, two security personnel were killed during 
the riot: Ankit Sharma, an Intelligence Bureau staff member (Bhardwaj 2020), and Police 
Constable Ratan Lal. The New York Times, whose journalists emphasize that “Delhi’s Police 
turned against Muslims,” mentions the fact that not only one police officer was killed but that 
80 others were injured, especially when Muslim protesters outnumbered the police (Gettleman 
et al. 2020). Seemingly as a result, the police directly assaulted Muslims even more brutally. 
One of these attacks, on February 24, 2020, was filmed and the videos went viral on social 
media. They showed five men beaten by the police in the Kardam Puri Pulia area and told to 
chant the national anthem. One of them, Faizan, died (Yadav 2020). In other places, the police 
were pelting stones at the Muslim mob along with Hindu rioters, or, as in Chand Bagh “the 
police were encouraging the mob to carry out the riots” (Shamshad et al. 2020, p. 74). The 
police also took part in the looting and destruction of mosques and madrasas – usually after 
destroying the CCTV cameras (Shamshad et al. 2020, pp. 40, 45). Not only could the victims 
not file a complaint, but they were accused of being responsible for the violence itself (Lalwani 
2020) – whereas no FIR has been registered against Hindu activists who took part in the riots, 
BJP leaders who made provocative speeches or policemen who were seen attacking Muslims on 
videos. The detailed report filed by the fact- finding committee set up on March 9, 2020 by the 
Minorities Commission of the state of Delhi and from which much of the information above 
was drawn was not even used by the authorities. Not only that, but the chairman of the Delhi 
Minorities Commission, Zafarul- Islam Khan, was accused of sedition in April 2020 because of 
a Facebook post (Bedi 2020).
Instead, the narrative promoted after the Delhi riots by the police and the BJP government – 















police and accusing the Muslims. On March 10, Amit Shah, the Home Minister to whom the 
Delhi police report directly, congratulated himself that the police succeeded in controlling the 
riots “within 36 hours,” “not allowing the riots to spiral” (The Wire 2020). Shah concluded 
that these “riots were ‘pre- planned’ conspiracy” and that it “will be a lesson for the country on 
what befalls those who indulge in rioting” (The Wire 2020).
This enabled the police to resort to a stringent anti- terror law, the Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act, 2019 (UAPA), under which a detainee may have to await trial for up to two 
years and not be released on bail or be apprised of the charges against him/ her for six months. 
It is noteworthy that the Narendra Modi government had just amended the law to make it 
possible to label as “terrorists” isolated individuals and not solely men and women belonging 
to an organization.
Conclusion
The trajectory of India’s democracy since 2014 has led it not only to renege on its traditional 
secularism by establishing a de facto ethnic democracy during Narendra Modi’s first term, but 
also to embark on the path of a de jure ethnic democracy since 2019, the year in which the 
BJP, on the strength of its electoral success, set out to transform the law and the Constitution.
This evolution drew on greater recourse to the police, who have taken up the task of Hindu 
vigilante groups, transforming social violence into state violence. The officialization of this 
new power relationship came out in the open when the judge of the Delhi High Court, Justice 
Muralidhar, who was seeking to hold the police to account, was transferred to Chandigarh, 
removing the only remaining obstacle in the way of pursuing the violence (Sachdev 2020).
But in other circumstances, Indian judges have sided wholeheartedly with the authorities. 
The Supreme Court thus did not deem it worthwhile to examine the cases of either the aboli-
tion of article 370 of the Constitution or the CAA, despite the large number of petitions. It even 
reactivated implementation of the NRC in Assam and arbitrated in favour of building a Hindu 
temple in Ayodhya. Reinforced by the legalization of a plan that until then enjoyed popular 
legitimacy only, Narendra Modi officiated, as a priest, over the laying of the temple’s corner-
stone. If the de jure ethnic democracy that India is becoming actually increasingly resembles 
a theocracy, the attitude of the judges – compounded by the decline of other institutions 
including Parliament (Jaffrelot and Jumle 2020) and the Election Commission (Ostermann and 
Ahuja 2018) – calls into question the very qualifier “democracy.” In just a few years, India has 
come to lengthen the list of countries whose authoritarianism dons a pluralist guise at election 
time, with several parties taking part, but the fairness of these elections is increasingly doubtful. 
In fact, Modi’s India increasingly fulfils the criteria of ethnocracy. This concept introduced by 
Donald Horowitz (Horowitz 1985, 499– 500) has been elaborated upon, once again, by Israeli 
social scientists. Oren Yiftachel applied it to his country in the late 1990s in an article that 
minimized the democratic side of the regime and emphasized, on the contrary, the domination 
of the state and the capture of its resources by a majority community at the expense of minor-
ities (Yiftachel 1997; 2006).
If India can now be considered as an ethnocracy because of its democratic decline and the 
growing assertion of Hindu nationalism, it can be compared more easily to other South Asian 
countries, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The parallel with the “country of the 
pures” is striking in more than one way. First, minorities are marginalized not only in all sites 
of power, but also physically, as evident from the ghettoization process experienced by Hindus, 
Christians and Ahmadis that runs parallel to what is now obvious in the case of Indian Muslims. 
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have separate electorates, whereas in India they vote with the Hindu majority. Secondly, red 
lines are crystallizing on both sides. In Pakistan, the anti- blasphemy law has become sacro sanct, 
whereas in India, to pay allegiance to the cow and to Lord Ram has not become part of the laws 
of the Republic (but some BJP- ruled states have passed acts in this direction already). Thirdly, 
the political leaders who do not defend the majority community are presented by the rulers as 
illegitimate and anti- national. In Pakistan, politicians are not supposed to express compassion for 
Ahmadis publicly and in India Modi has disqualified Sonia Gandhi because she was a Christian, 
according to him, and the Manmohan Singh government – which he called the “Delhi Sultanate” 
– because it allegedly was pro- Muslim (Jaffrelot 2013; 2016). In both countries, national- populist 
leaders, including Imran Khan and Narendra Modi, have exploited the fear and the anger of 
ethno- religious majorities in this context. Their mobilization techniques illustrate how, according 
to Arjun Appadurai, “predatory identities” exploit “the fear of small numbers,” that comes from 
the “anxiety of incompleteness” that afflicts ethnic communities when they do not coincide with 
the nation- state (Appadurai 2018). Imran Khan and Narendra Modi brought their communities 
from fear to outrage and anger, a theme that all populists exploiting social frustration have played 
on in the early twenty- first century. In his book on the role of anger in the rise of nationalism, 
Pankaj Mishra draws examples as much from the nineteenth century as from the present (Mishra 
2018): anger arises from fear itself because majorities are not supposed to feel vulnerable; and this 
anger can be turned towards the politicians who do not defend enough the majority community 
because of their cosmopolitanism or for other reasons.
Last but not least, India and Pakistan converge today towards similar forms of authoritar-
ianism because of the role the “deep state” plays in both countries. While the army and the 
security apparatus at large have occupied the driver’s seat for decades in Pakistan – even when 
civilians govern the country (but do not rule) – a similar scenario is unfolding itself in India: the 
Hindu nationalist movement is, indeed, infiltrating an increasingly large number of institutions, 
including the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the intelligence services and the army.
Nota Bene
This article draws on certain chapters of my book, Modi’s India. Hindu Nationalism and the Rise 
of Ethnic Democracy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, and New Delhi, Westland, 2021, 
which the interested reader might refer to for further information. There are few footnotes for 
this reason.
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Growing democratization, or increased 
authoritarianism?
Ian Talbot
Imran Khan presented his July 2018 election victory as ushering in a ‘Naya Pakistan’. He 
galvanized urban youthful middle- class support around his ‘modernizing agenda’ to end ‘dyn-
astic politics’, eliminate corruption, address environmental issues, reduce Pakistan’s economic 
dependency, and bring back money that had been laundered overseas. Eight months later, 
he launched an ambitious poverty alleviation scheme which focused on the empowerment 
of women. On 20 July 2019, the first ever elections were held for seats for the merged tribal 
districts in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assembly. Attempts to establish a ‘transformative’ polit-
ical regime followed a decade of gradual democratic consolidation in which governments had 
completed terms in office and power had been transferred following competitive multi- party 
elections. Does this evidence suggest that democracy is advancing in Pakistan, despite the 
army’s continuing presence in public life? Is the country bucking the trend, elsewhere in South 
Asia, of democratic recession, a process which forms part of what has been termed the third 
wave of autocratization (Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, 2019)?
Autocratization can be understood as backsliding from a liberal or elective democracy to a 
more authoritarian regime type, or a reduction in the limited space for freedoms provided by 
authoritarian rulers (Bermeo, 2015; Diamond, 2015). Pakistan has been variously described as 
an electoral autocracy, ‘partly free’, or a hybrid regime. The latter term more accurately reflects 
Pakistan’s heterogeneous elements when used by such scholars as Katharine Adeney (2017). 
Pakistan exists in a ‘grey zone’ in which multi- party elections coexist with reserved powers in 
the security and foreign policy areas for the powerful military (Shah, 2014).
The growing literature on autocratization recognizes that this global process is occurring 
simultaneously with some instances of democratization. A renewed interest in autocratization 
has come about because of the contemporary decline of liberal democracy in such countries 
as India, Hungary, Poland, and the United States. Pertinent for the Pakistan case study is the 
further finding that autocratization’s contemporary manifestation is marked not by ceasing 
elections, but rather by the undermining of such democratic rights as freedom of expression, 
rule of law and freedom of association.
Claims of Pakistan’s democratic advance can be focused too narrowly on the question 
whether elections in the past decade have been fair or free. The findings of international 
election observers superficially support claims of democratic advancement. Their reports have 










health (EU Election Observation Report, 2013; 2018). Within Pakistan, there has been fierce 
debate about the issue of pre- poll rigging and ballot fixing. Imran Khan campaigned vigorously 
on these issues following the 2013 polls (Mulla, 2017). Evidence regarding the most recent 
elections, however, points to his PTI party benefiting from the election engineering by the 
military. It did not want to see Nawaz Sharif returned to office. Intervention took the form of 
campaign restrictions, intimidation of Muslim League party workers and restrictions on media 
outlets that supported the Muslim League (Afzal, 2018). This chapter does not seek to go 
over this well- trodden ground. It argues instead that the examination of everyday experiences 
of infringements on political and human rights provides a more important means of assessing 
Pakistan’s direction of travel with respect to democracy, rather than concentrating on the issue 
of electoral malpractice.
The chapter focuses on three areas that have been discussed with respect to global trends in 
autocratization. These are firstly restrictions on the print and electronic media. Secondly, the 
extent to which there are infringements of the rule of law and the independence of the judi-
ciary. Finally, it examines the issue of freedom of association. It thus addresses the question that 
while elections have occurred on a more regular basis since 2008, are the rights and institutions 
that make the electoral process meaningful, being maintained or compromised? The study will 
utilize qualitative data drawn from civil society reports and newspaper accounts in support of 
its assessment. Before beginning this examination, it is necessary to briefly survey the historical 
context of processes of democratization and autocratization in Pakistan.
The historical context
The landscape which shapes autocratization in Pakistan is complex. Pakistan’s political devel-
opment cannot be understood simply in terms of the binary opposites of democratization and 
autocratization pursued respectively by civilian and military governments. Nor can its social 
development be similarly reduced to a straightforward clash between secular and Islamic visions 
for the future. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s clashed with the judi-
ciary and sought to undermine its independence (Talbot, 2005). They also harassed political 
opponents and attempted to control the media. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s used the army 
to crush political opponents in Balochistan (Lieven, 2011). This enabled the army to restore 
its influence after the debacle of the 1971 Bangladesh war. Two decades later, civilian leaders 
conspired with the military in bids to undermine their elected rivals. These actions strengthened 
the influence in Pakistan’s public and economic life, which the army had established during 
Zia- ul- Haq’s rule (1977– 88).
Nawaz Sharif during the 1990s also acceded to demands for Islamization to shore up his 
position. The linkages which the military had maintained with Islamic proxies were also 
maintained for strategic reasons, or even were established anew, with, for example, the creation 
of the Taliban in which Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister Nasrullah Babar played a significant 
role (Talbot, 2002). Even the military’s mainstreaming of militant groups in the 2018 elections 
is not without historical precedent, as Benazir Bhutto established ties with Islamist groups, des-
pite her liberal pretentions.
The links between the military, Islamic groups, and political parties, further complicate the 
Pakistan landscape. It is well established that Islamic proxies were first used in the struggle for 
Kashmir shortly after independence (Swami, 2007). With the passage of time, what has been 
termed the mullah– military nexus came into existence (Haqqani, 2005). The Pakistan army 
assumed the role of the guardian of Pakistan’s ideological as well as territorial integrity. The 













different forms. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler, favoured modernist Islam. Pervez 
Musharraf sought to draw on Sufi traditions in establishing a moderate Islamic regime image 
for western audiences. He also emphasized the dangers of Talibanization to encourage their 
governments to acquiesce with his regime, which as the ‘war on terror’ unfolded, adopted a 
Janus- like position with respect to Islamic militancy (Talbot, 2012)
The outset of the Zia regime marked the peak of Islamist groups’ access to state power. It 
is from the period of the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979– 89) that Inter- Services Intelligence 
(ISI), the military security agency, cultivated close ties with militant groups (Kiessling, 2016). 
These ties have survived until the contemporary era with respect to groups either committed 
to fighting India, or who are regarded as providing leverage in Afghanistan. Some militant 
groups have however outgrown their state patronage and have directed firepower against the 
institutions of the Pakistan state itself. Such groups sometimes loosely referred to as the ‘bad 
Taliban’ have developed links with Al Qaeda or more recently Islamic State.
Three further elements complicate the landscape for contemporary autocratization. Firstly, 
the so- called religious establishment, although it was promoted to exclude liberal forces 
from power (Waseem, 2007), does not automatically support the military-run or -guided 
governments. Religious parties, such as Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jamiat Ulema- e- Islam 
(F) have campaigned against them in the name of democracy. Secondly, the Pakistan state’s long- 
term patronage of the religious establishment and of militant proxies has cumulatively limited 
the social as well as the political space for the expression of liberal and plural ideas. A social 
environment has emerged in parts of Pakistan that is hostile to attempts by civil society groups 
and political parties to address human rights issues facing religious minorities and women. 
Thirdly, since 1949, when the Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA) 
came into existence, accountability relating to corruption and misuse of office has been open 
to political manipulation. Musharraf after his 1999 coup introduced tougher accountability 
processes that created a parallel corruption law system in the National Accountability Bureau 
(NAB). The Chairman has the power to hold the accused in investigative custody for 90 days 
(compared with 14 days under the ordinary laws), strip them of the right to bail and try them 
in a special court with a revised burden of proof and much tougher sentences than a pro-
vincial court would impose. Since 2018 NAB has become increasingly controversial as its 
investigations appear to be undermining leading opponents of Imran Khan. At the same time, 
it appears reluctant to investigate cases of those who are close to him.
The chapter focuses on the state’s limitation of freedom of association and expression. 
But social pressure to conform to ideal Islamic norms reinforces autocratization trends. One 
example is the hostility, both on- and off- line, to the recent marches to celebrate International 
Women’s Day that have been organized by the Aurat civil society organization. Others which 
lie beyond the scope of this study involve the restrictions on the Ahmadi community’s freedom 
of religious expression, the barriers to reform of the Blasphemy Ordinance which has been 
used maliciously against the Ahmadi and Christian communities, the persistence of so- called 
honour killings and the suppression of female voting in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. NGOs 
and social movements working to address injustices in the above areas have faced both official 
and societal restrictions.
In sum, Pakistan’s complex political and social landscape counsels against regarding any 
election as a breakthrough one for democratization. The high hopes vested in the youthful 
Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1988 were quickly dashed. Conversely, autocratization is not 
necessarily accelerated by military rule or even by governments close to the army. The early 
years of the Musharraf regime (1999– 2008) were, for example, marked by liberalization of 







authoritarian tendencies. Pakistan’s asymmetric social and political power relations and the 
entrenchment of the military are constant features regardless of regime type and the polit-
ical affiliations of elected governments. This may explain why Pakistan’s direction of travel 
either towards democratic consolidation or to autocratization is incremental. Pakistan’s history 
provides evidence of its following trends elsewhere in South Asia, but usually more slowly and 
less obviously.
The media
The existence of more than 500 newspapers and periodicals in Pakistan points to a vibrant print 
media, despite the challenges of online competition. Both domestic and international analyses 
reveal a less favourable picture. The 2020 World Press Freedom index, produced by the Paris-
based, Reporters sans frontiers (Reporters Without Borders), places Pakistan 145/ 180 countries (RSF, 
2020). The drop of three places from 2019 reflects reports from within Pakistan, produced by 
The Editors for Safety and the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors that press freedom became 
more restricted in the lead-up to and aftermath of the July 2018 elections. Press freedom had in 
fact been restricted throughout the preceding decade, in the context of ‘the war on terror’ and 
ethnic insurgency in Balochistan.
Journalists’ reporting was especially dangerous in Balochistan where they risked being both 
caught in the crossfire of insurgents and the military and of being harassed by the intelli-
gence agencies. On 28 August 2020, the Balochistan Union of Journalists publicly observed 
the deaths of 45 journalists and media workers in the province since 2008 (Dawn, 29 August 
2020). These threats have made Pakistan for some years one of the most dangerous countries 
for journalists to operate (Aslam, 2015). In July 2020, the outspoken journalist Matiallah Jan 
was kidnapped by unknown assailants in broad daylight outside the Government Girls School 
Islamabad. Fortunately, this was captured on CCTV footage which went viral on social media. 
The resulting furore led to him being released, rather than becoming one of the ‘disappeared’ 
(Dawn, 22 July 2020). Jan claimed that the security establishment was implicated in his abduc-
tion. Given the dangers involved, it is understandable that many journalists self- censor their 
work. A 2018 survey of Pakistani journalists found that 46 per cent of its respondents reported 
self- censoring because of fears for their safety.
The advent of the PTI Government which was on the ‘same page’ as the army led however 
to an increase in manipulation and harassment. Early in March 2020, Brad Adams, the Asia dir-
ector of the Human Rights Watch organization, summed up the situation by declaring that, ‘The 
space for dissent in Pakistan is shrinking fast and anyone who criticizes government actions 
can become a target’ (Dawn, 14 March 2020). Media manipulation was revealed most clearly 
in news blackouts. There were also interruptions of the distribution of newspapers that printed 
anti- government and anti- military articles along with the withdrawal of government adver-
tising. Journalists and media proprietors were arrested on anti- terrorism and accountability 
grounds. Finally, journalists suffered harassment from unknown assailants that were linked to 
the security agencies as well as to militant groups. The decades-long record of attacks, including 
murders being carried out with impunity, persisted with the advent of the PTI government. 
Seven journalists were killed in unsolved cases in 2019. In the past decade there have been six-
teen unsolved murders and only three prosecutions in sixty assassinations. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists, an independent organization working to promote press freedom worldwide, 
in its 2019 Global Impunity Index ranked Pakistan as the eighth worst country for prosecuting 
murderers of journalists (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2019). The Ministry of Human 






was quickly watered down by clubbing it together with other media legislation emanating from 
the Ministry of Information.
In the months prior to the 2018 polls, the military instigated a news blackout of the activ-
ities of the grassroots Pashtun civil roots movement, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). It had 
been founded four years earlier and had demanded an investigation into extra- judicial killings 
in Waziristan as well as a removal of the landmines laid by the army during its operations in 
the tribal areas. Despite the peaceful nature of the PTM protests, the army saw the movement 
as a threat to its impunity. The clamp- down was justified on the grounds of national security. 
In January 2020, the PTM leader Manzoor Pashteen was arrested on charges of sedition. The 
Urdu language website of Voice of America was temporarily blocked, when it reported about 
the temporary detention of another leading PTM figure Mohsin Darwar who was elected to 
the National Assembly in 2018.
During its second year in office, the PTI government brazenly marked its displeasure 
at the Herald and the Jang media groups. Imran Khan publicly accused their flagship 
newspapers, Dawn and Jang of printing ‘fake news’. In January 2020, the federal govern-
ment withdrew all the advertisements which were traditionally placed in Dawn. This was a 
major economic blow for the paper which it attempted to overturn in legal cases in Sindh. 
Imran Khan’s criticisms coincided with the army’s displeasure at an interview in May 2018 
between Nawaz Sharif and the paper’s assistant editor Cyril Almeida (Dawn, 12 May 2018). 
The former prime minister complained about the existence of parallel governments in 
Pakistan and questioned the progress of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks trial. Almeida had 
written extensively for Dawn on civil –  military relations. Indeed, earlier in October 2016, 
he had published an insider piece which alleged rifts between the Sharif Government and 
the army, which the former denied.
The army’s displeasure was revealed in an unofficial ban on the circulation of the paper in 
militarily controlled residential areas. The concerted campaign against Pakistan’s oldest news-
paper was also marked by protests outside its Karachi and Islamabad offices following its coverage 
of the November 2019 London Bridge terrorist attack. There were calls for Dawn’s editor to be 
hanged and the paper to be shut down. A crowd outside the Islamabad office chanted slogans 
in favour of the army’s intelligence wing (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2019). In 
January 2019, Almeida suspended his weekly column in Dawn.
The owner of the Jang media group was entangled in a case in which he was claimed to 
have illegally acquired seven acres of land, thirty- four years previously. Like political opponents 
of the government, Mir Shakilur Rehman faced prolonged detention without charge, while 
NAB probed the case in which he was referred. Reporters Without Borders unequivocally stated 
that the case was designed to intimidate the group’s journalists who had been highly critical of 
the partisan actions of NAB (Dawn, 14 March 2020).
Rehman also owned Pakistan’s largest private TV channel, Geo, which had fallen foul of 
the authorities. In the run- up to the 2018 polls, the channel was temporarily taken off air. On 
1 July 2019, there was a furore involving its leading presenter Hamid Mir. Five years earlier he 
had been wounded by an assailant that Mir claimed had links with the security services. The 
broadcast of his live interview on ‘Capital News’ with the leading opposition politician and 
former President Asif Ali Zardari abruptly ended. The Pakistan Media Regulatory Authority 
(PEMRA) denied involvement. Hamid Mir in a BBC interview labelled Imran Khan’s gov-
ernment as a ‘civilian dictatorship’ and claimed that censorship was daily increasing (BBC 
News, 2019a). Shortly afterwards, an interview with Maryam Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime 
Minister’s daughter and vocal government critic, was also prematurely ended. These episodes 




Taking TV channels off- air is not a new development of the PTI Government era. Cable 
operators blocked channels for example in November 2017, during the protests led by the 
Islamist group Tehreek- e- Labbaik (Mulla, 2017). There was also massive blocking of social media 
and content- sharing websites. Religious festivals which may provoke sectarian violence form 
other previous occasions when access has been blocked.
The case of the journalist Nasrullah Chaudhry can be seen, as not only an injustice to the 
individual, but part of a more general campaign to silence criticism of the government. In 
December 2019, an anti- terrorism court sentenced the veteran journalist, who worked for the 
Urdu daily Nai Baat, to five years in jail for alleged possession of banned material. This was the 
first case in which such a charge had been made in disregard of the need for sensitive sources for 
purely professional reasons. The Sindh High Court accepted this line of defence and acquitted 
Chaudhry (Dawn, 3 May 2020).
Citizen journalists and bloggers have also recently faced online restrictions and dangers. 
They have been threatened by mysterious individuals who it is claimed have links with the 
security services as well as by those connected with militant Islamic and ethnic groups. There 
was a spike of such cases in March 2019 in the wake of the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Salman, amidst the controversy of the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. 
In extreme cases, activists and investigative journalists faced assault and assassination attempts. In 
June 2019, the blogger and social media activist Muhammad Bilal Khan was murdered. He had 
been particularly vocal about the issue of enforced disappearances.
Reports released in 2019 by the Oxford Internet Institute (2019) and Freedom House 
(2019) painted a dismal picture of growing surveillance of the Internet and social media, and 
of large- scale attempts to manipulate opinion. Surveillance is assisted by the requirement that 
users link their internet and mobile connections to their national identity card. Cases have been 
brought against social media activists because of their online comments, as for example with the 
PMT activist Hayat Preyhel in July 2018. The PTI Government’s proposals for increased regu-
lation of online platforms were pushed back, but it revealed a commitment to closer control of 
content. The existing regulatory authority for online censorship has been accused of acting in a 
non- transparent and arbitrary manner. The increase in requests to Google to take down content 
further evidenced the PTI’s restrictive approach. The Government sent 214 requests to Google 
to remove 3,125 pieces of content between July and December; 196 requests had been made in 
the previous six months. Taking all these key developments into consideration, Freedom House 
in its 2019 Report on the Net rated Pakistan as ‘unfree’.
The judiciary
There is a well- established history of the judiciary lacking independence in Pakistan. Supreme 
Court judges from 1958 used the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to legitimize military coups (McGrath, 
1999). The period after 2007 was however marked by judicial activism (Waseem, 2007) with 
growing talk of a ‘clash of institutions’. There have been recent developments that could be 
interpreted as an attempt to undermine the judiciary’s independence. Firstly, questions have 
been raised about the judgements that excluded Nawaz Sharif from office in advance of the 
2020 polls. The continued legal pursuit of the Sharif family orchestrated by NAB has also been 
troubling. Maryam Nawaz Sharif early in July 2019 released a secretly recorded video that 
she claimed showed that her 69-years-old father had been wrongly convicted of corruption. 
The video revealed a conversation between Arshad Malik, the Accountability Court Islamabad 
Judge, and a PML- N supporter Nasir Butt. During the conversation, Malik stated that he had 







He subsequently rebutted the claim, saying that the video clip had been cut and edited and did 
not reflect what he said. He also said that the Sharif family had threatened him and tried to 
bribe him during the case. Judge Malik was suspended for misconduct. He was dismissed the 
service in July 2020 following a decision taken by a seven- member committee headed by the 
Lahore High Court Justice Muhammad Qasim Khan. This cast further doubt on the validity of 
Nawaz sharif ’s original conviction.
Another controversial case is that of Supreme Court Justice Qazi Faez Isa. President Arif 
Alvi accused him of misconduct over not declaring foreign assets and recommended that action 
be taken under Article 209 of the Constitution. His reference to the Supreme Court Judicial 
Council was intentionally leaked to the press. This encouraged a media campaign against Isa 
that tarnished his reputation and was also damaging to the prestige of the Supreme Court 
itself. The procedure for bringing the case against the Justice that he had ‘undeclared assets’ 
in Britain was based on flimsy grounds. Significantly, it was orchestrated by the newly formed 
Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) headed by Shahzad Akbar, the Special Assistant to Imran Khan on 
accountability. In June 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the reference against Isa. His wife 
had testified that she was of independent financial means and that the properties were her own 
assets. The ARU’s legal authorization to conduct the case was questionable. Its involvement 
indicated that Imran Khan was a party to the proceedings.
Justice Qazi Isa was highly regarded as an upright judge who could be a candidate for the 
role of Chief Justice in September 2023. He had however upset the military establishment with 
some notable rulings. This has led Zahid Hussain in an opinion piece to argue that the assets 
case was politically motivated (Dawn, 24 June 2020). There were two important cases in which 
Justice Isa had been critical of the security establishment. The first stemmed from the time in 
which he was a member of the Supreme Court Commission on the 2016 terrorist bombing in 
Quetta. The second involved the suo motu case into the 2017 Faizabad Dharna. Isa had shared a 
two- member bench with Mushir Alam, but he had individually authored the forty- three-page 
judgement. Just three months after it was delivered, President Ali made his accusations. Isa’s 
judgement that the security services should be more accountable was common to both cases. 
This crossed a red line in public discourse.
Isa had formed a one-man judicial commission into state institutions’ response to the 
bombing at Quetta General Hospital in which dozens had been killed on 8 August 2016. His 
report published four months later was highly critical of the role of Chaudhry Nisar Ali, the 
Minister for the Interior in the Nawaz Sharif Government. It also criticized the powerful army 
intelligence agency ISI’s lack of transparency. ‘The ISI does not have a website, address, email 
or telephone number’, the report remarked, ‘One can but commiserate with the poor citizens 
who may have to interact with them. If such nebulousness serves a purpose it could only be to 
remain aloof and unapproachable: unquestionable and unaccountable’ (The Express Tribune, 16 
December 2016).
The Justice returned to this theme in his judgement on the Faizabad Dharna. The Islamist 
Tehreek- e- Labbaik had paralyzed public life by its sit- in in Islamabad. The protests which called 
for the resignation of the Law Minister Zahid Hamid had been sparked by a change in the 
wording of the declaration related to the finality of the Prophet Muhammad enacted through 
the Elections Act of 2017. Controversy over the role of the military and security establishment 
in the protests was fuelled by video footage shot by a Dawn News TV reporter on his mobile 
phone that showed the Director- General of the Punjab Rangers Major- General Azhar Navid 
handing out money and encouraging protesters (BBC, 2019b).
Justice Isa’s judgement provided a detailed assessment of the context for the dharna. Its sting 




was based on the large- scale interference with broadcasts that we have noted was designed to 
prevent coverage of the events. Secondly, Isa ruled that the Constitution emphatically prohibits 
members of the armed forces from engaging in any kind of political activity. ‘The Government 
of Pakistan, the Ministry of Defence and the respective chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the 
Air Force are directed to initiate action against the personnel under their command who are 
found to have violated their oath’ (The Nation, 10 February 2019).
Freedom of association
Autocratization has been globally associated not only with curbs on the media and the 
strengthening of the executive, but also limits on the freedom of association. In 2019, the 
Register of Trade Unions banned sixty-two labour unions in Balochistan. This action followed 
a judgement from the Balochistan High Court (Human Rights Commission Pakistan, State 
of Human Rights in 2019, p. 10). Labour unions are banned from mining and other activities 
in Balochistan, especially when the companies have non- Pakistani (i.e., Chinese) investment. 
From October 2015 there was also a stricter regulation of both the activities of International 
Non- Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and of the funding of domestic NGOs by foreign 
donors.
INGOs had to obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior to be registered in 
Pakistan. Applications could be refused on the grounds of ‘involvement in any activity incon-
sistent with Pakistan’s interests, or contrary to Government policy’. These were sufficiently 
vague to enable the targeting of individuals and organizations deemed critical of government. 
All existing INGOs had to apply for registration. This was a cumbersome process. Only 74 out 
of 141 applications had been approved by 2019 (Human Rights Commission Pakistan, State of 
Human Rights in 2019, p. 225). Well- known organizations such as Action Aid and World Vision 
had to cease their activities in Pakistan. Registration went hand in hand with the requirement 
for No Objection Certificates from provincial governments to start relief work in specific geo-
graphical areas. Local NGOs were also restricted. They could only obtain foreign funding after 
a successful application for a Memorandum of Understanding with the Pakistan Government’s 
Economic Affairs Division.
The restrictions were most marked in the tribal areas where the Pakistan army was 
conducting operations and in the province of Balochistan; the scene of a long running insur-
gency that was becoming increasingly strategically important as a result of the Chinese– Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC). Throughout Pakistan, however, NGO work on human rights 
issues is discouraged. There is scrutiny and what amounts to harassment even of those NGOs 
working in less contentious areas such as health and education. ‘Intelligence personnel regu-
larly visit offices and demand to see documents on staff and ongoing projects (Human Rights 
Commission Pakistan, State of Human Rights in, p. 181). Western diplomats as well as aid workers 
have criticized the restrictions. In December 2019, the Sindh Provincial Government cancelled 
the registration of over 7,000 NGOs (70 per cent of the total number) on the grounds that they 
had not shared their financial records (Human Rights Commission Pakistan, State of Human 
Rights in 2019, p. 92). The Covid- 19 crisis, however, severely impacted on Pakistan’s fragile 
public health provision. In late March 2020, Imran Khan’s government eased for six months 
restrictions on NGOs and INGOs that sought to respond to the developing crisis.
The authorities have not just targeted NGOs that focus on human rights issues. 
Environmentalist groups have also been harassed. Their activities not only threaten vested 
interests with respect to land grabs, but they are viewed as ‘anti- state’ if they criticize activities 





grounds. The road building and power projects associated with CPEC have contributed respect-
ively to deforestation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and pollution in the Thar desert area of Sindh. 
In 2016– 17, ‘The Friends of Thar’ mobilized support in a campaign about the environmental 
impact of coal mining in the Gorano area of the desert. The authorities’ response paralleled that 
towards the PTM. National press coverage was discouraged, although the Sindhi print and elec-
tronic media reported on the movement. Activists were charged before anti- terrorist courts, 
whilst others received threatening phone calls (Sibt- ul Hassan Turi, Usman Ashraf, 2018).
Conclusion
Even before the Covid- 19 pandemic threatened Pakistan’s fragile economy, it was clear that 
reality would not match up to the rhetoric of a Naya Pakistan. Increasingly technocrats, 
linked with previous military regimes, supplanted party loyalists in Imran Khan’s inner circles. 
The 2018 election itself had seen some ‘electables’ replace long-time PTI members as party 
candidates. There was a dissipation of the tension in civil– military relations which had marked 
the third Nawaz Sharif government. However, this was not the result of further democratic 
consolidation, but rather because of the similarity of government and military viewpoints. This 
did not end speculation about a change of leadership, at the mid- term of the Imran Khan gov-
ernment. Despite his portrayal as the ‘army’s man’, he remained under scrutiny with respect to 
poor governance and economic competence. Pakistan’s political stability was no more guaran-
teed than at any previous time.
If there was little sign of democratization, what about autocratization? Here, there is evi-
dence that space for freedom of expression was becoming more restricted. This was not as 
dramatic a trend as in other South Asian countries which had traditionally enjoyed greater 
freedoms than Pakistan. Freedom of association was also restricted, although political curbs 
on the activities of NGOs and social movements such as PTM predated Imran Khan’s gov-
ernment. Societal pressures on those advocating minority rights were also the result of well- 
established trends. Contemporary developments thus consolidate pre- existing restrictions, 
injustices, and uneven power relations. Pakistan, for all its lack of freedom, thus provides 
incremental rather than dramatic evidence for a newly emerging third wave of autocratization 
in South Asia.
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RELIGIOUS CLIENTELISM  





One man, one vote is a central tenet of democracy. This, however, is regularly displaced in the 
context of developing democracies where various forms of inequalities permeate. The Indian 
Subcontinent is no exception. There are a number of power structures present in the region 
including but not limited to feudalism and clientelism. The former remains the perennial power 
structure undergirding much of the analyses of the democratic consolidation, or lack thereof, 
of Pakistan (Wilder 1997, Mohmand 2019). The latter, clientelism, is the main explanation that 
directly displaces the one man, one vote tenet and, as such, has the potential to not only hinder 
the democratic consolidation of developing countries, but also to contribute to democratic 
backsliding, that is, the autocratization of young democracies.
Much of the political science literature that examines vote choice in South Asia forwards the 
contemporary understanding of clientelism as a central explanation of voting behaviour, where 
clients sell their votes in exchange for a material good to the highest bidder (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007, Chandra 2007, Mohmand 2019). Effectively, citizens of the region are viewed 
through a marketized lens, where a cost– benefit analysis dominates as an explanation for their 
vote choice. What remains largely absent from the contemporary political science scholarship 
is a theory of clientelism that can explain why client- voters may be swayed by non- material 
incentives in casting their vote – that is, an understanding that goes beyond the economic lens 
of the material exchange, where instead what is witnessed is clientelism as politics, or a “total 
exchange” that is “at once economic, political, ritual and moral” (Piliavsky 2014: 11). This 
absence risks overlooking the role played by context and social identities that go beyond a quid 
pro quo understanding of the voter.
One such ‘total exchange’ is the power structure that permeates much of the rural expanse 
of Pakistan –  the pir- murid relationship. Pir is the local term for living saints – the same term 
is used across the local languages. Murid is the term used for disciples/ followers of pirs. Here 
the exchange takes place between voters and politicians both of whom play dual roles: patrons 
are both politician and living saint (pir) and clients are both voters and followers (murids) of 









for their saint- politicians in exchange for salvation. Unlike the marketized model of clien-
telism, religious clientelism allows the inclusion of context and social identities of the citizens 
as part of their calculus in casting their vote. This allows for a more holistic understanding of 
the murid- voter. It is important to note that material goods are also included in this calculus, 
but a preference and prioritization is given to non- material, religious goods, such as blessings, 
spiritual guidance and the ultimate – salvation. Pir- politicians have long formed part of the 
Pakistani political elite, with much attention devoted to their role as brokers able to deliver 
the vote (Talbot 2005, Wilder 1999, Gilmartin 1979, Malik and Malik 2017). Today, 16% 
of Pakistan’s National Assembly are pir- politicians, with similar numbers, if not more, in the 
Provincial Assemblies. Despite this constant and growing presence of pir- politicians over the 
past seven decades, there remains a dearth of research on the actors that vote for them, spe-
cifically what drives the murid- client, and the role that this spiritual relationship plays in their 
political behaviour.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First it seeks to present a subtype of clientelism 
that takes into account non- material exchanges between patrons and clients, activated through 
the inclusion of the actors’ social identity provided by religion. This can help further our 
understanding of how clientelism operates on the ground, and to provide a more nuanced 
and holistic analysis of the client- voter. Second, to examine how some functional aspects of 
this relationship, at the individual level, appear to hinder the self- determination of murid- 
voters when casting their votes. Because this effectively displaces the one man, one vote 
concept undergirding a core tenet of electoral democracy. This results in moving developing 
countries away from democratic consolidation and closer to authoritarianism. 
I argue that in religious clientelism, religion as a social identity operates at two levels 
simultaneously – collective and individual. At the collective level, religion provides a social 
group identity to clients through which they relate to others in their spiritual community as 
well as their overall social life. As such the individual belongs to a community of likeminded 
people, all bound by the spiritual connection to a common leader and congregation – where 
the connection to the spiritual leader remains centre stage. At the individual level religion 
serves as belief system. By this I mean a private sphere through which the individual situates 
himself in relation to society, and makes sense of the world, but also relates to the super-
natural, addressing questions pertaining to life after death, the meanings associated with 
different aspects of life and the like. It is this dual function of religion as both social identity 
and belief system in one that enables non- material goods to be part of the reciprocal exchange 
between client and patron. At the collective level it delivers the vote. At the individual level 
it allows for individualized, personal, private, non- material religious goods of salvation, spir-
itual guidance and blessings. I then explore how key aspects of this relationship may stymie 
the self- determination of murid- voters when casting their votes.
I draw on data that I have gathered through extensive fieldwork across Pakistan’s Sindh and 
Punjab provinces (September– December 2015, and April– May 2019). This includes in- depth 
interviews with thirty- seven murids, twelve pir- politicians, and participant observation. I further 
draw on a database I created of pir- politicians across time in both national and provincial assem-
blies as well as secondary sources. The overarching contribution of the chapter is that it provides 
insights from the client- side of the relationship. Specifically, on a theoretical level, the chapter 
uses clientelism as a framework to analyze a religio- political bond, highlighting the importance 
of non- material aspects of the clientelistic relationship that can undermine how citizens vote. 
It is firmly grounded in original empirical data, reflective of how clientelism works on the 
ground, resulting in a theory derived through an inductive process accounting for the interplay 
of both social and political identities simultaneously in the analysis of citizens’ voting behaviour. 
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At the empirical level, although pir- politicians and the power they wield has been the subject 
of much investigation (Ansari 1992, Talbot 2005, Wilder 1997, Malik and Mirza 2015), to 
my knowledge this is the first study to provide fine- grained, micro data on the murid- voter’s 
preferences and how this relationship affects their voting decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: I first define clientelism, followed by a sketch of 
the five core elements of religious clientelism. I detail the actors, their resource base, affective 
ties of the relationship, its iterative nature and the presence of trust. The second part presents an 
analysis of key aspects of the relationship that can undermine a client- voter’s self- determination. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion focused on whether this type of face- to- face clien-
telism is yet another factor contributing to the autocratization of Pakistan, or if it can help its 
democratic consolidation.
Delineating religious clientelism
Before sketching out religious clientelism, it is necessary to define the term. Clientelism is 
founded on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By clientelism I mean a form 
of personal, dyadic exchange relationship often rooted in obligation between two parties of 
unequal power (whether this power be social, political, economic or religious), where the inter-
change is often of non- comparable goods and services. I have adapted James Scott’s comparative 
framework to sketch out the five core characteristics of religious clientelism – (1) a dyadic 
relationship centred chiefly on a non- material exchange; (2) the resource base of the actors 
is personal; (3) the relationship is highly affective; (4) it is iterative; (5) the basis of religion 
fosters both trust and loyalty and finally the relationship is not purely of a quid pro quo nature 
(1972: 106).
First, religious clientelism is a dyadic relationship centred on two primary actors – the pir- 
politician (patron) and murid- voter (client). The murid swears allegiance to the pir- politician 
from whom he seeks spiritual enlightenment, and the ultimate, salvation – initiating a lifelong 
bond. This pledge reinforces the asymmetric character of the relationship, with the client in 
an inferior spiritual position to the pir- politician. The relationship centres on the iterative, 
and reciprocal, face- to- face interaction – cementing the personalized bond between the 
two actors. Typically, within larger clientelistic set-ups there may be a third actor involved, 
a broker, such as the khalifa, who acts as a representative of the pir- politician, found in the 
rural settings of Pakistan. Usually, a broker can play the role of patron too; however, I do not 
treat him as a patron in his own right because the khalifa normally has sworn allegiance to 
the pir- politician. More importantly he does not have access to either religious or political 
power. Effectively, the khalifa maintains no access to the goods that form part of the exchange 
relationship.
The patron is a pir (living saint) and a politician; he has both religious and socio- economic 
power. In the context of Pakistan, society is highly stratified, where people who exercise pol-
itical power tend to belong to a higher socio- economic stratum, in terms of access and assets. 
Echoing this, most pir- politicians are also landlords in their own right – giving them immense 
social standing and large embedded networks (Ansari 1992). One apt example is the current 
Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Querishi. He is considered a living saint because 
of his position as the spiritual head of the shrine of Baha’uddin Zakariya. He is also, according 
to the electoral register, a landlord in his own right. Another example is former Prime Minister 
Syed Yousaf Reza Gilani. He is the head of the shrine of Musa Pak, and has large landholdings, 
while serving as an active politician within the Pakistan People’s Party. In effect, both are 







The client in religious clientelism, murid, is a follower of a pir- politician and can be from a 
variety of socio- economic backgrounds; ranging from landlord (with access and ownership to 
land, contact networks, etc.), senior civil servant, middle- class banker, to the poor farmer that 
needs to work every day to put food on the table. Different permutations of these characteristics 
of the murid dictate the function that the clientelistic bond of pir- murid plays for them. For the 
poorer murid, the relationship functions as a coping mechanism – socially he or she may depend 
on his patron for access to the state machinery, including arbitration in land matters. On the 
religious plane the bond may help make sense of the material world, with the knowledge that 
this relationship provides access to salvation. For the murid who is a landlord, with hundreds 
of acres of land, the bond of pir- murid acts as an added layer of insurance. One example being 
mediation in cases of land squatting. This relationship creates expectations because both actors 
operate in an environment that reacts to the other.
Second, both actors’ resource base is personal. This resource base ties in directly with the 
actions available to each actor. The pir- politician has a number of goods to offer their clients, 
which form part of his ruhani (spiritual) and dunyawi (worldly) duties towards the clients; 
both non- material and material goods. The religious non- material inducements that the pir- 
politician offers the murid are tied in with his personhood. Only someone descending from a 
lineage of pirs dating back to the original saint, is able to offer this. This legitimation factor 
functions as a barrier to entry for other politicians. The non- material religious inducements 
include but are not limited to spiritual guidance, making religion accessible and the promise 
of salvation. These are done by delivering sermons that highlight the access he provides to the 
other worldly – in the form of providing a condensed, easy access to day- to- day religion – 
such as reminders of what is sufficient as part of being a good believer. Other non- material 
goods include social wellbeing (including social standing, social identity as well as belonging), 
access (government office or to business/ personal networks) and foremost impartial arbitration 
(in matters of land squatting, stealing of property, marriage breakdown, to name a few). The 
patron offers these through constant communication with his congregation via various nodes 
available to him. These include annual urs (death anniversary of the original saint), annual 
visits the pir- politician pays to his followers and on a regular basis through the extensive net-
work of khalifas. This provision reinforces the pir- politician’s social power (social standing as 
impartial arbitrator) and political power (through the murid’s political activity including votes). 
The material goods, normally provided as part of the pir’s worldly duties towards his murids, 
include building of schools, roads and getting jobs for the clients (whether in government or 
otherwise).
The murid’s resource base is also largely personal. The murid has a number of goods to 
offer the patron, including but not limited to allegiance, loyalty (religious, political and social), 
offerings (ranging from tithes, to land deeds, monetary donations), investment of time, and 
political support (this can range from showing up at political rallies, to casting their vote). The 
murid avails these non- material goods offered by the pir- politician through his position as a 
client, that is, through membership of the congregation. It is not an active good that is being 
exchanged, but one that requires investment of time and constant communication with the 
entirety of the informal institution associated with the pir- politician (the shrine, congregation, 
khalifa network). Importantly a client’s access to non- material goods can only be removed if the 
client were to leave the relationship. Furthermore, the actors relate to each other on two levels, 
both religious and political, where both have duties towards each other, creating expectations, 
where there is a complex overlap of religious and social identities. It is crucial to point out 
that only if one’s patron is running for office or has categorically expressed a political leaning 
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towards a candidate, is the vote perceived as part of one’s sworn spiritual allegiance, with the 
expectation of the murid is voting for their saint.
Third, the relationship is highly affective. Scott’s framework is helpful here, which assesses 
the strength of a clientelistic bond in relation to how many linkages patron and client share. 
Many link reinforce the bond, resulting in a stronger bond, whereas fewer links between the 
actors are associated with a weaker bond (1972). In case of the pir- murid, the actors share mul-
tiple links, all in different spheres of life – social, political and religious. Each link reinforces 
the other. Some scholars argue the possibility of differentiating between these linkages being 
limited to the analytical level, where differentiation in practice is of little importance. One 
example is Jeremy Boissevain’s study of Sicily, where patronage, friendship and kinship reinforce 
each other and exist as an amalgamation (1966: 29). I agree to a certain extent, where the 
linkages in practice indeed do exist as an amalgamation. However, I argue for a practical differ-
entiation between the bonds of the pir- murid, because the religious bond appears to be driving 
the social and political linkages, and as such constitutes a differentiation both empirically and 
theoretically.
Fourth, the relationship is iterative. There is regular interaction between the actors. On a 
daily basis there is social interaction between murids of the same congregation, the khalifa of 
the pir- politician, and at least once- a- year interaction with the pir himself during the annual 
urs (death anniversary) at the pir’s associated shrine. These face- to- face interactions with the 
entire system of religious clientelism are in stark contrast to today’s vote-buying literature 
where interaction is limited to only election time (Mohmand 2011, Hicken 2011, Stokes et. 
al 2013).
Finally, in conjunction with these four attributes outlined above, religion as the basis of cli-
entelism reinforces aspects of trust (Hosking 2014: 46) and loyalty. This is exercised at different 
levels and degrees. At the interpersonal level, the murid shares strong thick trust between him-
self and the pir- politician, where murids have committed valued resources (such as the oath 
of allegiance, tithes, investment of time and their vote) (Granovetter 1973). At the individual 
level, the pir serves as an authoritative figure, to whom murids look up as spiritual guide and 
intercessor, and in general, trust them more than ordinary human beings (Hosking 2014: 38). 
At the collective level, the myths associated with the pir- politician provide a narrative frame-
work for trust. This trust, between patron and client, is reinforced by the iterative and recip-
rocal exchanges between both actors. Finally, at the institutional level the murid has trust in the 
shrine and the congregation – that is, generalized trust. This is a strong thin trust based not on 
knowing someone personally but is “based on first- hand knowledge of how society generally 
works”. One example is the knowledge of what streets are safe to walk at night in the city one 
resides in, or what Bronislaw Malinowksi calls ‘auto- pilot’ trust which is based on one’s cumu-
lative experiences with said institution (Newton 2007).
Hindering self- determination?
Now that we have outlined and described the core characteristics of religious clientelism, 
we home in on the functional aspects of religious clientelism relationship which have the 
potential to subvert the political self- determination of the murid- voter’s vote choice. For ana-
lytical purposes we divide these into three separate categories: (a) voting as a religious duty, 
(b) inability to change pir, and relatedly, (c) social sanctioning. It is important to note that in 
practice these three aspects are not entirely separable. In fact, they overlap considerably and 








Voting as a religious duty
The first functional aspect of the relationship that poses a potential threat to the self- 
determination of the murid- voter is when voting is understood as a religious duty. Most voters 
cast their vote for the pir as part of the expectations that exist between the actors. In this case 
what the murids believe is expected of them. As one disciple of the late politician and spiritual 
leader Amin Fahim puts it, “Voting for Sain Sahib is not only our duty but it is also an expression 
of our love for him” (interview, Karachi, November 2015). Although the act of voting is under-
stood as a religious duty, this is not necessarily an active order from the pir – instead it appears 
to form part of the overall expectations held by both actors. The below quote highlights this 
expectation versus direct orders from the pir, where an explicit order would seal their choice 
in favour of the pir.
Yes, I vote for him…He never tells us to, but if he were to tell us his opinions then we 
would be bound to do so…That is what a murid is, we are his disciples.
(Interview, Hala, November 2015)
There is a mixed picture about whether or not direct orders coming from the pir- politician 
is the main modus operandi, indicated by a large majority pointing out “We vote for whatever 
political party that the Sain [his Honour] tells us”, there seems to be a communication network at 
work, where “lists” are provided to the congregation through the pir’s substantial khalifa net-
work. That voting is viewed as a religious duty is further reinforced by murids voting across 
party lines when their pir- politician switches party – across the political ideological left– right 
spectrum. One such example is the current Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Querishi, who 
previously was with the left of centre Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and currently is part of the 
right of centre Pakistan Tehreek- e- Insaaf (PTI). One murid puts it bluntly, detailing where their 
political allegiance stems from and why they vote in a certain way.
Our relationship is with Sain [His Honour], not with the party and not with anyone 
else. Listen, what is more important – this politics business or our faith? Imaan 
[faith] will be useful here and ‘there’ (pointing up to the sky, indicating heaven and 
afterlife).
(Interview, Multan, November 2015)
The quote also highlights the religio- clientelistic relationship as the driving force behind the 
political choices of these voters, where the personal bond supersedes the one with the institu-
tion of the party. Another aspect of voting that could limit the murid from voting for their pir 
is a practical one. Whether or not one can cast a vote for a candidate depends on where one 
is registered  to vote. Simply put, If one is registered in the same constituency from which the 
pir- politician is contesting office. In effect, this duty could practically be limited to the bounds 
of a constituency. How do murid- voters support their spiritual leaders through their vote if they 
cannot cast a direct vote for them? One murid explains the process in detail.
We vote for whatever political party that the Sain tells us, but normally we just vote 
for the person that is part of the list. Take my example, I can’t technically vote for 
Sain because I belong to Sindh [his pir was running from Punjab]. In this situation I 
just vote for the candidate who belongs to Sain’s party in our area.
(Interview, Multan, November 2015)
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This strategy, to vote for candidates via a list provided, or in the absence of such a list, for the 
political party that the pir- politician belongs to, appears to be a general trend among murids 
across the congregations, whether they belong to the congregations of Syed Yousaf Raza 
Gillani, Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Querishi or the followers of Makhdoom Jamil- uz- Zaman. 
Voting is understood by murid- voters to be a religious duty, and is accommodated and adjusted 
according to the knowledge at hand – specific (lists) or general (voting for the political party).
No exit?
The second, and perhaps more important aspect that may hinder murids’ exercise of choice is 
that one cannot change their pir. As elaborated earlier, when entering this religio- clientelistic 
bond, the murid takes an oath of allegiance – this entails exclusive submission to one spiritual 
leader (Ewing 1983). Furthermore, many times, the choice of pir is a matter of tradition, 
that is, swearing allegiance to the same pir that one’s fathers and forefathers did. This aspect 
of tradition in combination with the oath of allegiance can make the idea of changing a pir 
seem implausible. When asked if one can change their pir, one murid was dumbstruck, and 
responded
…this is a very strange question, it’s like asking if I can change my religious sect – 
becoming Shia from Sunni, or vice versa. We cannot change our sect, can we? So, in 
the same way, no you cannot change your pir. This is a matter of one’s beliefs.
(Interview, Multan, October 2015)
This highlights a loyalty that exists between both actors. It prevents them from choosing a 
patron in accordance with the best offer. This is in contrast to the contemporary understanding 
of the client, where clients are assumed to be able to go ‘patron shopping’, where the vote is 
used as a bargaining chip by clients with potential patrons, which the patron needs in order to 
gain political office. Effectively clients exchange their vote for the best material inducement 
offered, or in the words of Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, a situation in which clients 
are “willing to surrender their vote for the right price” (2007: 2). This is not the case for the 
murid- voter.
Furthermore, because the religious linkage supersedes the political one, for murids the vote 
does not translate to a bargaining chip when dealing with their pirs. In fact, for the murid to 
switch patrons comes with extreme social costs because of the sworn allegiance to the pir as 
spiritual leader. To borrow Anna Grzymala- Busse’s phrase, religion as an identity is not fun-
gible, you cannot leave without incurring a disproportionate social cost and the psychological 
burden of damnation (2012). The fear of damnation is best illustrated through the interview 
extract, where a murid confronted his pir and challenged his ability to provide spiritual advice 
because he himself was not following the advice he gave his followers.
Client:  “Why should I listen to you? You yourself are not doing those things that you 
tell us to do. In fact, you are indulging in things that you yourself say are not permitted 
for us [the pir- politician is widely known to be an alcoholic]. How can you then be a 
spiritual advisor?”
Patron: “Let us light a fire here.” [They light a small bonfire. The pir tells the murid to 
bring some water, and as there is no fresh water around, he tells him to fetch some from 







the pail of sewage onto the fire, and the fire went out.] The pir turned to the client and 
said “You see what just happened here? No matter how dirty I am, at the end of the 
day, I am still the one that will save you from the fires of hell and provide you salvation 
in the afterlife.”
(Interview, Karachi, November 2015)
The underlying role of this relationship as an inherent part of the murid’s social identity also 
begins to surface and provides better insight into why an exit from the relationship is more 
complicated than just opting out. The oath of allegiance, and tradition together with “this is 
part of who we are” (interview, Hala, November, 2015), makes for a layered relationship that 
serves not only one’s religious inclinations but also social ones. It helps us understand how social 
sanctioning is part of the active considerations the client operates with.
Social sanctioning
The third aspect of the relationship that may potentially stymie the murid’s self- determination 
via the vote, is social sanctioning. As the above sections show the relationship itself is inherently 
a socio- religious identity that forms part of the murid’s day- to- day existence. The clients have 
a choice to vote or not to vote for the patron. If they vote – they are guaranteed to receive 
the non- material goods (the promise of salvation, religious guidance, social wellbeing). If they 
choose not to vote for the patron there is a high social cost to pay; they lose insurance of salva-
tion, religious guidance but more so, their social wellbeing/ reputation is affected in an adverse 
manner. Because of religious clientelism operating at the collective and individual levels at 
once, not to cast a vote in favour of one’s pir can be viewed as betraying the entire congregation. 
In a conservative society like Pakistan, reputation and “face/ honour” can be the highest thing 
an individual possesses; therefore, this plays an imperative role in how other members of society 
perceive and react to one. Social standing not only affects the day- to- day quality of life but also 
is a major aspect of how one operates in various aspects of society. Therefore, social sanctioning 
in the form of social ostracism can result in isolation of not only the individual but also the 
individual’s family, revoking an imperative part of social identity and belonging. As such, the 
client is not only reacting to the goods provided to him by the patron but also reacting to the 
fellow murids of the congregation that are to be found in his surroundings.
The far- reaching effects of social sanctioning are best underscored by the example of exclu-
sion of a well- to- do murid. He is a local landlord who belongs to the elite of the country, both 
asset- and access-rich (he obtained his post- graduate degree in the USA, and currently manages 
5,000 acres of land of his own) but also has his own vast contact network across the country, 
with family members active politicians at the national level. His family was excluded from their 
congregation for displeasing the pir and had their “hands tied”. In effect, he was ousted from 
the congregation and the status of murid revoked through public announcement. Within the 
community word quickly spread of a social boycott against not only the offending individual 
but also the members of their immediate family. Members of the community stopped com-
municating with them, refused to intervene to provide any form of help, and also removed 
themselves from any public association with the former murid. This resulted in a social boycott 
and ostracization, where any work the client tried to perform in this context was limited to 
their own devices. In close- knit communities, social boycotts can spell doom for an individual 
actor, where even the well- off client will be subjected to the same demands and expectations as 
any other client – that is, both implicit and explicit expectations between client and patron. As 
such, revoking this relationship, or going against one’s pir, may come with extreme social costs, 
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where at the collective level it functions as a collective identity that provides social standing, 
protection of the patron and an added layer of insurance – especially in the case of conflict 
(such as land squatting issues). As one former superintendent of police (SP) of Sindh detailed 
“this is especially so in areas in which the state is lacking in the provision of the public good of 
law enforcement, and where even the local superintendent police officer has been appointed 
through the consent of the local pir, whether or not they are active politicians” (interview, 
Karachi, April 2019).
Discussion and conclusion
The empirical analysis above clarifies two important points. First, it highlights the important 
role of non- material considerations in a murid- voter’s decision- making process of casting a vote. 
These considerations are overwhelmingly tied in with social aspects of the relationship, where 
voting is not viewed as a bargaining chip in their exchanges with their pir- patron. Instead one’s 
vote is part of the expectations between the two actors, where the vote is perceived as “it’s 
just a vote” relative to other expectations from the relationship. The social embeddedness is 
underscored by the sanctioning that takes place by not only the patron, but also by community 
members.
The second point clarified is the need to make our models more reflective of how clientelism 
operates on the ground. So far, the literature has attempted to forward a parsimonious model of 
how voters operate, where the focus has heavily been on seeing and understanding clients through 
an economic lens, where the clients opt for the best material inducement. This reduces the lived 
reality of voters to simplistic models that are not reflective of the real world these citizens operate 
in. The above analysis, however, clarifies that we have to make space for non- economic consid-
erations when attempting to further our understanding of clientelism in general, but client- voters 
specifically. Specifically, we must pay attention to the client’s various identities and the social 
contexts they find themselves in, thus going beyond the quid pro quo of material goods. Put 
simply, the inclusion of long-term bonds into our analysis shows us how the murid-voter’s pol-
itical behaviour is not just a result of the material exchange relationship between himself and the 
pir-politician, instead it is a more complex and nuanced approach that accounts for the clientel-
istic bond as a whole, where non-material supernatural goods also feature.
Furthermore, it underscores how clients themselves monitor their own behaviour, and 
thus stop themselves from taking certain actions. This specific finding addresses the overall 
monitoring debate of clientelism, where a general assumption held is that patrons monitor 
clients’ actions and sanction them if they renege on their end of the bargain, despite scant evi-
dence in support of this assumption (Hicken and Nathan 2020). In this case, self- monitoring as 
portrayed by my empirical findings can help address this evidentiary gap.
Finally, the importance of this type of clientelism and its effect on a country’s democratic 
trajectory is highlighted in developing contexts such as Pakistan, where political parties do not 
operate as programmatic ones; instead politics is personalized, where voters relate to politicians 
through personalized linkages provided by the myriad of power relationships that they find 
themselves in. The importance of these linkages, especially religo- political ones, is reinforced 
in how these can affect the democratization or autocratization of a nation. This type of cli-
entelism has the potential to operate in either direction – towards democratic consolidation 
or autocratization. In the absence of programmatic parties, one way to use this relationship 
towards democratic consolidation of developing democracies is to follow examples of countries 
such as Ghana, where tribal chiefs are legally barred from running for office. In this case if the 





his disciples not only to participate in elections but ensure that they go to cast their vote, then 
the relationship could be a step in the right direction, to reinforce democratization efforts. 
Nevertheless, this does not negate the potential risk posed by pirs acting as brokers between 
political parties and the voters, where their lack of direct participation can be geared towards 
indirect influence instead. For the success of such an initiative the pir- politician would have to 
remove themselves from the political process altogether, by not encouraging any affiliations or 
endorsements, but only to ensure their followers partake in the electoral process by casting their 
vote for whomever they please. If the relationship is used in the above manner, it would help 
reinforce democratic consolidation.
However, if this relationship operates and hinders the choice of murid- voters due to the 
above reasons discussed, not only will the presence of such a relationship continue to stagnate 
the one man, one vote concept, but such ties will continue to contribute to the autocratization 
of nations like Pakistan. This is especially in an environment where the voters’ choice of can-
didate is not driven by their own understanding of the political sphere; instead their decision- 
making is driven by loyalty factors. That said, if murids vote for these pir-politicians because 
they believe them to be the most suitable actors able to represent their interests in the political 
arena, where a blend of material and non- material exchanges continue to be swapped, then at 
its core it will be an exercise in choice. For that to take place though, other factors available to 
citizens in democratic settings must also be present – such as freedom to express oneself without 
repercussions, insurance of one’s personal safety in day- to- day life and access to hold one’s 
politicians accountable. Until these other factors in Pakistani politics are assured, the pir– murid 
relationship will continue to be perceived by analysts at large as one that pulls Pakistan towards 
autocratization.
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The recent digital revolution has brought a new form of social organization which has been 
referred to as the Network Society. In the network society technological, social and media 
networks define linkages of individuals, groups and organizations. Pakistan is no exception to 
this development. The growth spurt in Pakistani social media use over the past decade indicates 
a shift from traditional mass society to a (digital) network society, though the volume of net-
work society in Pakistan is quite low compared to the total population. But the transition is 
there, and the digital space allows faster and more information transfer along with provisions of 
opportunities to develop larger networks to earn more social capital. However, it is important 
to see how this digital world is being governed by the State and what sort of treatment is being 
offered to its “citizens”, especially the religious minorities. This chapter explores key laws 
related to cyberspace in Pakistan, and how religious minorities and dissident voices are being 
treated in the online space.
Laws regarding cyber space in Pakistan
This section encompasses main laws related to regulation of cyber space in Pakistan. It shows 
that the promulgation of cyber laws followed the technological advancements in the country 
regardless of type or form of government.
The Government of Pakistan has promulgated various laws since 2002 to monitor digital 
data. The first of its kind was the “Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002”. Under its section 
36, any unauthorized access to any user’s data was criminalized. This law also asked for the 
establishment of a Certification Council under the Ministry of Information Technology and 
Telecom (MOITT) within 60 days of the promulgation of Ordinance 2002. Key functions of 
the Certification Council included granting and renewing accreditation certificates, conducting 
research in cryptography and preparing legislative recommendations for the protection of data 
and privacy of electronic subscribers.
In 2010, the “Monitoring and Reconciliation of Telephony Traffic Regulation” was passed 
(Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 2010). According to new legislation every long- 
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origin and destination of the call along with the duration of the call. The service providers were 
bound to keep a record of the traffic for a certain period of time.
In 2013, “The Investigation for Fair Trial Act” was promulgated, allowing officials with a 
judicial warrant to access electronic data of any citizen. This law was intended to protect citi-
zens against State oppression. Any officer of the relevant law- enforcement agency has to seek 
a judicial warrant to arrest an alleged culprit of cybercrime. However, the Act authorizes an 
Investigation Officer to request a warrant even on the basis of suspicion that any citizen is ‘in 
the process of beginning to plan’ a crime under Pakistani law.
In 2014, a massive terrorist attack took place in Peshawar where hundreds of students of 
the Army Public School were martyred by the terrorists. In response to this heinous attack, 
the State prepared a 20- point National Action Plan (NAP) to fight extremism and terrorism 
in the country. Point 14 of the NAP directly addressed the social media. It stated that measures 
should be taken against abuse of the internet and social media for terrorism (Ahmed, 2016). In 
pursuance of this plan, the parliament passed the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016, 
which addresses cybercrimes including online hate speech and violent extremism. PECA 2016 
was a sincere attempt to make digital spaces safer. However, this law has three problems. First, 
the reason quoted by the State to promulgate the law is to ensure national security, not the 
digital users’ online safety. Second, the law gives powers to the State to monitor the online 
activities of any digital user in real time. This aspect becomes crucial for the digital rights of 
the users because there is not any law in the country that provides data protection and privacy 
rights to digital users. In the absence of any such constitutional protection, exploitation of 
personal data by the State institutions cannot be overlooked. In addition, the lack of privacy 
and data protection makes the users vulnerable and susceptible to data theft and misuse. Third, 
there is ambiguity in the definition of certain terms in the law. For instance, Section 10A of the 
PECA states, “Whoever prepares or disseminates information. through any information system 
or device that advances or is likely to advance inter-faith, sectarian or racial hatred, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with 
both.” This section mentions the groups against which hate speech may be used, but it does not 
define what constitutes “hate speech”? This is the case with other terms like “public order” and 
“national security” used in the law. This ambiguity may put digital users at greater risk of State 
oppression, especially for the users who are human rights defenders and criticize State actions.
The control over citizens’ online activities became stringent with the introduction of the 
“Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) 
Rules 2020”. Again the focus of these rules was to control social media and increase the State’s 
surveillance.
These rules were passed without consultation of relevant stakeholders. Moreover, these 
rules asked social media companies to share the data of any user, and to block and remove 
any content that the government of Pakistan asks to be removed. Under these rules the 
definition of “extremism” is vague and so broad that it could easily be misused by the State 
to suppress anyone’s voice. The definition of extremism reads: “ ‘extremism’ means the 
violent, vocal or active opposition to fundamental values of the State of Pakistan including 
the security, integrity or defence of Pakistan, public order, decency or morality, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” 
(Shahzad, 2020).
The presence of a nationwide monitoring system and vague definitions of national security, 
extremism and hate speech, coupled with the absence of public data and privacy protection 
laws, means the digital crimes regulatory laws are a tool in the hands of the government to silence 





Agency has a dedicated cell to investigate electronic crimes and present a report to the parlia-
ment biannually. However, no report has been submitted to the parliament so far. Meanwhile 
many citizens have been arrested, vaguely accused of threatening national security and for acts 
described as “hate speech” (Jahangir, 2019). On the other hand, there are organized campaigns 
in online spaces against religious minorities, journalists and women’s rights activists but no sig-
nificant actions are taken against these organized troll groups. This selective implementation of 
the law (although the law itself is authoritarian in the absence of privacy protection to citizens) 
has given a message to social media users that anyone can get away with whatever he/ she shares 
on social media as long as that user is in favour of the government.
Digital freedoms and restrictions in practice
In this section I will talk about the persecution of minorities, especially Ahmadis, in online 
space. Religious minorities, including Sikhs and Hindus, also faced abuse in online space, but 
Ahmadis are the ones who face the most abuse, hatred, threats and online harassment.
The Ahmadis
Followers of the Ahmadiya religion believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a “Sub ordinate 
Prophet” (Hashim, 2018) to the Muslims’ last Prophet. They were considered Muslims until 1974 
when then parliament enacted a constitutional amendment declaring them non- Muslims. Now 
they are non- Muslims as per the constitution of Pakistan. Their population is roughly 5 million in 
Pakistan and they are the most vulnerable religious minority. Ahmadis are a persecuted minority 
and generally considered to be socially undesirable. Dining and doing business with Ahmadis is 
opposed by the majority of Muslims. Their places of worship are attacked, their households are 
threatened and their social exclusion is a “norm”. People who hate Ahmadis proclaim two main 
reasons to justify their hatred. They believe that Ahmadis are the apostates and as per their inter-
pretation of Islamic teachings, an apostate should be punished with death. Secondly, the haters 
claim that Ahmadis are blasphemers as they do not believe in the finality of the prophethood of 
the Muslims’ last Prophet, Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).
The persecution of Ahmadis in the digital sphere
Pakistani Twitter witnesses massive abuse against religious minorities, especially Ahmadis. The 
last two years’ Twitter data was collected against hashtags that targeted Ahmadis and it showed a 
surge in hatred against them in online space. Generally, any hashtag on Pakistani Twitter against 
a particular group (whether political or religious) would remain on top trend for a few hours 
but when it is against Ahmadis it remains on the top trend panel for a day or two. Moreover, 
the number of users engaged in the propagation of the hashtag against Ahmadis also remains 
higher as compared to hashtags on political or any other social issues. On average, an organic 
hashtag on the Pakistani Twitter panel has 5,000 to 15,000 users participating, sending 5,000 to 
20,000 tweets. But when it comes to the anti- Ahmadiya hashtag the number of tweets goes up 
to 78,000 with more than 10,000 users. This high number of users engaged in tweeting against 
Ahmadis indicates that general public sentiment is against Ahmadis and whenever a hashtag 
appears on Twitter, religiously motivated users contribute to its propagation. During the last 
two years, “Qadiani (the word used for Ahmadi) is the worst infidel” was propagated on Twitter 
multiple times with the total number of tweets exceeding 300,000. Four things were highlighted 





Digital autocratization of Pakistan
165
is part of religion; second, Ahmadis are traitors; third, Ahmadis should be thrown out of gov-
ernment jobs; and fourth, Ahmadis should be murdered as they are blasphemers. No doubt, 
TLP remained on top in propagating violent hashtags against Ahmadis but supporters of other 
political parties and the general public also added their voices. In July 2020, an Ahmadi was 
murdered during his court hearing in Peshawar. His murderer, Khalid Khan, was glorified on 
social media and hashtags “The winner’s message is ‘death to blasphemer’ ” and “Salute to the 
winner Khalid’s courage” were propagated on Pakistani Twitter and these hashtags remained on 
the top trend panel for more than two consecutive days with more than 200,000 tweets. These 
hashtags were not promoted solely by any single political party or religious group, but general 
users participated actively. This shows the level of public antipathy towards the Ahmadis. The 
cyber laws are meant to safeguard every citizen, but their poor or selective implementation 
gives space to social media users to threaten and propagate hate against minorities.
It is important to highlight that the Tehreek e Labbaik (TLP) emerged as the most prom-
inent group who propagated the most hashtags (almost 70% of all anti- Ahmadiya hashtags) 
against Ahmadis. So to understand the modus operandi of online groups who promote violent 
extremism, I chose TLP to do further analysis.
The Tehreek e Labbaik (TLP)
The TLP Pakistan is a far- right Islamist political party that was founded by a cleric, Khadim 
Rizvi, in 2015. Khadim Rizvi belonged to the Barelvi sect of Islam. Traditionally this sect 
was considered more peaceful and polite. Its main representation was Sufism as compared 
to the Deobandi and Ahl e Hadith sects who aggressively propagated and were engaged in 
Jihad during the Afghan war in the 1980s and 1990s. After 9/ 11, the War on Terror started 
in Afghanistan and in Pakistan too. The State started “cleaning operations” against Talibans in 
Swat and tribal areas of Pakistan. This time the State started to patronize the Barelvi sect as its 
component of Sufism was effective to portray a soft image of Islam against the Taliban (Farooq, 
2020). Khadim Rizvi was, however, an exception to the traditional Barelvism. He was a fire-
brand mullah who believed in using violence to push his agenda. He gained popularity on his 
support for Mumtaz Qadri who murdered the then Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer on the 
charge of blasphemy. TLP built its political campaign on the blasphemy issue and got registered 
as a political party in 2015. They actively protested against the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri in 
2016. Since then TLP has capitalized its popularity by pushing the agenda of blasphemy. In 
2017, TLP staged a sit- in against PMLN on a slight change regarding declaration of finality of 
the prophethood in one of the annexes to Election Bill 2017 (the words “I solemnly swear” 
were replaced with “I believe”). The protesters had tacit support of the military establishment 
(Siddiqui, 2017). This support gave TLP a kind of legitimacy to push their agenda. The military 
establishment wanted to oust PMLN in the 2018 general elections, so to curtail the vote bank 
of PMLN, they supported TLP to gain visibility in public (Butt, 2017). Since TLP’s sit- in in 
2017, they aggressively campaigned against religious minorities, especially Ahmadis (Hashim, 
2018). In 2018, they staged a huge protest against the acquittal of a Christian woman Asia Bibi 
who was falsely accused of blasphemy. But this time the military establishment stood with the 
civilian government of PTI and a crackdown was done against TLP on staging the sit- in.
Study methodology
Data against hashtags that were propagated by TLP during 2019 were collected. The Social 







networks of TLP. To analyze the text of the tweets, the content analysis technique was used. 
A total of 2,03,900 (figure rounded to nearest hundred) tweets from 17,200 Twitter users were 
collected. This data was analyzed by using SNA to see the structures of online social networks 
among TLP supporters.
Main findings in the social network analysis
SNA is a technique used to understand structures of networks and to see the position of a node 
in the given network. Node means a Twitter user. Tie means the connection a user establishes 
with another user by reply, mention, quote or retweet activity. For instance, if a user sends a 
tweet without mentioning anyone and this tweet is neither retweeted nor quoted/ replied, no 
Tie will be established.
Network Density (ND) is another characteristic that helps to understand the pace of com-
munication within the network. The higher the density, the faster the communication within 
the network. It also reflects how sparsely or densely the nodes are connected. If the density is 
one, it means all the users in the network are connected to every other user. A density close to 
one may reflect that users are working as a team and might know one another in offline space.
For the given dataset, the density of the whole network of 17,200 users was 0.001, which 
means that only 0.1% ties were formed out of all possible ties that could have been established 
in the given network. However, the analysis of the network of the top few hundred most active 
users revealed that there existed very strong connections. Two samples of 100 and 200 user- 
networks were taken to see if there existed any online relations among Twitter users. The results 
revealed that the network of top 100 Twitter users had a density of 0.90, meaning that 90% of 
all possible ties were established. This high percentage is reflective of very strong connections 
between the most active users. The graph density for the network of the top 200 users was 0.46, 
which means 46% of all possible ties were established.
Reciprocity is a measure of mutual ties. It shows a conversation or interaction is taking 
place between two users. For the TLP network the reciprocity was 0.039. It means roughly 
4% mutual ties were established. Further analysis of edge ties shows that Retweet percentages 
is the highest (96%). It means out of all (100%) ties that could be “mention”, “reply”, “quote” 
or “retweet”, the maximum proportion (96%) was retweets. It reflects that the users are not 
engaging in discussion, rather simply retweeting the exact tweet that was sent by someone. 
Such a high percentage (96%) of retweet shows that the hashtag is propagated inorganically 
by a group of people. Inorganic propagation means that organized groups in online space 
retweet a particular tweet multiple time. This phenomenon generates traffic on Twitter and 
its algorithms pick that particular tweet/ hashtag and display it on the Top Trend panel. If a 
hashtag is propagated organically it means more people from diverse geographic locations 
are tweeting with that hashtag and it contains a good proportion of reply and quote tweets. 
It seems unnatural that 96 out of 100 users are retweeting something without even saying a 
word of their own. There is no exact rule what percentage of retweets makes a trend organic 
or inorganic; however, I have observed that on Pakistani Twitter organic trends had a less than 
80% retweet ratio, generally.
There are certain characteristics of Twitter users that do not come under SNA but still can 
give important insights about users. For instance, Twitter issues a blue tick to users whose iden-
tities are confirmed by Twitter and they belong to categories of journalists, activists, or public 
figures. For the given dataset, out of 2,03,900 tweets, only three tweets were sent from a veri-
fied account. Most Twitter users from Pakistan do not have verified accounts but the absence of 
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verified users for a whole year nevertheless hints that people with known social identities and 
social following did not endorse the messaging of TLP.
On Twitter, there is a common observation that most people with real accounts have more 
followers as compared to friends (Twitter friends are the users who are following each other). 
But for TLP users the number of friends was higher than the number of followers. The average 
number of “followers” of each user were 1,699 while the average number of “Friends” were 
1,780. Most Twitter users have more followers than friends but the case was the reverse for 
TLP users. For a comparison, the data of users who tweeted about the women’s march was 
looked into by the author. It was found that on average each user who tweeted with hashtag 
#AuratMarch had 6,222 followers and 868 friends. In Pakistan, the propagandists who work in 
groups, create multiple Twitter accounts and then mutually follow to increase outreach. TLP 
supporters used the same technique.
TLP’s account opening pattern
In the given dataset, 266,261 and 755 accounts were opened in 2015, 2016 and 2017 respect-
ively. The number of new accounts increased in 2018 where 1,927 new accounts were opened. 
But a massive increase occurred in 2019 when 4,478 new accounts were opened in the first three 
months. Out of 2,03,900 tweets that were sent in 2019 by TLP, two-thirds were sent by the 
accounts that were opened in 2019. This trend indicated that the latest accounts were opened 
with the intention of propagating TLP messages on Twitter through an organized effort.
The first massive wave of account openings occurred in January 2019. This was the time 
when the government did a crackdown on the TLP leadership in response to their agitation 
against the acquittal of Asia Bibi. The second was in August 2019. This might have been done to 
protest against the revocation of Article 370 in India, which concerned Kashmir’s special status.
Qualitative analysis
Qualitative analysis of the collected tweets revealed that TLP supporters abused religious minor-
ities, especially Ahmadis and the liberal voices. They labelled political opponents with titles that 
were reflective of their disconnect from Islam. Also, they glorified a convicted terrorists and 
threatened political opponents and minorities. TLP instigated violence among its followers 
and supporters by glorifying the terrorist acts of Mumtaz Qadri and Khalid Khan. The former 
murdered a governor while the latter murdered an Ahmadi in Peshawar Court where he was 
facing trial under blasphemy charges.
TLP propagated hashtags with words demanding the cleansing of Ahmadis. TLP followers 
expressed their views that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam so there was no place for 
blasphemers in the country. They incited violence with tweets containing messages like “any 
lover of the Prophet (PBUH) can get offended and kill the person who had been accused of 
blasphemy”. “It is time to fulfil the promise made to the winner Mumtaz Qadri” (Mumtaz 
Qadri was convicted of the murder of Salman Taseer), “we will cut out your tongue”, “Anyone 
with good faith should stand up and murder the blasphemer” and “expel them from the 
country”. TLP introduced the slogan “There is only one punishment for the blasphemer, and 
it is beheading.” Also, they propagated that if a blasphemer is apologizing, do not believe him/ 
her. He/ she is faking it. Similarly, they ran an online campaign against Sikhs claiming that TLP 
followers would take revenge on Sikhs. Khadim Rizvi, the leader of the TLP, said in his speech 







Modus operandi of TLP
A pattern was identified in running hashtags and mobilizing people by TLP. Based on social 
network analysis of the online networks along with content analysis, I identified the following 
three characteristics of TLP’s Modus Operandi.
Everything is blasphemy
Using accusations of blasphemy remained a core strategy of TLP’s campaigning, and they used 
it extensively in online space. A pattern can be seen in the accusations that TLP made against 
political opponents, especially Prime Minister Imran Khan, and the ideological opponents like 
liberals and supporters of non- violence. They termed every “non- desired” behaviour at the 
social and political level as blasphemy. For instance, Pakistan’s leading English- language news-
paper Dawn ran a story about a Pakistani- born British citizen who was involved in the London 
Bridge attack in 2019. The newspaper wrote that the attacker was of Pakistani origin (Rehman, 
2019). This act of Dawn was labelled as blasphemy by TLP and a whole campaign was run on 
Twitter against the newspaper. TLP proclaimed that Dawn had digressed from the right path 
and should be punished for fighting against Allah and His Prophet. TLP instigated violence 
against the newspaper by propagating tweets like “If the State can’t do [anything against Dawn], 
then send a message to Allah and the Prophet’s (PBUH) personal security guards. Qadris [refer-
ring to Mumtaz Qadri who murdered Salman Taseer] would act upon it” (ُ2019 ,َنۡوُمِلۡس). 
Similarly, on the issuing of a 50 rupee coin in the name of Sri Guru Nanak to mark his 550th 
birthday (Jamal, 2019), TLP declared the act as blasphemy and launched an online campaign 
against the government. TLP’s social media supporters said “Isn’t it dishonour (blasphemy) to 
Riasat e Madina [State of Medina]? No fear of God, no respect for the Prophet PBUH” (Adil, 
2019). For them, issuing a coin in the name of any non- Muslim was equivalent to blasphemy 
and that should be punished. TLP turned every issue into blasphemy in an effort to keep them-
selves publicly relevant.
In 2019, university students organized a series of protests calling for an end to the ban 
on forming student unions. In 1984, the then dictator General Zia ul Haq imposed the 
ban. Apparently, the argument was to reduce on-campus violence, but this act damaged the 
very democratic fabric of society. Student unions were like nurseries where political and 
democratic ideas were introduced and cultivated in young minds. Decades later, students 
organized marches where they demanded the restoration of student unions. Women students 
actively took part in protests and the protesters chanted slogans citing liberal and democratic 
values. TLP found these student marches blasphemous and a threat to religious values. To 
counter student marches they propagated a hashtag – #WhenGreenWillSway (in Urdu). 
Under this hashtag thousands of tweets were sent, challenging and threatening the organizers 
and supporters of student marches. The wording of the hashtag was very symbolic. Some 
student protesters carried red flags, symbolizing the Left. In response, TLP threatened that 
when the green (symbolizing religion and TLP, as their flag colour is also green) will come 
to power, the Left will have no place in society. Liberal voices and human rights defenders 
who supported the student marches were also attacked by the TLP social media teams. 
Liberals, non- conservatives and leftists were labelled as “filth” that needed to be cleansed 
before it spreads to the whole country. Through Twitter hashtags, TLP spread a message that 
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Creating false analogies: paving the way for blasphemy accusations
TLP created a false analogy that joining TLP is tantamount to love for the Last Prophet of 
Muslims and that anyone who claims to be a Muslim and lover of Muhammad (PBUH) should 
join TLP. Opposing TLP means the opposer hates the defenders of the honour of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). This messaging through social media won many supporters to TLP. 
Now whenever TLP runs a hashtag on blasphemy many non- TLP supporters also contribute 
to the hashtag, presumably because they are expressing their love for religion and the Prophet. 
Similarly, TLP changed the etymology of the word traitor (Ghaddar) that’s in frequent use on 
Pakistani social media to silence dissenting voices. TLP interpreted this word as deviance from 
religious teachings. They said that a traitor is a person who betrays their religion by not fighting 
for the finality of the Last Prophet of Muslims. Summative analysis of data revealed that the 
word “traitor” was used 1,300 times for the person who betrays their religion and the Prophet 
(PBUH).
At times, the blasphemy accusations were not labelled overtly and at once. A case was built 
gradually by alienating the person from Muslims, first. Then leveled  blasphemy accusations 
against the person. For the purpose, a series of religious titles were used to alienate a person. For 
instance, words like “Gumrah” (astray), “Zindeeq”, “Murtad” (apostate), “Munafiq” (hypo-
crite), “Kafir” (infidel), “Mulhid” (atheist) and “Dajjal” (Anti- Christ) were frequently paired 
with the name of a “potential blasphemer”. In religious connotation and in local cultural 
settings it becomes easier to accuse a person of blasphemy if that person’s reputation, outlook 
and ideology are not very religious. Therefore, assigning titles of “religious deviance” to lib-
eral and apparently non- religious people and ideological opponents, makes it easier for TLP 
to accuse these people of blasphemy. Data revealed that the word blasphemer was used 7,000 
times, followed by the word infidel (3,000 times), traitor (1,400 times) in the context of betrayal 
of religion (unlike the actual meaning of the word), hypocrite (1,200) and apostate (1,100). 
This reflects how frequently the political opponents are labelled with words that challenge the 
accused’s allegiance to Islam. Consequently, it becomes easier to convince the general public 
that the accused is a blasphemer as he/ she was never a good Muslim.
Maintaining a unique identity
TLP claims that their religious purpose is to protect the honour of the last Prophet of Muslims 
and their purpose is beyond mundane things. But their actions in online space reveal that they 
are no different from any other political party or pressure group who struggles to maintain its 
public presence. TLP propagates hashtags on Twitter in favour of blasphemy laws but when any 
other group propagates a hashtag with similar content TLP would not participate. This clearly 
shows that they talk about the issue when they alone get the credit. When it is a joint effort 
of multiple groups talking about blasphemy, TLP would disengage themselves in online space. 
The most active TLP supporters would never propagate a hashtag that had not been initiated by 
their own group. A visual representation of Twitter data explains this phenomenon. Figure 14.1 
shows a relationship among online users and how they were aligned in different teams. There 
are four clusters of circles (each circle represents a Twitter user): three are placed on the top end 
of the figure and are connected to each other very tightly. However, the fourth one is at the 
bottom and has stronger intra- cluster connections (the lines connecting two circles represent 
online connection) but weaker inter- cluster connections. This figure is an actual representation 
of Twitter users who were propagating two separate hashtags. The top three clusters 






another group who propagated hashtag #CyberGhustakhAzadKiun (translation: why cyber 
blasphemers are free). Now it is interesting to note that both groups tweeted against blasphemy 
but they ran separate hashtags. A few lines that are connecting the top and bottom clusters are 
of “mention” or “reply” ties. In simple terms, these lines appeared as a result when a member 
of one group tagged or replied to a few individuals of the other cluster. There were no lines 
(ties) that reflected retweeting of each other’s tweets. Despite the fact that both the groups were 
tweeting against blasphemy, TLP did not join the other hashtag. And the very next day, TLP 
again ran its own hashtag against blasphemy and accused the Prime Minister Imran Khan.
TLP has aggressively promoted a convicted terrorist in online space along with propagating 
hate speech against minorities. They clearly instigated violence against Ahmadis. All these acts 
are criminalized under the law of the land. Section 9 of PECA 2016 clearly mentions that 
glorification of a terrorist, a terrorist offence and hate speech are liable to punishment. Section 
503 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which criminalizes intimidation. Likewise the propagation 
of malicious hashtags targeting the integrity and honour of any individual is also a criminal 
Figure 14.1 Same issue but divided they tweet.
Source: Twitter Data, compiled by the author (Rizvan Saeed)
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offence. Section 20 of the PECA criminalizes displaying or transmitting information that a 
person knows to be false and that harms the reputation of a person.
Conclusion
Pakistan has witnessed consecutive democratic rule since 2008. The age of social media is also 
almost the same. Therefore, it is hard to make a comparison between the situation of social 
media control under a dictatorship and during democratic government. However, the situation 
worsened with each change of government since 2008.
During the autocratic rule of General Pervez Musharraf cyber laws were introduced to 
facilitate registration and accreditation of electronic subscribers and service providers. At 
that time, social media was not rampant in Pakistan. In the following years, the democratic 
government of Pakistan People’s Party introduced the Investigation for Fair Trial Act with 
the intention to protect citizens’ rights against unfair trials. However, the most important 
legislation regarding social media regulation was passed in Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz’s 
tenure (2016), when laws were introduced to counter online violent extremism and hate 
speech. Later the PTI’s current government added new regulations to PECA 2016 to con-
trol hate speech and violent extremism on social media. Regarding the implementation of 
the cyber laws, successive governments adopted a more selective approach. Despite visible 
evidence of hate speech against minorities and violent extremism by groups like TLP, the 
governments did not take effective actions under cyber laws. Pakistani Twitter remained 
inundated with hashtags that contained derogatory and violent content against minorities, 
especially Ahmadis. Although there have been democratic governments since social media 
expanded substantially in the country, they have failed to protect the democratic rights of 
minorities to take part freely in the digital world and to optimize their potential to contribute 
to the cyber world. Now be it poor or selective implementation of cyber laws, the most vul-
nerable victims are Ahmadis. This seems to continue, whether it is an autocratic regime or 
democracy, until the State takes concrete steps to effectively and impartially implement the 
cyber laws.
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A SUPREME COURT OR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL JIRGA?
Moeen Cheema
This chapter investigates the role that the Supreme Court has played in the context of an 
increasing democratic deficit and the emergence of what is being widely referred to as a civil- 
military ‘hybrid’ regime in Pakistan. It looks closely at high- profile constitutional cases decided 
before and after the 2018 parliamentary elections and the resulting transfer of power to the 
current Pakistan Tehrik- e- Insaaf (PTI) government led by Prime Minister Imran Khan. These 
include cases in which former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was disqualified from being a 
member of parliament for life, and from formally heading his political party, an outcome which 
significantly undermined his party’s prospects in the 2018 elections. In another notable case, the 
Supreme Court heard a challenge to the extension of the incumbent Army Chief ’s tenure, but 
rather than laying out clear rules for such a scenario referred the matter to parliament, which 
inadvertently paved the way for greater military intervention in the political process. In a more 
recent case, the apex court reviewed the constitutionality of the proceedings for the removal of 
a Supreme Court judge known for stern critique of the military’s involvement in politics. This 
case, which is still making headlines at the time of the writing of this chapter, has resulted in 
visible divisions within the court itself and tarnished the reputation of the judiciary, leaving it a 
less credible arbiter of constitutional controversies.
The chapter argues that in such cases involving matters of high constitutional law and pol-
itics, the apex court has developed a method to temporarily reduce the political and inter- 
institutional tensions by mediating between the various power centres and reaching intermediate 
outcomes, rather than principled peremptory decisions. As such, the court acts more like a 
proverbial jirga (council of elders in customary dispute resolution) seeking a negotiated settle-
ment between the parties than a forum of legal adjudication. While such judicial intervention 
temporarily reduces the political strains, it ultimately enables the military- backed hybrid regime 
to assert its dominance under the cover of judicial oversight, contributing to autocratization 
in Pakistan. These cases and crises litigated before the Supreme Court are mere symptoms of 
a chronic ailment. The prospects of meaningful democracy in Pakistan are undermined by 
structural defects that no institution or political agent can remedy in the short term. At this 
stage it appears unlikely that the entire democratic set- up will be dispensed with through yet 
another military coup. Neither does it appear likely that mere continuity of the political dis-






institutions – governments, opposition political parties, courts and the military – remain firmly 
entrenched in their positions and seem determined to guard their respective turfs rather than 
negotiating long- term solutions to the challenges of corruption, electoral malpractices, devo-
lution and consensus- based policy- making on administrative and legal reform that might lead 
to a more stable and democratic Pakistan. The judiciary could play a significant role in such an 
environment in terms of setting firm constitutional rules for the game of politics. However, its 
strategy of mediating political crises and finding short- term compromises has exacerbated pol-
itical divisions rather than improving the democratic process. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
is increasingly looking like a divided house itself.
The Panama case and electoral engineering
Pakistan’s previous government at the federal level was formed by the Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML- N) in 2013 and led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for an expected five- year par-
liamentary term. The first two years of the party’s rule were dogged by claims of large- scale 
electoral rigging by the most vocal opposition party, the PTI, led by cricketer- turned- politician 
Imran Khan (Cheema, M 2016, pp. 76– 8). After a protracted political crisis, the controversy 
temporarily died down when both parties agreed to the formation of a judicial commission to 
investigate the allegations. While the judicial commission exonerated the ruling PML- N on 
the count of organized rigging, it nonetheless identified serious failings in the electoral process 
(Cheema, M 2016, pp. 78– 9). A parliamentary committee formed as a result of the crisis failed 
to develop a consensus on electoral reforms and the issue was likely to reignite with a vengeance 
as the 2018 elections approached.
The PML- N government enjoyed barely a year of stability in the aftermath of the PTI pro-
test movement when in April 2016 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
released leaked documents of a Panama- based law firm. The ‘Panama Papers’ revealed several 
offshore companies owned by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s family and proved their owner-
ship of high- end properties in London (Cheema, H 2016). The Sharif family has been in the 
business of politics and power either in the centre or Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province, for 
much of the last three decades. There had been allegations of corruption, money-laundering 
and tax evasion during every term that the party has won elected office, especially during 
Nawaz Sharif ’s two terms as Prime Minister in the 1990s. However, the Sharifs and their party 
managed to avoid both political fallout and judicial scrutiny of corruption charges. In con-
trast to the PML- N, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which formed the government from 
2008 to 2013, was dogged by high profile corruption scandals and intense judicial review by 
the Supreme Court. The PML- N had provided unwavering and visible public support to the 
court’s accountability drive including the decision to disqualify former Prime Minister Gilani 
for failure to institute corruption charges against President Zardari, also dating back to the 
1990s (Mahmood 2012). Unlike the PPP’s judicial ordeal, however, the corruption and money-
laundering allegations against the Sharifs appeared to have become past and closed transactions, 
a matter of history, until the release of the Panama Papers.
Despite the demands from the PTI for the formation of another judicial commission to 
investigate corruption and money- laundering allegations released in the Panama Papers, neither 
the government nor the court relented. In August 2016, Imran Khan, who has adopted an anti- 
corruption platform as the main charter of his party, decided to take the matter to the Supreme 
Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, which provides for the ‘Original Jurisdiction’ 
of the court. In such cases, the court can directly take up matters of “public importance with 






A Supreme Court or a constitutional jirga?
175
of constitutional interpretation. After months of regular hearings which received almost daily 
coverage in the national media, the five- member bench issued its first judgment in April 2017 
(Imran Khan v. Nawaz Sharif, PLD 265). All five members of the bench appeared to agree that 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family had failed to satisfy the court regarding the source 
of their immense wealth, or to provide a satisfactory account of when and how the properties 
in London were purchased. The respondents’ explanations seemed evasive and had shifted dra-
matically over the course of the proceedings. There was no proof of any bank transactions or 
any financial evidence of when and how the properties were purchased.
Nonetheless, the case raised challenging issues regarding the interpretation of the provisions 
on disqualification of members of parliament pursuant to which the removal of the Prime 
Minister was sought. Article 62(1)(f ) of the Constitution states that a person “shall not be quali-
fied to be elected or chosen as a member of Majlis- e- Shoora (Parliament) unless … (f ) he is 
sagacious, righteous, non- profligate, honest and ameen, there being no declaration to the con-
trary by a court of law.” The question before the court was whether it could issue such a declar-
ation under its Original Jurisdiction and disqualify the Prime Minister in the same proceedings 
based on the material on the record. The respondents argued that the court could only dis-
qualify a member of parliament if there had been a prior conviction or judgment by a court of 
competent jurisdiction for tax evasion, money- laundering, possession of wealth beyond known 
means, or a judicially proven misdeclaration of assets in the nomination forms filed as a candi-
date at the time of the elections (Cheema, M 2018). It is on this crucial question that the bench 
split with only two judges holding that Nawaz Sharif was disqualified from being a member 
of parliament and hence the Prime Minister for lack of integrity and financial probity. Justice 
Khosa, who was scheduled to be the next Chief Justice, wrote a lengthy and scathing opinion 
arguing that there was prima facie evidence of corrupt practices by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
(Imran Khan v. Nawaz Sharif, PLD 265). Since the Prime Minister and his family were the only 
people who held complete knowledge of the transactions the onus was on the respondents to 
provide such a ‘money trail.’
The majority of the bench, however, took a different stance on the issue of jurisdiction 
under Article 184(3). While also noting the glaring gaps in the Sharif family’s explanation of 
their financial dealings, nonetheless, they argued that the court could not disqualify a member of 
parliament in the absence of “admitted facts or indisputable documentary evidence” (Cheema, 
M 2018). Nonetheless, all three judges forming the majority in this phase of the case directed 
the creation of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to probe the allegations against the respondents 
and produce a report within sixty days after which the Supreme Court may again take up the 
matter. While the government initially expressed joyous relief at the Supreme Court’s interim 
order, the composition and the conduct of the JIT caused anxiety amongst ministerial ranks. 
The JIT not only included senior officials from a range of civilian agencies chosen by the court 
but also representatives of the military’s intelligence services. The majority justified the inclu-
sion of the military intelligence officials on the grounds that all civilian investigation agencies 
appeared to be under the control or influence of the incumbent Prime Minister and had refused 
to investigate the allegations (Cheema, M 2018).
In July 2017, the JIT presented a voluminous report to the ‘Implementation Bench’ com-
prising the three judges who had directed the formation of the JIT (Dawn, 11 July 2017). The 
JIT’s report unveiled extensive offshore holdings and businesses of the Sharif family well beyond 
what had surfaced in the Panama Papers. The JIT report also provided considerable evidence 
that the stance of the respondents on several issues and some of the documents furnished by 
them to the court were patently false and fabricated. The three judges who had directed the 





which was admitted by the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif had remained the chairman of the 
board of a UAE company named Capital FZE for six and a half years leading up to the 2013 
elections and was entitled to receive a salary. This position was used to obtain a permit to work 
and live in the UAE. Nawaz Sharif ’s lawyer admitted before the bench that the salary had 
accrued to the respondent as chairman of the board, but he had not withdrawn it at any stage 
until the company was dissolved in early 2013. The bench used this admission, and relying 
on dictionary definitions, held that accrued receivables were assets which were required to be 
declared by a candidate for election. Since the Prime Minister had failed to disclose this asset 
in his nomination papers at the time of the 2013 elections, he was disqualified from being a 
member of parliament for life, and hence this deposed him from office (Imran Khan v. Nawaz 
Sharif, PLD 692).
Of the plethora of material included in the JIT report, the accrued but un- withdrawn 
salary from Capital FZE was arguably among the weakest evidence of financial impropriety 
against the disqualified Prime Minister. Even though the five- member bench ultimately 
reached a unanimous decision after a convoluted two- stage process, the majority’s reli-
ance on accrued salary as undeclared asset provided both sides of the political divide with a 
basis to strengthen their respective narratives. The PML- N criticized the court’s decision as 
biased and legally incorrect, and several of its most vocal members were charged with and 
some were also convicted of contempt of court for such criticism. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Panama case, and the resulting trial of Nawaz Sharif before an Accountability 
Court on corruption charges and possession of assets beyond known means, strengthened 
the opposition PTI’s narrative as well as electoral prospects. The ruling PML- N as well as 
the PPP also claimed that pre- election rigging was also in play, whereby the military and its 
intelligence agency (ISI) were involved in the business of persuading ‘electable’ politicians 
and some minor parties to join the PTI.
There were again complaints of significant poll day rigging in the 2018 elections (Mir 2018). 
The elections resulted in a victory of sorts for the PTI as it emerged as the largest party in the 
National Assembly and in the provincial assembly of Punjab. However, it lacked a clear majority 
and needed the support of an array of minor parties and independently elected candidates to 
form governments at the federal level and in Punjab. There were also rumours that the forma-
tion of this seemingly fragile coalition had been facilitated by the military, providing the basis 
of the narrative that Imran Khan’s elected government was merely the cover for what was in 
essence a civil– military hybrid regime. This accusation against the PTI- led elected governments 
at the federal and provincial levels has only been strengthened by subsequent controversies, 
some of which ended up before the Supreme Court for adjudication.
Extension of Army Chief ’s tenure and parliamentary complicity
Despite the complaints of the opposition and allegations of electoral manipulation, the PTI 
governments at the centre and in Punjab appeared to be relatively stable. The opposition by and 
large accepted the results and unlike in the aftermath of the 2013 elections grudgingly conceded 
the outcome of the 2018 elections. While there were progressively increasing concerns about 
the capacity of the PTI to institute effective governance as the party lacked previous experience 
of ruling, the opposition initially proclaimed that it would provide it with the space to rule for 
the maximum term of five years as stipulated in the Constitution. However, as the PTI began an 
increasingly assertive and relentless campaign of accountability for political corruption against 
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in the legislative assemblies began to visibly deteriorate (Rehman 2020). The public debate 
between the government and the opposition became increasingly personalized and vitriolic, 
and political fragmentation in the country appeared to be reaching heights not experienced 
since the 1990s.
In November 2019, the incumbent Army Chief ’s three- year term was due to expire. The 
retirement of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the selection of his successor has historically 
been a politically sensitive moment. In August 2019, in order to pre- empt any speculation as 
to the matter, the PTI government attempted to grant General Qamar Javed Bajwa a three- 
year extension in his tenure as the COAS arguing that a difficult regional security situation 
required continuity in his command of the armed forces. A relatively unknown petitioner filed 
a challenge to the extension of tenure before the Supreme Court under its Original Jurisdiction 
(Jurisdiction Foundation, PLD 52). However, the petitioner refused to pursue the case but the 
court, nonetheless, continued the proceedings on the basis that a public law case brought under 
its Original Jurisdiction does not automatically cease if the petitioner seeks to withdraw it. 
Effectively, the court thus turned this petition into a suo motu case, that is, one initiated by the 
court itself. At issue in the initial proceedings of the case were the legality of the notification 
issued by the government purporting to grant an extension in the COAS’ tenure. There were 
several irregularities in the issuance of the notification itself, which represented confusion on 
the part of the government as to the appropriate process. First Prime Minister Imran Khan 
had himself issued the initial notification of extension in tenure, then immediately realized 
that under Article 243 of the Constitution the power of appointment rests with the President 
so the Prime Minister’s office sent a summary to him recommending the re- appointment of 
the COAS who instantly approved it. The very next day, the government recognized that the 
Prime Minister’s recommendation needed prior approval by the Cabinet, which was sought 
post hoc through circulation of the draft summary rather than through a Cabinet meeting (Jurist 
Foundation, PLD 1).
As the court proceedings unfolded, a very peculiar legal problem began to crystallize. 
Although the tenures of Army Chiefs had been extended on several occasions in Pakistan’s 
history, there was no legal framework governing the tenure and terms of service of the Army 
Chief. The Army Act, 1952 which had been framed by Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly 
pre- dated all three of Pakistan’s constitutions (respectively framed in 1956, 1962 and 1973). 
After considerable vacillation, the government and the COAS’ lawyers settled on the argu-
ment that in the absence of any relevant legal provisions in the Army Act, Article 243(3)(b) of 
the Constitution – which granted the President the power to appoint the Army Chief on the 
advice of the Prime Minister – was effectively a self- executing provision, that is, one which can 
be given effect to without the aid of legislation. The government also argued that there existed 
an unwritten convention that the tenure of the COAS was initially for three years and could be 
extended for another term of any duration under Article 243 (Jurist Foundation, PLD 1). The 
court had two clear legal options before it. It could have accepted the government’s position 
that Article 243 was a self- executing position and the appointment, re- appointment, and exten-
sion of tenures of the COAS were completely the President’s prerogative, subject to the advice 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. While this position would have assisted the government 
in the instant case and legalized the problematic practice of extending Army Chiefs’ tenures, it 
would have juridically established the primacy of civilian governments in the appointments of 
the COAS, historically a matter fraught with tensions between civil and military leaderships. 
Alternatively, the court could have taken a categorical position against extensions of tenure of 





the absence of any relevant provision in the Army Act enabling the extension of the COAS’ 
tenure such a purported extension was illegal.
Instead, the court chose a middle ground that temporarily placated both sides. The court 
delved into the constitutional history of Article 243 and observed that Article 40 of the 1956 
Constitution had stated that until “Parliament makes provision by law in that behalf, the 
President shall have the power … to appoint Commanders- in- Chief of the Army.” The court 
interpreted this provision as transitory, and given that the Army Act, 1952 was already in exist-
ence, an expression of the assertion that the Army Act needed to be substituted or amended 
to provide for more comprehensive regulation of the armed forces (Jurist Foundation, PLD 1). 
Similarly, the court analyzed comparable provisions in the 1962 and the original form of the 
1973 constitutions, which provided for the command of the armed forces and the power to 
appoint services chiefs to be vested in the President “subject to law” and observed with some 
surprise and consternation that no such law had been passed since the promulgation of the 
1973 Constitution. The court subtly glossed over the fact that contrary to its interpretation of 
Article 40 of the 1956 Constitution, the phrase “subject to law” could be interpreted to mean 
that the framers of the 1962 and 1973 constitutions proceeded upon the assumption that such 
law already existed in the form of the 1952 Army Act, evidenced further by the absence of any 
attempts to substitute or significantly amend it. Nonetheless, the court proceeded to interpret 
the requirement of raising and maintaining the armed services “subject to law” under Article 
243 of the Constitution to hold that legislation governing the tenure, retirement age, and the 
process for the extension of service of the Army Chief needed to be passed by the parliament. 
In an exercise of “judicial restraint” and enabling a compromise between the government and 
the opposition, the court effectively granted an interim six- month extension to the COAS’ 
tenure during which parliament may pass legislation to regulate the services chiefs’ tenures on 
a permanent basis (Jurist Foundation, PLD 1).
Such legislation required the support of the opposition as the government lacked a majority 
in the Senate, the upper house of parliament. However, despite the challenging parliamentary 
equation, and despite mutterings of discontent from the opposition, the legislation was speedily 
passed in January 2020 validating the extension in the COAS’ tenure. Contrary to the seem-
ingly broader import of the Supreme Court’s judgment, the Act focused exclusively on the 
President’s power to appoint, reappoint and extend the tenures of the services chiefs. It clari-
fied that the initial appointment of the COAS will be for a term of three years, which may be 
extended for an initial period of up to three years at the discretion of the President upon the 
advice of the Prime Minister (Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act, 2020). The Act also provided 
that the maximum retirement age of the COAS will be 64 years. The ease with which the Act 
was rushed through the parliament gave credence to rumours of backroom dealings between 
the military establishment and the two major opposition parties, the PML- N and the PPP. 
Such claims of accommodation between the military and the opposition gained further strength 
when prior to its enactment Nawaz Sharif was granted bail in the corruption cases against him 
on medical grounds and allowed by the government and the courts to travel abroad to seek 
treatment for an allegedly serious immune disorder. 
Since his departure to the UK, no evidence has been forthcoming of Nawaz Sharif ’s con-
tinuing serious ailment or of any medical treatment he may have received in that regard. As such, 
while the Supreme Court’s decision nominally resulted in upholding the parliament’s right to 
legislate on military affairs, as a matter of political reality it only showed that not only the gov-
ernment but also major opposition parties are susceptible to the military’s influence as and when 
the need for their complicity arises. Furthermore, protracted corruption investigations and 
trials against virtually all significant opposition leaders thus provide both the government and 
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the military with considerable leverage over the opposition and have strengthened the narrative 
that the hybrid regime uses accountability processes for political manipulation.
Judicial accountability and a fractured Supreme Court
In May 2019, the President filed a reference against Justice Qazi Faez Isa, a sitting judge of the 
Supreme Court, before the Supreme Judicial Council alleging the ownership of undeclared 
and unaccounted-for foreign properties by his spouse and children. The Supreme Judicial 
Council (SJC) – comprising the Chief Justice, the two most senior judges of the Supreme 
Court, and the two most senior Chief Justices of the provincial High Courts – issued a 
show cause notice to Justice Isa commencing proceedings under Article 209 which provides 
the exclusive mechanism for the scrutiny and removal of a judge for misconduct. Justice 
Isa responded to the show cause notice, and also filed a petition challenging the reference 
under the Original Jurisdiction of the apex court arguing that the presidential reference to 
the SJC was mala fide (i.e., issued in bad faith) and had been initiated to discipline him for 
certain judgments in which he had criticized the involvement of the military in politics 
(Justice Isa, PLD 1). The case acquired additional significance because Justice Isa is scheduled 
to become the Chief Justice in September 2023, coinciding with the end of the current 
parliamentary term and the resulting elections if the presidential reference against him were 
quashed. There were a number of legal defects manifest in the record and the preparation 
of the reference. As such, the court could have simply quashed the reference and ended the 
matter at that point, of course leaving open the possibility for the government to prepare a 
more thorough reference if it wished to do so at some political cost. Conversely, the court 
could have held that since the SJC has already taken cognizance of the matter, that is the 
preferable forum.
Instead, once again, the court chose an intermediate form of action and proceeded with 
hearings in the case for approximately ten months before a ten- member full bench (Justice Isa, 
PLD 1). In the process, regular coverage of the proceedings in the media caused considerable 
damage to the court’s standing for amongst other things Justice Isa objected to the original 
composition of the bench as it included two judges who would stand to benefit: one would 
become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for a short duration; the other would have his 
tenure extended if Justice Isa were to be removed from office. Both judges recused themselves 
from the bench under protest as their impartiality had been implicitly impugned by Justice Isa’s 
request. The petitioners, which included not just Justice Isa but also an array of senior lawyers 
and representatives of bar associations, had argued that the presidential reference had been 
motivated by malice and was designed to undermine the independence of the judiciary. In June 
2020, all ten members of the bench held the reference to be a nullity (Justice Isa, PLD 346). 
However, the majority judgment, in which seven members of the bench joined, declared the 
reference to be mala fide in law as there were several grave errors of law in the preparation of 
the reference which represented a blatant disregard of the law, but there was no malice in fact 
on the part of the President or the government.
The errors in the preparation of the reference included the fact that it was not the President 
who had initiated the investigation upon the advice of the Prime Minister as required by the 
Constitution, but instead the Law Minister had authorized the Asset Recovery Unit attached 
to the Prime Minister’s office to conduct the investigation upon the supposed application 
of a relatively little known and dubious informant. The majority also observed that the 
basis of the reference was essentially a tax matter, but unsubstantiated allegations of money-





advice of the Prime Minister but in the present context was also required to seek independent 
advice and exercise his own judgment prior to forwarding the reference to the SJC, which he 
failed to do. As such, the presidential reference to the SJC, and consequently the SJC’s show 
cause notice to Justice Isa, were quashed. However, at the same time, the seven- member 
majority of the bench sent the matter to the Federal Bureau of Revenue (FBR) to investi-
gate the allegations contained in the reference and issue notices to Justice Isa’s spouse and 
children under the relevant tax laws “to offer an explanation regarding the nature and source 
of the funds (Justice Isa, PLD 1).” The FBR was also directed to present a report to the SJC, 
leaving open the possibility that a new reference may be initiated by the SJC suo motu in case 
of adverse findings against Justice Isa in the FBR report. The court thus temporarily diffused 
the crisis, chastising the government for the manner in which the reference was filed, but 
also partially substantiated the allegation leaving the proverbial sword of Damocles hanging 
over the future Chief Justice.
Contrary to the three judges in the minority who insisted on the end of all proceedings 
against Justice Isa in the quashing of the reference, the majority insisted that a perception of 
the accountability of the judiciary also needed to be maintained (Justice Isa, PLD 1). Since 
the ownership of three properties in London by the spouse and children of Justice Isa, even 
though financially independent, had been admitted the source of the funds and the mode of 
their transfer needed to be investigated by the tax authorities. This was necessitated by the 
definition of ‘misconduct’ under Article 209 of the Constitution which, according to the 
seven- member majority, included both professional and private actions, and not just conduct 
related to the performance of official/ judicial functions. Furthermore, the judicial code of 
conduct requires judges to “avoid litigation and to be diligent in their financial affairs to min-
imise the chance of any embarrassment in the performance of their functions (Justice Isa, PLD 
1).” Given that the close family of a judge enjoy many of the incidental perks and privileges 
of their office, it is incumbent upon the family members to also demonstrate probity and dis-
cretion in their affairs. As such, it is also incumbent upon judges to be reasonably aware of 
their family’s financial affairs and they cannot thus simply take the plea that their close family 
are financially independent. As noted above, although the majority of the bench sought to 
balance the need to protect judicial independence from interference by the executive with 
transparency in judicial accountability, the end result was a prolongation of the crisis which 
has left not only the public perception of the judiciary tarnished but has also led to deepening 
divisions in the Supreme Court.
In a review of the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Isa notably and in an unprecedented 
manner decided to argue his own case before his colleagues on the bench. In protracted 
proceedings, which are rare in review cases as the court is only empowered to reassess the 
legality of its original decision, Justice Isa not only levelled serious allegations of persecution 
by the government at the behest of the military command for criticizing the military’s role in 
politics, but also criticized members of the apex court for failing to safeguard judicial independ-
ence. Such public criticism of the judiciary from an apex court judge arguing his own case has 
taken its toll on the Supreme Court’s reputation, and divisions within the court over Justice 
Isa’s case have also become manifest. Although the bench decided by a narrow majority of 6:4 
judges to quash all proceedings against Justice Isa, the court will be the ultimate loser. As Justice 
Isa has been absolved of charges of misconduct against him without providing the ‘money trail’ 
or chain of transactions in the purchase of foreign properties by his family, parallels with Nawaz 
Sharif ’s case will be inevitable. The critics of the court will accuse the judiciary of setting a 
different standard of probity for judges than was set for elected politicians in Nawaz Sharif ’s 
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disqualification case. This would also strengthen the PML- N’s narrative that Nawaz Sharif ’s 
disqualification was in error of law. On the other hand, when Justice Isa ascends to the office 
of the Chief Justice, his impartiality on issues relating to the PTI and the current government 
will remain under a cloud.
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, and highlighted in this chapter, the Supreme Court has become 
the arena for resolution of high profile and potentially destabilizing constitutional and polit-
ical controversies. Instead of laying down clear constitutional principles and bright line rules 
governing the conduct of governance, politics, and institutional powers and parameters, the 
apex court has repeatedly sought to act as a mediator and found various devices to temporarily 
diffuse the underlying political tensions.
In the Panama case, the court failed to avail the opportunity to lay the ground rules on how 
corruption charges against ruling politicians and allegations of financial impropriety ought to 
be dealt with. Instead, the majority on the bench found an intermediate solution by creating a 
Joint Investigation Team (JIT) that may engage in fact- finding and enable the court to deter-
mine the probity of the allegations against former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The outcome 
was a decision that was principally muddled and has given an extended lease of life to polit-
ical fragmentation. In the Army Chief ’s tenure case, the court again diffused the tensions in 
the interim by referring the matter to the parliament rather than reaching a clear and precise 
legal formulation, resulting in the extension of the controversy and paving the way for the 
military’s enhanced involvement in parliamentary politics. Finally, in Justice Isa’s case, rather 
than deciding the matter on clear constitutional grounds by either completely quashing the 
reference or letting the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) conduct its proceedings, the court 
reached a compromised interim solution of referring the matter to the tax authorities. This has 
only resulted in further controversy with protracted proceedings which have cast a shadow over 
the court’s credibility as an independent and impartial arbiter of constitutional controversies.
In a constitutional scheme such as Pakistan’s, given the contexts of increased polarization 
and the heightened role of the military in the political process, an independent and credible 
judiciary is needed to act as a check on increasing autocratization and reduce controversies that 
serve to destabilize the fragile democratic system. Not only has the court failed in that task, its 
mediatory approach has only served to enhance the dialectic of autocratization and destabiliza-
tion, and the judiciary itself is now under strain as a result of that failure.
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As opposed to the findings of Fukuyama and others almost 30 years back, elucidating that a lib-
eral democracy could last forever since it had maintained due dominance, today’s democracies 
paint a picture of gradual decline (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). This view is furthered by 
ambiguity that subsists about the thrust and ferocity of the existing upsurge of autocratization 
in the world (ibid., 2019). To understand the framework of a liberal democracy, characteristics 
of the “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 2007) have to be explored further to understand various 
facets of its interaction with the rights of minorities in a modern- day democracy. According to 
Democracy Index 2020 by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, the average global score for dem-
ocracy fell from 5.48 in 2018 to 5.37 in 2020 on a scale of 0– 10 where 10 indicates full dem-
ocracy and 0 means fully authoritarian states. In 2020, Pakistan secured 105th position in global 
ranking with 4.31 points. This score was a slight improvement over 2019, when it was 4.25 and 
Pakistan’s global democracy ranking was 108th. However, Pakistan is still under the category 
of Hybrid Regime. The question is, are the liberal democratic rights that do exist distributed 
equally in society? An important undertaking is to see whether the situation of minorities did 
improve when Pakistan climbed on the democracy index. This chapter unpacks the history of 
minority rights in Pakistan parallel to government shifts between sporadic democratic moments 
to martial law. It is often assumed that minorities suffer more in times of autocratization. We 
argue that this is not always the case – at least not in Pakistan.
Minorities in Pakistan – the legal definition
The word “minority” is used twice in the Preamble of the Constitution of Pakistan while 
Article 36 of the Constitution is specifically about minorities to guarantee minorities’ legit-
imate rights and interests including their due representation in the Federation and Provincial 
services. While in the Preamble, minorities and backward and depressed classes are discussed 
in the same breath. Besides these three references, there is no separate discussion of minor-
ities in the Constitution. Articles 8 to 28 of the Constitution of Pakistan deal with funda-
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There is no exact definition of “minority” given in the Constitution of Pakistan. However, 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony talks about minorities as religious 
minorities in its official documents and states that they work for inter- religious and inter- 
sectarian harmony (Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith 
Harmony, 2020). While highlighting the Ministry’s role in improving the lives of minorities 
in Pakistan through special initiatives, the Ministry refers to religious minorities only. Since 
Shia Muslims are not considered a minority officially by the State of Pakistan, so they are not 
discussed as a religious minority, in this chapter. They formally enjoy the same rights as all 
Muslims in Pakistan. This, however, is no attempt to diminish the importance of atrocities and 
violence that Shias, especially Hazara Shias, are facing in Pakistan today.
A segment of Muslims known as Ahmadis was declared non- Muslim in 1974 through a 
Constitutional Amendment. In 1889, a then Muslim scholar Mirza Ghulam Ahmad from 
Qadian (a city in today’s India) claimed to be the “messiah”. Mainstream Islamic scholars of 
the time opposed his claim and declared him a heretic. However, he attracted a good following 
and they were called Ahmadis after his name Ahmad. They remained part of the Muslim 
community until 1974, when they were declared non- Muslim by the Parliament of Pakistan. 
According to the 1998 Census of Pakistan (Pbs.gov.pk, n.d.), Ahmadis constituted 0.2 percent 
of the total population. In numbers, this makes roughly 300,000 individuals. However, this 
figure is quite contested. Some sources estimate that there are more than half a million Ahmadis 
in Pakistan (UNHCR, 2017).
In the subcontinent, Christians started proselytization of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims 
during the sixteenth century. In the area that is now Pakistan, the majority of converts were 
low- income, landless workers who were mostly Hindu Punjabis (Church of Pakistan, 1998). 
According to the 1998 census, 1.6 percent of the population were Christians. The popula-
tion census was next conducted in 2017, recording Pakistan’s total population as 220 million. 
However, the detailed results have not been published yet. A government body – the Council 
of Common Interest (CCI) – has to approve the results for publication. On December 22, 
2020, the CCI approved for release the Census 2017 results but as of September 2021, the 
government had not published any details on the minority population. However, Ramesh 
Kumar – then a Member of the National Assembly – shared that there were 5 million Christians 
in Pakistan by 2019 (Tunio, 2019). Converting this number to a percentage share of Christians 
out of a total population as per Census 2017, it translates into 2.4 percent roughly.
At the time of independence of Pakistan, Hindus constituted about 15 percent of the popu-
lation. During the initial years after independence, a large migration took place from Pakistan 
to India. Pakistan’s first census of 1951 recorded the Hindu population as 13 percent and most 
of them were living in East Pakistan. Then in 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh and the 
Hindu population share in today’s Pakistan declined substantially. According to the 1998 census, 
the share of Hindus was only about 1.6 percent excluding Scheduled Castes. The latter are 
Hindus but not considered part of four Varna groups of Hinduism. These were given the status 
of Scheduled Castes through a Presidential Order in 1957. Ramesh Kumar, who is a Member 
of the National Assembly on a minority seat and is Patron- in- Chief of the Pakistan Hindu 
Council, claims that the Hindu population is closer to 4 percent.
Evidently the religious minorities in Pakistan are so small in numbers that even if they acted 
together in politics as a united force, they would still represent less than 10 percent of the popu-
lation. The small share of the population is most likely a reason that contributes to their exposed 
situation in the country.
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Formative years and minority rights
The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, laid the ideological foundation of the country 
in his speech on 11 August 1947. He said, “We are starting in the days where there is no dis-
crimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between 
one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all 
citizens, and equal citizens, of one State.”
Unfortunately, Jinnah did not live long enough to ensure equal citizenship of all citizens. He 
passed away on September 11, 1948 and the very next year the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan presented a bill to the Constituent Assembly that asked for the inclusion of the Objectives 
Resolution as Preamble to the Constitution of Pakistan (that was yet to be formed). The 
Objectives Resolution stated that Pakistan’s Constitution would be Islamic in nature and should 
be devised in the light of the sacred books of Muslims. The minority members of the Assembly 
expressed strong disagreement to the move. They feared that making Pakistan an Islamic State 
would affect the status of minorities of “equal citizens” and turn them into second- class citi-
zens. However, the Objectives Resolution was passed on March 12, 1949. The 25- member 
Basic Principles Committee (BPC) subsequently sketched the layout of the Constitution, 
which then was formed under the chairmanship of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan. The first report 
of the Committee was presented in 1950 but any fruitful deliberations could not be carried out 
due to the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951. Finally, the report was presented before the 
Assembly on December 22, 1952 by the then Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin. The fore-
most recommendation in the report was restricting eligibility for being the Head of the State to 
Muslims only. Naturally minority members opposed this recommendation as this would de jure 
and de facto make them second- class citizens. Another recommendation of the Basic Principles 
Committee was to set up Ulema Boards by the Governor General and the provincial governors. 
All the laws would be presented to these boards for a review in the light of the Quran and the 
Sunnah. This made it clear to the minorities that the proposed changes were not only about the 
head of the State. All laws were to be structured according to Islamic teachings. An influential 
Muslim scholar of the time, Maulana Maudodi, clearly mentioned the dichotomy of citizen-
ship in an Islamic State. He believed that there should be a difference between Muslim citizens 
and the dhimmies (the protected subjects) – the non- Muslims living in a Muslim country (Nasr, 
1996). His interpretation was popular at the time and it gave air to the fears that had been 
expressed by the minorities over Islamization of the newly formed State of Pakistan, unlike the 
vision of her founder.
During Pakistan’s formative years (1947– 1956) the issue of separate and joint electorates 
remained under discussion. Preceding the provincial elections in East Bengal (part of Pakistan 
until 1971) in 1953, to cater to certain political needs of the province a suggestion was 
surfaced to amend the Government of India Act 1935. This Act was used as the Interim 
Constitution for Pakistan till the formation of the first own Constitution in 1956. The 
suggestion was to provide for separate electorates for Caste Hindus and Scheduled Castes. 
But this recommendation was opposed by Hindu minority members. They felt that represen-
tation of Hindus can be ensured within a system of joint electorate so there was not any need 
of a separate electorate for Hindu minorities. However, they were in favour of reservation of 
seats for Christians, Buddhists and the Scheduled Castes. In 1952, a conference was held in 
Comilla, East Pakistan, by minorities where they objected to the suggestion of having sep-
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assembly of Pakistan, the issue of a separate electorate was discussed again. The report of the 
Committee on Fundamental Rights that was formed in 1947 to safeguard rights of minor-
ities, was presented. This report had dissenting notes by three non- Muslim members: B 
C Mandal, P H Burman and R K Chakravarty. They declared that a separate electorate 
would not be in the interest of minorities (Report of the Basic Principles Committee, 1954). 
However, the dissenting notes of the three minority leaders were not considered and a sep-
arate electorate was introduced. This was a major first blow to equal and effective represen-
tation of minorities in Pakistan’s legislative assembly.
Muhammad Ayub Khan’s Era – associating minorities with enemies
Pakistan saw its first military coup in 1958 – spearheaded by one of the generals of the Pakistan 
army, Ayub Khan, who overthrew the first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza. During Ayub 
Khan’s reign, after recurring conflicts with India over the Kashmir region, the enemy in 1965 
was branded as Hindu instead of Indian. This created hostilities towards Pakistan’s Hindu com-
munities too. Moreover, Christians were increasingly perceived and labelled as foreign agents 
Malik (2019). This naturally increased the insecurities of Christians in Pakistan. During severe 
tensions between Pakistan and India in 1965, there were also reports that many Christians were 
spies for India. The archives of the Special Police records in Lahore provide abundant evidence 
that cases of this nature were registered against Christians at that time.
Consequently, the situation for minorities was complicated from the start after Partition. 
However, the situation would soon become even worse.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s democracy – legalizing exclusion
Succeeding the dictator Ayub Khan, the civilian leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was received as 
a democratic leader. However, he proved worse for minorities than his predecessor. In 1974, 
under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Ahmadis were declared non- Muslims through 
a Constitutional Amendment. It was a big blow to Ahmadis who were already vulnerable to 
societal discrimination. The legal framework gave legitimacy to existing violence and prejudices 
against them, and at the time there already existed a long history of anti- Ahmadi sentiments and 
discrimination against the community by the larger Muslim population.
In 1953, riots targeting Ahmadis broke out in Lahore; their shops in Lahore were set on fire 
and there were cases of mob violence directed specifically against them (‘1953 Lahore riots’, 
2015). Ultimately, the then government had to impose Governor’s Rule to control the situ-
ation. But there were no attempts at government level to declare Ahmadis as non- Muslims. 
It was two decades later, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto brought the debate on the faith of the 
Ahmadis to the floor of the National Assembly, when they were finally declared non- Muslims. 
Since the emergence of Pakistan, the minorities were facing discrimination at societal level with 
no state patronage explicitly. But in 1974, the then government joined the bandwagon and 
capitulated to pressure of religious political actors. This paved the way for long- term entangle-
ment of religious- based political parties in the power game. After getting Ahmadis declared 
non- Muslims, these religious groups started to push the government to include Shias, Zikris 
and Ismailis on the list of minorities (2008, 109).
Surprisingly, however, a year later, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced a Constitutional 
Amendment in favour of minorities including the Ahmadis. It was to give them effective 
representation in the Parliament. Under the 4th Constitutional Amendment in 1975, minor-
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according to the Constitution) got the right to vote for non- Muslim candidates as well as for 
Muslim candidates. Bigger minorities including Hindus and Christians were given four seats 
each, while Sikhs, Parsi and Ahmadis were given one seat each. One seat was reserved for 
representatives of other religious minorities (Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990). This 
political move was meant to ensure equal rights of minorities for their political participation. 
However, this leverage could not last long and soon Zia ul- Haq – the then army chief with 
anti- liberal ideology – toppled the government and imposed martial law. Hence began another 
dark chapter for the minorities and liberal elements of society.
Muhammad Zia ul- Haq’s Islamization – patronizing violence
Zia ul- Haq overthrew the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. After a year (in 
1979) of his coup, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. This changed the geopolitical situation of 
the region. The US used Pakistan as a proxy and entered into the Afghan war to counter the 
USSR. From a Pakistani perspective this war was termed as Afghan Jihad. The label of Jihad 
helped the US and Pakistan governments to recruit fighters from Islamic countries, especially 
from Pakistan. To create more mujahideen (the fighter who fights in name of Islam), Zia ul- Haq 
used the Islamic religion as a tool to motivate the youth to join the Afghan Jihad (Stern, 2000). 
Simultaneously, Zia ul- Haq went the extra mile to impose Islamic laws in Pakistan.
Minorities’ security and identity were threatened badly during Zia ul- Haq’s regime. Zia 
ul- Haq reverted the part of the 4th Constitutional Amendment that gave representation to 
minorities in the legislature. The nullification of a separate electorate for minorities was a big 
blow to all minorities especially the Ahmadis who were under constant societal persecution. 
Eliminating the separate electorate at that moment of history meant causing more damage to 
Ahmadis. They had recently been declared non- Muslims (in 1974) in response to public hatred 
against them. Under a joint electorate they had no chance of having their fair representation in 
the National Assembly.
For Zia ul- Haq, there were two main factors that motivated him to withdraw rights for 
minorities: First, Zia ul- Haq wanted to counter the popularity of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Islamic 
socialism and liberal views. Therefore, he introduced “real” Islamic values. In order to hinder 
alliances between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s “Pakistan People’s Party” (PPP) and the religious 
majority, Zia ul- Haq pursued non- secular policies (Yasmeen, 1999). Secondly, the geopol-
itical situation of the region in the 1980s created a need for mujahideen to fight against the 
USSR in Afghanistan. Islamization was used by Zia ul- Haq to attract young men for Jihad. 
In sum, slogans of Islamization served his purpose to refute Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s socialist 
ideology to one end and to garner emotional support and ideological grounds for war against 
socialism (USSR). Where counter- narratives were not available to subdue Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 
actions, Zia ul- Haq showed extremity. He inflicted severe punishments on allies of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto. Many jialas (supporters of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) were arrested on fake charges and were 
imprisoned for years.
Zia ul- Haq did not stop at eliminating the separate electorate, his legislative proselytization 
continued. His legal initiatives of amending blasphemy laws put the minorities at further risk 
of isolation and discrimination. To gain popular support, he played havoc with the society by 
channelizing societal prejudices into legal courses of action against dissenting and unwanted 
voices. Sub- sections 295B and 295C were added to the Pakistan Penal Code. These sections 
criminalized the defiling of the Holy Quran with life imprisonment and defiling of the name of 
the Holy Prophet with the death sentence, respectively. Also, a new section of the Constitution, 
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in Islam with three- year imprisonment. The changes legitimized anti- minority sentiments and 
gave a legal tool to persecute the minorities.
Zia ul- Haq’s amendments to legal instruments regarding religious offences created more 
advantages in favour of the majority Muslims. Ahmadis, who had been declared non- Muslims 
only a decade earlier underwent another legal persecution in 1984 where they were barred 
from reciting Azan (the religious call to prayer) and calling their prayer houses Masjid (the word 
for Muslims’ prayer house). These legal amendments put the Ahmadis at an even further margin 
of society. The legal discrimination coupled with cultural violence gave a social legitimacy to 
the incidents of direct violence against Ahmadis in particular. Since the promulgation of blas-
phemy laws in the 1980s, the misuse of these laws against minorities and fellow Muslims began. 
Fake cases had been registered for economic gain and personal vendettas. The number of cases 
registered under the blasphemy laws show that minorities fell prey to these laws disproportion-
ately. At the time in Pakistan, less than 4 percent of the population belonged to minorities; 
however they faced 45 percent of the blasphemy accusations (Curtis, 2016).
Zia ul- Haq’s patronage of religious segments catalyzed the opening of new religious semin-
aries across the country. The number of religious seminaries (madaris) increased exponentially 
during the 1980s. These madaris were receiving foreign funding as well as they were supported 
by the State from the Zakat Fund (Zakat is a religious tax that every Muslim has to pay annu-
ally at the rate of 2.5 percent of his/ her total wealth). Zakat was considered a private matter 
but Zia ul- Haq institutionalized its collection. All the banks were ordered to deduct Zakat 
from all Muslim account holders on the first day of the Islamic month of Ramaddan. Zia ul- 
Haq used these funds to finance religious seminaries to create more mujahideen for the Afghan 
war. Up to thirty- six percent of the costs of the madaris, especially of the Deobandi sect (one 
of two main branches of Sunni Islam in Pakistan), were met by the government (Yasmeen, 
1999). The increased number of students boosted the street power of religious- cum- political 
parties including Jamiat Ulema e Islam (a political party which is derived from the Deobandi 
sect’s philosophy). Jamat e Islami (JI), another religious based political party that was founded 
by a religious scholar Maulana Maudodi who believed in a dichotomy of citizenship between 
Muslims and non- Muslims, also played a key role in Zia ul- Haq’s government. The Jamat 
eIslami remained an ally of Zia ul- Haq and occupied key ministries in Zia ul- Haq’s cabinet 
including the education ministry where a curriculum was introduced that promoted the Jihad 
element of Islam. Extremist religious actors that had established their legitimacy during the 
Afghan Jihad era acquired space in mainstream media. Graduates of religious seminaries were 
awarded certificates equal to a Master’s degree, and they were eligible to apply for any main-
stream job that required a Master’s degree. Zia ul- Haq’s patronage of religious extremists brought 
them to the mainstream and they became a regular party in power games at the national level. 
The process of religious politicization can be compared to the militarization of politics which 
had not ended since martial law was first introduced by Ayub Khan.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmadis as non- Muslims was followed by Zia ul- Haq’s 
Islamization, and the backlash against democracy (especially in the 1980s) substantially ousted 
the non- Muslims from political life. In 1988, Zia ul- Haq was killed in an air- crash and democ-
racy got a new chance. However, the democratic experiment lasted for just a decade.
The fragile democracy of the 1990s
When Pakistan saw a short spell of democracy after Zia ul- Haq’s death, politicians in Pakistan 
then downplayed the opportunity to strengthen democracy by conspiring against elected 
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elected as Prime Minister in 1988. Although she was more inclined towards liberal ideology 
but the democratic transition could not bring any significant change to minorities’ rights. Her 
government was toppled on accusations of corruption. Then, Nawaz Sharif who remained 
Chief Minister of Punjab (the most populous province of Pakistan) under Zia ul- Haq’s regime, 
became the Prime Minister. Sharif was more inclined towards right- wing Islamic ideology. And 
under his leadership, in 1998, the Parliament passed the 15th Constitutional Amendment that 
added Article 2- B to the Constitution. Under this law, the government got the authority to 
impose Sharia laws in the country. Additionally, it withdrew Parliament’s power of laying down 
a Code of Ethics for official functionaries including judges and legislators. These powers were 
transferred to the government itself. This Amendment put minorities at further risk of State 
discrimination.
The tragedy of Shantinagar also took place during the tenure of an elected government in 
1997. A village in the Khanewal district of Punjab was raided by a furious mob of Muslims who 
suspected that some of the residents of the village of Shantinagar had defiled the Holy Quran. In 
a series of incidents, Muslims destroyed 13 churches, 1,500 houses of Christians and numerous 
shops (Religious Extremism and its Impact on Non- Muslims, 2018). Ahmadis had long been 
facing mob violence but this was one of the first incidents where Christians also faced large- scale 
mob violence. Nevertheless, the situation would change, but for unexpected reasons.
Pervez Musharraf ’s enlightened moderation
By the end of the 1990s General Pervez Musharraf was the army chief. However, tension and 
distrust between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, had started to build. In 
1999, Nawaz Sharif tried to replace Pervez Musharraf with a new Chief of Army Staff. Instead, 
Pervez Musharraf toppled Nawaz Sharif ’s government through a coup and imprisoned leaders 
of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, including Nawaz Sharif. A year after the coup, the 9/ 11 
attacks in 2001 on the US changed the geopolitical situation again to something similar to the 
situation during Zia ul- Haq’s initial years. The United States demanded Pakistan’s support to 
fight terrorists in Afghanistan. General Pervez Musharraf agreed to support the US. However, 
unlike Zia- ul- Haq, domestically Musharraf promoted the idea of “Enlightened Moderation”, 
which focused on promoting moderate Islam and discouraging the extremist interpretation of 
Islamic teachings. This turned extremist Muslims against Musharraf while minorities welcomed 
this idea. During his time in power, the government restored the reserved seats for religious 
minorities in 2002. The seat division was similar to that when there was a separate electorate, 
i.e. four seats each for Hindus and Christians, one each for Sikhs, Parsis and Ahmadis and one 
for Buddhists. However, in the following years, the number of reserved seats for the minor-
ities remained the same despite a 32 percent increase in total seats for the National Assembly 
of Pakistan.
2008– 2018: violence against minorities by non- State actors 
and the State’s response
General Pervez Musharraf eventually allowed for a new transition attempt towards democracy. 
It started in the most terrible way when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in December 2007 
after just having returned from her exile. A democratic election was eventually held in February 
2008, and then until 2018, the Pakistan People’s Party (the left- inclined political party) and the 
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (the party inclined towards the Islamic right wing) once again 
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ally in the War on Terror, and was carrying out operations in the country to fight terrorists, the 
terrorists who claimed to be religious fundamentalists increased attacks targeting security forces, 
civilian populations and minorities. Terrorists equated Christians with supporters of the US 
and thus carried out deadly attacks on churches in Pakistan. To mention some of the attacks, in 
September 2013, a church in Peshawar was bombed by terrorists where nearly 85 people died 
(Boone, 2013) and the attackers claimed that the bomb blast was the response to the killing 
of Muslims in tribal areas of Pakistan by the US drone strikes. Two years later, in 2015, two 
churches were attacked in Lahore claiming 20 lives with several injured.
For Ahmadis, the situation was always bad, but it got worse during this decade when “dem-
ocratization” was supposedly taking place. To mention a few of the incidents, in 2010, the 
Ahmadi prayer area was targeted, and hundreds were killed (CNN Wire Staff, 2010). In 2018, 
a 100- year- old prayer facility of the Ahmadiya community was destroyed in Sialkot (Sayeed, 
2018). Along with these brutal attacks they were consistently harassed by the majority Muslims. 
The State machinery could not protect well the community and its worship places. Even non- 
Ahmadis who stood for religious minorities and civil liberties were targeted. For instance, 
Sabeen Mahmud – a progressive human rights activist, was murdered for speaking up for human 
rights. Another human rights defender, the lawyer Rashid Rehman, was also murdered because 
he was defending Junaid Hafeez (a lecturer at Baha uddinn Zakariya University Multan), who 
was accused of blasphemy. However, the State did conclude some high- profile anti- minority 
criminal cases. Also, the murderers of Sabeen Mahmud were arrested and sentenced to death.
Furthermore, through a landmark judgment in 2016, Mumtaz Qadri who murdered the 
Governor of Punjab province, was sentenced to death despite massive public pressure. Mumtaz 
Qadri was a police official who was on duty to provide security to the then Governor (Salman 
Taseer, a public opponent of anti- minority blasphemy laws). Qadri’s action was celebrated by 
many lawyers who offered free legal support to him. He was declared a hero by many religious 
elements. Public rallies were organized in favour of his action. However, the government did not 
submit to the extremists’ demands for Mumtaz Qadri’s release. Eventually Qadri was hanged. 
Similarly, the culprits of 2010 attacks on the Ahmadi mosque were sentenced to death by the anti- 
terrorism courts. In another case, five individuals were booked under the charges of a mob attack 
that killed a Christian couple over blasphemy allegations in 2014 (Ghumman and Gabol, 2016).
However, even if it is evident that the state has tried to counter terrorism in the country 
targeting minorities, there are many more ways that suppression of minorities continues to 
be exercised in the country. Forced conversions of Christians and Hindus to Islam is another 
challenge faced by the minorities. At times, the conversions are voluntary, but many times 
non- Muslims are forced to convert by extremists. Hindu and Christian girls are kidnapped and 
to cover up the crime they are converted to Islam forcefully. Due to fear of forced conversions 
many parents marry off their young girls (Saeed, 2016). The issue of forced conversion has been 
prevalent for decades, but it certainly got worse after 2008 due to a general increase in crimin-
ality and religious extremism.
For the last two decades the successive governments have taken few concrete steps to soften 
the environment of tension between the Muslim and non- Muslim segments. To end discrimin-
ation against minorities, the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a judgment in June 2014 that led 
the Federal Government towards developing a dynamic task force for the protection of religious 
minorities. The then Parliament passed a law titled “National Commission for Minorities Act 
2015”. This Act established a National Commission for Minorities with six official and eleven 
non- official members. Non- official members included representation from Hindu, Christian, 
Sikh, Bahai and Parsi communities. However, Ahmadis were not given any representation. 





Religious minorities in Pakistan
191
Affairs was a concrete step forward for protecting minorities (Glendon and Swett, 2015). But 
the exclusion of Ahmadis showed the then government’s poor stance on ensuring the rights of 
all minorities.
Recent developments relating to discrimination    
and the situation for minorities
In October 2018, Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf (Pakistan Justice Party) came into power. This 
popular party has managed to engage youth and brought a more positive image of Pakistan 
to the outside world. With regards to improvements to lives of minorities, this government 
has also taken some initiatives. First, the National Commission for Minorities formed in 
2016 was renotified in May 2020 with an addition of a member from the Kalash community. 
Ahmadis were given representation initially, but the government changed the decision shortly 
after due to public pressure. The renotification of the Minority Commission expressed the 
government’s intentions to safeguard minorities. However, the move was not welcomed by 
minority representatives. The Chairman of People’s Commission for Minority Rights, Peter 
Jacob, criticized the process of formation of the Commission. He stated that the Supreme 
Court ordered to establish the Commission through an act of Parliament, but the government 
had created the commission through cabinet approval. This does not give the Commission the 
legal sustainability and administrative and financial autonomy that is required for independent 
working (Pakistan Today, 2020). In the same year, the government established an economic 
advisory committee that included a US- based Pakistani economist Atif Mian who happened to 
be an Ahmadi too. His nomination had to be withdrawn due to anti- Ahmadiya sentiments that 
gave rise to massive public pressure.
The situation for other minorities has seen some improvements. In 2019, the government 
established the Kartarpur Corridor to allow the Sikh community from within Pakistan and 
from India to visit their holy site Darbar Sahib, located in Pakistan at a distance of 4.5 kilometres 
from the Pakistan– India border. A special access package for the Indian Sikh community has 
been introduced allowing them to visit the Gurdwara inside Pakistan without a visa. Although 
this step facilitated the Indian Sikh community, it gave a message to minorities of Pakistan that 
the State is considerate of their religious rights.
In 2020, another positive step to ensure minorities’ right to practice their religion was 
taken by the federal government by allocating land for construction of a Mandir (temple) for 
the Hindu community in Islamabad. However, the construction process had to be stopped for 
a while due to massive public outrage. The government engaged Muslim religious scholars 
and asked them to harmonize public sentiments in favour of construction of the temple. This 
strategy worked and the construction of the temple was resumed. Similarly, in another incident, 
the government took firm action against criminals who were involved in the desecration of a 
Hindu temple in the Karak district of Pakistan (Siddiqui, 2020).
The impression of how the situation for minorities has changed over time is to say the least 
chequered.
Conclusion
In Pakistan, steps have been and are being taken by the State to ensure rights of minorities. 
The successive State patronage in the past has nonetheless developed strong anti- minority 
sentiments among Muslim masses that will take long, consistent and concerted efforts by the 
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the evolution of minority rights did not remain linear; instead it evolved in a circular way with 
the change of governments and regimes, and not always following or being synchronized with 
autocratization and democratization movements. However, one constant component was the 
escalation of negative emotions among masses against minorities, although the hatred against 
each minority group is at a different level and because of different reasons. To reiterate the 
context, Hindus are hated because of animosity against India, while Christians are associated 
with the West and America. Ahmadis face the fiercest antipathy, caused by a religious inter-
pretation that anyone who leaves Islam is punishable with death. Pakistan’s history reflects that 
it does not simply struggles between military and civilian forces that put minorities at more 
risk. For instance, the decision of declaring a segment of community non- Muslim through a 
Constitutional Amendment was done by a democratically elected government (Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto’s). Moreover, the representation of minorities in the Senate was raised by a dictator 
(Musharraf). To empower minorities, it will take concerted efforts by successive governments 
with a multi- pronged strategy to deflate anti- non- Muslim sentiments, along with stricter 
implementation of the existing laws related to protection of minorities in a more genuine 
democratic setting.
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CPEC, GOVERNANCE, AND 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 
IN SOUTH ASIA
The path of most resistance?
Marc Lanteigne1
Introduction: CPEC and China’s South Asian strategies
Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative (yidai yilu一带一路) (BRI) trade policies have fre-
quently been presented by Beijing as primarily an economic exercise, designed to more effect-
ively link China with key cross- regional markets, both political and security concerns have 
never hovered far from the BRI in several ways. At the same time, Belt and Road agreements 
and investments have also had effects on various levels of local governance among BRI part-
ners. Few examples of these effects have more effectively been demonstrated than in South 
Asia, where reactions to these emerging trade routes have been especially polarizing. While 
this region acts as a key land bridge to other parts of Asia, just as crucial for the BRI has been 
the Indian Ocean, which is by far the most important link in the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road’ which Beijing wishes to create, since the waterway connects the Chinese economy to 
regions, especially Africa and the Middle East, with which Beijing is especially anxious to 
deepen engagement. Moreover, China is also seeking to expand its economic presence within 
the Indian Ocean area itself, raising questions about potential regional rivalries given India’s 
traditional dominance of that region.
Several South Asian / Indian Ocean governments have engaged China in the wake of its 
BRI overtures. By far, however, the most prominent actor in the South Asian ‘wing’ of the 
Belt and Road has been Pakistan, a venerable Chinese ally and political partner since well 
before the government of Xi Jinping introduced the BRI in 2013. Islamabad has been the 
recipient of arguably the most formal and intricate element of the Initiative, namely the China– 
Pakistan Economic Corridor (ZhongBa jingji zoulang中巴经济走廊) or CPEC (Ministry of 
Planning – Pakistan 2021). This development blueprint was founded in 2013, a result of a 
proposal by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, as a constellation of development and infrastructure 
projects designed to further develop the Pakistani economy and consolidate the country’s bilat-
eral economic ties with Beijing (Reuters/ SCMP 23 May 2013). Central to the success of this 
enterprise was the development and expansion of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to act as a transit 
hub for Chinese maritime shipping and a nexus for Chinese trade further inland, to South 
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development. Yet in many ways, CPEC is also a microcosm of the Belt and Road as a whole, 
reflecting the challenges of developing infrastructure and the relevant financing, in addition to 
having to integrate the economic aspects of the BRI with local and regional politics and strat-
egies, effecting various levels of governance within Pakistan and creating a challenge to the 
already- fragile political structures which were created after the return to civilian government 
in the country in 2008.
At present, it remains too soon to judge the success of CPEC, as many of its components 
have been beset with delays, political pushback within various administrative levels in Pakistan 
and ongoing security challenges. The economic and health effects of the post- 2020 global pan-
demic on the region and on Sino– Pakistan cooperation are yet to be determined. However, 
in addition to occasional strains on the Sino– Pakistan relationship since CPEC’s creation, 
the plan’s evolution has prompted concerns about domestic political directions in Pakistan. 
However, even at this (indeterminate) stage, it can be argued that the Corridor plan has greatly 
affected the economic relationship between China and Pakistan and as will be argued, has also 
added an additional layer to existing regional diplomacy and security concerns, especially in the 
case of Pakistan’s main adversary, India.
CPEC can also be considered a difficult learning experience for Beijing, given that the BRI 
in Pakistan has also shone an uncomfortable spotlight on the limitations of the Belt and Road in 
separating developmental from governance and security concerns. However, CPEC’s progress 
thus far should also be evaluated in regard to its potential effects on pluralism in Pakistan, and 
whether the Corridor may be exacerbating political and security stresses within the country 
which may open the door to greater risks of autocratization, defined in this sense as a process 
of regime change towards greater autocracy (Cassani and Tomini 2020). By placing such a great 
emphasis on the success of the CPEC process, Islamabad may be opening the door to greater 
risks of both political schisms and regional rivalries within Pakistan, as well as forcing questions 
about the internal security of the country as it continues to struggle with insurgencies and 
terrorism in the country’s peripheries.
The inception, and uneven trajectory, of the BRI in South Asia
During the two initial speeches by President Xi which inaugurated China’s Belt and Road 
projects, the first outlining the ‘belt’ as a series of land routes connecting Northeast Asia to 
Europe via Russia and Eurasia, and the second detailing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 
South Asia was not directly mentioned, but it became obvious that the region was going to be 
affected very much in its early stages by the BRI. President Xi first described the ‘belt’, during 
his speech in Astana, Kazakhstan, as working its way through Central Asia, while the subse-
quent speech on the Maritime Silk Road was given in Jakarta and featured the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the main case example (Xi 2014).
Yet, since both Central and Southeast Asia are adjacent to South Asia, it was clear that for 
Beijing to be successful in the development of both facets of the BRI, the Indian Ocean region 
would be needed by China as a vital conduit to numerous overseas markets. Moreover, for the 
BRI in that part of the world to be successful, Beijing would not only need to develop many 
partnerships with countries in the region, but also multiple points of access for Chinese trade, 
especially given concerns about both rival sea powers India and the United States (Kaplan 
2011, 277– 93). Before turning to the specific case study of Pakistan, it is necessary to observe 
how the BRI has developed in the overall South Asia / Indian Ocean milieu, given that while 








regional gains elsewhere with the possibility Pakistan may evolve into a core of the initiative’s 
expanded Indian Ocean network.
India, a strategic rival to China, is an ideal starting point as well as the antithesis to the 
Pakistani case. New Delhi, an avowed non- participant in the BRI, dominates South Asia not 
only geographically but also due to its economy and its military power. Sino– Indian trade has 
traditionally been robust, and the two states also participate in larger economic and strategic 
regimes, including the Group of Twenty, the ‘BRICS’ configuration (the economic cooper-
ation between the large emerging economies of Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa), 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Beijing- led Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) (Cooper and Farooq 2016). China is also an observer in the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which counts India and Pakistan as its 
largest members. Politically, however, the Sino– Indian bilateral relationship has a far different 
shape, starting with the two powers being regional adversaries who fought a frontier conflict 
in 1962 which resulted in China’s annexation of the Aksai Chin region. The two countries 
continue to maintain a tense watch over their disputed mutual border which has occasionally 
bubbled over into violence in the succeeding decades. China’s close relations with Pakistan, 
starting with a friendship agreement in 1956 and continuing with closer economic and security 
cooperation (Khan 1961), further elevated Beijing as a security challenge in the eyes of the 
Indian government.
What has changed due to the BRI are emerging Indian concerns about Chinese economic 
encirclement via the various land and sea elements of the Belt and Road, as well as the pos-
sibility that the BRI in South Asia could evolve into a ‘Trojan Horse’ to reduce India’s own 
power in the region. Thus, New Delhi has kept out of the Initiative, reflecting the ongoing 
disconnect between the economic and strategic dimensions of the Sino– Indian relationship, a 
situation which commentators have referred to as the ‘four C’ problem (‘conflict, competition, 
cooperation and containment’) (Sachdeva 2018; Joshi 2018). While both China and India are 
large economies with burgeoning markets, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has declined to sign 
a Belt and Road cooperation agreement with Beijing.
Decades of mistrust between Beijing and New Delhi, including over the status of their 
border and Beijing’s robust, ‘all- weather’ (quantianhou 全天候) relationship with Pakistan (Mu 
2018), have been more recently compounded by concerns in New Delhi about an increasing 
Chinese security presence throughout the region. This stance not only reflects worries about 
expanded Chinese economic diplomacy in many parts of South Asia and the Indian Ocean, 
including via the BRI, but also the enhancement of Chinese military land and sea- power which 
may challenge traditional Indian hegemony in these regions. In 2015, Beijing announced its 
intention to build a ‘logistical support facility’ (baozhang sheshi 保障设施) in Djibouti, the 
first such Chinese overseas base (Cabestan 2020). Although it has been described by Chinese 
authorities as required for resupply and support for multilateral missions, such as counter- piracy 
operations and peacekeeping, the placement of the facilities on the Red Sea and in a position 
to oversee North Africa, the Middle East and the Arabian Sea, has further underscored the 
importance of the Indian Ocean to Chinese security interests (including economic security via 
the BRI).
The most pressing concern for India vis- à- vis a China security threat has been their mutual 
disputed border. The Doklam Incident in mid- 2017, when Chinese and Indian soldiers were 
involved in a tense faceoff on the tri- border area with Bhutan, starkly illustrated the fact that 
although there remains a cold peace on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), meaning the frontier 
between the two powers, an agreement on the demarcation of the boundary in the politically 
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A brief but violent skirmish in June 2020 between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the 
Galwan River Valley, in the Aksai Chin area resulted in at least twenty fatalities from the 
Indian side and an unspecified number of deaths and injuries of Chinese military personnel. 
Despite the fact that no firearms were present during the fighting, rocks, batons and other 
improvised mêlée weapons were used, while some deaths were reportedly caused by falls from 
great heights. This was the first time such an incident of such magnitude took place along 
the LAC since 1975. The political aftershocks, and Indian outcry after the incident, further 
degraded the diplomatic situation between the two governments (Peri et al. 2020; Goldman 
2020; Singh 2021). The Modi administration has thus been forced to walk a fine line between 
moving to better check Chinese security interests in South Asia, and maintaining key Indian 
economic links with Chinese markets despite the souring political relationship, especially in the 
wake of Indian public outcry over the Doklam and Galwan incidents.
Elsewhere in the region, medium powers Bangladesh and Myanmar have been much more 
open to BRI engagement, and both countries have been central to Beijing’s interests in developing 
a stronger presence on the Indian Ocean coast. The BRI has gained support in Bangladesh, not 
only because of Chinese economic power but also because the initiative opens the possibility 
of developing Beijing ties as a counterweight to India. China, in turn, has expressed interest 
in engaging Bangladesh through various development programmes including the Bangladesh– 
China– India– Myanmar (BCIM) corridor (Mardell 2020, Saimum 2020). China has retained its 
dominant role in Myanmar regional relations, with Yangon as a supporter of the BRI despite 
Myanmar’s own security concerns with Beijing and local Myanmar concerns about the finan-
cial viability of the China- backed Kyaukphyu port project (Lanteigne 2019; Reed 2020; Ryack 
2020). Small states Bhutan and Nepal have found themselves often caught between two giants, 
as China and India have accelerated their geopolitical rivalry in the Himalayas. The Doklam 
Incident, for example, underscored Bhutan’s tenuous strategic situation, and that state has also 
eschewed participation in the BRI. Nepal, by contrast, has been more receptive to Chinese 
investments, especially since the 2015 earthquakes, as Beijing was a major provider of aid and 
support to the Nepalese government during that crisis (Parashar 2019; Vater and Siegel 2019).
To the south, Sri Lanka has been frequently presented in the West, especially the United States, 
as a Belt and Road cautionary tale about the dangers of a too- close embrace of the BRI in the 
form of Chinese ‘debt traps’. However, in reality the island nation represented a (rare) case of an 
asset transfer to Beijing, in this case the port facilities at Hambantota, due to non- payment of debts. 
Despite being commonly cited as an example of alleged Chinese predatory loan practices, the Sri 
Lankan case in reality was a result of overall poor financial management of which China was only a 
minor player in Colombo’s overall debt crises (Kratz et al. 2019; Jones and Hamieri 2020; Hundlani 
and Kannangara 2020). However, Chinese economic dominance in Sri Lanka continues to be a 
concern not only for detractors within the country but also for India. In December 2020, for 
example, it was announced that a Chinese firm would build a US$300 million tyre manufacturing 
plant near Hambantota, which would make the first major BRI Chinese investment in local manu-
facturing. Moreover, there remain concerns that Hambantota itself could in the future be used not 
only to service civilian ships but potentially Chinese naval vessels as well. This despite the fact that 
plans were announced in mid- 2018 to use the port for the Sri Lankan navy, not Chinese military 
vessels (Agence France- Presse /  South China Morning Post 2020; Reuters 2 January 2018).
Finally, the island economies of the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles have become the focus 
of Beijing’s local ‘small state’ diplomacy within the Belt and Road frameworks (MacDougall 
and Taneja 2020; Robinson 2015, 88– 93). Chinese debts in the Maldives related to the BRI, 
including the centrepiece Sinamale Bridge project completed in 2018, became the source of 












Mauritius, however, as that state celebrated the activation of a bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA), the first China has penned with an African state, in January 2021. China has expressed 
hopes that this deal will be a test for future agreements in Africa, as Chinese economic dip-
lomacy on the continent continues to accelerate at a rapid pace (Ethirajan 2020; Mundy and 
Hille 2019; Nyabiage 2021). The government of the Seychelles has also been a supporter of 
the BRI, and the island state’s willingness to foster closer economic cooperation with Beijing 
was further affirmed during a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the first month of 
2021, with meetings which included pledges of further Chinese support in the areas of energy, 
tourism and transportation, as well as health in the wake of the global pandemic which began 
the previous year. Seychelles also received the distinction of being the first African state to dis-
tribute the China- made vaccine for the Covid- 19 coronavirus (CGTN 2021; AFP / SCMP 
10 January 2021).
Thus, Beijing has made significant gains in its ‘ink spot’ strategy in developing the BRI 
in South Asia, as well as addressing the potential for pushback by India. All of these regional 
successes, however, remain modest compared to the commitments which the Chinese govern-
ment made to Pakistan via the CPEC process. The potential successes of CPEC would be seen 
by Beijing as a significant vote of confidence for the greater Belt and Road, which has now 
become the centrepiece of Chinese foreign policy and cross- regional diplomacy.
The fundamentals of CPEC and Pakistan’s responses
The economic relationship between China and Pakistan, despite weathering numerous pol-
itical storms, has remained robust since the Belt and Road was initiated, with total trade in 
2019 measured at just under US$18 billion (down from a 2017 peak of US$20.1 billion). The 
two countries had signed a free trade agreement in 2006, following up that pact with a similar 
agreement of liberalization of services three years later and with an updated FTA in 2019. 
By 2011, China had become Pakistan’s largest trading partner (MFA China 2021; Shah et al. 
2020; Kundi 2020), and given the strength of bilateral cooperation, as well as Chinese strategic 
interests in the Indian Ocean, it was not surprising that Islamabad would be amongst the first, 
and the largest, of BRI- related initiatives.
As the name suggests, the core of CPEC was the planned creation of infrastructure which 
would connect the far western Chinese territory of Xinjiang with international markets via the 
southern Pakistan coast, and specifically that country’s port city of Gwadar. However, in add-
ition to communication and transportation (highways and railways), CPEC is also envisioned 
as a platform for bilateral cooperation with other sectors including agriculture, energy, finance, 
health, human development, information technology and tourism. Various China- backed 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were also established in various Pakistani provinces, including 
Balochistan, Punjab, and Sindh, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
which in 2018 were incorporated into the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan’s 
holdings in Kashmir, referred to in Pakistan itself as Azad Jammu and Kashmir, but in India as 
Pakistan- occupied Kashmir (PoK). Economic security concerns were also incorporated into 
CPEC thinking, as illustrated by the additional focus on counter- poverty measures as well as 
maintaining border stability and associated human security and stability in the frontier regions, 
especially given the often- precarious situation in Kashmir (Government of Pakistan 2020; Syed 
2020; Chen and Zhang 2016).
What made the CPEC idea distinct, however, was that its projects would loop together 
aspects of both the land based ‘belt’ and the maritime ‘road’, via what was referred to as a ‘1+4’ 
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sets of projects: energy, industrial cooperation, infrastructure, and the Port of Gwadar devel-
opment initiatives (Wing et al. 2020). As one Chinese academic paper argued, there were 
many ‘early harvest’ (zaoqi shouhuo早期收获) successes within CPEC projects, including the 
expansion of Gwadar, as specific energy and transportation infrastructure as well as in agricul-
ture and services, but the Corridor is far from complete (Tao and Gu 2019). There have also 
been considerable problems faced by both Beijing and Islamabad which have slowed progress. 
These matters include internal political disputes within Pakistan, concerns about Pakistani debts 
in relation to the projects, and looming security concerns threatening the project, as well 
as whether the state of the global economy post- pandemic will adversely affect global trade 
patterns at least in the near- term.
The original budget for CPEC was estimated at US$45 billion after its original incep-
tion, but that figure was later raised upwards to over US$60 billion. Nonetheless, a September 
2020 critique by Andrew Small suggested that the latter figure was over- optimistic given that 
many projects were scaled back between 2015– 18, with pandemic- related effects seen as likely 
adversely affecting the Corridor’s bottom line as well (Ul Hassan 2020, Small 2020). Beyond the 
potential developmental benefits for Pakistan, Islamabad also sees advantages to the Corridor 
in an improved counterbalance of diplomatic pressures from India, as well as the United States. 
Despite longstanding diplomatic ties between Islamabad and Washington, American influence 
in Pakistan relative to China was thought to be eroding, especially during the isolationist US 
presidency of Donald Trump and its interests in severely reducing financial support for the 
Pakistani military (Shah 2017; Chacko 2018). Thus, CPEC was also a product of a perceived 
window of opportunity for the Xi government to further improve its diplomatic and strategic 
standing in South Asia. In addition to the economic dimensions of CPEC, the Corridor also 
opened up opportunities for closer cooperation between the Chinese and Pakistani militaries, 
including reportedly in the areas of joint weapons development and satellite launches (Abi- 
Habib 2018). However, considering the still- strong role of the military within Pakistani politics, 
the domestic political effects of this partnership do carry risks involving power- sharing between 
Pakistan’s civilian government and its armed forces.
All roads, figuratively and at times literally, within CPEC lead in some way to Gwadar, and 
it is this municipality which continues to be a barometer of CPEC’s overall progress. Gwadar is 
a coastal town on the Arabian Sea with an estimated population of 85,000, but with ambitious 
government plans announced to increase that number to two million by 2050 (Aamir 2020). 
The area had been an area of interest for China that long- predated the inception of the Belt and 
Road, but once the BRI had begun to expand in South Asia, the region was to be incorporated 
into China’s Maritime Silk Road interests in the Indian Ocean, as well as Beijing’s strategy of 
developing friendly ports around the area in anticipation of increased Chinese sea traffic. This 
strategy has frequently been referred to as a ‘string of pearls’ (zhenzhu lian珍珠链) approach on 
Beijing’s part, and many of China’s BRI arrangements in and around the Indian Ocean could 
also have emerging strategic value, much to the chagrin of both India and the United States 
(MacDonald et al. 2004; Miller 2017, 167– 8).
Gwadar and the surrounding areas were purchased by the Pakistani government in 1958 
from the Sultanate of Oman, which had overseen the region for approximately two centuries. 
Islamabad had high expectations of developing an expanded port facility there, while Gwadar’s 
location, not only close to Iran but also to the oil emirates and the fossil fuel- rich Persian Gulf 
and Strait of Hormuz, caught the attention of China by the late 1990s as Beijing was seeking 
to develop alternative energy routes to the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia (Khetran 2014; 
Khan 2018; Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies of Renmin University 2016; Kalim 












stronger maritime capabilities but was also concerned with the ‘Malacca dilemma’ (Lanteigne 
2008), namely the strategic risks of having the Malacca Straits interdicted by an outside power. 
Even though importing fossil fuels and other goods via Gwadar was far less cost- effective than 
the traditional means of using the Strait and the South China Sea route, the former option 
was considered a vital option in case the latter was threatened. Plans by the Pakistani govern-
ment to turn Gwadar into a maritime transport hub ran into logistical problems shortly after 
construction began in 2002, and five years later it was agreed that the contract to complete 
the work would be granted to the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (Zhongguo haiwai 
gangkou konggu youxiangongsi中国海外港口控股有限公司). The first substantial shipment of 
Chinese goods to pass through Gwadar was celebrated by both governments in November 2016 
(Reuters 13 November 2016; Miller 2017, 175).
As one China- based analysis detailed, the most significant effects of CPEC thus far have 
been the improvement of ‘all- weather strategic cooperation’ between the two states and the 
development of economic ‘growth points’ within Pakistan thus improving overall economic 
performances. In addition, CPEC was described as an invaluable model of the advantages of 
Belt and Road Cooperation, and so Beijing has remained dedicated to ensuring the Corridor 
is successful (Zhang 2019). From the viewpoint of Pakistan, however, the results have been 
considerably more mixed, creating political stresses within the country and exacerbating many 
internal political and regime tensions. After the early harvest successes of CPEC, by 2017 the 
various processes were beginning to slow down, and concerns were raised that growing tensions 
between then- Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a strong supporter of deepening economic ties 
with China, and the Pakistani military might lead to a political crisis.
As the aforementioned 2020 study by Andrew Small argued, Mr Sharif ’s dedication to the 
CPEC idea resulted in raised suspicions amongst military leaders about a too- close geopolitical 
relationship with Beijing and the potential for corruption (Small 2020, 35– 40). This uncer-
tainty subsequently plagued any further CPEC- related progress until the controversial July 
2018 elections, which saw the coming to power of Imran Khan of the Pakistan Movement 
for Justice (Pakistan Tehrik- e- Insaf – PTI) party with the new Prime Minister continuing to 
support the Corridor but taking on a more balanced stance and noting that Pakistan could also 
stand to learn from China’s previous developmental successes (Al- Jazeera 2018). Prime Minister 
Khan’s arrival in office signalled a more nuanced, smaller- scale ‘CPEC 2.0’ approach which 
better fitted the economic realities of both China and Pakistan, but despite the planned slower 
approach, many of the economic and strategic issues surrounding CPEC remained.
CPEC next: making the most of an uncertain future?
While the global economic trauma during 2020 contributed to reservations about CPEC’s 
short- term agenda, obstacles to its development from various directions had begun to appear 
well before the pandemic. Among these have been direct political and security concerns for 
Pakistan which have been affected by CPEC, demonstrating the difficulties created by trying 
to separate the Corridor from the strategic challenges of the region but also problems of gov-
ernance and risks of greater autocratization facing Islamabad should various internal power 
balances be upset by the ongoing development of CPEC plans. These have included the 
exacerbation of political cleavages within Pakistan, including between various provinces and 
regions, as well as between civilian actors and the still- politically powerful Armed Forces. After 
the military government of General Pervez Musharraf, which seized power in 1999, gave way 
to civilian administrations nine years later, the Pakistan Armed Forces never strayed far from the 
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General Qamar Javed Bajwa, exercises considerable influence over the country’s foreign affairs, 
including relations with Beijing (Krishnan 2021, Shah 2020). Thus, CPEC will continue to act 
as a critical variable in questions of both pluralism and risks of autocratization in the country.
In analysing these concerns, it is efficacious to examine Pakistan’s current strategic concerns. 
Various mechanisms within the CPEC process have found themselves entangled, and in many 
cases unwittingly, in security concerns plaguing both the north and the south of Pakistan. Chinese 
CPEC- related investment in Pakistani- held Kashmir has been a sore point for the Modi gov-
ernment since the development of the Corridor. The Line of Control (LoC), which separates 
Indian- and Pakistan- held Kashmir, routinely sees both sides accusing the other of ceasefire 
violations, with China, including local Chinese investments, being more frequently seen as 
an unstable additional element in Kashmir’s security situation. Moreover, since the main links 
for CPEC’s transportation projects run through Pakistan- held Kashmir, it remains in Beijing’s 
interests to assure stability, especially with the restive Chinese territory of Xinjiang right across 
the border (Ramachandran 2018). The Xi government retains hopes that the successful set of 
CPEC economic and transportation links will also have a stabilizing effect on China’s far west, 
but navigating Pakistan’s internal politics and security risks remains a challenge for Beijing.
In keeping with traditional Chinese foreign policy views equating security with counter- 
poverty, the CPEC process has sought to include components in Pakistan’s territory in Kashmir, 
including a planned SEZ at Moqpondass which would specialize in raw material processing, 
including metals and minerals (Ministry of Planning – Pakistan 2020; Bhat 2019). However, 
India’s worries about the strategic impact of CPEC’s investments in Kashmir, including the 
Moqpondass installations, were not assuaged when Prime Minister Khan began to moot 
suggestions in 2019 that Pakistan’s territory in Kashmir, still claimed by India, could eventually 
be incorporated as a new province of Gilgit- Baltistan. Such a move, however, would be seen 
in New Delhi as not only an escalation of local tensions, but also serving Chinese economic 
interests, including the enhancing security of the main transport lines under CPEC (Hussein 
2020; Kartha 2021; Shahid 2020b).
The security situation facing CPEC is just as precarious in southwestern Pakistan, especially 
in the case of Balochistan, the least developed province of the country despite being resource- 
rich and which includes Gwadar. Within the province, local militants and separatists, supported 
by Daesh/ Islamic State, have staged attacks and kidnappings, with Chinese nationals also being 
targeted. This has prompted concerns in both Beijing and Islamabad about the potential for 
further attempts to destabilize CPEC projects, and these threats have served to create a rift 
between the country’s civilian policymakers and the armed forces. In mid- 2020 the Pakistani 
military began to push for additional legislation which would permit that body to have more 
direct control over CPEC projects, with the argument that military oversight would quicken 
the pace of the Corridor’s development, given the dysfunction of the Khan administration, 
as well as assuring Beijing that their investments would be more secure (Findlay 2020; Shakil 
2020). Critics of the move, including opposition parties in Pakistan, have expressed concerns 
that such a new law would considerably strengthen the overall policymaking and economic 
power of the military. Plans were mooted during 2020 to entirely fence in the Gwadar port 
facilities before local authorities reversed the decision in January of the following year under 
public pressure (Aamir 2021; Keegan 2021).
Local anger in Pakistan at China’s economic presence in the region has not been aided by 
the global backlash against reports of re- education facilities in Xinjiang which have targeted 
the region’s Uighur populations. Beijing is seeking to walk a fine line between ensuring the 
security of its CPEC investments, especially since the Corridor remains at the core of many 










Pakistan. One solution has been for closer, targeted security cooperation between the two 
governments designed to protect the integrity of the CPEC process, especially in the case of 
the tenuous security situation in Balochistan caused by the ongoing threat by local militants 
(Basit 2019). The Chinese and Pakistani governments are worried about direct attacks on 
CPEC facilities by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a radical organization which for 
the past two decades has sought independence from Pakistan, and affiliated groups. Since the 
CPEC processes began, the BLA has also considered Chinese interests to be legitimate targets 
(Beg et al. 2019; Washiyama 2020; Chaudhury 2020). Islamabad is concerned that these threats, 
coupled with the slowdown of the Chinese economy caused by the post- 2018 Sino– American 
trade war and the global pandemic, may temper Beijing’s enthusiasm for continuing CPEC at 
its previous pace, and therefore the Khan government has been interested in allaying Chinese 
fears over the Corridor’s integrity. Improved Sino– Pakistani security cooperation may address 
issues related to the complications of completing CPEC’s main plans in a timely and safe 
fashion, but it is clear that the problems facing the Corridor are starting to adversely affect civil–
military relations within Pakistan, and could create further problems for South Asia’s overall 
stability, especially as it relates to India but also the Indian Ocean as a whole, given regional 
concerns about China’s economic and strategic expansion and whether Pakistan may further 
evolve as a platform for these ambitions.
Politically, China is also having to face an often- uncertain atmosphere in Islamabad, including 
concerns about divisions between political actors in Pakistan, communications between gov-
ernment actors and their Chinese counterparts, and managing public expectations of CPEC’s 
goals. The latter became more complicated given the economic shocks, which had begun 
to weaken the Khan government, caused by the start of the 2020 pandemic and subsequent 
depressed global economic activity (Liu 2016; Kundi 2021; Findlay and Bokhari 2021). When 
the project began, the Pakistani political establishment was far from united on the benefits of the 
Corridor, and Chinese officials were wary of numerous areas of underdevelopment in Pakistan 
which would hamper CPEC goals, in addition to the difficult security situation in the country. 
Ensuring that the benefits of CPEC are distributed as evenly as possible throughout Pakistan has 
also been a considerable challenge for both governments, especially since regionalism, including 
in Balochistan, has been a longstanding problem for many Pakistani administrations.
Moreover, there has been the omnipresent problem of corruption in Pakistani political 
quarters, at times creating a backlash on the CPEC process, with one notorious example being 
an opposition campaign in 2020 to remove the Khan government’s main official overseeing 
CPEC operations, Asim Saleem Bajwa, a retired Lieutenant- General in the Pakistan Army, on 
corruption and misappropriation of funds charges. In October of that year, Mr Bajwa agreed 
to step down as an advisor to Prime Minister Khan, but retained his post as CPEC head (You 
and Zhou 2019; Ahmad et al. 2020; Shahid 2020a; The Hindu / PTI 12 October 2020). The 
affair further illustrated the problems that the Xi government has had in trying to keep CPEC 
projects free of influence by internal Pakistani affairs, and underscored the fact that despite the 
ongoing potential of the Corridor, its eventual success will be greatly dependent on whether 
a sufficient degree of political (and governmental) stability in Pakistan is maintained. However, 
CPEC has also revealed another facet of the precarious political balance between the civilian 
government and the military within Pakistan, and with so much investment at stake, there is 
the question of whether the push to stabilize Pakistan’s economic and security situation so that 
CPEC can conclude will throw open the door to more visible power struggles and threats to 
the current system of governance in the form of autocratization risks.
CPEC was crafted to be an economic conduit between China and Pakistan, as well as the 
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regions. Yet, ultimately the Corridor could not escape the development of both a political and 
a strategic identity, and its building blocks have started to have significant effects on the Sino– 
Pakistani relationship as well as matters of governance, including effects on civilian– military 
relations, pluralism, and the integrity of the current system of civilian government, within 
Pakistan itself. The projects which comprise CPEC have experienced periods of both optimism 
and pessimism since 2013. The after-effects of the global pandemic, political instabilities within 
Pakistan, and the cooled relationship between Beijing and New Delhi are all variables which 
will now determine the near future of CPEC’s evolution. The end point of this branch of the 
Belt and Road may not be easy to predict at present, but it can be argued that its progress has 
already had a significant effect on questions of governance, the questions of security and sta-
bility, and the risks of autocratization in Pakistan, as well as the political and security question 
throughout South Asia.
Note
 1 The author would like to thank Lynn Gardinier, Francesca Rán Rositudóttir and Mingming Shi for 
their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this chapter.
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In pursuit of a one- party state?
Ali Riaz
With democratic backsliding unfolding in an incremental manner in Bangladesh for years, 
concerns have been expressed since 2016 whether the country will descend into a one- party 
state. The Strategic Forecast predicted in May 2016 that the country would shift toward single 
party authoritarianism (Strategic Forecast, 2016) and in early 2018 the Bertelsmann Foundation 
described Bangladesh as an ‘autocracy’ (BTI, 2018). In April 2018, a report of Aljazeera asked 
the question – “Is Bangladesh moving towards a one- party state?” (Aljazeera, 2018).
It is against this background that this chapter explores the political trajectory of Bangladesh 
and examines the likelihood of transformation of governance to a one- party state. The ongoing 
strategy of the government to neuter the opposition along with a rapid shrinking of space for 
dissent, and the country’s previous history of experiencing a one- party state have contributed 
to the growing salience of this question. Bangladesh experienced a one- party system between 
January and August 1975 under the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) which is currently in 
power. The party had never acknowledged the introduction of the one- party system as a 
misstep, instead in the context of diminishing trust over the election Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hasina had suggested in 2019 that reviving the one- party system (Jugantor, 2019), introduced 
in 1975 by her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, offers a solution to the elections- without- 
voters problem.
One- party states: the nature and scope
In this chapter one- party states are defined as, “states in which, effectively, only one ‘mass’ polit-
ical party had full legal existence and in which party membership was practically the sine qua non 
of political power” (Rothman, 1967, p. 675). In discussing the nature and scope of a one- party 
state, a distinction between de jure one- party state, and de facto one- party state must be made. 
De jure one- party states are those where the constitutional and legal framework allow only the 
ruling party to operate. In the 1950s and 1960s, de jure one- party states proliferated in various 
parts of the world, especially in the newly independent countries. The reasons for the emer-
gence and survival of these states were variously explained; for example, a culturalist argument 
was advanced on the prevalence of one- party states on the African continent (Carter, 1962). 
Many of the 29 African states that became independent between 1956 and 1965 adopted the 













the country, particularly where nationalist movements have taken place (Carter, 1962, p. 4). 
“The lack of social stratification and social classes in traditional African society was often cited 
as one causal factor” (Rothman, 1967). Elsewhere, it was viewed as a necessary effort for a 
nation to be educated “into becoming modern and national by enlightened state leadership” 
(Lamprou, 2017, p. 514). Ideological imperatives of socialism created a number of one- party 
states under the Communist parties, especially in Eastern Europe. In Asia and Latin America, a 
trend accompanied the growing intervention of the military in politics between the 1960s and 
1980s. As such, various forms of de jure one- party states emerged – some with civilian leader-
ship, others under military rule.
With the proliferation of democracy globally, described by Huntington as the “Third Wave 
of Democracy” (Huntington, 1993) beginning in 1974, the number of one- party states started 
to decline. The crisis of legitimacy, democracy promotion by Western states, and snowballing 
contributed to the decline (Huntington, 1991, p. 13). Consequently, a handful of ideological 
one- party states, such as China, North Korea and Cuba, remained as examples of one- party 
states. Many of these de jure one- party states, including many ideological one- party states in 
Eastern Europe, embarked on liberalization and democratization.
However, by the late 1990s, there were concerns about the future of the wave (Diamond, 
1997) and by the early 2000s it became evident that the third wave, like the previous two waves, 
had not only stalled, but also begun to be reversed (Diamond, 2000). Stagnation, erosion and 
reversal of democracy among the transitional countries, particularly the third wave democra-
cies, necessitated differentiating them from both democracy and authoritarianism. While many 
of them displayed some democratic attributes like regular elections, allowing opposition parties 
to exist and citizens to exercise some civil and political rights, there were serious concerns 
about the quality of elections, the limited space for dissent, and the absence of an independent 
judiciary. This emerging system was named variously, for example, illiberal democracy/ liberal 
autocracy (Zakaria, 1997, pp. 22– 23), feckless pluralism/ dominant- power politics (Carothers, 
2002, pp. 10– 14), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002, p. 53), electoral 
authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002, pp. 41– 46), and semi- authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003, 
pp. 16– 20). These concepts were brought under a broad term – hybrid regime – by Larry 
Diamond (Diamond, 2002). The defining characteristics of the hybrid regime according to 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) include, substantial irregularities in elections, flaws 
in functioning of government, restrictions of political participation, and harassment of and 
pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent (EIU, 2015).
These developments increasingly diminish the scope for checks and balances of the execu-
tive branch, limit the space for opposition parties to operate and manipulate elections making 
it a tool for sustaining the regimes. These are the markers of a de facto one- party state. As for 
the opposition, it is “suffocated by the ruling party who accuse them of being traitors, disloyal, 
oligarchic etc. … Deprived of any kind of means and platforms to express itself, the oppos-
ition succumbs into vegetarian life, as if it is a body still alive yet dysfunctional” (Dean, 2017). 
These “discontinuous series of incremental” developments have led, in some cases, to a de jure 
one- party state.
Bangladesh: erosion of democracy
The democratization process in Bangladesh began in 1991 and in the initial years it fulfilled five 
key indicators of electoral democracy – suffrage, elected officials, clean elections, freedom of 
association, and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, as identified by 
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Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) – were elected to power alternately 
through relatively fair elections until 2008. However, democratic institutions remained fra-
gile. The failure of both parties to build strong democratic institutions, create a democratic 
culture and their engaging in incessant acrimony added to the fragility and contributed to the 
gradual erosion of democracy. Both demonstrated a proclivity towards a dominant party system, 
“which refers to a category of parties or political organisations (sic) that have successively 
secured election victories and whose defeat is unlikely for the foreseeable future” (Laws, 2016). 
The constitutional amendment which reintroduced the parliamentary system in 1991 had also 
provided unbridled power to the Prime Minister. With the Prime Minister as the head of the 
party, the leader of the house and the leader of the parliamentary party, executive aggrandize-
ment was a natural consequence.
The 13th Amendment of the Constitution ensured that free and fair elections are held upon 
completion of the term of the incumbent and provided safeguards against manipulation of 
elections. The amendment created the provision of the caretaker government (CTG) – a non-
partisan government to oversee the election. The provision stipulated that an 11- member non- 
partisan cabinet will be appointed upon the completion of the term of the elected government. 
The cabinet will be headed by the immediate past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. With 
no other accountability mechanism in place and increasing politicization of state institutions, 
election remained the only means for keeping the incumbent in check. In late 2006, ahead of the 
election scheduled in January 2007, law and order broke down as the opposition led by the AL 
launched street agitations to prevent the immediate- past Chief Justice from becoming the head 
of the CTG, while the incumbent BNP engaged in machination to influence the forthcoming 
election (Riaz, 2014). In the midst of the crisis, the military staged a promissory coup, a form of 
military intervention which “frame[s] the ouster of an elected government as a defense of demo-
cratic legality and make[s] a public promise to hold elections and restore democracy as soon as 
possible” (Bermeo, 2016, p. 8). After a failed attempt to reform the political system, banish two 
former Prime Ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina from politics, address corruption issues 
in combination with growing disillusionment with the government, the Asian economic crisis 
and external pressure, the caretaker government handed over power through a general election 
held in December 2008. The Awami League secured a landslide victory.
Four steps towards a de facto one- party state
With three- fourths majority in the parliament, the AL began to adopt measures since 2010 
which were designed to incrementally weaken the opposition, make elections ineffective, 
muzzle the press and create a culture of fear. Four steps were pivotal in establishing the control 
of the AL over politics and the electoral process: the removal of the CTG provision from the 
Constitution, persecuting the opposition including Khaleda Zia and other BNP leaders with 
frivolous cases, adoption of legal and extra- legal measures to silence the critics, and curtailing 
the independence of the judiciary.
The first crucial step in the process of establishing complete control was the removal of 
the CTG system. The CTG provision, which allowed a non- partisan government to oversee 
the election, led to four free, fair, and inclusive elections, in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008. In 
June 2011 the incumbent scrapped the caretaker government provision from the Constitution 
through an amendment. The argument of the ruling AL was that a verdict of the Supreme 
Court had voided the system. The verdict in question had declared the 13th Amendment 
unconstitutional. However, the justices observed that the next two parliamentary elections 








the parliament chose to do so. The justices also agreed with senior lawyers’ opinion that there 
would be anarchy should the ensuing election be held under a partisan government. A parlia-
mentary committee comprised of AL members also favoured continuing the system, but Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina decided otherwise.
The new provision stipulated that an election must be held within 90 days of the completion 
of a parliament’s tenure (or within 90 days of a dissolution of parliament before it completes its 
term). The BNP and all opposition parties threatened to boycott the election unless the CTG 
system was restored. The BNP and the opposition made good on their threat and boycotted 
the election held on 5 January 2014. Deletion of this provision enabled the incumbent to 
remain in power with all the tools at its disposal to manipulate the electoral processes. Without 
an independent electoral commission and growing politicization of civil administration, the 
provision created an uneven field for the opposition (Riaz, 2014; Riaz, 2016, pp. 88– 102). 
With no opposition candidates, the result of the election was a foregone conclusion. More 
than half of the parliament members, 153 candidates of the ruling party and its allies were 
elected unopposed. It created a parliament with no opposition. In an unprecedented move, the 
incumbent designated one of its coalition members, the Jatiya Party (JP) led by the former dic-
tator H M Ershad, the parliamentary opposition. It was intended to marginalize the legitimate 
opposition and render them ineffective. An election with the lowest voter turnout and lowest 
participation of parties became the most consequential election in the history of the nation.
The consequence was not only limited to the 2014 election, but also influenced the election 
five years later. In the December 2018 election, although the BNP and other opposition parties 
participated, the deck was stacked against them. Weakened by years of persecution and the 
entire administration, including the Election Commission and the law enforcing agencies, 
working in favour of the incumbent the election delivered an unprecedented victory to the 
AL. Of 300 seats of the parliament 288 seats were won by the ruling party and its allies. The 
election was described by the New York Times as “farcical” (The New York Times, 2019) and 
by the Economist as “transparently fraudulent” (Economist, 2019). As such, two consecutive 
parliamentary elections were manipulated to create parliaments with no opposition and the 
legislative body became subservient to the executive.
To weaken the opposition, especially the BNP and its allies, the ruling party began to file 
cases against its leaders from 2010. The Islamist party, Jaamat- i- Islami (JI), was the first to face 
the wrath. As the JI and many of its leaders were opposed to the independence of Bangladesh 
and sided with the Pakistani Army in its genocidal acts in 1971, they were charged with crimes 
against humanity in 2010 when the government established the International Crimes Tribunal 
(ICT). Although the trial process had some procedural flaws, it enjoyed enormous support from 
the Bangladeshis. The long overdue justice for those who became victims of the genocide was 
the primary reason for such overwhelming support, but over time it is alleged to have become 
a political tool of the incumbent. As the verdicts began to be delivered in February 2013, the 
JI unleashed unprecedented violence to stop the trial and further isolated itself from a large 
number of citizens.
The BNP, however, was on the receiving end of the heavy- handed measures for its 
movement for the restoration of the CTG system. From the beginning of AL rule, Khaleda 
Zia became a target of persecution. For example, during the military-backed caretaker gov-
ernment of 2007– 2008, several graft cases were filed against both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda 
Zia to banish them from politics. By May 2010, less than 18 months after the AL came to 
power, all 15 cases against Sheikh Hasina including those filed during the BNP government 
between 2001 and 2006, were dropped or quashed by courts (BBC, 2010), while cases against 
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(The Business Standard, 2020). She was convicted in two graft cases in 2018 and sentenced 
to 17 years in prison (Firstpost, 2018). At least 30 cases have been filed against the Secretary 
General of the BNP. The party alleged in October 2018, two months before the election, 
that 4,100 cases were filed against its activists involving more than 800,000 party members 
(The Daily Star, 2018a). The number grew exponentially in the following months prior to 
the election; activists, including opposition candidates, were charged and arrested. The failed 
attempt of the BNP to launch a mass movement against the government on the anniversary of 
the election and widespread violence around the country provided the government an excuse 
to adopt heavy- handed measures. The BNP’s inability to involve a large populace and a lack 
of a concrete strategy backfired.
With the growing authoritarian bent of the incumbent since 2009, legal and extra- legal 
measures have been adopted to silence the critics. The amendment to the 2006 Information 
and Technology Act in 2013, particularly Section 57, with harsh punitive measures for the use 
of cyberspace for publishing “prejudicial to the image of the state” and providing power to 
law enforcement agencies to arrest someone without a warrant and to detain him/ her for an 
indefinite period sent a chilling message. A human rights group reported that “between 2013 
and April 2018, police submitted 1,271 charge sheets under the law, most under Section 57 
of the Act” (Reuters, 2018). In 2017, 300 cases, including two dozen against the journalists, 
were filed (The Daily Star, 2017), and various websites were blocked. Other laws were used 
against the journalists and editors. Seventy- nine cases were filed against an editor (Sattar, 2016) 
after the PM had spoken harshly against the editor (Bdnews24, 2016), another editor was 
incarcerated for years (BBC, 2016), the government forced businesses to stop advertising in 
two newspapers to deprive them of revenue (DW, 2015), and a photojournalist was detained 
for months (Meixler, 2018). The relentless campaign against civil society organizations and 
leading members of the civil society, and vilification of them were encouraged by the ruling 
party. This was to ensure that no accountability mechanism could emerge. In October 2018, 
months before the election the government implemented a vaguely defined law with harsher 
punitive measures called the Digital Security Act of 2018 which practically criminalized 
dissent. These measures were accompanied by the growing number of extrajudicial killings 
and enforced disappearances. Between 2009 and 2018, at least 1,921 people became victims of 
extrajudicial killings and 109 were victims of enforced disappearances, according to a Human 
Rights group (Odhikar, 2020; Odhikar, 2020a). A combination of these permeated fear 
throughout society.
As in other new authoritarian systems, the judiciary in Bangladesh became an arena which 
came under the influence of the incumbent. When the High Court and the Supreme Court 
nullified the 16th Amendment of the Constitution, the ministers and the parliament members 
reacted furiously. The amendment empowered the parliament to impeach Supreme Court 
judges. In 2018, after the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the government, the Chief 
Justice came under pressure. He left the country and later in a memoir claimed that he was 
forced to resign (Bergman, 2018). In a similar vein, the government also issued the rules 
which retain the power of appointment, administration and removal of lower court judges 
in the president’s hands as opposed to the Supreme Court. The Bangladesh Judicial Service 
(Discipline) Rules 2017 contravene the spirit of the separation of the executive and the judi-
ciary (The Daily Star, 2018b).
These four steps in the past decade demonstrate not only shrinking space for dissent and 
increasing draconian measures adopted by the government, but also show that the boundaries 
between the state, government and the ruling party have become blurred. They began acting 













the façade of the democracy will remain in the future. The question has the theoretical aspect 
referred to previously.
Authoritarianism in the wake of Covid- 19
The growing authoritarianism of the incumbent was laid bare in the wake of the Covid- 19 
global pandemic as the government intensified various coercive measures to silence the critics 
of the government through legal and extra- legal measures. Since the first case of coronavirus 
infection and death were reported in March 2020, the government adopted a three- pronged 
strategy to suppress any dissent. These include imposing a ban on government and semi- 
government officials including teachers of public educational institutions to talking to media or 
posting on social media, restrictions on mainstream media, and filing cases against journalists, 
social activists, and citizens at large.
Bangladesh, like many other countries, was ill prepared to handle the pandemic, although 
leaders of the ruling party underestimated the danger of Covid- 19 and claimed that the 
country was ready. Denial, deliberately limiting the number of tests, uncoordinated responses 
and complacency marked the early responses. The public healthcare system began to fail after 
years of neglect and corruption. Patients were turned away from hospitals and health workers 
complained of lack of protective equipment. Members of poor and lower middle- class families, 
especially those who were in the informal sector, were badly hit. After much delay, the govern-
ment began to offer relief, sold food at subsidized prices, and started a cash- transfer programme, 
but these efforts were marred by large-scale corruption perpetrated by the local level ruling 
party activists. Despite the number of deaths rising and the virus spreading, the government 
claimed successes and anything contrary to the government narrative was considered ‘anti- 
government/ anti- state activities.’
Examples of the government’s restrictions abound. In March 2020, two college teachers 
were suspended (The Daily Star, 2020), a doctor was sent to jail (The Daily Star, 2020a). On 16 
April, the government instructed the nurses of the public hospital not to speak about the lack 
of preparation; on 23 April, Health Minister Zahid Maleque ordered all health officials not to 
talk to the media; on 24 April, members of the civil service were told not to write in or talk 
to the media, including social media, without government permission; on 3 May, government- 
run hospital health workers were instructed not to engage with the media; and on 7 October, 
the government prohibited students and teachers from “writing, sharing, ‘liking’, or posting 
anything that “ruins the image of the government or the state”, or “disrespects any important 
person, institution or profession” on social media (The Daily Star, 2020b).
Hundreds, including journalists, academics, opposition activists, a doctor and students, were 
arrested by the government for posting content on social media critical of the government 
under the controversial Digital Security Act (DSA) 2018. According to the British Rights 
Organization Article 19, at least 63 journalists have been attacked and assaulted between March 
and June of 2020, either by the members of the law-enforcement agencies or the supporters 
of the ruling party (Article 19, 2020). According to a Bangladeshi research organization, the 
Centre for Governance Studies (CGS), between 1 January 2020 and 25 February 2021, about 
800 cases have been filed under the DSA. The organization gathered information of 402 cases, 
in which the total number accused was 873. A breakdown of the professions of the accused 
revealed that 13.68% of them are journalists (CGS, 2021). It is not only the journalists who are 
being persecuted; social activists, independent writers, bloggers, and cartoonists were arrested. 
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others including a cartoonist; they were charged under the DSA and detained in a high security 
prison. On 25 February 2021 Mushtaq died inside the high security prison (The Daily Star, 
2021). He was denied bail six times. Cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore, who was later granted 
bail for six months, alleged that Mushtaq was tortured in police custody and he was tortured 
by unknown abductors (The Daily Star, 2021a). In June 2020, a 15- year- old was detained and 
sent to the juvenile correction centre for ‘defaming’ the Prime Minister on Facebook (Gulf 
News, 2020). Restrictions on media reportedly increased. On 26 March 2021 the government 
appointed 15 government officials to ‘monitor’ the 30 private television channels. The decision 
was withdrawn after severe criticism.
Situating Bangladesh in the global trend
Bangladesh’s recent experience of democratic backsliding raises the question about the pathway 
of the third wave democracies. In the early days of the global wave of democratization, it 
was prophesied that these countries will follow a linear path – opening to transition to con-
solidation. But faced with the reality of stalled democracy and erosion, attention has now 
turned to the examination of pathways of the emergent democracies. According to Freedom 
House data: more countries which began the journey towards democratization after 1988 have 
experienced backsliding: “of the 23 countries that suffered a negative status change over the 
past 13 years [2006– 2019] (moving from Free to Partly Free, or Partly Free to Not Free), 
almost two- thirds (61 percent) had earned a positive status change after 1988” (Freedom House, 
2019). Equally notable are the findings of Mainwaring and Bizzarro, that “among the 91 new 
democracies that (by our count) emerged from 1974 to 2012, 34 experienced breakdowns, 
often in short order. In 28 cases, democracy stagnated after transition, usually at a fairly low 
level, and in two more it eroded. Democracy advanced relative to the starting point in only 23 
cases. Few countries have succeeded in creating robust liberal democracies (Mainwaring and 
Bizzarro, 2019, p. 100).” These data show that Bangladesh’s experience is not unique, although 
disturbing, particularly considering that the country was founded with the promise of liberal 
democracy.
The nature of these new autocracies is also different from previous forms of authoritar-
ianism. Frantz and Kendall- Taylor have argued that newly emerging autocracies are distinctly 
different from classical autocracies as these are more individual centric, that is power is placed 
in a single leader. They show that “From 2000– 10, 75% of authoritarianisation (sic) cases led 
to personalist (as opposed to other forms of) dictatorship.” This has been made possible because 
“these leaders succeed in eliminating their potential opponents and autonomous centers of 
power” (Frantz and Kendall- Taylor, 2017, p. 62). They state, “Since the end of the Cold War, 
… highly personalised (sic) dictatorships have become the most common form of authoritar-
ianism. In 1988, personalist regimes comprised just 23% of all dictatorships. Today, [2017] 40% 
of all autocracies are ruled by strongmen” (Frantz and Kendall- Taylor, 2017, p. 63).
These characteristics are worth bearing in mind while looking at the current system of 
governance and the rise of Sheikh Hasina at the helm of power in Bangladesh. Repeated insist-
ence by the party leaders (Prothom Alo, 2016; The New Nation, 2019) and pro- government 
journalists (Rahman, 2019) that there is no alternative to Hasina shows the personalistic nature 
of her leadership. The demands for her intervention in solving any problems, from capital 
markets (Mia, 2020), to helping innocent children (Bangladesh Post, 2020), to school- level 














Despite a propitious beginning towards democratization in 1991, Bangladesh experienced the 
gradual erosion of democracy through the subsequent 15 years. The promissory coup of 2007 
accelerated the backsliding. Although there were hopes that this short- lived experience will 
help politicians, particularly the incumbent, to chart a new course of inclusive democracy and 
institution building, the journey has been in the opposite direction. The incumbent has led 
the country further away from a democratic path; institutions, such as legislative and judiciary, 
have been further weakened and the executive has seized more power with the PM at the helm. 
Executive aggrandizement, elimination of the vertical accountability mechanism, shrinking 
space for dissent, emasculation of the opposition and the blurring of state and party does not 
portend well. It validly raises the concerns that the country will descend into a one- party state.
Building on the insights about other third wave democracies and drawing on the developments 
of the past decade, further autocratization of the system of governance in Bangladesh is the most 
likely scenario and the strengthening of the emerging de facto one state is the most prospective 
situation in the coming years. However, unless the incumbent faces a serious challenge a de 
jure one- party state is unlikely, for several reasons. One of the key reasons is that the incumbent 
would like to keep the democratic façade as hybrid regimes tend to do. The apparent ‘demo-
cratic’ identity helps the regime garner international legitimacy on the one hand, while striving 
for domestic approval from its citizens, on the other. In the absence of moral legitimacy, thanks 
to two manipulated elections, the incumbent will show that it has constitutional legitimacy. 
The international environment of growing authoritarianism has created an enabling environ-
ment for the regime. However, various sporadic movements such as the road safety movement 
(BBC, 2018) in 2018, testify to simmering discontent.
Since 2014, especially since 2018, the international community has left the question of dem-
ocracy behind for other considerations (Riaz, 2020). This has helped the incumbent pursue its 
agenda without any repercussions. The mutation of the hybrid regime into an authoritarian 
regime is also dependent on the role of the opposition, which thus far have failed to mount 
any effective resistance to the ruling party’s agenda. The opposition, particularly, the BNP, is 
wrecked due to the absence of a bold leadership; its organizational capacity has weakened, and 
it is acting rudderless. Its ability to reshape itself will have a bearing on the nation’s path forward.
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THE DECLINE OF    
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Protests at the Phulbari and Rampal coal mine
Shelley Feldman1
Introduction
Bangladesh has become an icon of dramatic economic growth and is also recognized for having 
made “the greatest progress in human development indicators in recent decades” (UNDP 
2010). Moving up the development hierarchy of countries, from a low to a lower- middle 
income country, has often been associated with increasing democracy as a form of rule and 
participation. The promise of increasing democratization, accompanied by good governance, 
is assumed to help steer market- led development reforms. These twin goals of development 
and democracy have inspired Bangladeshi elite for many years, even as key indicators of their 
success highlight the neocolonial or dependent character of the country’s political economy. 
These aspirations are fuelled by a desire for the country to continue on “its journey to upper 
middle- income status, in close cooperation with the government, stakeholders, and develop-
ment partners,” where development partners include continuing support and dependence on 
bi- and multilateral assistance that contributes to shaping development policy (e.g. World Bank 
2020). Yet, governance in recent decades is characterized by a rise in autocratic practices which 
raises these critical questions: Can the country realize the promise of strengthened democratic 
rule while also achieving sustained economic growth with the support of donors and develop-
ment partners? Or, with indications of democratic backsliding, is a rise in autocratic practices a 
more likely long- term consequence? The discussion below focuses on answering these critical 
questions.
Rounaq Jahan (2020) and Ali Riaz (2020), two eminent political scientists of Bangladesh, 
draw attention to old and new challenges to democracy, the rise of autocratic practices, and 
the making of one- party rule. Like other political scientists, they highlight the economic 
and institutional correlates of a process of democratic decline across world communities 
(Luhrmann et al. 2018, 2019; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Cassani and Tomini 2020). 
They focus on these correlates to explain failures in electoral politics and the rise of one- party 
rule, or on challenges to democratic rule, such as declines in the rule of law and freedom of 
individual expression and social media (Riaz 2019). While this approach reveals the processes 
entailed in the consolidation of executive power and the challenges this poses for parliament 
and the judiciary, it gives far less attention to practices of governance and everyday practices 
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for recognition and for government accountability, including through protest and popular 
mobilization.
In this chapter, I draw attention to state practices involving large- scale infrastructural devel-
opment as sites where challenges to demands for democratic participation expose the (re)making 
of state– society relations. Attention to the practices through which state– society relations are 
constituted thus offers a window on the declines in democracy and processes of legitimation 
that secure or enforce rule. I argue that current government interventions in the form of large- 
scale rural infrastructural development projects increasingly override or elide consideration of 
democratic participation, in particular, popular representation and demands for accountability. 
I focus, by way of example, on the protests that have risen in opposition to development 
projects promoting coal extraction, which are often elided in decisions about policy choices 
to expand opportunities for economic growth and where far too little attention is paid to how 
land will be acquired, compensation paid, and livelihoods ensured. I argue that by repressing 
popular mobilization and protest, the government has decentred civil society from its role as 
central to democratic practice. In highlighting protests at sites of investments in coal extraction, 
a central feature of the current government’s development strategy, I expose the contradiction 
between the adoption of a neoliberal growth strategy and participatory democracy.
The discussion is organized as follows: I first situate decisions about the country’s devel-
opment trajectory in relation to its aspiration to move up the development hierarchy of 
countries. I follow with a brief comment on civil society and its contradictory relation to 
democratic practices before turning to a discussion of the energy sector and the construction 
at coal extraction sites. Here I emphasize issues raised by the protest movements, including 
environmental degradation, land grabbing, corruption, and transformations in everyday soci-
ality. Finally, I turn attention to the government’s response to these protests that has marked 
a decline in democratic participation and decision making. Available secondary evidence for 
this discussion comes from two resource extraction sites: Phulbari, Dinajpur and Rampal, 
Khulna, the latter adjacent to the Sundarbans (Gardner et al. 2012; Ahasan and Gardner 2016; 
Chowdhury 2016; Faruque 2018; Chowdhury 2016, 2017; Mahmud, Roth and Warner 
2020; Misra and Mookerjea 2017). These sites are two among a number of coalfired power 
plants under construction which garner support from the government, often in concert with 
support from China and India (Gallagher et al. 2021) but, distinctive about the Phulbari and 
Rampal sites is the ongoing opposition they have faced, offering a window on contestation 
between local communities and the government.
Eclipsing democracy and the rise of autocratic rule
By the dawn of the twenty- first century, the fragility of the country’s democracy had become 
increasingly evident, especially after the military- backed Caretaker Government that ruled 
Bangladesh from 2007 to 2008. Riaz (2020) views the period between 1990 and 2009 as one 
of semi- authoritarianism where democracy is being eroded and power is being concentrated 
in the hands of the executive. Such monopolization indicates that rather than a replacement of 
the executive, such as is common in coups, backsliding in Bangladesh is more akin to processes 
where there is a weakening of checks on executive power and a series of institutional changes 
that hamper the power of an opposition to challenge executive preferences. Under Sheikh 
Hasina, it has entailed a process that consolidated executive power by defying the proced-
ural norms of liberal democracy. Under her rule, this was made especially evident when she 
removed the system of a caretaker government and the strategic manipulation of the electoral 









of the members of civil society and opposition political parties,” effectively undermining the 
efficacy of elections and undercutting institutions of accountability, as well as opportunities for 
voice and representation (Riaz 2020: 9).
Mass mobilization against autocratic rule is not new in Bangladesh. Opposition politics has 
often been characterized by popular protest, including hartals, which could bring the country 
to a standstill, and also by the pro- democracy alliance that led to the ouster of the Ershad 
regime – the second military regime to hold power in the country since 1977 – and ushered in 
democratic elections. Such mobilization and resistance continued to characterize the conflict 
between the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under electoral 
democracy, first through hartals, confrontation, and violence, and, subsequently, through house 
arrest and the crippling of parliament and other democratic institutions. As I suggest below, the 
BNP and the AL have fought for leadership since 1991 even as they broadly share policy prior-
ities and, to some extent, policy practices.
Popular protest also marked the 2013 Shahbag movement seeking the death penalty for 
those sentenced and convicted of crimes committed during the independence- war in 1971. 
This initially peaceful struggle for justice for the events of 1971 has been recognized as a water-
shed moment representing grassroots mobilization against the country’s continuing corruption 
and dysfunctional political culture, exposing the tension between recognition of Bangladesh as 
a secular state and a religious backlash that led to government repression of the unrest which 
ensued. Repression also framed the spontaneous protests of students in Dhaka that emerged 
following the death of two children by a speeding bus that brought Dhaka to a standstill. 
Not only was the protest met with tear gas and rubber bullets, with police injuring more 
than forty, and arresting mostly the young for protesting against institutional corruption, but 
the demand for accountability in how licences were issued or road safety insured was not 
addressed. A number of journalists, including the renowned photographer Shahidul Alam, 
were also charged or detained. Defined as an embarrassment, the government blocked internet 
services so as to inhibit further mobilization (BBC 2018). This led to an international response, 
including calls to stop the government’s “violent crackdown” on “overwhelmingly peaceful 
student protesters” that signal the place of repressive tactics in securing rule, even under the 
guise of electoral democracy.
Moreover, Sheikh Hasina’s reelection in both 2014 and 2018 was boycotted by the major 
opposition party, the BNP. Defining her “landslide victory” as neither free nor fair (Feldman 
2015; Riaz 2020) further undercut trust in the electoral process and confirmed allegations of 
creeping authoritarianism, given the silencing of political rivals as an emblematic feature of 
democratic backsliding. Regrettably, what began in 1991 as a political environment which 
sought to uphold the five principles of democratic rule: electoral, liberal, participatory, delib-
erative, and egalitarian is, instead, characterized as an electoral autocracy (Jahan 2020; Mechova, 
Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017; Riaz 2020). Further, contributing to AL’s loss of credibility and 
the institutionalization of one- party rule is the erosion of civil and political rights, including the 
failure to adjudicate crimes against civil rights activists, secular bloggers, and political protesters. 
She has, for example, negotiated with those who sought the death penalty for bloggers and 
wanted school textbooks to remove secular and Hindu references. In other instances, however, 
she has employed repressive measures such as directing security forces to detain opposition 
leaders without judicial due process, and, in still other instances, has failed to investigate and 
adjudicate those who murdered writers and bloggers who wrote on “controversial freethinking 
or atheistic topics,” or on LGBT issues (BBC 2016; Hussain 2017; Saez 2018). In these cases, 
balancing democratic governance with her political interests and economic policies has led to a 
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Aspiring economic growth and inclusion in the global economy
While framing Bangladesh’s economic growth in terms of its desire to continue its journey 
to upper middle- income status is relatively new, demands for improving the country’s per-
formance in the global economy have long been part of the conditionalities of the WB, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank, and other International 
Financial Institutions (IFI). These demands have been accompanied by the promise of a neo-
liberal development strategy that offered both greater economic prosperity and the poten-
tial of a “third wave” of democracy. Accordingly, achieving the promises of development and 
democracy has entailed opening the economy to export- led growth supported by structural 
adjustment conditionalities set by the WB and the IMF, that would support new forms of par-
ticipation in circuits of bi-  and multilateral lending, capital investment strategies, and integra-
tion into the global economy.
New and expanded investments from China, however, have changed the aid landscape 
which increasingly showcases large-scale infrastructure development (Sarkar 2014). As Hussain 
(2019) argues, China’s one- belt- one- road strategy resembles “a grandiose globalized version of 
the US Marshall Plan,” and all that is implied by the influence sought by China’s commitment 
in the region. While relations with China have long been a feature of South Asian engagement, 
especially regarding their interest in Chattogram, the location of Bangladesh’s major port and 
the Bay of Bengal, current relations sustain interest in “Bangladesh’s unique geo- political pos-
ition” which bridges South and Southeast Asia via a modern Silk Road that is marked by trans- 
Asian highways and railways (Mannan 2019: 55). This commitment, coupled with the growing 
demand for energy, has led China, as well as India, to become leaders in a “new international 
energy order,” each investing heavily in Bangladesh (Mannan 2019) where Chinese investments 
focus on large bridge and infrastructure projects, export processing zones (EPZs), special eco-
nomic zones (SEZs), and coal extraction.
To be sure, since the mid- 1970s, the World Bank has occupied a central position in the 
dissemination of development knowledge and practice and, along with the IMF, has been 
instrumental, not only in shaping the contours of the Bangladesh economy, but also in shaping 
relations with the NGO community. NGOs, for their part, began in rehabilitation efforts 
following the 1971 war and as a resource of rural mobilization. By the later 1970s, however, 
opportunities for NGO collaboration with bi-  and multilateral aid agencies institutionalized 
their development role, thereby transforming a significant proportion of the sector from civil 
society institutions concerned with mobilization and conscientization, as well as processes of 
democratization, to institutions offering services and resources that acted increasingly as para- 
statals (World Bank 2013). This means, for example, that an increasing number of NGOs 
offer microcredit (Grameen Bank) and primary village education (BRAC) to support or con-
tribute to government institutions already in operation in contrast to those which promote 
conscientization and advocate for justice and rights as a voice of civil society. Recognizing the 
multiple roles played by NGOs reveals how the institutionalization of NGOs alters state– civil 
society relations.
Such changing state– civil society relationships have created new subjectivities by reconsti-
tuting the liberal subject as primarily wage earners and small- scale entrepreneurs who are increas-
ingly dependent on individualized credit, thereby transforming rural production relations that 
included wage labour, but, also, in- kind exchanges, sharecropping arrangements, and relations 
of subsistence production. In rural areas, this shift has been enabled by the dramatic expansion 
of NGOs that provide resources and services and are to be distinguished from those that work 








in export production has similarly contributed to creating new subjectivities, particularly of 
women, by providing employment for millions, while contributing to the country’s sustained 
growth rate through participation in the country’s export regime.
An export- led development strategy has been embraced by both military and democratic 
regimes, including various forms of one- party, oligarchic rule. In the transition from import sub-
stitution to export- led growth, for example, the policies of both Zia Rahman (1977– 1981) and 
Mohammad Ershad (1982– 1990) responded similarly to the structural adjustment requirements 
of the Bretton Woods institutions, including Ershad’s adoption of a New Industrial Policy 
(NIP) which attempted to “restore macroeconomic balance and improve prospects for the 
emerging private sector” (Quadir 2000: 208). As Naomi Hossain (2017) reminds us, inter-
national donors had been pressing the government to deregulate and privatize the economy for 
some time, and the military governments were receptive to this challenge. Between 1972 and 
1982, such reforms largely responded to internal and short- term exogenous economic shocks. 
But, since that time, the reform process sought to “change the entire direction of the economy 
towards a private enterprise dominated market economy” (Sobhan 1993: 925). Each regime 
stabilized its military rule with large- scale rural development projects, decentralization strat-
egies, and an increased role for NGOs that contributed to building a political network through 
the distribution of resources and patronage (Quadir 2000: 197). As Shamsul Haque (2002: 414) 
argues, each regime was able “to coopt and use large NGOs as substitutes for opposition pol-
itical parties.” Consequently, the country’s NGO elite have operated as a distinct section of 
the national elite who, alongside bureaucratic and political elites and a network of industrial 
and corporate capital, intersect with international capital that is reputed to be characterized by 
widespread corruption and competitive clientelism (Lorch 2018).
Neoliberalism or democracy: a contradictory relation?
The deepening crisis of the Ershad regime was felt especially by intellectuals and students who 
were central to the 1990 mobilization which brought military rule to an end. The election 
which followed in 1991, under Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, chief justice of the Supreme 
Court, was described as “free and fair” by local nongovernment and foreign observers alike. But 
this election result revealed the growing consolidation of the elite who, according to Talukdar 
Maniruzzaman (1992: 217– 218), by benefiting from foreign aid during previous regimes 
secured its place as “a new class of beneficiaries, consisting of private intermediaries who acted 
as commission agents, both legally and illegally, for foreign suppliers of goods and services 
financed by the aid.” As Maniruzzaman continues, aid helped
industrialists who borrowed money from aid- financed DFls or who ran their factories 
on foreign exchange provided as commodity or as program aid to finance recur-
ring imports … . [and] helped construction contractors on aided projects and local 
consultants working under various aid- financed programs of technical assistance.
This class also benefited from a policy of patrimonialism and crony capitalism (Feldman 
and Geisler 2011) that included “the massive transfer of public wealth to private hands” 
(Maniruzzaman 1992: 218). These relations, coupled with relatively inexperienced political 
and administrative personnel, failed to provide the basis for long- term democratic rule, even as 
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Khaleda Zia’s coming to power in 1991 had support from some segments of this emergent 
elite and further aided in promoting the neoliberal development agenda by simplifying the regu-
latory role of government agencies. In the words of Fahimul Quadir (2000: 206), Zia assumed 
“a promotional rather than regulatory role in facilitating the development of the private sector,” 
a commitment that corresponded to pressure from the donor community. Moreover, the Policy 
Framework Paper (PFP) negotiated between the IMF and the Government of Bangladesh in 
1990 continued through the first democratic BNP government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia 
who made efforts to remove remaining “barriers to the development of a liberal- capital model” 
and further the programme of economic liberalization as a vehicle to consolidate the ruling 
elite. This was accomplished by allowing “business elites to use economic restructuring as the 
primary tool to attain their financial and economic objectives” (Quadir 2000: 208).
Sheik Hasina also endorsed the PFP and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF), acknowledging that there has been little difference between the economic policies of 
the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Sheik Hasina, however, 
was “said to be concerned about their political image [and] … reportedly told the Fund that 
advanced publicity about the negotiation of a possible ESAF arrangement would be politically 
damaging” (note 24, p. 225, note 35). Such ambivalence reveals that a political environment 
characterized by extreme polarization, requires balancing a program of economic liberaliza-
tion with the challenges of democratic governance. While this balance has been a concern of 
prior governments, each has sought to create legitimacy differently. How did Sheikh Hasina 
balance economic liberalization, on the one hand, with governance, on the other hand? The 
balance she chose seems to have tipped in favour of economic growth over democracy in 
order to facilitate the country’s shift from aid- focused policy to an investment- oriented strategy 
that largely corresponds to efforts to move the country up the development hierarchy. It is 
also a strategy that is best accomplished through public– private partnerships in infrastructure 
investment (Amin 2016). From a policy perspective, this has entailed support for free trade 
and limited government intervention and the development of infrastructure, including roads, 
highways, and transportation, as well as support for the energy sector and a dramatic increase in 
the number of SEZs to attract investment.
I now turn to examine Sheikh Hasina’s relation to the energy sector in the resource extrac-
tion areas of Phulbari and Rampal, two sites of ongoing mobilization against the construc-
tion of open- pit coal mining. At these sites, protest against the siting and extension of these 
large- scale development projects has faced repression and other forms of state intervention that 
limit freedom of speech and assembly, including extra- legal practices that expose a governance 
strategy that is increasingly autocratic.
The energy sector
As the cases of the Phulbari and Rampal energy projects will show, development goals, along 
with increased domestic energy demands, led to prioritizing energy production over democratic 
participation in decisions made in the energy sector. Under military rule, the WB and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) began their support of the energy sector through production-sharing 
contracts (PSCs) with multinational oil companies (Muhammad 2014). During the first demo-
cratically elected BNP government PSCs were signed with gas companies that include Chevron, 
Santos, Cairn Energy, and Shell. These energy deals were struck when the country’s need for 
electricity was evident and daily load- shedding had a direct effect on productivity that threatened 







popular support for the government. In 1996, the National Energy Policy (NEP) recognized the 
urgency of ensuring proper exploration, production, distribution, and the rational use of energy 
sources. It also acknowledged the rapid changes in global, as well as domestic conditions. Since 
then, they have prioritized energy diversification of available indigenous commercial energy 
resources where coal is assumed to play an expanding role in providing the country’s future 
energy needs. More recently, the International Trade Administration offered advice to US and 
international businesses indicating that the Bangladesh government plans to increase power gen-
eration beyond expected demand to propel growth in the export- oriented economy and meet 
the needs of a growing middle class. The plan calls for raising US $70 billion in total investments 
in the sector over the next 15 years (Bangladesh Trade Guide 2020).
Increased domestic demand for energy, coupled with pressure from the donor community, 
have thus helped to secure policy reforms adopted by the government via the PSCs (Muhammad 
2006). Anu Muhammad (2006), in his detailed history of the sector, argues that Bangladesh 
was once able to meet its need for gas but, under PSCs, would eventually have to purchase its 
own gas using foreign currency. At this time, power generation came mostly from gas and oil, 
but the need for more energy turned attention to coal- based power stations which were central 
to new PSCs signed with multinational oil companies. These agreements were signed despite 
findings by scientists that extracting and burning the world’s remaining coal reserves would be 
the world’s single biggest contributor to global warming thus tipping the scale towards irrevers-
ible climate change.
Yet, as coal production in the global north has declined, often in response to concerns 
about climate change, investors have turned to sites in the global south. This put pressure 
to move ahead on the Phulbari project involving not only collusion between multinationals 
and Bangladesh in shaping the country’s investment climate, but also aggressive efforts by the 
US which were not surprising “given that there was 60 percent of US ownership” in the 
project (Chowdhury 2016: 91; Muhammad 2014). For their part, the government continues 
to expand its plans to build coal- fired power plants to reduce the increasing gap between 
its energy demand and supply, with the goal of diversifying its energy mix (Kotikalapudi 
2016). However, as Chaitanya Kumar Kotikalapudi (2016) points out, this strategy builds 
on a weak energy governance structure, violations of environmental norms, a refusal to 
engage the public through consultations, the cooptation of the development narrative, and a 
lack of transparency and accountability which, together, reveal a failure to maintain demo-
cratic norms.
Moreover, since much of the production will be for export, it is worth heeding Joseph 
Stiglitz’s remark: “A country that sells off its natural resources, privatizes its oil company, and 
borrows against future revenues, may experience a consumption binge that raises GDP, but the 
accounting framework should show that the country has actually become poorer” (quoted in 
Muhammad 2014: 62; Kotikalapudi 2016: 161). Thus, whatever benefits the country may reap 
in its growth rate from such energy policy will be only short term with immediate concerns 
that include the relationship between energy resources and security that have exposed how 
corruption, poverty, inequality, and repression “go hand in hand with the exploitation of nat-
ural resources” thereby challenging the balance between development and democratic govern-
ance (Muhammad 2014: 59).
The cost to be paid for the relation between corruption and repression on the one hand, 
and natural resource exploitation, on the other hand, may be experienced most acutely 
by those living in resource- extractive communities who protest, collectively, to protect 
their rights, lives, and livelihoods. Most such opposition movements have identified land 
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environmental havoc that results from open- pit mining as their central concerns. Also sig-
nificant is the importance dwellers at sites of extraction give to the loss of “sociality, dignity, 
and personhood” (Nuremowla 2016: 3). In Phulbari, for example, in only one mining com-
munity, 14,660 acres (23 square miles) will be destroyed, 80 percent of which is farmland, 
including ponds, fruit and timber trees, as well as businesses, homes, schools, health facilities, 
mosques, temples and churches, graveyards, and two archaeological sites (UN News 2012; 
Jahan 2014: 16). This will not only have serious environmental consequences, but will dis-
place, by some estimates, 220,000 people, many of whom are indigenous and vulnerable. Such 
displacement is accompanied by the loss of employment, and, given a shortage of “empty” 
land, resettlement will be difficult, if not impossible, for those seeking to engage in agricul-
tural production. Further, the project threatens the country’s food security by transforming 
one of its most fertile agricultural regions into an open- pit mine with its attendant infrastruc-
ture (UN News 2012) and damaging the most massive aquifer in north- western Bangladesh 
resulting in the depletion of the groundwater in the immediate vicinity, as well as outside the 
mining zone (Muhammad 2014).
Faced with the impacts on their lives and the environment, rural dwellers attempted to 
signal opposition to these projects. But their efforts to engage government were met with 
intimidation and violence. Muhammad (2014) and others (Gardner et al. 2012; Chowdhury 
2016; Faruque 2018) detail the bloody uprising in Phulbari in 2006 where 50,000 people had 
gathered to protest against the open- pit coal mine (Nuremowla 2016). Three people were 
killed at the site and hundreds more were injured when semi- military (BDR) forces, usually 
charged with guarding the border, fired on the crowd, exposing the government’s deployment 
of forces that threatens the right to protest and portends continuing state intimidation and vio-
lence against protesters (Gain 2006).
Perhaps based on the need to balance development policy and an increasingly elusive 
democracy, the government agreed to three conditions for moving forward: Asia Energy, 
the PSC partner, would be forced to leave, there would be no open-pit mining anywhere in 
the country, and any future decisions regarding coal development would include commu-
nity input. However, despite the apparent success of the protest, and the agreement signed 
between the government and the community, pressure to resume the project won out. But, 
as people’s resistance continued, so did the government’s repressive response. These gov-
ernment actions led a group of UN experts to question the transparency and legitimacy 
of project operations, noting concerns over the repression of human rights defenders who 
peacefully protested at the mine. As one UN rapporteur noted in support of the freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association, “People must be informed throughout, and must not be 
intimidated out of exercising their rights to express their opinions and peacefully assemble” 
(UN News 2012).
Again, in 2016, ten years after government agreements made with protesters, there was again 
a lack of transparency and accountability regarding the government’s decision to move forward 
on the project. This time, Phulbari protesters joined with climate activists in London, during 
the annual general shareholders meeting of GCM, formerly Asia Energy, where they continued 
to press their demands to stop the project. In 2019, however, GCM Resources confirmed that 
it had entered into a bilateral agreement with China Nonferrous Metal Industry and Power 
Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina) to jointly manage the Phulbari Coal Mine 
project. And, in February 2020, they said they had secured a US$1.5 million increase to its 
existing loan facility of US$3 million with Polo Resources Ltd, raising the total loan amount 
to US$4.5 million (Global Energy Monitor). Still, as Ahasan and Gardner (2016) point out, 








exploit the country’s natural resources and the profits that are captured by multinationals and 
corrupt government officials.
While the government has moved ahead with the Phulbari project in spite of continued 
opposition to open- pit mining, opposition has also occurred in Rampal, an area 14 kilometers 
from the Sundarbans Reserve Forest, where the government is moving ahead with the develop-
ment of another coal power plant without consideration being given to its impact on the envir-
onment or on people’s lives. The Rampal plant is owned by the Bangladesh- India Friendship 
Power Company (BIFPCL) as a joint venture between the National Thermal Power Company 
(NTPC) of India and the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB). The Indian com-
pany, Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL), will construct the plant in a financial agreement 
reached in 2017, with debt financing provided from the Indian Export- Import Bank. Covering 
1,834 acres of mostly agricultural land, the coal plant will threaten the livelihoods of over two 
million inhabitants who depend upon the Sundarbans forest’s resources to meet their daily 
needs. Its adverse effects will threaten agricultural and fisheries production as well as food 
security (Muhammad 2013).
The plant would also leach toxic substances from deposited coal burned ashes that contain 
many heavy metals including arsenic, lead, mercury, nickel, vanadium, beryllium, barium, cad-
mium, chromium, selenium and radium, which are dangerous if released into the environment 
(Chowdhury 2017). Discharging toxic water into the Passur River, and oil and chemical wastes 
from coal- carrying vessels will likely further contaminate the water, a worry that is already evi-
dent from the recent capsizing of a vessel carrying 350,000 litres of furnace oil that capsized in 
the Shela River in 2014, followed by another cargo vessel capsizing only a year later in the same 
river (Mookerjea and Misra 2017).
Residents at Rampal will also face greenhouse gas emissions and anticipated climate 
change that will increase the salinity of the water and contribute to drinking and irrigation 
water shortages in the coastal regions. Moving ahead on the Rampal project also threatens 
the rich biodiversity of the Sundarbans and, once operational, will permanently destroy the 
Sundarbans’ ecosystem, a natural defence against extreme weather events. The eight million 
tons of CO2 that it will emit each year will harm local residents and contribute to global 
warming (UNESCO n.d.; Sourcewatch 2015; Human Rights Watch 2020). In addition, it 
will leave the south- western coast of Bangladesh vulnerable to storms, cyclones, and other 
natural disasters. As noted by environmental scientists, including Abdullah Harun Chowdhury, 
who forcefully identifies the long- term effects of the Rampal plant: “most of the impacts of 
coal- fired power plants are negative and irreversible, [and cannot] be mitigated” (Chowdhury 
2017: 85).
In response to these social, economic, and environmental concerns, and similar to protests 
mounted against the Phulbari project described above, from November 24 to 26, 2016, more 
than 10,000 people marched from Dhaka to Khulna to “Save the Sundarbans” and persuade the 
government to drop its backing for the construction of coal plants near the Sundarbans. Soon 
thereafter, a report by the United Nations World Heritage Centre and the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature’s World Heritage Programme recommended that the proposed 
coal plant be relocated to prevent harm to the Sundarbans. This was followed by an open letter 
from prominent Indian organizations to the prime minister of India urging him to withdraw 
support for the project in a context where a “similar proposal to build a thermal power plant 
in … West Bengal … was turned down … for being too proximate to the forest” (Misra and 
Mookerjea 2017: 5). According to Earthjustice, this growing pressure was met by forceful gov-
ernment pushback, including threats, harassment, and unlawful detention of protesters. Not 
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opposition figures have even received anonymous death threats” (https:// earthjustice.org/ blog/ 
2016- november/ environmental- defenders- are- under- threat- in- bangladesh). Such responses 
have characterized the government’s reaction to protest over the mine for some time. In August 
2016, for example, a student activist was arrested for criticizing Sheikh Hasina’s position on the 
mine (Earthjustice 2016), and in October of the same year, police in Dhaka attacked peaceful 
protesters with tear gas shells and water cannons, leaving about 30 people injured, some crit-
ically (Dhaka Tribune 2016). Protesters also demanded transparency and accountability and 
opposed extra- legal forms of violence against their efforts. But, for its part, the government 
held to its contention that the siting of coal plants “will have little to no impact on the forest, 
saying they will use the latest technology to mitigate pollution” (The Guardian 2016).
Open- pit coal mining clearly offers the Government an opportunity to secure cheap electri-
city. However, supporting mines located either in Phulbari or Rampal fails to account for other 
development goals that include ensuring the safety and livelihoods of its large population or a 
commitment to food security and ecological sustainability. Moreover, the Government’s deci-
sion leaves open to question whether coal production is the only way to secure cheap electricity 
to sustain economic growth. And, crucial for this discussion, are the questions: How will legit-
imacy for the AL be maintained, if popular protest is suppressed, ignored, or responded to with 
legal and extralegal violence? And, will autocratic rule increasingly shape not only the electoral 
system but, also, other relations of governance? Stated differently, what we are witnessing in 
Bangladesh is an increasingly fragile balance between development goals and autocratic rule 
that seeks to achieve development goals at any cost.
Conclusion
To complement discussions of autocracy focused on the consolidation of executive power, 
I have examined democratic backsliding at the grassroots level in the context of attempts by 
various governments to balance the twin goals of economic ascendance and democracy. With 
the adoption of a neoliberal development strategy, viewed as central to economic growth, 
I have examined investments in two open- pit coal mines, one in Phulbari and a second in 
Rampal. Such investments expose long- term contestation over the siting and construction 
of these mines for reasons of ecological and social sustainability. Opposition by thousands of 
local community members has highlighted the consequences of removing thousands of acres 
of productive agricultural land and its people under circumstances which result in displace-
ment, dispossession, insecurity, and the disruption and destruction that such loss portends for 
community solidarities. Opposition also garnered the support of a national and international 
community who, like community members, acknowledge the need for energy security, but are 
concerned with the environmental costs of open- pit mining, including the costs to biodiver-
sity, CO2 emissions, pollution of waterways, and climate change. Yet, none of these concerns 
have been adequately addressed with policies that would secure the lives of residents and the 
sustainability of the environment. Instead, protests have been met with authoritarian responses 
that include exclusion, intimidation, police fire, and, significantly, extra- legal forms of violence 
without the possibility of adjudication.
The analysis of these sites reveals that investment in open- pit mining is one outcome of 
bureaucratic and economic elite interests in moving up the development ladder by sustaining 
short-term, if high, rates of economic growth. Evidence also suggests that the cost of open- 
pit mining leads to long- term ecological devastation, despite claims to the contrary, and social 
instability and loss. It has also come at the cost of the instantiation of democratic rule in 







autocratic rule. Significantly, the failure to maintain these basic tenets of democratic rule is the 
result not of internal interests alone, but corresponds as well to pressures from the multi- and 
bilateral aid community and private sector to adopt policies that strengthen Bangladesh’s inte-
gration into the global economy while maintaining its dependent status.
As I have shown, both class pressures and those of the international aid regime have shaped 
decisions regarding energy development for more than forty years, but, today, coal mining has 
come to hold a central place. This is the case even as a major investor in one open- pit mine 
rejected the opportunity to build a similar plant on the other side of the Bangladesh– Indian 
border, and when the global north has sought to find more sustainable forms of energy pro-
duction. I conclude by acknowledging the challenges involved in balancing resource extractive 
growth policies while sustaining democratic norms and the promise of democratic governance. 
But, as the Phulbari and Rampal examples show, those who seek economic, social, and eco-
logical security, when living under governments that apply autocratic rule to achieve partisan 
development interests, have neither rights nor voice in securing a sustainable future. Or, as 
this development contradiction exposes, when class and international pressures for economic 
growth prevail, democratic participation falls by the wayside and is relegated to the realm of 
the ideal.
Note
 1 This work was supported by Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie 
Skłodowska- Curie grant agreement: grant number 665958.
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Bangladesh is among the most disaster vulnerable countries in the world (Behlert et al., 2020). 
Yet, steady expansion of response capacity to recurrent hazards, including floods and cyclones, 
has impressed many. During the past 15 years, attainments such as a decline in recorded cyclone 
deaths, innovative warning systems, fine- tuned crisis policy frameworks, humanitarian engage-
ment, and climate advocacy have earned Bangladesh an international reputation as a rising star 
within disaster risk reduction (DRR).
However, if Bangladesh ever did live up to this label, this is certainly not the case anymore, 
when accelerating autocratization prevents enlightened discussion of risks. In February 2021, 
Dhaka activists protested over the death in jail of writer Mushtaq Ahmed whom the police had 
arrested for criticizing pandemic preparedness (Mahmud, 2021). The government framed his 
and similar arrests as legitimate security measures for preventing corona virus ‘rumours’ that 
could compromise crisis management. This approach, criticized by human rights organizations 
for being repressive (AI, 2020; Article19, 2021; HRW, 2020a), displayed a textbook authori-
tarian disaster response, where autocrats use crises as opportunities to maintain a responsible 
façade while at the same time curbing dissent (Diamond, 2020).
In light of what therefore seems a dramatic shift in Bangladesh’s approach to disasters, this 
chapter examines the under- explored and uncomfortable possibility that efforts ideally geared 
towards preventing and tackling disasters can, in fact, also enable autocratization. From a DRR 
perspective, such questions are critical because autocratization, this chapter demonstrates, inten-
sifies and expands vulnerability and – by fear and by force – suppresses social warning systems, 
creating vicious circles for disaster risks. How could Bangladesh’s disaster governance become 
so repressive so fast, and with so little criticism from partners home and abroad? Has dis-
aster governance aided autocratization, and if so, how? What consequences does the country’s 
authoritarian disaster response have for its capacity to tackle future risks?
The chapter first introduces relevant concepts and context for exploring the links between 
disaster governance and autocratization. After that, discussions of responses to cyclone risk, 











authoritarian forces, and show how they are seized. Thereafter, the extent to which increased 
crisis- focus in global development leaves democracy in Bangladesh behind is considered. Lastly, 
the conclusions summarize the bleak prospects for comprehensive risk reduction in a state that 
suppresses core disaster preventive mechanisms such as free speech and real elections.
Concepts and context: the risk-creating politics of disaster 
governance in Bangladesh
Research documenting Bangladesh’s path to autocratic rule has concentrated on constitutional 
mechanisms and institutions (Riaz, 2019; Riaz and Parvez, 2021). The following focus on dis-
aster governance opens for further discussion how additional processes and actors, including 
foreign aid, can also enable autocratization.
Disasters, risks and responses
Bangladesh is a hot spot for disaster risks. Disaster risks are inherently social products of vul-
nerability, exposure to hazards, and capacity to anticipate and tackle crises with disastrous 
potentials. Disasters (involving large- scale destruction or fatalities) only materialize when vul-
nerable people and places are exposed to human- made or natural hazards that states and soci-
eties lack the will or ability to protect them from (Wisner, 2016).
Bangladesh’s capacity for disaster management has improved radically since Independence, 
which in part was catalyzed by West Pakistan’s callous response to the historically fierce 
1970 cyclone that washed away between 250,000 and 500,000 lives. Protective investments 
include direct (cyclone shelters, flood warning, earthquake drills) and indirect (public health, 
building codes, poverty reduction) measures. Bangladesh has also pursued a policy shift from 
single responses to comprehensive risk reduction. Many risks remain though, and new ones 
develop: The global textile industry has increased workplace risks (Hossain, 2019c). Donor- 
supported infrastructure development has negatively affected ecology. Unchecked global trade 
and regional crises have presented complex transboundary challenges such as climate change, 
refugee influx and health hazards.
Bangladesh’s risk realities demonstrate the value of disaster governance, meaning actors, 
norms and practices concerned with processes that drive or protect against disasters (Forino 
et al., 2018). Because the crises later discussed are of the kinds that carry disastrous potentials, 
associated crisis management practices are conceptualized as sub- ventures of disaster governance.
The normative presentation of disaster governance can be worlds apart from its real effects 
(Barnett, 2013; Hilhorst, Boersma and Raju, 2020). Aid and government analyses rarely discuss 
unintended impacts. DRR receives far more attention than disaster risk creation (DRC) (Lewis 
and Kelman, 2012). Conventional disaster governance routinely fails to include disaster- affected 
people in planning and evaluation, while repressive governance actors actively keep people and 
practices that can compromise them at bay.
Domestic disaster politics
Disasters have shaped Bangladeshi politics ever since the dawn of Independence. The painful 
experiences of the 1970 cyclone Bhola and the 1974 famine, Hossain (2018, 2019a) has shown, 
stimulated a social contract through which elites would prioritize the basic welfare of people. 
Disaster management became a prioritized issue, and protection in situations of disaster a 
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Ability to make performance personal is key. After the Ershad military regime’s 1990 fall, the 
two major political parties, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) (founded by its present leader’s 
late husband; currently in opposition) and the Awami League (AL) (founded by its current 
leader’s late father; presently in office) and their various blocks have (with some intermissions), 
competed in turbulent elections, and alternated in power. Because few political differences 
exist between the two, ideologies of nationhood (Hossain, 2019b) and each party’s lineage to 
towering figures in Bangladesh’s political history have become emotionally powerful resources. 
Political networks combine patronage and patriotism to mobilize supporters, and various 
governments install personalized mechanisms such as the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund (Khan 
and Rahman, 2007).
Confrontational and patronage political realities have stimulated routine blame games and 
elite manipulation of disaster funds (Mahmud and Prowse, 2012), but also responsive public 
action. Demonstrating ability to deliver the goods in times of crisis is important for governments, 
members of Parliament and opposition parties alike, and the electorate values leadership traits 
such as swift and far- reaching networks (Ruud, 2011). Political competition, a relatively un- 
censored press, and committed local and international partners have mutually supported each 
other in advancing disaster management. While no single disaster has ever made a measurable 
impact on Bangladesh’s elections (partly because everyday risks matter more to most than occa-
sional hazards), political leaders nevertheless have reasons to believe that a scandalous disaster 
response could (Hossain, 2019a; Rubin, 2020).
With the gradual breakdown of electoral democracy, this system is undergoing a silent 
collapse. For autocrats, disaster response becomes a hybrid arena for keeping up a veneer of 
accountability, and at the same time a pretext for curbing criticism. Autocracy in a political cul-
ture that sees political criticism as personal offence moreover enables state mechanisms such as 
the 2018 Digital Security Act (DSA) that criminalizes defamation, with blurred or no bound-
aries between offences against the image of the state and offences against the ruling party. This 
way, authoritarian rulers can promote a disaster-responsive image while also using pseudo- legal 
means, corrupt police and packed courts to downplay and deter criticism.
Foreign influence
Apart from specialized state institutions, notable disaster governance actors in Bangladesh are 
donors, UN agencies, and local and international development and humanitarian organizations. 
Norms include UN frameworks for DRR, national regulatory frameworks (promoted by 
actors such as NGOs or the UNDP) and organizations’ codes of conduct. Practices centre on 
specialized areas such as relief and rehabilitation, where also disaster- affected people, expatriate 
networks, companies, and social organizations are involved. Other factors include aid policy 
trends like blurring public– private boundaries, goal expansion associated with the global 
Sustainable Development Agenda (UNISDR, 2015) and increased results- focus. In theory, that 
focus can motivate positive effects, yet in practice also stimulate easily measurable (irrelevant, or 
even harmful) achievement rather than sustainable impact.
Interactions through which disaster governance can aid autocratization
How, then, does domestic disaster politics and increasingly managerialist foreign influence 
interact to enable autocratization? Changing aid realities stimulate pragmatism amongst all 
parties. Bangladesh’s aid dependence has declined and its bargaining position has increased. Aid 












of accountability. Moreover, conventional disaster aid, Barnett (2011, p. 221) observes (for 
humanitarianism) is “hardly a paragon of democratic rule”. Autocratic or semi- autocratic 
donors like China, Saudi Arabia and India are also on the market. When foreign project 
reports highlight measurable outputs such as numbers of people evacuated and relief packages 
distributed, domestic political networks can nurture an accountable façade.
Disasters provide opportunities for autocrats to repress political opposition. Yet, no regime 
can rule by coercion alone, and von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) have shown that autocrats 
also employ and combine multiple legitimation strategies. Closed regimes mobilize pri-
marily around national identity (for example, saviour narratives) while hybrid regimes prefer 
procedures, and all stress performance. Below, this chapter will show that in Bangladesh, con-
ventional disaster governance primarily aids autocratization through the supply of performance 
pointers that autocratic forces can link to, and therefore use to promote an image as a superior, 
future- oriented, renowned and compassionate liberator and protector.
Disaster governance and autocratic legitimation in practice
The following are examples from cyclone, refugee crisis and pandemic handling that intersect 
autocratic processes before and after democratic collapse (see Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). 
The examples highlight how disaster governance’s risky disaster reductionisms have paved the 
way for autocratization, produced boosting materials to autocrats and been slow to link disasters 
and human rights. Examples of authoritarian crisis management also demonstrate that although 
the present regime goes to lengths to demonstrate efficiency, autocracy is by nature a vicious 
risk accelerator.
Fifty years of fighting cyclones: power concentration    
and seizure of simplified success
In Bangladesh, every biannual ‘cyclone season’ brings intense storms from the Bay of Bengal 
that coastal people have to weather. On average, once per third year cyclones reach levels of 
intensity classified as ‘severe’. A few times per decade, fierce cyclones and associated storm 
surges intersect low- lying delta lands, shallow rivers and funnel- shaped coastlines to trigger 
large- scale destruction if striking exposed lands and people, especially during high tide.
Forecast and warning systems have steadily improved, increased evacuation, and inspired 
UN officials and other disaster experts to deem Bangladesh a champion within DRR (Paul, 
2009). The key indicator referred for this status is radical decline of recorded cyclone- related 
fatalities. While the lethal combination of extreme poverty, minimal preparation and record- 
high storm surges led past cyclones to claim hundreds of thousands of lives, fewer cyclone fatal-
ities followed later. After 2007 Cyclone Sidr, with wind speeds up to 240 km/ h, several analysts 
compared the death toll (between 4,000 and 10,000) to past catastrophes; the 1970 cyclone 
Bhola and 1991 cyclone Gorky (138,000 fatalities), and theorized that Bangladesh had become 
significantly better at saving lives in the face of cyclones. These appraisals marked the beginning 
of a success narrative premised on considering Cyclone Sidr in juxtaposition to past cyclones, 
thus emulating a natural experiment without controlling either for natural factors such as land-
fall timing (high tide can, for example, increase storm surges and more than double impact) or 
for root social factors apart from mitigation issues.
Despite Paul’s (2009) methodological critique of these comparisons, the narrative travelled 
further, into authoritative texts such as the 2014 Human Development Report, which first sig-
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a severe cyclone in 1991 caused nearly 140,000 deaths, while a 2007 cyclone of similar 
magnitude killed 4,234 people. The reduction in cyclone- related deaths was achieved 
mainly by improving early warning systems, developing shelters and evacuation plans, 
constructing coastal embankments, maintaining and improving coastal forest cover 
and raising awareness at the community level.
(UNDP, 2014, p. 107)
Sustained use of questionable cyclone event comparisons as evidence for a trend is unsur-
prising because aid analyses are increasingly wired to emphasize inspiring results that enable the 
sector to renew engagements. Linking capability to tackle cyclones with growing concerns for 
extreme weather, for example, the state and aid partners used the policy window opened by 
Cyclone Sidr to establish climate- funding mechanisms.
Downplayed, however, are problems that affected people have to battle in the shadow of 
success, some of them fashioned by a disaster management system that looks better on paper 
than it works in practice. For example, many Sidr- affected people just barely survived with 
help from neighbours with slightly sturdier houses, because public shelters were too few, too far 
away, in too dangerous conditions or full. Invisible is also the supply of financial and technical 
means that (government, bureaucratic and NGO) elites can seize to manipulate post- cyclone 
relief and recovery (Aase, 2020; Nadiruzzaman and Wrathall, 2015). Lastly, development strat-
egies that have concentrated political power on few hands (van Schendel, 2009) are shielded 
from review. Illustrative here is coastal land transformation for shrimp exports and associated 
embankment construction near the Sundarbans mangrove forest, in part framed as flood miti-
gation. These choices have incentivized saline water intrusion, corruption, displacement and 
exploitation of landless people, and other risk multipliers that also increase floods and cyclone 
danger. Yet, plans continuously present embankments as protective, and now promote them as 
climate adaptation (Dewan, 2020).
During the past decade, the idea of Bangladesh as a DRR champion took the shape of a 
never- ending story. With every new (and most of them weaker and with a less dangerous path 
and timing than, for example, the 1991 or the 2007) cyclone, the system has been presented 
by disaster governance actors and analysts as having passed a test, while it in reality has passed 
smaller- scale (but also important) preparedness challenges. Opportunities for constant gratifica-
tion suit aid for reasons discussed. They also, however, suit autocrats.
Recently, the current regime seized the simplified success story: Ironically, Cyclone Sidr 
hit during the controversial reign of the (in part donor encouraged) military- backed 2006– 
2008 Caretaker government that coordinated the response. The same government also clumsily 
and unsuccessfully tried to ‘clean’ politics by jailing the two major political party leaders for 
corruption charges. In the election manifesto speech held prior to the 2018 rigged (Riaz and 
Parvez, 2021) elections, the ruling party made no reference to this period. Blaming the oppos-
ition for the 1991 cyclone fatalities was confrontational politics as usual, as was connecting 
disasters and shame, claiming that previous rulers had “turned Bangladesh into a dependent 
and beggar country” and a “symbol of flood, drought, cyclones” (BDAL, 2018). Later, how-
ever, the party in power – at a time when opposing its image was becoming increasingly 
dangerous – also seized the aid-created success narrative premised on decline in fatalities that 
can only be explained by many and much more complex and combined factors than political 
leadership, if at all. For example, answering the opposition’s criticism of the 2020 coronavirus 
response, the Information Minister used the never- ending rationale discussed above to claim 
that “Hasina [the PM] handled all disasters” (TIB, 2020b), thus converting ‘country perform-










Bangladesh has now reached a dangerous situation where the stakes for upholding success 
are likely to lead to higher control over natural hazard narratives. It has also reached a situation 
where disaster death tolls of earlier magnitude appear unthinkable, which is untrue and no good 
news considering, for example, climate change or the state’s recent relocation (discussed below) 
of thousands of refugees to a cyclone-exposed island. The disaster governance narrative that 
Bangladesh’s aid partners have co- produced, in part to inspire more and better DRR action, 
has contributed to this situation.
The 2017 Rohingya refugee crises: maximizing humanitarian performance
In August 2017, crackdowns against Rohingya (predominantly Muslim) minorities that 
Myanmar had discriminated against and denied citizenship for decades escalated into attempted 
ethnic cleansing. Organized murder, rape and village burning forced more than 700,000 refugees 
to flee to Bangladesh. Bangladeshi society responded with solidarity and spontaneous help. The 
AL Government (whose 2014 victory manifested in part because the opposition distrusted the 
possibility of actual competition, and boycotted them) formalized the response, and displayed 
sympathy with victims whose story echoed Bangladesh’s own struggle for Independence while 
underscoring that support would be temporary until refugees could return home. The state 
built camps, provided relief and organized collaborations with local and transnational aid actors 
(Lewis, 2019).
The responsibility that Bangladesh took to protect the Rohingyas – that few else, including 
the UN, had previously shown (Zarni, 2019) – received much acclaim. In September 2017, 
a British television report from a refugee camp called the PM the ‘Mother of Humanity’. 
This label, which appeared tailor- made for the ruling party’s political heritage story and 
complemented a determined daughter’s narrative with motherly softness and care, soon 
appeared beneath the PM’s images on roadside campaign posters. Shortly after, the Cabinet 
approved a Mother of Humanity Award (which the PM ‘refused’ to progress in her own name), 
where local government bodies could nominate persons committed to social causes all over the 
country and awardees would receive a gold medal and a Tk 200,000 cheque.
The crisis also enabled the (officially secular) Government to validate ordinary people’s 
faith- based solidarity with the Rohingyas and protect Islam during a phase where it courted 
religious groups such as the radical Hefazat- i- Islami to broaden its support base. Meanwhile, 
the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation driven by the party machinery itself received 
limited attention. In December 2018, the PM’s efforts for the Rohingya cause earned her the 
Inter Press Service’s International Achievement Award and the Global Hope Coalition’s Special 
Distinction Award for Leadership. These New York events took place only six weeks after the 
ruthless arrest of renowned photographer Shahidul Alam (for press coverage of the 2018 road 
safety protests) exposed the regime’s hardline approach to critics globally (Ahmed, 2018; Hasan 
and Wadud, 2020), and made domestic headlines prior to the general elections in December 
the same year (The Daily Star, 2018).
After the AL had secured another electoral victory, the Government’s approach changed, and 
borders were closed. About 1.2 million refugees in poor and packed refugee camp conditions 
had brought concerns such as public resource stress, employment tensions, and potential radical-
ization. After several futile (including forced) repatriation attempts, the Government took up its 
previously initiated plan to relocate 100,000 refugees to the remote and highly cyclone- exposed 
Bhasan Char island, which previously had been abandoned after criticism from human rights 
activists. Bhasan Char was ‘developed’ through contracts officially worth over US$ 300 million, 
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new state– business connections. Refugees have overall, however, refused to relocate. A study by 
Zaman et al. (2020) found that 90 per cent of Rohingya respondents opposed relocation, citing 
the unique vulnerability of the less than 20- year- old silt island to cyclones and tidal flooding as 
primary reasons. The UN and rights groups have insisted that independent experts assess the 
relocation’s feasibility, but no unconditional access has been granted.
In 2020, the Government effected the relocation of some thousand refugees, and used the 
coronavirus as an argument to speed up the process. Overall, observers have refuted official 
claims that all resettled refugees have consented freely (DW, 2021). Some agreed to go due to 
uncertain pull factors such as hearing that the island would have more facilities than provided 
in camps. There are, however, reports of ruthless push factors such as having one’s name appear 
on official relocation lists with no explanation, or being threatened, forced or bribed into “con-
sent”, and transportation, by public officials (McPherson and Paul, 2020).
Rights groups have claimed that life on Bhasan island involves dire living conditions, sexual 
harassment by the Navy and contractors, restricted freedom of movement and free speech, and 
violent retaliation for protest. Naval and government spokespersons have denied the allegations, 
saying that the Rohingyas are guests that are taken care of (Hossain, 2020). To justify the 
relocation, officials draw on Bangladeshi culture for resilience and gratitude. Ministers uphold 
that cyclones are part of ordinary coastal life, that solid structures are better than temporary 
tents, and that the island facilities are better than anything available to millions of impoverished 
Bangladeshis. This attitude is hard to distinguish from conventional disaster aid that routinely 
empowers privileged people to determine the acceptable risks of poor and unconsulted others.
The international community’s failures to address Myanmar’s brutality towards the Rohingyas 
along with its excessive praise of Bangladesh have aided identity- based autocratic legitimation 
and helped the Government into a position from where it now, through the relocations, can 
demonstrate its long- sought superiority of ends over means.
The Covid- 19 pandemic: ‘responsible’ repression in the time of Corona
In March 2020, the coronavirus that triggered the Covid- 19 pandemic was found in 
Bangladesh. After initial reluctance, the Government took diverse lockdown measures to con-
trol the spread of the virus. Narrative control soon followed. A private university’s pressure 
against a researcher to withdraw his scientifically modelled Covid- 19 predictions was the first 
sign that the response would be anything but open and informed. Along with China, Egypt and 
Venezuela, Bangladesh became a pioneer in curbing criticism, belittling expertise and criminal-
izing inconvenient facts or opinions, framed as ‘covid rumours’ (HRW, 2021a). The state means 
applied were wide- ranging:
The Government issued a circular on May 7, banning all government employees from 
posting, “liking,” sharing, or commenting on any content which might “tarnish the 
image of the state” or the Government’s “important persons,” warning that violation 
of this order would result in legal action. The authorities have increased surveillance 
of anyone who might spread “rumors,” and has ramped up media censorship. The 
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the country’s primary counterterrorism unit, recently 
formed a “cyber verification cell” to identify Covid- 19 “rumors.”
(HRW, 2020b)
The regime never had to declare a state of emergency in order to control dissent, because the 











Act (DSA) which enables the politically penetrated state to curb criticism. Through the DSA, 
online expressions ‘found to’ create instability or offend the state can be punished with up to 
10 years in prison, or life sentence (for repeated “offences”). Its arbitrary and excessive use is 
inconsistent with human rights law requirements for legality, non- discrimination and propor-
tionality (AI, 2018; Carmalt and Dale, 2012).
Efficient crisis response depends upon combining capacity and trust (Christensen et al., 
2016). Pandemics are different from Bangladesh’s ‘usual’ disasters because their management 
demands higher, and longer- term, score on both dimensions. Social distancing is particularly 
difficult for millions of people living in poverty who lack access to protective equipment, 
testing, treatment and crisis assistance and cannot afford to ignore subsistence. Knowing 
this, and knowing that starvation is more damaging to legitimacy than a quiet pandemic, 
the state relaxed public health restrictions in practice. A study by Ali, Hassan and Hossain 
(2021) found that ordinary people’s non- compliance was widely tolerated, and that upholding 
protective legitimacy with citizens took priority over pandemic management. Due to low 
testing and generally unreliable data, the extent to which this approach cost or shielded lives 
is indiscernible.
Its hard line approach to state critics and lenient approach on the ground illustrate that the 
regime prioritized its own survival over public safety. In theory, concerns raised by persons 
arrested under the DSA could have improved relief, informed the ‘war’ against the virus, or 
supplied ideas for post- crisis economic restructuring. In practice, the risk that critics also could 
have exposed an underfunded and corrupt health system (where certificates can be bought and 
funding pocketed, see Al- Zaman, 2020) and compromised the interests of regime supporters, 
became too high.
Nine months after his arrest under the DSA for criticizing shortage of protective equipment 
for healthcare workers and for sharing a drawing from (also arrested and tortured) cartoonist 
Kishore’s “Life in the time of corona” series on Facebook, Mushtaq Ahmed died in pre- trial 
custody (HRW, 2021b). The regime’s excessive force against critics has long been an open secret. 
Yet, Ahmed’s death and pandemic repression presented new trials for autocratic legitimacy 
because the global pandemic had high salience across the world and human rights watchdogs 
increasingly engage with disaster issues. The UN is now pressurizing Bangladesh on revising the 
DSA. Domestically, post- pandemic economic crisis may challenge the performance legitimacy 
that the Government prioritized in the first active phase of the pandemic. Large- scale and (due 
to supply via India) relatively early Covid- 19 vaccinations can lower the challenge, and reduc-
tionist reports of ‘impressive’ disaster response efforts by an earlier developing country might be 
expected in the years to come.
Leaving democracy behind?
The following section lifts the gaze from specific crises discussed thus far, to reflect on the broader 
links between the merging of disaster and development taking place under the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) agenda, and autocratization. Due to multiple risks associated with 
climate change, Bangladesh’s strategic role for foreign improvement projects (Hossain, 2018) 
is under renewal. This happens while development- related problems increasingly are framed 
as crises. Calhoun (2004) has warned that this “emergency imaginary” stimulates symptoms 
treatment over systems change. In this context, free speech and political competition, it seems, 
can pragmatically be subordinated to urgent crisis action.
The present Government in Bangladesh often uses development jargon to prove crisis 
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2021, the government launched the Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan. The name ‘Mujib’ cultivates 
a political heritage line from the freedom fighter, first PM, ‘father of the nation’ or ‘friend 
of Bengal’ (‘Bangabandhu’) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to his daughter, the present PM. This 
imagery uplifts her capacity to lead for the future. Abroad, the plan was ‘lauded’ by ambassadors 
and UN personalities for its “transformative climate concept for sustainable economic growth 
through investing in nature and climate resilience” (TIB, 2020a), thus disconnecting civil rights 
from sustainability.
The development sector increasingly elevates personal crisis management traits of political 
leaders. In 2015, the PM was awarded the United Nations Champions of the Earth Award 
by the UN Environment Programme, for climate advocacy. In 2020, the Guardian’s online 
development section provided a platform for the PM and a CEO for the Global Center on 
Adaptation, which is a multi- stakeholder advocacy group initiated by former UN General 
Secretary Ban Ki Moon. On this arena, and in this company, the regime could present its ‘fights’ 
with cyclones and the coronavirus, and display sympathetic future- oriented concerns and cap-
acity writing for example that: “as countries we can learn from successes around the world and 
support each other. It’s by pulling together that we will emerge stronger and more resilient” 
(Hasina and Verkooijen, 2020).
So far, the international scene has been a low- risk arena for the regime. When the Overseas 
Development Institute hosted the PM’s talk on the country’s development “policy, pro-
gress and prospects” (ODI, 2018), the presenter was shielded from human rights questions 
(Channel4news, 2018). On (the few) occasions where the government openly has been 
questioned and even confronted, it has used development success to gloss over the situation. 
In a TV interview on the state of democracy, the international affairs advisor eluded criti-
cism of enforced disappearances (i.e. unlawful abductions or other liberty-depriving actions 
that are conducted, and concealed, with direct or indirect support by the state apparatus), 
with responses such as “that is not our policy” or by deflection by referring to empowerment 
initiatives (Al Jazeera, 2019). Meanwhile, at home, the ruling party’s Centre for Research and 
Information (CRI) communicates that the PM’s policy of “leaving no one behind” (i.e. the 
slogan of the SDG agenda) reflects the policy of Bangabandhu (bdnews24.com, 2020).
When risk and rights are subordinated to development, autocrats can thrive. However, 
playing the development card may be less efficient if donor interests are directly challenged. 
Recently, when an Al Jazeera documentary suggested high- level political association with a sur-
veillance scandal that could jeopardize military interests at home and abroad, the Government 
accused the news medium of being part of a plot to destabilize “the secular democratic gov-
ernment of Bangladesh with a proven track record of extraordinary socio- economic develop-
ment and progress” (The Daily Star, 2021). Domestic media in turn publicly conveyed that real 
journalism on the matter would imply economic or personal risks that could threaten their 
existence, and the UN initiated investigations.
With stronger international spotlight on its power abuse and a weakened opposition, the 
regime might opt for a softer approach. Other options include changing the means of oppression 
or altering the meaning of democracy altogether.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that disaster governance has supplied boosting materials for autocratic 
legitimation in Bangladesh. Governance of disaster processes can concentrate power and mis-
represent risk realities, and by combining the two, aid autocratization. Autocrats adapt the 











of might and care, and to gloss over the fact that the politicized state apparatus also uses crises 
opportunities to curb opposition.
In Bangladesh, the vicious circles that autocratization creates for disaster risk need more 
attention. First, autocratization intensifies existing disaster vulnerabilities of people living in 
marginal economic and social conditions. When regime-loyal economic elites can elevate them-
selves above the country’s rich environmental and social policies, more risks are also created 
in the dark. Second, autocratization creates new risks among people who are usually not on 
disaster governance actors’ watch lists, and who, in situations of disaster, can press for efficient 
response. Bangladeshi writers, students, scholars, artists, activists, journalists, opposition leaders, 
bloggers, civil servants, public employees and others who call the will, capacity or legitimacy of 
the powerful into question are now at unprecedented risk of human rights violations ranging 
from subtle sanctions to arrests, torture and enforced disappearances. Third, self- censorship 
sweeps valuable information about system dysfunctionalities under the carpet, and increases 
the distance from the most vulnerable to decision- makers, and humanitarian organizations that 
operate in restrictive countries trade non- discrimination in exchange for access (Desportes, 
2020). Lastly, in the culture of fear that autocratization instils, much- needed serious discussion 
(Jasanoff, 2010) about future risks becomes illusory. Imminent threats of magnitudes that could 
overwhelm Bangladesh’s capacity – likely co- created by economic interests associated with 
politics – receive dangerously shallow attention. Imagine, for example, earthquakes in export- 
processing zones, food industry- driven antibiotics resistance or record- high storm surges from 
deforestation and carbon emissions. Another imminent risk is land- use change-driven trans-
mission of zoonotic viruses such as Nipah – with death rates up to 75 per cent recorded in 
Bangladesh (Constable, 2021) when only the wealthiest, best connected and least exposed can 
expect high- quality care.
Bangladesh’s disaster warning system is crumbling. At stake is the country’s inherently 
imperfect (Wisner, 2016) yet all the same historically unique capacity to tackle recurrent natural 
hazards and other crises, progressed by affected peoples, various governments, and committed 
national and international partners over almost 50 years. At this point in history, when core dis-
aster preventive mechanisms such as free speech and real elections have been stripped away, any 
assessment of the country as a champion within disaster risk reduction is invalid, hazardously 
ignorant or simply propaganda.
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A pretext for autocratization
Asheque Haque
Introduction
Bangladesh is a land of contrast; this rather small country in terms of landmass with an incred-
ibly large population, which makes it one of the most densely populated countries in the 
world, is home to many exceptions and expediencies, especially when it comes to politics. Yet, 
there is one experience that stands out in recent years, and that is the continuous increase of 
authoritarianism in the country. Riaz (2019) has labelled Bangladesh as a “Hybrid regime” – an 
authoritarian state that looks and acts like a democratic one while a study by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (Croissant 2020) classified Bangladesh as relapsing into an autocratic state. In 2020 
Freedom House (2020) gave Bangladesh a score of 39 out of 100 in its Freedom of the World 
Index and labelled the country as “Partly free” while Human Rights Watch in its World Report 
2021 (Human Rights Watch 2021) stated that the Bangladeshi government had “doubled down 
on authoritarian crackdown on free speech, arresting critics, and censoring media”.
Two of the most prominent laws used by the authorities in the past two decades to prop 
up increasing authoritarianism – the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act 
2006 and the Digital Security Act (DSA) 2018 – were labelled as tools to counter violent 
extremism by the government. Bangladesh is a Muslim- majority country, and like many other 
countries around the world, jihadi ideology-based violent extremism spread among a small 
portion of the population over the past two decades. The ICT Act 2006, originally created 
to combat cybercrime, was amended in 2013 to address terrorism in the digital space. It was 
replaced by the DSA 2018, which was supposed to counter radicalization and the spread of 
jihad on the internet. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, said that the DSA was 
enacted in order to provide the people with digital security to live in the “Digital Bangladesh” 
that her government built. She said, “It’s our duty to prevent the youth from taking a wrong 
path or getting involved in militancy and terrorism; we must make sure that they do not do 
anything harmful to the country and the people.” And she added, “This is why digital security 
is absolutely necessary” (bdnews24.com 2021).
However, in December 2019 Shariat Bayati, a Baul folk singer, was arrested and a case was 
filed under the same DSA 2018 (Abrar 2020). His values, ideologies and worldview could not 
be any further from that of a jihadist. How is it that a law, which is enacted to counter violent 
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Amnesty International claimed in 2020 (The Daily Star 2020) that since the law was passed, the 
DSA 2018 has been “wielded as a weapon to silence critics and suppress dissent”.
In this chapter I discuss the origin of the DSA 2018 and the experience of violent Islamist 
extremism in the past decade leading to the search for a comprehensive legal remedy. The sub-
sequent discussion focuses on the DSA 2018 and its various sections that curtail civil liberties 
and freedom as well as the section that covers terrorism-related offences. This is followed by the 
discussion on how these counter-terrorism laws were used to increase authoritarianism in the 
country and support the ruling regime. The discussions show that countering violent Islamist 
extremism has played a counter- intuitive, yet significant, role in Bangladesh’s slide towards 
an autocratic system over the past two decades. ‘Militancy’, as violent Islamist extremism or 
terrorism has been termed in the local context, has provided a pretence for the incumbent 
regime to curtail the civil liberties and human rights of the population, weaken democratic 
institutions, but strengthen the capabilities of the state security apparatus. The chapter shows 
that the Bangladeshi government enacted the Digital Security Law 2018 claiming that it was a 
counter- terrorism tool, but in reality it was used to ensure the survival of the regime by pros-
ecuting their opponents, and thus increasing the authoritarian control over the country.
It is worth noting that the DSA 2018 is not the only law that the government has in order 
to prosecute violent extremist organizations and their members. The Anti Terrorism Act 2009, 
the more generic Bangladesh Penal Code 1860, various Rules enacted over the years, and even 
Executive Orders by the President have had the effect of controlling or curtailing civil and pol-
itical rights of the citizens if they commit such offences. But among them the DSA 2018 stands 
out in its scope, reach and the potential of abuse or arbitrary use. This chapter focuses on the 
DSA 2018 in order to analyze how a counter terrorism law for the digital spaces has become 
the widely abused mechanism for stifling intellectual pursuits in the country.
The democratic backsliding in Bangladesh
The political experience of Bangladesh as an independent nation is full of bold strides of 
democracy, frequent interventions by unelected forces, innovations to find a unique local gov-
ernance method and rabid corruption fuelling massive economic disparity. In the 50 years of 
its history, the country has seen 11 national elections (Al Jazeera 2018), as well as ten military 
takeovers or attempts (Ali 2010 and The Daily Star 2012).
Bangladesh’s slide from a democratic country towards an authoritarian, autocratic state has 
been discussed by many authors in the past few years. Riaz (2019) elaborated how Bangladesh 
went from “an electoral democracy to a hybrid regime” where he stated that the democratic pro-
cess in the independent Bangladesh started in 1991, but within the next two decades the quality 
of democracy deteriorated and the governing polity became an “electoral authoritarianism”. 
He argued that Bangladesh quickly transformed into a “hegemonic authoritarian regime” as 
was demonstrated by the national elections in 2014 and 2018 and the process continued to 
“institutionalize the hegemonic authoritarianism via an election” (Riaz and Parvez 2021). Riaz 
claimed that democracy in Bangladesh ended with the manipulation and blunt rigging of the 
2018 national election by the incumbent political party. He identified that the manipulation 
included, among other means, the establishment of control over the media, which was predom-
inantly carried out by the then newly enacted DSA 2018. The law, which was passed only two 
months prior to the election, was used to arrest 63 people including online and cultural activists 
and journalists between 8 October 2018 and 15 January 2019.
Mostafa and Subedi (2020) noted that three socio- political mechanisms – marginalization 










leaders – added to the election manipulation to increase authoritarianism in Bangladesh. As 
such, proponents of democracy and functioning institutions, as well as of progressive ideas and 
secular values, have all faced scrutiny and oppression under the DSA 2018 and other policies 
of the regime. Abrar (2020) blames “the rise of obscurantism, coupled with political expe-
diency by the ruling elite” for the recurring violence against “artists, singers, art enthusiasts 
and cultural activists who stand for freedom, diversity and coexistence”. In an interview with 
CIVICUS, Ferdows argues that self- censorship and fear are common among civil society 
members, human rights defenders, journalists, and citizens in general in Bangladesh. She lists 
several key challenges that relate to various sections of the ruling authority and create obstacles 
to freedom of expression and assembly in the country (CIVICUS 2019). Hossain, Billah and 
Islam (2020) argue that faced with the strict control by the Bangladeshi Government over civil 
society spaces, most civil society organizations and media entities are following a “see- no- evil” 
policy to continue operating in the country, while those who attempt to report violations of 
human rights face excessive pressure from the ruling authorities.
ICT Act 2006 and violent Islamist extremism in Bangladesh
The origin of the DSA 2018 can be traced back to the Information and Communications 
Technology Act 2006, abbreviated as the ICT Act 2006. This law created the groundwork for 
basic jurisdiction regarding computers and the internet and focused mostly on implications of 
computer and ICT usage in business and administration while providing rules for e- commerce 
and cyber- crimes (Ali 2011). There was one particular article in this law that still proved to 
be controversial; Article 57 of the ICT Act 2006 elaborated the “Punishment for publishing 
fake, obscene or defaming information in electronic form”. The article describes that the use 
of computers or the internet deliberately to “prejudice the image of the State or person or 
causes to hurt or may hurt religious belief or instigate against any person or organization” will 
be an offence. The punishment for this offence was set to be imprisonment for up to ten years 
along with the possibility of a large monetary fine (Government of Bangladesh 2006). The 
Bangladesh Government amended the ICT Act 2006 in 2013 and increased the maximum 
punishment under Article 57 from ten years to 14 years. At the same time, the Bangladesh 
Police was given the authority to “file a case and arrest any person under the law” without prior 
permission or warrant (Adhikary 2017).
Even though the origin of DSA in the form of the ICT Act 2006 was in order to provide 
a legal structure and solutions to issues such as e- commerce and cyber- crimes, the necessity 
to include another category of offences soon emerged. With the proliferation of smartphones, 
increased access to the internet and relatively affordable internet data packages provided by 
multiple, competitive mobile phone operators, larger portions of the population started to be 
active online (Hasan 2020). The opening up of this digital space allowed various fringe groups 
who did not have access to the public space in real life to become vocal. Among them were 
Islamists and jihadists who used the opportunity to radicalize and recruit Bangladeshis.
Bangladesh’s experience with violent extremism based on jihadism was a part of the global 
jihadi movement. In the post 9/ 11 world, the jihadi ideology started to spread further increasing 
the number of sympathizers in Bangladesh and leading to several jihadist attacks in the early 
2000’s. These included attacks on government officials such as the police or judges as well as 
public spaces such as cinemas, theatres or cultural events. Probably the most prominent of the 
attacks was the assassination attempt on current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2004, even 
though she had faced attempts before (International Crisis Group 2018). Still yet, radicaliza-
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used rudimentary communications methods without much online presence. With the spread 
of mobile phones in the county and the development of digital technologies, Bangladesh and 
Bangladeshi jihadists started to open up to the digital space. Hizbut Tahrir was one of the 
earliest Islamist groups in Bangladesh that organized its movement using both online and phys-
ical worlds. Heavily connected to their branch in the UK, the Bangladeshi chapter started using 
social media sites such as Facebook and maintained an active website for the Bangladeshi audi-
ence. But the main activities of this group remained in the physical world, especially around 
mosques and at different education institutions (Khan 2015).
Hizbut Tahrir was soon followed by the more violence- prone Ansarullah Bangla Team, who 
were spreading the ideology of Al Qaeda and global jihad in the Bangla language using the 
internet. Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani was the spiritual leader of this terrorist group and was 
perhaps the first prolific ideologue to use information technology to spread one of the largest 
compilations of violent extremist materials in the Bangla language. His sermons during Friday 
prayers were laden with jihadi ideological and operational discussions and calls for action. These 
sermons would be uploaded on the internet within hours and spread around the world to his 
large number of online followers on various platforms. He is the first jihadist leader to success-
fully utilize the digital space for the Bangla- speaking audience. Along with preaching about 
jihad, his followers used the internet to actively recruit others and to raise funds (Haque 2016).
At this time, Bangladesh was in the middle of the International Crimes Tribunal 
proceedings, a judicial process established to prosecute the perpetrators who had committed 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide during Bangladesh’s War of Independence 
in 1971 (Samad 2016). Many of the accused were involved in Islamic politics, and several 
leaders of Bangladesh Jamat- e- Islami, a mainstream political party in the opposition, were 
among them. Following a verdict of a Jamat leader by the Tribunal, members of the general 
public started a popular movement in Shahbagh Square in the capital, giving it the moniker 
Shahbagh Movement. This was initially led by an online group of bloggers and freethinkers. 
Soon, this turned out to be a major popular uprising with people joining around the country. 
Islamists labelled these bloggers as “atheists and blasphemers” and started a counter- protest led 
by Hefazat- e- Islam, another Islamic movement (Sarker 2017). This ongoing political devel-
opment gave Rahmani the perfect opportunity to increase his impact and make his followers 
carry out jihadist actions.
With the active promotion of jihadist violence in Bangladesh by Rahmani using the digital 
space, violent extremist attacks quickly increased in the country. Ansarullah Bangla Team, and 
their affiliate Ansar- al- Islam, killed a number of bloggers, rights activists, free thinkers, and pro-
gressive writers within a span of two years. They continued to maintain a heavy presence online 
and used the digital space to be constantly in touch with their supporters and sympathizers 
(International Crisis Group 2018). The experiences of 2013 with regards to both the growth 
of militancy in the country and the rise of mainstream political movements using digital means 
led to the amendment of the ICT Act in 2013 making it stronger in order to control this space. 
Riaz (2021) said that this amended law was used “against ‘secularist’ bloggers on the one hand 
while clamping down on Islamist websites on the other”.
Bangladeshi jihadists started to show their support to the Islamic State (IS) soon after it was 
established in 2014. The sharing of various news from the IS and the subsequent discussions 
about this terrorist organization primarily took place online for the Bangladeshi supporters, 
and soon this resulted into radicalization and recruitment efforts (Roul 2015). IS also published 
articles concerning Bangladesh and produced other jihadist content in the Bangla language and 
shared it online for their Bangladeshi audience (Haque 2020). While initially the activities of 











terrorist attacks in the country at Holey Artisan Café in Dhaka on 1 July 2016. Twenty- two 
people, including 17 foreign nationals, were killed in that attack carried out by five Bangladeshi 
young men. The attackers were heavily armed, well- trained and were incredibly brutal in their 
tactics. They were only stopped when a combined force of military commandos stormed into 
the building. The shock from this attack reverberated around the country and abroad (The 
Daily Star 2016). From early on it was clear how the digital space enabled and amplified this 
attack and glorified jihadism. The IS had not only made threats about attacks; they provided 
live updates as well as published videos and statements claiming the attack – all using the digital 
space (Deutsche Welle 2016).
With this attack it was clear that Bangladeshi terrorists had become increasingly sophisticated 
with their use of the online spaces for their radicalization, recruitment, and operational activ-
ities. As the intensity of violence from terrorism increased, which was evidently connected 
with the online space, securing that space became a matter of utmost importance. In the 
physical world, the Bangladeshi security forces relied upon legal measures such as the Anti- 
Terrorism Act 2009 and also some extra- judicial methods, as have been detailed by various 
rights organizations (International Crisis Group 2018). But these measures were not possible 
to emulate in the digital space, and the need for a far reaching and controlling mechanism was 
apparent. Even though the Anti- Terrorism Act 2009 was further amended in 2013 for courts 
to accept evidence in the form of communication over social media or the internet, it did not 
ban such activities legally speaking (The Daily Star 2019). As such, a law that would curb the 
online space for radicalization and recruitment of these terrorists, as well as curb the conduit to 
violent actions, was desirable for the authorities for whom it was common to be heavy handed 
in dealing with terrorism. At the first glance, the DSA 2018 had the possibility to provide 
this kind of measure. As it happened, two developments in Bangladesh – the rise of Islamist 
extremism and the expansion of digital spaces – that happened simultaneously, were expected 
to be managed by one mechanism – the DSA 2018.
The Digital Security Act 2018
The Digital Security Act, 2018 is described as “An Act to make provisions for ensuring digital 
security and identification, prevention, suppression and trial of offences committed through 
[a]digital device …” (Government of Bangladesh 2019b). This Act, with nine chapters and 
58 sections, covers various topics related to the digital life of the Bangladeshi populace. The 
National Parliament passed this Act on 19 September 2018 through a voice vote, with a minus-
cule 11 Members of Parliament opposing it in writing. The bill was placed before the Parliament 
on 9 April with several discussions and approvals by various Parliamentary Committees taking 
place before the final vote. Immediately after the passing of the Act, journalists, media houses 
and rights activists raised concerns that “the act goes against the main spirit of the Constitution 
and will restrict free- thinking, freedom of speech and freedom of expression” (Hasan 2018).
Several sections of the DSA raised concerns from early on. Among them sections 21, 25, 
28, 31, 32 and 43 were highlighted to go against the freedom of speech and independent jour-
nalism by journalists and media rights activists (Nazeer 2020). Sampadak Parishad, a platform 
of the country’s newspaper editors, denounced eight sections – 8, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32 and 
43 – as posing serious threat to freedom of expression and media operation (Hasan 2018).
The following are short excerpts from the DSA 2018 of these sections (Government of 
Bangladesh 2019b). Section 8 gives the power to the Bangladesh Telecommunications and 
Regulatory Commission to remove or block any data- information that creates a threat to digital 
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against liberation war, spirit of liberation war, father of the nation, national anthem or national 
flag”. Section 25 punishes the transmission or publication of propaganda with “an intention to 
affect the image or reputation of the country”. Section 28 punishes the “publication, broad-
cast, etc. of information in website or in any electronic format that hurts the religious values 
or sentiment”. Section 29 penalizes the publication, transmission, etc. of defamatory informa-
tion Section 31 penalizes offences that deteriorate law and order, and explains that anything 
“that creates enmity, hatred or hostility among different classes or communities of the society, 
or destroys communal harmony … shall be an offence”. Section 32 punishes the breach of 
secrecy of the Government under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 using digital means. Section 
43 states that if any police officer has reasons to believe that an offence under this Act is likely 
to be committed, then the officer can conduct search, seizure and arrest without a warrant. 
Section 53 of the Act states that offences under section 21, 28, 31, 32 and a few others as well 
as a subsection of section 29 will be non- bailable offences. The Act also has extra- territoriality 
to cover offences committed outside of Bangladesh as described in section 4, which states that 
“if a person commits any offences under this Act beyond Bangladesh which would be punish-
able under this Act if committed in Bangladesh, the provisions of this Act shall be applicable in 
such manner as if he had committed such offence in Bangladesh”. The punishments for many 
of these offences are very strict and harsh, as described in the Act.
In comparison to this long list of sections regarding various offences for expressing opinions, 
only section 27 of the DSA discusses the offences and punishment for committing cyber 
terrorism (Government of Bangladesh 2019b). There is no other section describing offences 
related to violent extremism, radicalization, or recruitment. There are several sections about 
cyber- crime, forgery, identity theft or violation, hacking or damages to information infrastruc-
ture, but they are not connected to violent extremism in the Act per se. When placing this Act 
before Parliament, the Telecom and ICT Minister argued that ensuring the country’s security 
from digital crime and ensuring the security of people’s lives and property were the main object-
ives of this law (The Daily Star 2018). Sajeeb Wazed Joy, the Prime Minister’s son and her ICT 
Advisor, said in a statement that the DSA had been enacted to “stop spreading of falsehood and 
militant activities through social media to protect minority communities” (Prothom Alo 2018). 
The importance of the DSA 2018 in combating terrorism is evident in the Anti- Terrorism Unit 
Rules 2019 of Bangladesh Police where section 8 states that the unit will be able to investigate 
offences under the Anti- Terrorism Act 2009 and other listed Acts including the ICT Act 2006, 
amendments to it, and the DSA 2018 (Government of Bangladesh 2019a). Sayeed Ahamed 
termed online propaganda by global terrorist groups as cyber- crime and argued that traditional 
laws were not suitable for digital spaces, and as such these crimes provided the context for the 
DSA 2018 (Jamal, Mahtab, and Sajen 2016). Parvez (2019) commented that the DSA 2018 
follows other laws to govern digital spaces which Bangladeshi violent extremists have been 
using for “psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, data mining, recruitment, mobiliza-
tion, networking, information sharing, planning, coordinating and training”.
This discrepancy between the offences for which this was claimed to be enacted and the ones 
for which it was being implemented, also becomes evident when looking through the arrests 
made and cases filed under the DSA 2018. Zaman (2020) noted that between October 2018 
and November 2020 there have been more than 1,000 cases filed under the DSA 2018 against 
“ordinary citizens, activists, academics and journalists for ‘criticizing’ the government policies 
or its political leadership”. Between January and June 2020, a total of 208 people were booked 
under the DSA in 113 cases, and 114 persons were immediately taken under arrest. She argued 
that, “an astonishingly high number of enforced disappearances, crackdowns on any critics, 








the Digital Security Act show the abysmal state of civil and political rights in the country”. The 
Centre for Governance Studies in Bangladesh found that between February 2020 and February 
2021, 873 individuals under 402 cases were accused under the DSA 2018, out of which only 22 
people received bail and three were released. Among the accused, 13% are journalists, another 
13% are politicians, 5% are students and 2% are teachers (Jagonews24.com 2021).
On 26 February 2021, Mushtaq Ahmed died inside a prison while being denied bail for 
over nine months. He was a businessman and a writer who was arrested under the DSA 
2018. Bangladeshi jurist Shahdeen Malik said that Mushtaq was a victim of the oppression 
by the Bangladeshi Government, and that this was a murder of freedom of expression itself. 
Bangladeshi authorities heavily cracked down on the civil society members protesting this 
death as well (The Daily Star 2021b). Ahmed Kabir Kishore, a cartoonist who was imprisoned 
around the same time with Mushtaq, was finally released on 4 March 2021, and described the 
horrific torture committed upon them by unidentified security officials of the regime while 
under custody (Islam 2021).
Compared to all these incidents, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a case where 
members of violent Islamist organizations have been arrested under the DSA 2018. Searching 
through multiple reports of arrests of militants in Bangladesh as published online by mainstream 
Bangladeshi media has not produced any result so far. Often the reports mention that a case 
has been filed under the Anti- Terrorism Act but on many occasions the media reports do not 
mention the Act under which the case has been filed at all. Even in the rather obvious incident 
where members of a known and officially banned terrorist group conducted activities with 
bitcoins online in order to raise funds for purchasing weapons, the media report does not pro-
vide this detail (Khan 2019). As such it cannot be confirmed whether or not any terrorists have 
been prosecuted under the DSA 2018 at this time.
From countering violent extremists to suppressing regime opponents
How did the DSA 2018, which was supposed to be a legal remedy to violent extremism in 
Bangladesh’s digital space, end up being used for completely different purposes? The answer 
might not be very straightforward or easy to pinpoint. But it is clear from the discussion in the 
previous section that the DSA has been used regularly to suppress the freedom of expression in the 
country and crack down on perceived regime opponents. The DSA has aided the ruling regime 
to increase authoritarianism over the population on all three mechanisms as described by Mostafa 
and Subedi (2020) – marginalization of political oppositions, institutionalization of authoritarian 
policies and co- option of religious leaders that increases authoritarianism in Bangladesh.
Bangladeshi authorities have used the DSA 2018, and its predecessor the ICT Act 2006, in 
order to weaken and suppress the opposition political parties in the country. The ruling Awami 
League has consistently blamed the opposition parties, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 
and Jamat- e- Islami (JI), as organizations that sympathize with, harbour and nurture militants 
in the country (Ramani 2016). This allowed the harassment of political opponents in the 
guise of anti- militancy operations. Ahmad and Kugelman (2018) argued that Bangladesh used a 
“counter terrorism pretext” in order to justify their crackdown on opposition members. They 
observed that while members of Jamat- e- Islami did not have any organizational connection with 
terrorists, many of their political actions included violence. This allowed Bangladeshi authorities 
to often term members of the political opposition as terrorists or extremists. This was evident in 
the language and tone used by the senior members of the ruling regime towards the leader of 
the opposition Khaleda Zia over several years. In March 2014, the then Information Minister of 
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(Prothom Alo 2014). In February 2015, the then Finance Minister termed Zia as “the queen 
of terrorism” (Prothom Alo 2015b). In November 2015, the Information Minister stated that 
Zia was leading militant activities in the country with assistance from JI, and informed that 
the authorities were taking measures according to the law (Prothom Alo 2015a). In March 
2017, the Information Minister termed Zia and her political party as the main supporters of 
militants in the country (Prothom Alo 2017). The fact that in 2015 approximately 125 people 
were killed by arson attacks during political protest and movement by the opposition parties 
only cements this sentiment among parts of the population (Firstpost 2018). In this context of 
violence and the increased rhetoric by the leaders in Government, the scope of the DSA was 
extended to use it against the opposition political parties.
Additionally, the Awami League promoted themselves as having an anti- militancy narrative 
which valued the sacrosanct “Spirit of the Liberation War” (Dhaka Tribune 2019). This, paired 
with the offence for tarnishing the image of the state under section 25 of the DSA, effectively 
led to the enforcement of the singular Awami League narrative that assisted in establishing a 
one- party state. Furthermore, there was no place for any doubters in this narrative. Civil society 
organizations that reported on the human rights violations or abuse of the judicial process fell at 
the crosshairs of the regime, and were labelled as disruptive to anti- militancy operations, hence 
committing anti- state activities which diminish the reputation of Bangladesh. Members of the 
media and civil society organizations were also acting as watchdog over the regime activities, 
as they do in most places of the world. But this meant that many uncomfortable questions, 
schemes of corruption, extravagances of the party officials, and abuses of power by regime 
officials were being raised about the current regime. In order to establish the regime narrative 
and provide the selected information, DSA was a convenient tool already present to suppress 
critics, just like it has been used to suppress regime opponents. Increasingly more of these 
crimes were booked under the DSA. Lacy and Mookherjee (2020) elaborated on the various 
ways in which journalists and rights activists self- censor themselves. As such the DSA played a 
part in the institutionalization of authoritarianism in Bangladesh.
Furthermore, Lacy and Mookherjee (2020) describe the aim of the Bangladeshi ruling 
regime to control the “virtual street” with the two laws regarding digital spaces. This stems 
from the intention of the ruling regime to preserve their political power. Bangladeshi politics 
found a new avenue in the past decade in the form of digital space. While the physical political 
space of the country was tightly controlled by the dominant political party in power, the new 
digital space was wide open and ushered in a new era of political discourse on social media 
and blogging forums. The DSA particularly attempts to control this space through its various 
sections curbing protest and dissent. Lacy and Mookherjee (2020) argue that the “criminal-
isation of online speech highlights the vulnerability of the seemingly omniscient state”. The 
ruling authorities were worried by this space and from the experiences of the Arab Spring they 
realized the capacity of this digital space in changing the political power of a country. As such 
the Shahbagh movement and the Hefazat- e- Islam movement that followed it were inherently 
considered a threat to the continuation of the regime. Lacy and Mookherjee claim that the 
“draconian amendment of the ICT law in 2013” was a response to the Shahbagh protests and 
the subsequent Hefazat- e- Islam protests in Dhaka.
Mostafa and Subedi (2020) argue that “the authoritarian regime in Bangladesh is less likely 
to survive without co- opting the religious leaders”. This is because the authorities understand 
that Islam is a central organizing force and can provide massive support to the regime. Ramani 
(2016) argues that the rise of violent Islamist extremists was a response to the perceived secu-
larization of the country by the ruling authorities. The Hefazat- e- Islam movement of 2013 










taking anti- Islamic actions. Aware of this outcome and intent on changing this, the regime 
subsequently placed emphasis on nurturing the relation with Islamic groups and leaders of 
the country to get a share of their popular support. Thus, the DSA 2018 was used in order to 
appease these Islamic groups by deliberately targeting bloggers, Bauls, rights activists and so 
on, who often express anti- regime opinions, along with taking a liberal and often anti- religion 
stance. The religious leaders, in return, co- opted with the regime and bestowed the Prime 
Minister with their recognition and approval by terming her as “the mother” of all them (Dhaka 
Tribune 2018).
In 2014 Alam maintained that “internet governance, that is, restricting or controlling access 
to certain information, cannot become a tool for muzzling of dissent, of the rights to air one’s 
views …, and the rights to inform people of the facts”. He worried that the Bangladeshi pol-
itical culture was dysfunctional enough that the stipulations under one law could be extended 
over other groups who were not originally intended to be covered by that law. He added that, 
“it has happened before, and, if it does again, very likely would result in the kind of vicious 
political animosity that the country does not need” (Alam 2014). Unsurprisingly though, it 
appears that his warning has come true as we discuss the use of DSA 2018 and its predecessor 
the ICT Act to curb political dissent rather than to combat violent extremism, thus increasing 
authoritarianism in Bangladesh.
Conclusion
This chapter traces the development of legislative measures by the Bangladeshi authorities in 
order to govern digital spaces that grew in the first two decades of the twenty- first century. 
This development coincided with the growth of violent Islamist extremism or militancy in the 
country, which posed a security challenge to the authorities. The authorities claimed that the 
ICT Act 2006, then the 2013 amended version, and finally the Digital Security Act 2018 were 
legal remedies necessary for countering militancy, especially in the digital spaces. However, it 
has been evident from the discussions in this chapter that these laws were not used for their 
intended purposes most of the time for arresting and prosecuting terrorists.
On the contrary, it emerges that in the name of countering militancy, Bangladesh has 
empowered and enabled its security apparatus through enacting these strict laws. And this same 
apparatus, with these strengthened capacities, has systematically dismantled a political oppos-
ition, choked an independent media, suppressed a thriving civil society, and curtailed the civil 
and political rights of the populace in the physical and the digital spaces. While this has enabled 
the ruling regime to establish unquestioned, unchallenged control over state power, democ-
racy has suffered significantly in the process along with political tolerance and pluralism. The 
country has further moved towards an autocratic regime, with a strict authoritarian rule but 
with some pretence of a democratic state.
The DSA 2018 is one of the most prominent tools in the hands of the regime authorities that 
enabled this autocratization. While it was claimed that this law would be used for countering 
violent extremism, from early on the multiple sections in the law that control and curtail 
various civil and political rights and liberties were pointed out by many journalists, legal experts 
and rights activists. The Editors’ Council stated that this law will have a “chilling effect” on press 
freedom in the country (Mahmud 2018). Zaman (2020) claimed that the DSA reinforced puni-
tive measures to curb freedom of expression and assisted in creating a digital authoritarianism 
in Bangladesh. Faisel, concerning Article 19 (The Daily Star 2021a), argued that the “act is not 
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the discussion in this chapter, it is also visible that the DSA 2018 provided political expediency 
and solidified political domination for the ruling party.
The DSA 2018 used the pretext of countering terrorism to achieve political gains, but 
in the process, it infiltrated into the lives of every citizen in the country to limit their rights. 
It has become so invasive and extensive that in 2020, a 15- year- old child was arrested by 
the Bangladesh Police under the DSA 2018 for defaming the Prime Minister and sent to 
a correction facility during the Covid- 19 pandemic. Reporting about that incident Nazeer 
(2020) stated that the DSA was used to justify invasive forms of surveillance and to violate the 
rights of free speech of a minor. This incident exemplifies the necessity to reform the DSA 
2018, but also to ensure that legal instruments that violate human rights that are enshrined 
by international norms and treaties are amended. Bangladesh may have been on the path of 
autocratization, but it is still possible to reverse the trend.
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The making of a strongman regime
Arild Engelsen Ruud1
Introduction: what is a ‘strongman’?
Sheikh Hasina Wazed has been prime minister of Bangladesh since January 2009. Over these 
years, Bangladesh has seen a marked deterioration in its democratic status, with human rights 
bodies and international organisations voicing concern and objections over stage- managed 
elections, increasing surveillance, enforced disappearances and a legal regiment that stifles criti-
cism (Human Rights Watch 2021). Sheikh Hasina and her party, Awami League, have slowly, 
meticulously and successfully built what in reality is a one- party state. Sheikh Hasina herself 
has become without question the most powerful leader in contemporary Bangladesh, in reality 
unchallenged by any political rival inside or outside of the political party she is leading. This 
chapter will employ the concept of strongman to investigate the case of Sheikh Hasina’s prime 
ministership and ask how this change from electoral democracy to an authoritarian regime 
came to pass. What are the main elements in the construction not just of an authoritarian 
regime, but one in which there is an unquestioned leader?
The Introduction to this Handbook points out that there is a marked increase in forms of 
autocratic rule in South Asia, a development which is part of a wider trend. While authoritarian 
regimes exhibit some similar features, they are also different from one another. Efforts to ana-
lyze and understand this development and such regimes have over time given rise to a plethora 
of concepts, including authoritarian, autocratic, semi- democratic and sultanist. Derivatives such 
as ‘sultanistic’ have been tried out, as well as ‘neo- sultanistic’, ‘authoritarian populist’, ‘illiberal 
populist’, ‘semi- authoritarian’, ‘electoral autocracy’, ‘constitutional autocracy’ and others. The 
number of terms led an exasperated Collier and Levitsky (1997) to group all in the wide cat-
egory of ‘hybrid regime’.
The point of introducing yet another term, strongman, is to shift focus from regime type to 
regime construction. The tendency inherent in the effort to define regime types is to ignore 
the creation and formation of a regime (Young 1999). Observers look at the end product rather 
than the process by which such a regime is formed, its actual coming- into- being. But regimes 
are not simply there; they are constructions, coalitions of forces built over some time. This is 
all the more evident in the case of the current phase of transition, from functioning electoral 









how elites let power slip, the current form of transition must focus on how disbursed power is 
increasingly centralised, how the many lose power to the few.
The argument here is that there is an active building process behind this transition, an active 
building of a regime. The term strongman also helps us shift focus to an observable fact, that 
much of the actual building process happens around one person. In the case of Bangladesh, this 
person is Sheikh Hasina. For the Philippines it is Rodrigo Duterte, for India Narendra Modi 
and for Cambodia Hun Sen. For Sri Lanka it seems to happen around the Rajapaksa family, or 
at least two of the brothers. There are many other similar cases.
There is reason to believe, and this chapter will make that suggestion, that this one person 
or family is of crucial importance to the regime changes. However, the challenge inherent in 
the term strongman is not to over- emphasise the role of the one leader. We need to keep eyes 
open for the other forces that engage with the leader, that support him (or her). Hence I shall 
prefer the term ‘strongman regime’.
Strongman regimes are what Lai and Slater (2006) refer to as ‘personalised regimes’. These are 
different from a ‘junta’ or a ‘party machine’ regime in which the leader is restricted by a larger group 
of people. This useful distinction should be modified to allow an understanding of the dynamics in 
which a regime moves from one type to another. The concept strongman regime encourages us to 
investigate the dynamics of the relationship between the strongman and the regime.
By drawing on the Bangladesh case, this chapter will focus on three aspects. First, a con-
stitutional tweaking has facilitated the building of a coalition of state institutions and forces. 
Crucially, this coalition drew support away from Awami League’s rival while also being a self- 
sustaining coalition in which different elements are mutually supportive. Secondly, the ideo-
logical construction of Sheikh Hasina and her family as exceptional and crucial to the country’s 
identity, its very DNA, is important because it provides legitimacy to the regime. The narrative 
justifies the regime’s focus on economic development rather than on maintenance of a liberal 
democracy. And, thirdly, the regime has implemented a legal framework that effectively stifles 
criticism and silences the opposition. Legal protection and tweaking is crucial to strongman 
regimes’ maintenance (Morgenbesser 2020), and in the Bangladesh case it has proven to be an 
effective tool in the mutual support of the ruling coalition.
The ‘strongman’ term is justified because behind these developments and at crucial junctures, 
are politically savvy if risky choices. The leader is not just a figurehead but the core person. She 
has used what leverage she had with success although the challenges have been substantial. The 
transition from electoral democracy to an authoritarian regime was not a smooth, gliding pro-
cess. It was a process characterised by conscious choices and determination as well as the ability 
to take advantage of opportunities as these arose. Hence the term strongman.
Constitutional tweaking and building a coalition
The Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina has successfully and with great dexterity 
shaped state institutions in a way that ensures their continued cooperation in maintaining its 
rule. Crucial in this were first its handling of a formidable rival state force, the military, and 
second two constitutional amendments.
When Sheikh Hasina became prime minister in January 2009, it was her second stint in 
office. She had been in power once previously, sitting a full term from 1996 until 2001 when 
her party lost the election. She returned to power after her party had won the December 2008 
election with a convincing majority.
That election, however, was held two years late. Despite its nominally democratic constitu-
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that had been backed by the military and implicitly supported by foreign governments and 
at least initially by substantial proportions of the middle classes. This government, known as 
the Caretaker Government, had pursued a ‘minus two’ agenda, seeking to send both Sheikh 
Hasina and her rival Khaleda Zia, the chairperson of Bangladesh Nationalist Party BNP, into 
permanent exile (Hagerty 2007). The Caretaker Government and its backers blamed the two 
political leaders for many of the country’s ills, including corruption and violent political unrest. 
That this agenda did not succeed was largely due to intense political work, involving mobil-
isation and argumentation. One very clear lesson for Awami League and Sheikh Hasina when 
returning to government positions in January 2009, was that the rule of politicians was not a 
given. The armed forces constituted a real potential adversary.
The need to build bridges was made even clearer only a little more than a month later, when 
a mutiny erupted in the Pilkhana cantonment in Dhaka of the border security force Bangladesh 
Rifles (Momen 2010). The mutiny lasted two days and left about 80 people dead. It was prob-
ably caused by the overbearing attitude of army officers commanding the force. Army officers 
and their families living in the cantonment also bore the brunt of the mutiny. Sheikh Hasina 
had herself led the response, as minister of defence, and had emphasised the need to avoid fur-
ther bloodshed. Although many army officers were enraged by the mutiny and the killing, the 
prime minister’s calm and negotiated approach was appreciated by others.
After this, a conscious effort was made to bridge the gap of distrust and suspicion between 
Awami League and the armed forces. Relatives of the Pilkhana victims were given housing 
and government jobs. A number of transfers in the armed forces ensured promotion of Awami 
League sympathisers. Sheikh Hasina increased their budgets, attended ceremonies in person, 
and emphasised the army’s contribution to the country’s liberation. She took particular care of 
the 9th Infantry Division which is stationed in Savar and protects the main access route to the 
capital from any revolting army faction elsewhere in the country.
As she was building closer relationships with the armed forces, one serious challenge was 
that BNP had traditionally been seen as closer to the military than Awami League. BNP’s leader 
Khaleda Zia was a rival for the military’s affections being a former general’s widow and had 
been living in a house in Dhaka cantonment since the 1970s. In 2011, Sheikh Hasina had her 
evicted from this house.
The Hasina government also expanded the role of the military. The 9th Infantry Division 
was in 2011 expanded to include special units in connection with the new bridge being built 
across the Padma. These new units included an engineering corps. This policy was replicated 
in several other cases and the military is increasingly involved in construction and contracting. 
One striking case is the Rohingya settlement built on the island Bhasan Char by the navy. 
The settlement has capacity for 100,000 refugees and is fitted with cyclone shelters and a solid 
protective embankment. The costs have not been disclosed. Companies hired by the military 
to execute such tasks are often manned and owned by retired officers and provide a wel-
come income in addition to the pension. The armed forces’ welfare organisation (Sena Kalyan 
Sangstha) is successfully involved in a number of commercial and industrial ventures, including 
petrochemicals, cement- production, shopping centres and the Dhaka Radisson Hotel. The 
profit helps provide services to armed forces personnel, including retirees.
Sheikh Hasina has also ensured that the military can continue its attractive engagements in 
UN peacekeeping operations (Bangladesh is among the top three nations to provide troops 
for such operations). These not only allow welcome field experience for the military but also 
handsome salaries for the individual personnel.
A number of other perks have been instituted for bureaucrats and military officers above a 






for buying a private car as well as generous maintenance costs for that car, and housing loans well 
below the going market interest rate. For bureaucrats there are several fellowship programmes 
for foreign degrees. In the words of one observer, these are ‘benefits for allegiance’ programmes.
In a different development, the Hasina government in 2011 abolished the Caretaker 
Government instrument arguing that Bangladesh was now a mature democracy (15th 
Amendment, June 2011). With this the government ensured political oversight over the 
election process. The Caretaker Government instrument had been introduced into the con-
stitution in 1996 after massive street protests against the then BNP government’s manipula-
tion of the election process (Kochanek 1997). The Caretaker Government instrument was the 
instalment three months before an election of a neutral government headed by the last retired 
Supreme Court judge. The CTG as it is known ensured free and fair elections. It was in oper-
ation for the second election in 1996, which Awami League won, and in 2001, which Awami 
League lost and after which Sheikh Hasina resigned as prime minister. However, at the end of 
its period, in 2006, the BNP government again sought ways of manipulating the CTG by inter 
alia changing the retirement age for Supreme Court judges (Hagerty 2007). The unrest and 
street violence that followed justified the de facto military coup of January 2007. The lesson for 
Awami League was that in the ‘toxic’ political culture of the country (Islam 2013), even a con-
stitutional provision would not ensure a level playing field. The amendment that abolished the 
Caretaker Government instrument was the logical outcome of this experience.
BNP protested against the abolition of the Caretaker Government instrument and engaged 
in violent and disruptive street protests. However, in the end they were ineffectual. Public 
opinion may also have swung against them. Moreover, the brutality of the protests provided the 
government with justification for dealing with the situation as a law and order problem rather 
than as legitimate political protest. But the police also pushed the boundaries of legitimate 
police action. It used with great effect what one senior police officer called ‘the Khulna model’, 
which was to put ten opposition leaders behind bars – ‘and fifty others will go into hiding’ (pri-
vate communication; also Human Rights Watch 2018b). Because of BNP’s boycott, 154 of the 
300 members of parliament were ‘elected’ unopposed and without a vote. The voter turnout 
was extremely low (some put it at less than 25 percent). BNP, the former ruling party, ended 
up without representation and the role as official opposition went to Jatiya Party, a party closely 
aligned with Awami League (its founder- chairman was special advisor to the Prime Minister 
and members of the party served as cabinet ministers).
The point to underline is that none of this was strictly illegal or unconstitutional, however 
contrary to the spirit of democratic competition it may have seemed. In a sense, Awami League 
had successfully outmanoeuvred its main rival largely due to the rival’s own tactical errors.
Another challenge turned opportunity was a very heated national debate and national 
mobilisation that took place in parallel to the election unrest. This development followed from 
Awami League’s election promise to try the 1971 war criminals. This was a long- standing 
demand among many Awami League supporters and progressives. The vocal Ekattorer Ghatak 
Dalal Nirmul Committee had been established by leading intellectuals when Jamaat- e Islam 
leaders were introduced into government positions by Khaleda Zia in 1992 and had continued 
its pressure ever since. Jamaat leaders had opposed independence in 1971 and many had actively 
engaged in collaboration with Pakistani forces and committed atrocities against freedom 
fighters. In 2009 Awami League decided to act on its promise and set up the International 
Crimes Tribunal. The first indictments were issued in 2010 and the first verdicts passed in 2011. 
This started a period of intense cultural debate and conflict in the country. In February 2013 
at least 100,000 progressives gathered at Shahbag in Dhaka because of fear that the govern-
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organisation Hefazat- e Islam mobilised several hundred thousand in what was widely seen as a 
counter- demonstration at Shapla Square in Dhaka to press for more Islamist policies, including 
laws against blasphemy and non- Islamic practices (Bouissou 2013). In the midst of all this, 
alleged atheist bloggers were targeted by violent jihadists and some were killed in bloody acts 
of violence.
During these months of heated debate and mobilisation, Sheikh Hasina and Awami League 
sought to strike a balanced agreement (Lorch 2018). The progressive Shahbag movement 
was partially co- opted and neutralised. More of a concern was the Islamist mobilisation. The 
Hefazat was a newcomer on the scene and represented the traditional (qawmi) Islamic clerics 
(ulama) and their many Islamic seminaries (madrasa). The Hefazat’s capacity to mobilise had 
made a deep impression and the demands had resonated well even among Awami League 
supporters (Fair and Abdallah 2017). The Hefazat represents a theological tradition different 
from and often opposed to that of Jamaat. Sheikh Hasina seems to have acknowledged this with 
clarity and a degree of cynicism, and later that year she reached out to Hefazat leaders. Over the 
months and years that followed, her government implemented policies that were controversial 
among her core supporters because they reflected Hefazat demands. These include changes in 
the school textbooks (less progressive, less ‘Hindu’), acceptance of qawmi madrasas as on par 
with government schools, the removal of a statue of a ‘Greek goddess’ (in fact, Lady Justitia) 
from the Supreme Court building, and a substantial increase in the salaries of madrasa teachers 
(Lorch 2018). She was later praised by Hefazat as ‘Mother of Qawmi’. It is arguable that the 
government with some success has incorporated the qawmi ulama in the periphery of its grand 
coalition.
In another amendment to the constitution (16th Amendment, 2014), parliament was made 
superior to the Supreme Court and given the power to dismiss judges if allegations of incap-
ability or misconduct against them are proved (Dhaka Tribune 2017). With this, judicial over-
sight over parliament was abolished and the judiciary made beholden to parliament and in 
reality to the ruling party. In connection with a judicial review of the amendment, the Chief 
Justice supported a view of the amendment as unconstitutional. A few months later he was 
forced to leave the country and subsequently dismissed (Riaz 2021). The next Chief Justice 
accepted the amendment as in line with the constitution. In the same amendment, a provision 
was introduced to the election law that made it mandatory for the court to hear the election 
commission’s view first before issuing any judgment on an election complaint. The election 
commission is nominally independent of the executive, but in reality subservient to it.
These are the eye- catching developments. Quietly most major news outlets and televi-
sion channels have been brought into the ambit and many owners or their family members 
made member of parliament or given other forms of preferential treatment (Dhaka Courier 
2019; Riaz and Rahman 2021). Also important in the expanding coalition have been the law- 
enforcement agencies, of which the main ones are Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the various 
branches of the police (Detective Branch, Special Branch, Criminal Investigation Branch), and 
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI, the military intelligence). Members of these 
institutions plus the civil administration willingly employed double standards in dealing with 
opposition and government candidates during elections (Riaz 2019). There were instances of 
trumped- up charges against opposition candidates and their candidacy annulled by officials on 
flimsy grounds. Some 30,000 cases are alleged to have been filed against opposition activists 
and leaders and 8,000 allegedly arrested, causing each personal problems and inhibiting polit-
ical space for the opposition. Officials in polling stations allowed activists to stuff ballot boxes 
and the police often turned a blind eye to acts of violence and intimidation by Awami League 











police to have ‘delivered’ the outcome, including many in the police force. News outlets and 
organisations such as Transparency International Bangladesh documented extensive irregular-
ities in almost all constituencies and the partisan role played by police or the administration in 
more than half of the constituencies (The Daily Star 2019).
Within the first few years in power, Awami League had in effect neutralised or co- opted 
major loci of power and authority in the country. The military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary 
had been significant alternative sources of authority and power in independent Bangladesh’s 
early history. The traditions of the ‘vice- regalism’ (Shah 2014) ran deep in institutions that were 
partly rehabilitated after 1975 by the autocratic governments of Ziaur Rahman (1975– 1981) 
and H.M. Ershad (1982– 1990), who relied on the established classes to replace Awami League 
appointees (Baxter 1984). That these had remained formidable loci of power was proven by the 
2007– 2008 military- backed Caretaker Government, but by 2014 they had been co- opted into 
an Awami League coalition.
In addition, Awami League’s rival BNP had committed tactical errors and marginalised itself 
from its constitutional rights while also proving to be dependent on the easily vilified Jamaat 
for its street presence. Crucially Sheikh Hasina had also ensured that Shahbag did not develop 
into an alternative locus of power on the progressive left.
Family and exceptionality
Central to ideological justification of her regime is that she is her father’s daughter. Her father, 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was the independence movement’s leader and the 
country’s leader until he was murdered along with most members of his family in 1975. Sheikh 
Hasina was then abroad and returned to Bangladesh only in 1981. After a short debate which 
the rokto (blood) faction won, she has been the supreme and largely uncontested leader of her 
party – formally re- elected at regular intervals. She is now on her fourth general secretary. After 
the 2018 election, she surprised observers by easing out most senior party leaders from minis-
terial positions, including her own cousins and her daughter’s father- in- law (Khalidi 2019). It 
was an exercise of supreme control.
That Sheikh Hasina is ‘Bangabandhu’s daughter’ is deafening in a muted way. Her father’s 
special place in the nation’s history is emphasised and reinforced in numerous official and 
public acts. And yet in this there is no direct suggestion that her being Bangabandhu’s daughter 
makes her genetically fit or dynastically endowed to be prime minister. Her exceptionality is 
reinforced more indirectly.
A clue can be had from the documentary film, ‘Hasina: A Daughter’s Tale’. This profession-
ally made documentary directed by her nephew was released a month before the 2018 election 
in cinema halls all over the country. Here she is portrayed as an ordinary housewife, seen in her 
kitchen, making food for her family or talking happily with her grandchildren. These footages 
of contemporary happiness are contrasted by photographs and footage of her father and her 
reminiscences about him and what he meant for her both personally and politically. The soft 
approach of the documentary underlines the brutality of the assassination in 1975, the bloody 
attack on him that also killed her three brothers, her mother and several other members of her 
family.
This legacy of blood and loss is crucial to the creation of her political persona. She is 
an ordinary person with an extraordinary background, someone with strong leadership 
qualities but whose political outlook and aims have been shaped through terrible personal 
horror. She mentions her father in every speech and faithfully attends to his name and 
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connects her personally and intimately to the father of the nation, its eternal leader (Ruud, 
forthcoming).
Shortly after her coming to power, his status of father of the nation (jatir janak) was given 
constitutional foundation, his portrait was to be found in all public offices and schools and he 
was given special legal protection against defamation. Over the years, an official cult has been 
constructed around him and his legacy. Several public holidays and national celebrations are 
directly or indirectly associated with him, such as his declaration of independence speech, his 
homecoming after the war and the assassination of him and his family – marked every year 
as the ‘day of mourning’. His birth is celebrated as the national children’s day but known 
as ‘Mujibur’s birthday’. His centenary is celebrated as ‘Mujib year’. A range of government 
agencies, buildings, educational institutions, streets, tournaments and parks are named after 
him, mostly by Sheikh Hasina’s governments. Generally the more prominent institution in 
any sector is named after him, such as the national football stadium, the country’s largest 
conference centre, the country’s first satellite, a heavily armed missile frigate and the presti-
gious Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Medical University. Major national investments include the 
Bangabandhu Bridge across the Jamuna and a large new international airport planned near 
Dhaka (to be called Bangabandhu International Airport).
Every Awami League poster has images of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Sheikh Hasina. And 
Awami League posters are everywhere, in every street and street corner, on every wall across 
the country. As Kuttig points out (2020), banners and posters are pervasive visual and material 
expressions in an environment where ‘visibility means everything’ (Blom Hansen 2004). The 
specialness of the family is part of the official cult, to a large extent reinforcing the sense of 
mourning and loss as legitimising strategy (Mookherjee 2007). Sheikh Hasina and her sister 
have special state protection as members of Bangabandhu’s family (since 2009). Her son, known 
as Joy, is often included on the posters. Sheikh Hasina’s mother is in some contexts referred to 
as Bangamata (the mother of Bengal). Her brothers are commemorated with ceremonies, and 
several sport clubs, tournaments and arenas are named after them. There is, for instance, a pro-
fessional football club named after one brother, Sheikh Jamal, the name added to the original 
name in 2009, and an international football cup was set up and named after another brother, 
Sheikh Kamal, in 2015. The official crest of the cup bears his portrait.
It should be noted that many beyond Awami League share in the sentiment of Bangabandhu’s 
specialness. It is not uncommon even for critics of Sheikh Hasina’s government to refer to her 
father as ‘the greatest Bangali of all times’. The phrase originated in 2004 in a BBC Bangla 
Service poll in which Mujibur Rahman came out ahead of Bengali Nobel laureate Rabindranath 
Tagore. Sometimes Mujibur is called ‘the greatest Bangali of a thousand years’. Bangladesh was, 
of course, born in a terrible war of liberation that saw bloody violence and destruction as well as 
acts of daring resistance and sacrifice. Stories and memories of the war are to most Bangladeshis 
even fifty years on deeply emotional (Mookherjee 2015). To many of those who took part, 
Bangabandhu was a great source of inspiration.
The specialness of Bangabandhu and the specialness of Sheikh Hasina’s family are 
complemented by another legitimising strategy: the assertion that Bangabandhu’s vision was 
not just a great source of inspiration behind the independence movement, but the greatest; that 
the people were mobilised by his ‘dream’ for the country. The idea of Bangabandhu’s ‘dream’ 
is important in the official narrative and he is often referred to as the ‘dreamer of the Bengali 
nation’. The dream remains undefined but is generally thought to be a Sonar Bangla, a Golden 
Bengal, prosperous and free from hunger and poverty. Occasionally references are also made 
to his ‘ideology’, but historically Mujibur never formulated an ideology and what activists 







Nonetheless there is a strong emotive resonance in the way Bangabandhu’s dream is under-
stood today. In popular renderings, Bangabandhu as a person showed respect to high and low, 
ate simple food and treated all as his equals. These are values that are generally thought to have 
mobilised people to the suffering and sacrifice of the independence war. His daughter makes 
oblique reference to this aspect of the narrative when she claims that she is in politics to alleviate 
the suffering of the poor.
This ‘dream’ is central to how his daughter is exceptional. Sheikh Hasina and her party 
insist that they have come to power to fulfil the task he has started, to fulfil his ‘dream’, but 
that they have done so only ‘after 30 years’. The great horror of the assassination is equal only 
to the bright future that was lost in that act. The sacrifice of the war was wasted in that atro-
city, which makes it all the more imperative for the nation four or five decades later to strive to 
fulfil the promises embedded in that struggle. Bangabandhu’s ‘dream’ and the emotive appeal 
of a country free from hunger and poverty are held up as the ultimate goal of the government 
and the country, and Sheikh Hasina’s unquestioned loyalty to this ‘dream’ renders her uniquely 
appropriate to fulfil it. The connection is drawn in many contexts. One example is in the jus-
tification for the Digital Security Act (to which we shall return), as ‘the revival of the Golden 
Bangladesh of the father of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman […] The great dreamer has 
given his own successor to fulfil the dream of Golden Bangladesh, Honourable Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina’ (Bangladesh Government 2018).
There is also a practical side to this dream of a country free from poverty and hunger. Sheikh 
Hasina’s government has seen economic development as central to its legitimacy and has worked 
towards this with not inconsiderable success (O’Neill 2018). On important social indicators, 
including life expectancy, food consumption and literacy rates, Bangladesh has moved up ahead 
of India. Economic growth has been substantial and in 2018 Bangladesh fulfilled all eligibility 
criteria for graduation from Least Developed Country to Middle Income Country. While the 
country is still characterised by mind- boggling economic differences between rich and poor, 
growth is visible in most parts of the country.
Infrastructural development and ‘megaprojects’ are very much part of the agenda: coal 
plants, a nuclear plant, and bridges, roads and a light railway in Dhaka (Mirza forthcoming). 
When in 2012 the World Bank pulled support for the Padma Bridge project after allegations of 
corruption in high circles, Sheikh Hasina angrily responded that Bangladesh would construct 
the bridge with its own funds. The decision to go ahead committed her political standing to a 
huge, daunting project in a striking mark of a strongman leader. The country would develop, 
she would pursue her father’s ‘dream’, with or without the help of others.
Sheikh Hasina’s place in the narrative as the successor who ensures the fulfilment of 
Bangabandhu’s dreams is an obliging construction, committing her to the mast but also allowing 
her liberty to interpret his dream. She is a forceful politician in her own right, but it is her 
unique loyalty to her father’s legacy – interpreted as the ambition of the nation – which ultim-
ately legitimises her as the country’s leader.
Violence and the law
However, a narrative is not sufficient to keep a regime afloat, and critics need to be silenced. 
It is possible to argue that politically, Bangladesh has always been a violent place (Jahan 2005, 
Tripathy 2014). There are many stories of politically motivated violence in the early years of 
the independent republic and even more from the years of military dictatorships. During the 
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hostels, bodies could be found floating in rivers or street gutters, Islamists in particular cut 
tendons of activists from rival camps, buses were burnt during street confrontations and general 
strikes (known as hartal) often included violent encounters and beating of anyone caught out.
From 2009 onwards and in particular after 2014, the forms have changed from vandalism 
and individual acts of violence to state orchestrated forms of repression (Suykens and Islam 
2015). According to one report (Odhikar 2020a), the number of injured dropped from 24,000 
in the year leading up to the 2014 election to 4,700 injured the year leading up to the 2018 
election.
There are two significant developments behind this shift in political violence. One is the 
increased deployment of law- enforcement agencies against opponents rather than the deploy-
ment of party or student front activists. We will return to this in the next section. A second 
development is legal changes and in particular the introduction of laws effectively banning 
online criticism of the rulers. The legislation has permitted space for law- enforcement agencies 
to act with impunity and has created an atmosphere of apprehension that effectively does away 
with the need for street confrontations (Lacy and Mookherjee 2020).
The introduction of first the Information and Communication Technology Act (ICT act of 
2006, amended 2013) and the Digital Security Act (Bangladesh Government 2018) has done 
much harm to the country’s democratic credentials. In the EIC Democracy Index, a significant 
contribution to Bangladesh’s fall between 2010 and 2020 is the drop in its score on ‘civil liber-
ties’. This was particularly due to the infamous Section 57, introduced to the ICT act in 2013. 
This section heralded ‘significant’ limitations on individual freedom of expression and serious 
challenges to democracy (Feldman 2015). It carried sentences of up to 14 years’ imprisonment 
and 1 crore taka (approx. 100,000 euros) in fines, or both, for posting false, provocative or sen-
sitive news however interpreted. The Digital Security Act (DSA) that replaced the ICT act has 
often been characterised as ‘draconian’. It maintained the level of sentences but broadened the 
applicability of the law. The DSA gained much notoriety as a means of intimidation. According 
to one report, there were on average three cases a day, and in 2019 alone 1,135 persons were 
arrested in 732 cases under this act (Prothom Alo 2020a).
The DSA has commonly been applied to critics of government policies. Human 
Rights Watch (2018a) has held that the government made use of the DSA to detain polit-
ical opponents and critics of its response to the ongoing pandemic. Under the law anyone 
in Bangladesh can be arrested for posts that are alleged to negatively affect the nation’s 
image, including criticism of government policies (Committee to Protect Journalists 2020). 
The law has been widely criticised by international rights bodies including the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, by Bangladeshi civil rights bodies and in newspaper 
editorials. They claim that the authorities ‘increasingly used the DSA to harass and indefin-
itely detain activists, journalists and others critical of the government and its political leader-
ship’ (Human Rights Watch 2021). Lacy and Mookherjee (2020) have called the law ‘a new 
technique of governmentality’.
Crucial here is that arrests have also been made for criticising the judiciary or other polit-
ical leaders (Human Rights Watch 2018a). The case of Shafiqul Islam Kajol is illustrative. This 
editor of a lesser- known local newspaper was in 2020 picked up from a street in Dhaka and 
‘disappeared’. The police, as is common in these cases, claimed no knowledge of what had 
happened to him. While he was missing, a case was filed against him under the DSA, claiming 
that he had shared posts defamatory of certain Awami League leaders on Facebook. When he 
reappeared after 53 days he was immediately arrested (or rearrested) for his alleged crime under 











A widely circulating interpretation is that he was picked up after the publication of an article 
on the arrest of an Awami League leader. The leader allegedly ran a secret escort agency where 
some senior Awami League leaders and members of parliament were said to have been clients. 
The case against Kajol was filed by a member of parliament. The case named others but Kajol 
was the only one arrested. It is alleged that he was singled out ‘because some Awami League 
politicians suspected that he had incriminating information of the goings on in this escort 
agency and they feared exposure’ (Netra News 2020).
This may or may not be true. The connection between Kajol’s disappearance and his 
Facebook post is not established. The point is that it suffices to be rumoured to scare people 
away from criticising ruling party leaders and that the police and the judiciary seem happy to 
play along. Kajol’s case is a good illustration of how the police, the judiciary and the ruling 
party together constitute a mutually protective coalition. The willingness of the police and the 
judiciary to protect leaders quite far down the political hierarchy is increasingly evident. In an 
illustrative case (Prothom Alo 2020b), the police arrested a 25- year- old village man ‘on allega-
tion of criticising leaders of ruling Bangladesh Awami League on Facebook’. The case had been 
filed by the local president of the Awami League volunteer front.
‘Criticising leaders of ruling Bangladesh Awami League on Facebook’ is the operative 
phrase. In an online survey of Bangladeshi journalists (Hasan 2019), almost all respondents 
claimed it was near impossible to pursue objective news reporting on certain issues because of 
the existence of a ‘censorship machine’. Key actors in this censorship machine include a pro- 
government political apparatus, key government offices and certain leading politicians, the 
security agencies, and interestingly fellow journalists. Outside journalism, there are ‘digital 
vigilantes’ as well as ‘the vast multitude of sycophants and attention seekers’ motivated by 
personal rivalries or hoping for rewards (Lacy and Mookherjee 2020). The system shields 
itself from criticism in particular on certain ‘no- no’ topics (Riaz and Zaman forthcoming; 
Haq forthcoming). These include the prime minister and her family, the armed forces, and 
the official narrative about the war of 1971. But this political sensitivity and the DSA are 
opportunities widely exploited by individuals and by the system. While the prime minister 
earlier claimed that Bangladeshi journalists enjoy utmost freedom (The Daily Star 2020), she 
has also held that spreading false propaganda is not protected by freedom of speech (The Daily 
Star 2021).
Even more sinister than the DSA are the extrajudicial activities of law- enforcement agencies. 
‘Crossfires’ or ‘encounters’ gained particular notoriety. The victims were often alleged criminals 
or radical opponents of the regime (such as Islamists and jihadists). A brief ‘war on drugs’ in 
2018– 2019 saw 395 alleged drug peddlers killed in ‘crossfires’ according to one report (The 
Daily Star 2020). Another report claims there were 225 extrajudicial killings in Bangladesh 
in 2020 (Odhikar 2020b). Another extrajudicial method is that of enforced disappearances 
(‘goom’). Some have disappeared not to be seen again while others do reappear after a while, 
such as the journalist Kajol mentioned above. According to one report, there were 31 enforced 
disappearances in 2020 (Odhikar 2020b; Barua 2020).
The enforcement agencies and branches of the government seem to act on assumed direct-
ives rather than on direct orders, and they seem occasionally to operate in competition with one 
another. In an interesting development, the number of extrajudicial killings dropped drastically 
after July 2020 when a former army officer was shot and killed by police officers. This caused 
an uproar from the military side and the police officer and his accomplices were arrested. The 
sharp drop in extrajudicial killings after this indicates that the government could stop the prac-
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The strongman leader
Sheikh Hasina is a strongman leader, but not necessarily of the same mould as other strongman 
leaders. The specialness of her family and her own unquestioned but constantly re- emphasised 
loyalty to her father and his dream constitute the central trope of an exceptionality and one that 
justifies her leadership as logical and necessary for the nation. Her specialness is not expressed 
in the same manner as Rodrigo Duterte (Curato 2015) or Donald Trump, for whom transgres-
sion into ‘bad manners’ of the boss mould was a trademark of their populist appeal and claim to 
represent ‘ordinary’ people (Moffitt 2016). But she does transgress, in ways that emphasise her 
personal rule. She on occasion disregards finer constitutional or moral niceties, and often (but 
not always) publicly so. A small but telling example found place in connection with allegations 
of corruption against the vice- chancellor of Jahangirnagar University in 2019. Both students 
and teachers staged demonstrations demanding a judicial inquiry, whereupon the prime min-
ister warned them that if they were unable to prove their allegations they would be punished 
and government funding for public universities would be withdrawn (Dhaka Tribune 2019).
These transgressive acts are part of her masterfully brazen style that underlines her position as 
the strongest leader, the one whose control over the state machinery can threaten any action – 
possibly illegal, often transgressive, definitively doable. This is classic strongman ploy, as if saying 
‘I dare you to oppose me!’
Conclusion
A strongman regime centres on and depends on one person. It is a regime because it is a solid 
edifice, it has durability and resistance to external shock and pressure. It is unshaken by economic 
upheavals and unfazed by inept handling of disasters such as the Covid- 19 pandemic. Such 
regimes often rely on ideological constructions such as the nationalistic cult the Bangladeshi 
regime has built around its father of the nation and his family, to which also the prime minister 
belongs, and on laws and agencies that protect against criticism. But the prime minister has also 
proven herself to be eminently pragmatic and this is perhaps one of her strongest points. She has 
forged solid bonds with forces that cold- shouldered her father, including the armed forces and 
the bureaucracy. She has neutralised the increasingly formidable challenge of Islamism. And she 
has harnessed the support of the somewhat sullen but ultimately cornered progressives.
The weakness of a strongman regime is its reliance on that one person – who not only 
provides legitimacy but also the political strength and prowess of the regime. Sheikh Hasina 
has been instrumental in building a regime that is self- protecting and mutually supportive. But 
the dangers are real. A rivalry between the police and the military and the ever- present need 
in Islamist quarters to assert themselves constitute potentially fundamental threats to the edi-
fice. Threats such as an economic downturn that ruins elite privileges are still untested for the 
cohesion of the regime.
Currently the strongman regime appears solid, but because it is a strongman regime and not 
a junta or another form of authoritarian coalition regime, it relies on the continued presence of 
the steady hand of the prime minister and on her ability to legitimise the regime through her 
family association and her actions. Succession will be a huge challenge and the risk involved is 
considerable.
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INSTITUTIONS UNDER    
AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
IN BANGLADESH
Serdar Yilmaz and Syed Khaled Ahsan
Bangladesh is a unitary state with national and local governments. Authoritarianism by the 
ruling party of the country has several attributes of the autocratization process: brutal party 
contestation, constrained space for exercising democratic rights, and absence of free and fair 
elections at the national and local levels (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). The purpose of 
authoritarianism is to bring public administration structures at all levels under the control 
of the national government. The focus of this chapter is to provide a historical account of 
how the ruling party has constrained local democracy and hindered development of an insti-
tutional landscape that is favourable to the extension of political liberties and free and fair 
elections.
In Bangladesh, the local government system is organized around elected councils and 
administrative units reporting to the council. In the rural areas, there are three types of local 
governments: union parishad (UP), upazila parishad (a.k.a. sub- district local government) and 
zila parishad (a.k.a. district local government). In the urban areas, pourashava (a.k.a. munici-
pality) and city corporation are the two administrative units of the local government system.
The Constitution (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 2019) has 
mandated an elected local government system without guarantees for autonomy. Articles 59 
and 60 of the Constitution envisage locally elected political leadership managing local gov-
ernment administration and work of the public officials in the administrative units. Therefore, 
the concept of local government institutions (LGIs) refers to the locally elected political lead-
ership and administrative units in the above- mentioned five types of local government. The 
responsibilities of LGIs include maintaining public order, preparing and implementing plans 
to deliver local public services and economic development, and imposing taxes to finance 
local budgets.
Parliament has been entrusted by the Constitution to enact laws to transfer and delegate 
power to the LGIs and enable them to plan and deliver services to the citizens. The LGIs are 
meant to provide all amenities to the citizens at the local level according to Articles 59 and 
60 of the Constitution (Barakat et al. 2015). The Supreme Court of Bangladesh reiterated the 
features of the LGIs in a 1992 ruling as electoral accountability towards citizens and public 
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to them together with independent and substantial sources of income (Kudrat- E- Elahi Panir v 
Bangladesh 1992).
However, the Constitution gives the national government through parliament the power 
to change the regulatory framework for the local government system. Successive governments 
have exploited the provisions of the Constitution to dominate the LGIs to consolidate their 
powerbase. This is an ongoing process of democratic backsliding (Bormeo 2016). Like so many 
countries, Bangladesh has been experiencing a gradual process of autocratization under a legal 
façade (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019).
In Bangladesh, the autocratization process has affected the local democracy and LGIs alike. 
Hence, the LGIs have been facing an uphill struggle to assert their independence and roles in 
service provisions since independence of the country in 1971. This chapter provides a brief 
history and evolution of LGIs and local democracy since independence. It starts with a brief 
description of the process of the taming of local democracy and discusses the issues that impede 
the growth of the LGIs such as interference of the members of parliament (MPs) and civil 
servants, elimination of the opposition, uneven level playing field in the elections, monopoliza-
tion, capacity challenge and financial insolvency.
Adoption of the Constitution and taming of local democracy
After independence, the Constitution was proclaimed in 1972 and general elections were held 
in 1973. Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the supreme leader 
of the independence movement, won the election. Until the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman by a group of junior army officers on August 15, 1975, the BAL governed the country 
with an absolute majority.
The first BAL government amended the Constitution on January 25, 1975 to introduce a 
one- party system. Articles 59 and 60 were rescinded and Article 11 was modified by dropping 
its last sentence reading, ‘and in which effective participation by the people through their 
elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured.’ It was the first blow to 
the democratic local government system in Bangladesh. Later, the Constitution of the country 
became subordinated to the martial law proclamations from August 15, 1975.
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh saw the rule of military 
dictators from 1975 to 1990. In 1976, Ziaur Rahman, a military ruler and founder of the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), promulgated the first local government ordinance in 
Bangladesh. The ordinance recognized three types of LGIs: UP at the union level, thana pari-
shad at the sub- district (or upazila) level and zila parishad at the district level. Later, in 1980, a 
swanirvar gram sarkar or the self- reliant village government was introduced below the UP level 
by amending the local government ordinance of 1976. The amendment promoted unanimity 
to select the gram prodhan or head of the gram sarkar and other eleven members of the village 
government through consensus of villagers. The village government system was considered as 
an attempt to politicize the local government system. On May 30, 1981, Ziaur Rahman was 
assassinated by a group of army officers. After his death, the village government system was 
abolished by another martial law administrator in July 1982.
In 1982, the introduction of a new tier of LGI, upazila parishad at the upazila or sub- 
district level, triggered a strong reaction from political parties. The political parties, including 
the BNP led by Khaleda Zia, the widow of Ziaur Rahman, and BAL led by Sheikh Hasina, 
the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, resisted the introduction of a new level of LGI by 
the military government headed by H. M. Ershad. They were concerned about the military 
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BAL boycotted the first two upazila parishad elections held during the Ershad regime. In 1991, 
there was an attempt to start the democratization process in the country after the resignation 
of military dictator, H. M. Ershad and establishment of a non- partisan caretaker government in 
1990. The BNP won the national election in 1991 and formed the government. The BNP- led 
government abolished the administrative tier at the upazila level altogether. The justification 
for the abolishment was that the upazila parishads were not economically viable for the country 
as they did not have the capacity to raise revenue from their own sources. In fact, the abolish-
ment of upazila parishads was an attempt to strengthen the control of MPs in the LGIs (which 
was codified as a law in 1998). The judiciary reinstated the upazila parishad system in 1992. 
Nonetheless, the BNP government did not enact a legal framework for the upazila parishad 
during its term. In 1998, the BAL government formally reintroduced the upazila parishad level 
by enacting the Upazila Parishad Act, 1998. This back and forth of abolishing and reintroducing 
new tiers had a detrimental impact on the institutionalization of LGIs in Bangladesh.
After transitioning from the anti- democratic military regime to a civilian democratic 
system, the first general election was held in February 1996 under the BNP- led administra-
tion. However, this election was boycotted by the BAL and other opposition political groups. 
They demanded that the general election in the country be held under a non- party caretaker 
government. A genuine mistrust grew between the ruling BNP and the opposition political 
groups as the candidate of the then ruling BNP won in a controversial by- election for a par-
liamentary seat in March 1994. After that the opposition political groups did not participate 
in any elections held under the ruling BNP (Hossain 2021). Finally, the BNP succumbed to 
the demand of the opposition political groups and brought about the election- time caretaker 
government system. In June 4, 1996, just three months after the February 1996 election, a par-
ticipatory general election was held under the caretaker government.
Election- time government practice was exercised during the 1996, 2001 and 2008 elections. 
As a result, transition of power through credible elections started maturing the foundation of 
the nascent democracy of the country. The BAL and BNP won the elections held under the 
caretaker governments in 1996 and 2001 respectively. However, the BNP- led government 
made attempts to manipulate the constitutional bodies to form a caretaker government to have 
election results in their favour in 2006. That triggered violent street protests organized by the 
BAL and other opposition political groups. The unrest in the country provoked the military to 
intervene to form a caretaker government. The general election was delayed until December 
2008 and that was won by the BAL. Later, an electoral breakdown happened in 2014 as a con-
sequence of ‘a unilateral change in the rules of electoral administration (the elimination of the 
practice of a caretaker government before the election) that tilted the electoral playing field and 
triggered an opposition boycott’ (Diamond 2015).
The practice of a caretaker government was instrumental to create a level playing field envir-
onment in which an election could be held in a free and fair manner without political influence 
by the outgoing government. We coined the term electoral breakdown in this discourse to 
describe the assault on the nature of free and fair elections providing de jure institutional guar-
antees for a level playing field. An uneven playing field is a common feature of contemporary 
authoritarianism (Way and Levitsky 2020). The departure from the election time caretaker gov-
ernment practice was a breakdown of an established electoral norm, which resulted in political 
polarization. Consequently, the polarization has exerted authority over all state and non- state 
institutions in the country and has prevented the consolidation of democracy. The political 
authoritarianism of both parties, BNP and BAL, has weakened the independence and growth 
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Interference in the LGIs
When the BAL- led government reintroduced the upazila parishad in 1998, they carved out 
an advisory role for the MPs. According to constitutional scholars, the advisory role of MPs, 
codified in section 25 of the Upazila Parishad Act, does not conform with Article 59 of the 
Constitution. The Article states that ‘local government in every administrative unit of the 
Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with law.’ 
The advisory role of the MPs in the upazila parishads disempowers the upazila parishads as 
an autonomous LGI (Sowdagar 2013). Both the BAL and BNP consider the upazila parishad 
as an impediment to sustaining their powerbase in the community. They perceive that the 
upazila system threatens the authority of their MPs. In 2008, the military- backed caretaker 
government promulgated a new upazila parishad ordinance and abolished the advisory role 
of the MPs. It is noteworthy that the military- backed caretaker government took the judi-
cious measure to safeguard the local democracy, while successive civilian governments have 
used their authority (or legal façade) at the centre to choke the democratic system in the 
country. After the 2008 elections, the BAL-dominated parliament reinstated the role of the 
MPs in the upazila parishad. The opposition BNP did not oppose that. They expected that 
this provision would also benefit them when they return to power in the future. With the 
reinstatement of MPs in the upazila parishads, the elected representatives of the LGIs became 
hostage to the authority of the MPs and administrative apparatus of the national govern-
ment. Party loyalty became the precondition for the selection of upazila level positions 
(Islam 2018).
The country’s central bureaucracy is responsible for the civil servants’ recruitments, 
placements, promotions and dismissals. The existing political culture requires the officials 
posted in the local governments to maintain relationship with the MPs and other leaders of the 
ruling party. Bureaucrats are often obliged to include beneficiaries recommended by an MP for 
various social safety net programmes of the government. According to Khan (2015), politiciza-
tion of the administration has become the norm rather than an exception under highly authori-
tarian national governments in Bangladesh. As a result, the public administration has lost its 
edge in delivering public services to the citizens. The Bangladesh Upazila Parishad Association 
finds the upazila nirbahi (executive) officers as new rulers at the upazila level (Prothom Alo 
2021). Their bureaucratic attitudes constrain the elected officials in performing their roles. 
Many consider neglecting the elected officials of the upazila parishad is a ploy to establish a 
feudal rule. The civil servants posted in the upazilas and districts are perceived to be more 
powerful than locally elected leadership. In fact, as the saying goes local bureaucrats do not serve 
under the LGIs, rather elected representatives of the LGIs are being made to serve under them. 
Overall, the interference of the civil servants in the LGIs has damaged the fabric between the 
citizens and LGIs.
Neither the ruling BAL nor the opposition BNP had a principled stand on the independ-
ence of the upazila parishad. The BNP did not oppose the advisory role of the MPs in the 
upazila parishad in the first place, expecting to use it for their advantage. Now they have voiced 
their concern of the section 25 of the upazila parishad act of 1998. The opposition political 
groups have had an insignificant representation in parliament during the last two terms, and the 
ruling BAL did not agree with their demand for dropping section 25. In 2019, an MP of the 
opposition BNP raised the issue of repealing section 25 in parliament. The government ruled 
out any possibility of removing the roles of the MPs in the upazila parishad from the upazila 
parishad act of 1998 (UNB News 2019). Parliament is unlikely to allow the LGIs to freely per-
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environment. The administrative apparatus of the state remains loyal to the national govern-
ment and political masters, and lacks respect for the elected officials of the LGIs. The Local 
Government Division’s (LGD) holding of power to exercise control over the activities of the 
LGIs and mandatory advisory function MPs has further complicated the situation for the LGIs 
(As- Saber 2009). Thus, the LGIs have to remain heavily dependent on the national govern-
ment. Their transparency and accountability to the citizens are compromised. They could not 
be self- governing institutions but an extension of the national government (Panday 2011).
The interference of any officials or an MP who are elected in the LGIs contradicts the ver-
dict of the apex court of Bangladesh. The Chief Justice of the country described the situation 
in a full court judgment as local governments are ‘…meant for management of local affairs by 
the locally elected persons. If government officers or their henchmen are brought to run the 
local bodies, there is no sense in retaining them as Local Government bodies’ (Kudrat- E- Elahi 
Panir v Bangladesh 1992).
Elimination of the opposition at the local level
The BNP and other opposition political groups paid a high price for the unprincipled com-
promise with the ruling BAL in trying to dominate upazila parishad by granting the MPs an 
advisory role. Just a few months ahead of the 2014 national election under the BAL- led admin-
istration, the victory of the opposition BNP- backed mayors in the city corporation elections in 
June– July 2013 rendered the BAL anxious. The opposition political groups started expounding 
the results of the city elections as an indication of citizens’ support towards the demand for an 
election- time caretaker government to conduct the 2014 national election. The BNP and other 
opposition political groups declared boycotting the national election unless the election- time 
caretaker government system was reinstated. The elected officials of various LGIs from the 
opposition groups were active in the street protests demanding reinstatement of the caretaker 
government system to hold the national election in 2014. The BAL government accused them 
in many cases over their suspected involvement in the political violence like arson attacks, sabo-
tage, vandalism, etc. Although, the government could not prove any allegations brought against 
them in court, they started targeting opposition-controlled local governments. The ruling BAL 
did not want to take chances and decided to abandon the election time caretaker government 
system. The targeting of the elected officials of the LGIs who had won from the opposition 
groups set a new precedent of autocratization by the BAL- led government in the country. As 
a result, the BAL had undermined the political opposition and extended its patronage roots 
further into the local communities to consolidate its position to cling to power (Lewis and 
Hossain 2019).
The interference of the government in the city corporations and other LGIs has jeopardized 
the connections between the citizens and LGIs and affected the service delivery to the citizens. 
The interference has become incremental and led to shrinking of the democratic space in the 
local governments and accountability of the LGIs to the citizens. In Khulna, Sylhet, Rajshahi, 
Gazipur and Barisal, for example, candidates from the opposition BNP won elections in the 
city corporations in the 2013 elections. However, the elected mayors in Sylhet, Rajshahi and 
Gazipur could hardly perform their mayoral roles. They were suspended on several occasions 
under section 12 of the Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009, which provides a legal 
basis for the suspension of a mayor or a councillor if he/ she is convicted or charge- sheeted in a 
criminal case. While many councillors of different city corporations who belonged to the ruling 
BAL and were charge- sheeted in criminal cases were allowed to perform their duties, opposition 
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of city corporations and municipalities, twenty- eight upazila chairmen, thirteen upazila vice 
chairmen and more than 150 union parishad chairmen and members between 2014 and 2015 
(New Age 2017). They were charge- sheeted in different cases like arson and murder, but none 
was convicted by the courts in the end. The charges brought against the elected officials were 
apparently politically motivated. The Rajshahi mayor challenged the legality of the suspension 
order against him in 2017. The supreme court found an arbitrary exercise of discretionary power 
to suspend the mayor. Also, the court directed the LGD to inform the authorities concerned 
in the government and parliament to take steps to amend the provision on suspension of city 
mayors and councillors (The Daily Star 2017). The incidents of suspension of the elected officials 
have not stopped after the verdict nor has the government or parliament taken any measures to 
amend the act. The ruling party has been using the section of the act as means to control or 
diminish the power of the elected officials from the opposition political groups.
Elections on an uneven playing field
Amendments were made in all local government acts to introduce party- based local govern-
ment elections in 2015. However, the party- based local government elections have so far failed 
to boost a constructive political climate. The UPs were the first LGI to go for party- based 
elections from March 3 to June 4, 2016. Incidents of selling of party nominations by the leaders 
of the BAL, BNP and others were rampant as the system created a scope for the local party 
leaders to get involved in corrupt practices (Panday 2019). In the UP elections, 145 people 
were killed, a record 214 were elected uncontested and 212 of them were from the ruling BAL 
(The Daily Star 2016).
In 2016, the first ever zila parishad elections were held in December. Since the Zila Parishad 
Act, 2000 does not have a provision for universal adult franchise, the 21- member body of the 
leadership of zila parishads was indirectly elected by the elected officials of other LGIs of the 
district. Although the voting in the zila parishads elections was held in a non- partisan manner 
(unlike the other elections for the LGIs), the candidates were aligned with political parties. 
Nearly all electorates for the zila parishads belong to the ruling BAL. Candidates who belonged 
to the ruling party won all positions in the zila parishads. The candidates from the opposition 
political groups hardly had any chance to be elected for any positions in the zila parishads. 
Hence, no opposition political groups dared to participate in the elections.
The elections of the LGIs are no more trustworthy, credible and competitive as a whole. 
Elections since 2016 have only deepened the feeling of despair among the general public 
and greatly weakened the country’s democratic polity. The opposition BNP boycotted local 
elections in the first half of 2019, and the country saw an historically low turnout of voters 
on the polling day (Freedom House 2020). Since the eleventh parliamentary elections held on 
December 30, 2018, the voter turnout has been declining. The voter turnout for the Dhaka 
North City Corporation on February 28, 2019 was only 30%. It was 40% in the five- phase 
upazila parishad elections in 2019. On February 1, 2020, the voter turnouts were 25.85% and 
29.07% for the Dhaka North City Corporation and Dhaka South City Corporation elections. 
The Daily Star reported an astonishingly low number of voters turned out at the centres in the 
city corporation elections in Dhaka. The poor voter turnout dampened the spirit common in 
elections in the country. Almost all the poll observers at the centres were for the mayoral and 
councillor candidates from the ruling BAL (The Daily Star 2020).
The poor voter turnout is a direct result of low levels of public trust in the election 
commission. The highly politicized election commission of the country failed in holding any 
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machines (EVMs) in the elections. The EVM system in Bangladesh has no provision for a voter 
verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) or verified paper record (VPR) (Karim 2020). Introduction 
of the VVPAT could give confidence to the voters and the contesting parties against possible 
election fraud and malfunction. A majority of the opposition political parties and citizens’ 
groups in Bangladesh are concerned by using the EVMs as the election officials lack credibility. 
However, the ruling BAL favours using the EVMs in the elections.
The government machinery controls each of the key stages of any contested election, such 
as campaigning, polling and declaring results. The end result is such that the elections are par-
ticipatory, while their outcomes are not credible at all. The level playing field does not exist 
for the candidates in the local government elections. The election observers of an opposition 
candidate are not allowed to stay in the polling stations. The pattern has been common for the 
local government elections in Bangladesh.
The election preparation and campaign by opposition candidates are often obstructed by 
filing frivolous lawsuits against them. Candidates from the opposition political groups were 
prevented from contesting the municipal polls in 2015. About 3,000 activists of the opposition 
BNP were arrested in a single week before the elections (Mazumdar 2016). The trend has not 
changed as the municipal elections were taking place in January 2021. Violence and irregular-
ities in the polling process made candidates from the BNP withdraw from the elections (New 
Age Online 2021).
Elections that were held in various LGIs of the country between December 2020 and 
January 2021 have made it clear that the election process has become one- sided and less com-
petitive. The election commission, civil administration and law enforcing agencies have all 
worked in favour of the ruling party candidates in the municipalities and city corporation. All 
of which had a detrimental impact on citizens’ participation in local democracy. To give one 
example, the voter turnout in the Chattogram City Corporation election held on January 27, 
2021 was only 22.52%.
The BAL- backed mayoral candidate got all votes in 13 polling centres, while the BNP- 
backed candidates did not get any vote in 22 centres in the Chattogram City Corporation 
election. The ruling BAL-backed candidates and dissident BAL candidates won all the positions 
there. Elections in Chattogram, the second largest city of the country, mirrored what had 
happened in the elections in 83 municipalities on December 28, 2020 and January 16, 2021. 
The ruling BAL won 18 out of 23 and 40 out of 60 mayoral positions on December 28, 2020 
and January 16, 2021 respectively. Intimidation of the opposition candidates and their election 
agents, obstruction of voters, capturing of polling stations, stuffing of ballot papers in ballot 
boxes and violence by the ruling BAL activists marred all the elections in the LGIs (Hossain 
2021; New Age 2021).
In some instances, midway through the election day, the opposition candidates withdrew 
from the elections with allegations of irregularities in the polling process. According to Riaz 
(2019), the election commission in collusion with the civil administration, law enforcing 
agencies and ruling BAL party activists ensured victory to the ruling party.
Out of 40 candidates for the councillor positions nominated by the opposition BNP for the 
Chattogram City Corporation elections held on January 27, 2021, some 29 were accused in 
criminal offences. The number was only four for the candidates of the ruling BAL. The charges 
brought against the opposition political activists were ‘gayebi’ or false according to the candidates 
from the BNP. Bringing charges against the political rivals serves as a strategy of the ruling party 
to obstruct them from election campaigning (Ghosh and Hasan 2020).
More recently, accusing the ruling party of winning the local elections by vote rigging and 
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upcoming local elections in April 2021 (New Age 2021). It is very likely that the elections 
in 4,571 UPs scheduled to start in April 2021would be one- sided and candidates loyal to the 
ruling party would win in all the UPs.
The unfair and dubious elections have implications for democracy at the local level and 
service delivery to the citizens by the LGIs. The citizens’ ability to hold the elected officials 
accountable for their service delivery is severely constrained. A nomination of the ruling party 
often guarantees a victory to a candidate in the election. The outcome is poor planning and 
implementation of development schemes and selection of beneficiaries for different services. As 
a result of these unfair and dubious elections, the local politicians have become more loyal to 
the ruling party than to the people they are supposed to be serving.
The Bangladesh country report of Freedom House has mentioned the concerns of the 
opposition political groups and international election observers of the lack of independence of 
the election commission and its biased attitudes. Unfair election practices favoured the ruling 
party in the country’s general elections held in 2018 (Freedom House 2020). On December 
14, 2020, a group of 42 distinguished citizens requested the President of the Republic form a 
Supreme Judicial Council to probe graft allegations against election commission officials. They 
requested they investigate ‘irregularities in the 11th Parliamentary Election and elections in 
Dhaka (North and South) City Corporations, Khulna City Corporation, and Gazipur City 
Corporation’ (Tithila 2020). The election commission and executive branch of the govern-
ment will not be able to work independently and with integrity as long as they serve under 
an authoritarian government. Diamond (2015) observed that democracy would not return 
anytime soon to the country. The outcomes of the elections evidently strengthen the control 
of the ruling elites of the country over the LGIs at the cost of the independence and growth 
of the latter.
Monopolization of the LGIs
The LGIs are greatly politicized as a result of the confrontational politics and disrespect for 
democratic norms and institutions. Monopolization of the local government system and its 
resources has reduced the effectiveness of the LGIs in the country. This monopolization by 
a ruling party is termed partyarchy (Coppedge 1994). The partyarchy has adversely affected 
the service provisions in the LGIs and undermined democracy at the local level. As a result, 
service provisions by the LGIs are being marred by irregularities and corruption. A number 
of elected officials in different LGIs allegedly embezzled government cash aid and relief for 
the targeted beneficiaries during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic in the country (Dhaka 
Tribune 2020).
The monopolization of all state institutions and resources including the LGIs by the party 
in power has weakened the formal accountability mechanisms of the LGIs and put govern-
ance in crisis (Osman 2010). The ruling BAL has succeeded in capturing the majority of the 
LGIs of the country through coercive and undemocratic means. Coercion in the elections 
process ensured control of the ruling party over the LGIs at the expense of local democracy. 
The coercive force has also greatly undermined the legitimacy of the elected bodies of the 
LGIs in the country.
At present, over 90% of the municipal mayors and upazila parishad and UP chairmen are 
from the BAL. Out of 12 city corporations, only two have mayors from the main opposition 
party, BNP. The loyalty of the elected officials to their party bosses is damaging the checks 
and balances of democracy. The LGIs remain engaged in implementing the agenda set by the 
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Two major problems to tackle in order to make local democracy work
In Bangladesh, the overriding problem for making local democracy work is the lack of capacity 
of LGIs, which is a function of autonomy. When local governments are assigned to perform 
certain functions, they should be given sufficient resources to fulfil their obligations together 
with freedom to design their own policies (Widmalm 2008). Otherwise, without autonomy 
to exercise discretion local governments will never develop capacity. According to Widmalm, 
‘[t] he most central aspect of decentralization concerns the extent to which real power is moved 
downwards in the administrative or democratic structure’ (Widmalm 2008: p. 44).
Although the LGIs in Bangladesh have been assigned to perform important responsibilities, 
they lack the means to independently perform those functions. This can be attributed to the 
failure of the national government to empower the elected officials with necessary author-
ities, resources and responsibilities to establish control over local bureaucracy and perform their 
duties. The LGIs remain merely a playground for the political parties in Bangladesh to exhibit 
their strengths every five years during the elections (Ahmed 2019). Configurations of the LGIs 
have often been changed for strengthening the powerbase of the ruling party of the country. 
The political dividends of changes in the LGIs to ruling parties are significant. Often the reasons 
for reconfiguration of the LGIs are to increase popularity in the voting population and create 
new spaces to accommodate more party leaders.
The UPs are one of the oldest democratic institutions in Bangladesh, predating the inde-
pendence of the country, although, they are not well staffed and well resourced. The Local 
Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 provides a detailed organizational structure and lists 
positions to be filled. However, the national government controls the recruitment, salary and 
benefits, disciplinary measures etc. of the civil servants posted in the UPs. The UPs are allowed 
to appoint additional staff with prior approval of the government. They lack resources to 
finance the salary and allowances of any additional staff. In reality, therefore, no UP can afford 
to appoint any staff on their own. Until 2009, the secretary was the only full- time staff in UPs. 
The offices of the deputy commissioner at the district level have started recruiting the accounts 
assistants for the UPs in 2019. Out of 4,571 UPs, only a few now have two full- time staff.
According to the UP act, the government was required to specify the controlling power of 
UPs over the civil servants working at the union level through notifications. Yet no government 
has come forward to assign the civil servants working at the unions under the administrative 
control of the UPs to augment the staffing capacity. Thus, the UPs lack managerial capability 
and resources to provide service delivery to the citizens (Aminuzzaman 2010).
At the zila parishad level, the situation is more dire. Despite the elections that took place in 
the zila parishads for the first time in the country, the locally elected political leadership could 
not get a visible grasp of the local bureaucracy. The MPs and civil servants based in the district 
headquarters have been playing a major role in decision making since 2009 and they continue 
to do so (Ahmed 2016).
The second major hurdle in front of local democracy is the lack of financial resources for 
LGIs to perform their constitutionally assigned functions. The financial insolvency and politi-
cization of financing prevent the LGIs developing the necessary capacities to be autonomous 
local government units in the service of their citizens. The ruling parties have done very little 
to improve the intergovernmental fiscal system. The share of local government expenditures 
in the national budget for the fiscal year 2020/ 21 is only 7% (Macroeconomic Wing 2020). 
As there are duplicative distributions of functional responsibility among the LGIs and between 
the LGIs and administrative apparatus, it is difficult to estimate the expenditure needs of the 
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are surviving on budgetary support in the form of grant- in- aid from the national govern-
ment and occasional assistance from the international donors. In the fiscal year, 2017/ 18, the 
UPs, pourashavas and city corporations spent USD 6.1, USD 18.0 and USD 44.2 per resident 
respectively (World Bank 2020). Although LGIs have an entitlement over the share of national 
resources, dependence on national government transfers has resulted in the losing of autonomy 
by the LGIs (Siddiqui 2014).
The grant- in- aid doesn’t judiciously consider population, area, special needs and past per-
formance of an LGI to allocate and disburse resources. At present, the World Bank-financed 
Local Governance Support Projects (LGSP) have been providing direct block grants to all 
UPs and a few municipalities. The LGSPs aimed at establishing an efficient and transparent 
intergovernmental fiscal system. Nonetheless, the LGSP model for intergovernmental transfer 
remained limited mainly to the UPs and dependent on external financing. The tax base of the 
LGIs could be strengthened by empowering them to take more control of the tax collection 
in their respective constituencies. Taxes on property transfer, land development and proceeds 
from markets, water estates, issuance of licences etc. are some potential sources of revenues for 
the LGIs. The distribution of authority among different LGIs on tax collection in some areas 
like leasing, issuing licences etc. lacks clarity too. The tax base of the LGIs remains insufficient 
to support service delivery to the citizens. The government could not give an enabling envir-
onment to the local government system to improve the prevailing situation.
Loyalty of the elected officials to the ruling party always put the LGIs in an advantageous 
position to receive financial support from the national government. In addition to accessing 
financial resources, the loyalty gives them impunity in case of irregularities too (Sabina, Khan 
and Badiuzzaman 2015). On the other hand, local jurisdictions managed by opposition parties 
are penalized. In the last five years, the mayors elected from the opposition BNP in thirty muni-
cipalities got less allocation for their projects than the mayors from the ruling BAL (Rahman 
2021). Politicization of the financing deprived the citizens of municipal services who elected 
mayors from the opposition political groups.
The discriminatory behaviour of the government has ramifications for the future of local 
democracy. The ability of the local governments to respond to the preferences of its citizens is 
inseparably tied to the democratic system and its practice of a country. The opposition political 
groups would be inclined to mobilize their supporters for bigger protests if the authoritarianism 
is further entrenched in the country and the ruling BAL is not willing to give any of the levers 
of power. The protests by the opposition in Bangladesh often lead to political violence in the 
end. Ultimately, the LGIs will be losing their relevance in the local development and growth 
of democratic polity at large.
A future to look forward to?
The local governments are described in general terms in the Constitution of Bangladesh and 
they do not enjoy constitutional guarantees (Ahmed 2016). Although parliament is entrusted 
with the task of bringing the legal framework for the LGIs, there are questions about the inde-
pendence of the legislative branch from the executive branch. The existing legal frameworks 
for the local governments have kept back most of the governing power with the national gov-
ernment, as the attributes of a unitary state are very dominant in the psyche of the ruling elites. 
Therefore, in order to safeguard the tenets of local democracy, the LGIs need some constitutional 
guarantees for autonomy and access to financial resources to deliver services to the citizens.
Few acts related to local government have provisions for the unelected officials to inter-
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authority of the MPs. The act made it mandatory for the upazila parishads to accept 
their advice (Mazumdar 2010). The apex court of the country showed judicial activism 
in interpreting the constitutional principles of local- level democracy: ‘Parliament is not 
free to legislate on local government ignoring Articles 59 and 60’ (Kudrat- E- Elahi Panir v 
Bangladesh 1992).
Bangladesh has never witnessed any initiative of two major parties, BAL and BNP, to estab-
lish an effective self- governing local government system. The LGIs merely remain as extensions 
of the national government with limited citizens’ engagement. The interference of the ruling 
party to capture the LGIs has increased manifold during the last decade. Yet, the introduc-
tion of the party- based local government system can potentially become a blessing in disguise. 
Hankala, Martinez- Vazquez and Rodriguez (2019) emphasized the need for balancing between 
democratic decentralization and party integration. Notwithstanding, democratic decentraliza-
tion entails competitive local elections to generate accountability and incentivize local leaders 
to improve governance. On the other hand, integrated parties would pass down national 
preferences to the local level (Hankala, Martinez- Vazquez and Rodriguez 2019). The country 
would await an environment for the fair, honest and free elections for the LGIs.
One of the most destructive legacies of the authoritarian rule in Bangladesh would be 
numerous attempts to monopolize and weaken the local government system. Unqualified 
leaderships are brought in by the LGIs who are chosen for their political loyalty to the ruling 
party. Also, the influence and dominance of the self- serving bureaucrats over the LGIs have 
now increased manifold. Attempts to centralize roles and responsibilities of the LGIs have 
shrunk the democratic spaces and exposed the continuing autocratization trend in the country. 
A vibrant local government system in Bangladesh could thwart the ongoing autocratization 
process and pave the way for a transition to a liberal democratic rule.
Glossary
1. Union – The lowest tier of administration in Bangladesh
2. Parishad – Council
3. Union Parishad – Union Council, a local government institution
4. Upazila – Sub- district, the second tier of administration in Bangladesh
5. Upazila Parishad – Upazila Council, a local government institution
6. Zila – District, the administrative tier above sub- district in Bangladesh
7. Zila Parishad – District Council, a local government institution
8. Pourashava – Municipality, an urban local government institution
9. City Corporation – Local government institution in a large city
10. Constitution – Constitution of Bangladesh
11. Swanirvar gram sarker – Self- reliant village government
12. Non- partisan caretaker government – Election time government in Bangladesh
13. Electoral breakdown – a term describing assault on de jure safeguard mechanisms for free and 
fair elections
14. Upazila nirbahi officers – Upazila Executive Officer
15. Local Government Division – A national government agency under the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives
16. Partyarchy – Dominance over the various state and non- state institutions by the political 
parties
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Sri Lankans take pride in their island being Asia’s oldest democracy— given that the country 
achieved universal suffrage in 1931, some seventeen years before independence and merely three 
years after Britain allowed the vote for all its citizens. Since independence in 1948, the island has 
evidenced competitive politicking, with parties/ coalitions alternating in power at the national 
level multiple times and dozens of elections held at the local and provincial levels. Political par-
ticipation has also been high, with turnout at the 2015 and 2019 presidential elections exceeding 
80 percent. Yet this is also a country that has hardly gone a decade since independence without 
experiencing major violence in the form of ethnic riots and pogroms, left- wing insurgencies, 
and a grotesque civil war between majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils that lasted nearly 
thirty years (DeVotta 2019). In the past decade, since the ethnic conflict ended in 2009, Christian 
Evangelicals and especially Muslims have experienced episodic violence thanks to prominent 
politicians and Buddhist monks fanning communalism (DeVotta 2018).
Sri Lanka thus represents a democratic paradox: its citizens passionately value the franchise 
and the country holds relatively free and fair elections even while tolerating ethnoreligious vio-
lence. The added irony is that much of the ethnoreligious violence is promoted and justified 
in the name of Buddhism, given that the island is viewed as a sanctuary for Buddha’s teachings 
and Sinhalese nationalists consequently insist on Buddhist superordination and minority subor-
dination. Post- independence Sri Lanka initially looked like it was on the road to being a liberal 
democracy. However, the Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism that took root made the country 
into an ethnocracy, in that the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology undermines equal citi-
zenship by dictating that minorities live in the island thanks to majority sufferance (Uyangoda 
1994; DeVotta 2007).
The mainly state- sanctioned and - tolerated violence that continues to get perpetrated with 
impunity to promote majoritarianism disqualifies the island being branded a liberal democracy 
notwithstanding its competitive and inclusive politics. To rank as a liberal democracy, a country 
must go beyond merely holding competitive and inclusive elections; it must also uphold civil 
liberties for all citizens irrespective of ethnicity and religion, ensure an independent judiciary 
that fearlessly enforces the rule of law, tolerate civil society, minimize corruption, and balance 











liberal democracy in even democratically consolidated societies is a work in progress. This is 
because opportunistic leaders and populist movements can quickly undermine even robust 
democratic institutions. The specific causes promoting such destabilization in a particular 
country may vary, but some overarching reasons attributed for the ongoing global democratic 
regression include demo- sclerosis in the United States, the Iraq War and the attendant de- 
legitimation of democracy promotion, the proclivity among some Eastern European elites for 
soft- authoritarianism, illiberal populism in western democracies stemming from an aversion 
to globalization and immigration, and China’s spectacular rise and support for authoritarian 
leaders (Diamond 2019b; The Economist 2014).
For much of the world’s history people lived under authoritarian rule. Indeed, even today 
approximately 68 percent of the global population lives in autocratic states (Alizada et al. 2021, 
7). The compromises and individual self- restraint required to ensure democracy, especially in 
ethnoreligious societies rife with crosscutting cleavages, are so daunting that it makes the quest 
for democracy appear foolhardy and arrogant. It is with good reason Rousseau noted that “If 
there were a people of Gods, it would govern itself democratically. Such a perfect government is 
not suited to men” (Quoted in Simon 2004, 433). Yet Rousseau himself and others urged soci-
eties to aspire towards democracy because it remains the political system most likely to promote 
peace and economic growth. If it is widely acknowledged that democracies tend not to wage 
war against fellow democracies (Russett 1993), it is also clear that people living in authoritarian 
states are more likely to suffer from famine, endure greater rates of poverty and mental illness, 
and also experience lower life expectancy (Kasparov and Halvorssen 2017).
If communism’s demise as a dominant ideology seemed to suggest democracy was bound 
to be the only governance game in town, this was arguably because scholars and policymakers 
initially overlooked how elites in post- communist and post- authoritarian states with a proclivity 
to stay in power by hook or by crook were deft at manipulating societal cleavages to do so. 
Such elites and the hybrid regimes that consequently ensued have not only compromised these 
newly- democratized states (Carothers 2018), they have also goaded leaders in established dem-
ocracies to embrace illiberal tactics to perpetuate power.
While the exact causes and extent of ongoing autocratization may be disputed (Levitsky 
and Ziblatt 2018; Mechkova, Luhrmann, and Lindberg 2017), we can agree that it “entails a 
deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance” (Waldner and Lust 2018, 95). 
And while it is hard to pinpoint when precisely recent autocratization begins, the factors con-
tributing to it are easily recognizable. These include corruption, executives seeking to operate 
extra- constitutionally and extra- judicially, and the state’s inability to meet citizens’ most basic 
needs (Diamond 2019a, 20). The manipulation of ethnoreligious cleavages and persecution of 
minorities for political gain and the absence of the rule of law, which prevents elites from being 
held to the same standards as everyone else, are other clear warning signs that the process of 
autocratization is in the works. As Larry Diamond notes, “No liberal democracy has ever just 
suddenly had a heart attack and died … . And it [does not] take the political scientist’s version 
of a cholesterol test or an EKG to spot the emerging symptoms” (ibid). Consequently, while 
the world is yet to experience a full- blown third reverse wave leading to a large number of 
states ceasing to be democracies, there is no disputing that there has been a trend away from 
liberal democracy in the past fourteen years (Repucci 2020; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; 
Chu, Huang, Lagos, and Mattes 2020). Sri Lanka under especially the Rajapaksa family has 
contributed to this, although presidents who preceded the Rajapaksas laid the groundwork for 
autocratization.
Various exigencies can contribute to democratic backsliding. In Sri Lanka’s case, 
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led to security and sovereignty being privileged above individual rights and freedoms, and this 
cluster of factors especially compromised liberal aspects of democracy. Whatever the galvan-
izing reason at a given time, backsliding entails institutions that ensure transparency and hori-
zontal accountability being weakened. It leads to checks on executive power being eroded, 
which typically gets done via new laws or referenda. The ensuing “executive aggrandize-
ment” compromises good governance and promotes hybrid regimes (Bermeo 2016). In such 
instances, the pressure western democracies put on such regimes to counter their assault on 
civil society, civil liberties, and the rule of law could encourage opportunistic leaders to move 
closer to authoritarian states. Here too Sri Lanka stands out given how the Rajapaksas have 
gravitated towards China as part of a symbiotic relationship that has exacerbated corruption 
and autocratization.
That noted, democratic regression in Sri Lanka was baked at home and took shape in the 
1950s, when Sinhalese Buddhist politicians eschewed consensus politics and instead pursued 
majoritarian politics that unleashed civil war. It is Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism combined 
with the civil war and authoritarian proclivities of certain leaders that compromised the island’s 
democracy and pushed it in an autocratic direction (Tambiah 1986; Wilson 1988). In what 
follows, this essay briefly discusses how ethnonationalism contributed to democratic erosion 
in the island before critiquing the presidencies of Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005 to 2015) and 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, brothers who together with their grasping family are most responsible 
for autocratization in Sri Lanka. The challenges stemming from the COVID- 19 pandemic 
may have stymied Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s majoritarian agenda, but the ensuing health and 
socioeconomic crises have allowed him to further militarize the island in ways that will make 
reversing autocratization extra difficult.
Ethnonationalism and democratic regression
As per Sri Lanka’s most recent census, the Sinhalese comprise 74.9 percent of the population, 
while Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Muslims are 11.2 percent, 4.1 percent, and 9.3 per-
cent, respectively. In terms of religion, Buddhists are 70.1 percent, while Hindus, Christians, 
and Muslims are 12.6 percent, 7.6 percent, and 9.7 percent, respectively (Department of Census 
and Statistics Sri Lanka 2011). The island’s demographics necessitated checks against major-
itarianism. The absence of such structural constraints ensured it was only a matter of time 
before ambitious politicians played the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist card to attain office. What 
ensued was a phenomenon of ethnic outbidding, which led to the main political parties— 
United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)— competing against each 
other on who could best provide for the majority community at the expense of especially the 
Tamil minority (DeVotta 2004).
Consequently, while Sri Lanka began its post- independence journey smacking of a liberal 
democracy, with one scholar noting that among the decolonized states the island had “the 
best chance of making a successful transition to modern statehood” (Wriggins 1961, 316), this 
promise was sundered within a decade. By the time the Sinhala language was instituted as the 
island’s only official language in 1956, amidst riots against minority Tamils, the country was 
well on the way to becoming an ethnocracy, wherein belonging to the culturally dominant 
Sinhalese Buddhist nation trumps being a citizen of Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2018, 278; Smooha 
2002). This is clear when one looks at the anti- minority and majoritarian policies that were 
instituted by the time the island celebrated a quarter century of independence in 1973: Tamil 
civil servants were forced to learn Sinhala to be promoted; Sinhalese civil servants were stationed 











into the courts system, including in the predominantly Tamil northeast region that Tamils con-
sider part of their historic homeland; Tamil areas were provided little development assistance 
despite foreign aid earmarked for these regions; publications promoting Tamil culture from 
nearby Tamil Nadu state in India were banned; Tamil students were required to score higher 
than their Sinhalese peers to enter university; a quota system was developed to ensure that 
rural Sinhalese students got into the university more easily; and Sinhalese from the south were 
transplanted to the northeast to promote Sinhalese colonization and alter the region’s demo-
graphics. Additionally, Buddhism was provided the foremost place within the 1972 constitu-
tion. Thus, illiberal populism rooted in ethnonationalism has long been a feature of Sri Lankan 
politics (DeVotta 2002).
Majoritarianism engenders sullen minorities, and it is hardly surprising that Tamil youth 
felt the urge to rebel. When a Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission was set up to 
analyze the civil war, its members baldly said that “The root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka lies in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the 
Tamil people” (quoted in Minority Rights Group International 2014). As one author aptly 
noted when referring to the anti- Tamil policies that were instituted, “If the gods had wished 
to destroy, the madness of Sri Lanka’s rulers gave them every opportunity” (Harris 1990, 222).
It is debatable if an ethnically tranquil Sri Lanka will have prevented certain leaders from 
acting in authoritarian vein, but it is indisputable that the ethnic conflict enabled authoritar-
ianism. In this context, the semi- presidential constitution instituted in 1978 allowed President 
J. R. Jayewardene to act arrogantly, while the war and its triumphalist aftermath allowed 
Mahinda Rajapaksa to operate autocratically. Ultimately, while the actions of these two leaders 
especially nudged the country towards autocratization, the expanding militarization and major-
itarianism under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is ramping up autocratization in the island.
Constitutions designed for democratic societies ideally incorporate checks and balances as 
a way to institutionalize stability over the long term. Jayewardene’s constitution, however, was 
partly designed to ensure the UNP stayed perpetually dominant (Oberst 1984). Jayewardene 
was wont to brag that the only thing he could not do under his constitution was change a man 
into a woman and vice versa. In this spirit, he amended the constitution 16 times between 1978 
and 1988, often in partisan and whimsical fashion. In 1980 he vindictively stripped SLFP leader 
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike of her civic rights for seven years (in retaliation for her previous 
extension of SLFP rule by two years until 1977) and expelled her from parliament, thereby 
ensuring that his most effective opponent could not challenge him for reelection in 1982. He 
then refused to hold scheduled parliamentary elections that would most certainly have led to a 
loss of seats for the UNP and instead held a severely compromised referendum that extended 
the party’s five- sixths majority for another term. He even forced all UNP ministers to turn in 
signed but undated resignation letters, which ensured that they followed his dictates. His atti-
tude toward the democratic process was best captured when he boasted:
We are contesting the election to win and at a time most favorable to us. We intend 
… to demolish and completely destroy the opposition politically. After that I say to 
you, roll up the electoral map of Sri Lanka. You will not need it for another ten years.
(Samarakone 1984, 86)
Jayewardene used his power to dominate and assault those who crossed him. For instance, he 
used hoodlums belonging to the UNP’s labor union to suppress strikes, beat protesters, harass 
journalists and Supreme Court justices, and attack political opponents. These forces were also 
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this took place amidst the escalating ethnic conflict, which helped justify executive overreach. 
Ranasinghe Premadasa, Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga 
followed Jayewardene as executive presidents between 1989 and 2005, with Wijetunga serving 
just 18 months to wrap up Premadasa’s term after the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) assassinated him in May 1993. While Premadasa and Kumaratunga engaged in 
petty politicking and also abused their authority as president, their regimes were more illiberal 
than autocratic. That changed when Mahinda Rajapaksa succeeded Kumaratunga.
Autocratization under Mahinda Rajapaksa
No president undermined democratic governance as effectively and ruthlessly as Mahinda 
Rajapaksa. Sinhalese Buddhists had long overlooked spreading illiberalism, because the 
ethnocracy that came with this benefitted them materially and those who faced the 
consequences of illiberalism were mainly Tamils (DeVotta 2021b). However, the post- war 
illiberalism President Rajapaksa and his family instituted sought to create a Rajapaksa dynasty 
by undermining the state. As one of President Rajapaksa’s younger brothers bragged in refer-
ence to family rule, “an era of ‘ruler kings’ has begun” (The Economist 2010, 49).
Rajapaksa became president in November 2005 and soon thereafter nearly 140 members of 
his immediate and extended family took over various government positions. Three Rajapaksa 
brothers, by virtue of controlling nearly 80 government portfolios, arrogated to themselves 
between 60 and 70 percent of the country’s budget. For instance, Mahinda Rajapaksa, besides 
being president, was also the minister for defense, finance, highways, planning, and ports and 
aviation. These combined portfolios placed 78 government institutions directly under his 
control. While charming and politically savvy, the president brooked little dissent. His older 
brother, Chamal, was Speaker of Parliament. His younger brother, Basil, was the Minister of 
Economic Development, which included the Board of Investment and the Tourist Promotion 
Bureau. Gotabaya, another brother who is now the island’s president, was the country’s Defense 
Secretary. In addition to superintending the armed forces, police, and coast guard, Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa also oversaw immigration and emigration, the Land Reclamation and Development 
Corporation, and the Urban Development Authority. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, Namal, was 
a member of parliament and was being groomed to succeed him. Namal and Basil routinely 
overrode decisions by ministers; and those seeking a government job typically had to have their 
approval. This led to a supine cabinet of ministers who dared not cross Rajapaksa lest they lost 
their positions and perks.
During the Rajapaksa years opposition politicians were harried, civil society was neutered, 
and thugs associated with the regime operated with impunity. Self- censorship was routine and 
those who criticized the regime or military were murdered or disappeared (Helf et al. 2015, 
3– 4). White vans operated by rouge units within the military were used for such purposes. 
Businesses, ranging from insurance companies to banks, were infiltrated via board membership 
and their policies influenced in ways that benefitted ruling politicians and hurt the regime’s 
competitors. Such autocratic capture allowed the government to starve independent media 
and the opposition of resources. Instead of accommodating the defeated and broken Tamils in 
some fashion, the regime further humiliated them especially in Northern Province by resorting 
to militarization and tolerating predatory behavior among soldiers and regime supporters 
(DeVotta 2016).
The extent of the government’s arrogance was evidenced when Rajapaksa targeted retired 
army commander Sarath Fonseka, who was responsible for the military strategy to defeat the 









dragged away from his office, court martialed for improper military procurements, divested of 
his civil rights and military honors, and sentenced to jail for three years.
The judiciary too was controlled, with telephone justice— whereby someone in the 
president’s or attorney general’s office called justices to tell them how to rule in certain cases— 
becoming common. The judiciary’s weakened position and the government’s authoritarian 
nature were especially highlighted when the country’s first ever female Chief Justice was 
impeached in January 2013. Her sin was to rule that a government program designed to transfer 
funds to the Rajapaksas for patronage purposes was unconstitutional. An irate president set up a 
Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) comprised of politicians from the ruling coalition that 
found her guilty of financial and official misconduct, which formed the basis for impeachment. 
This was done despite the Supreme Court ruling that the PSC had no right to investigate a 
senior judge and the Appeals Court ordering parliament to abandon the impeachment process. 
Civil society organizations, clergy members, foreign governments, and various international 
bodies likewise objected strenuously. President Rajapaksa disregarded their entreaties and sum-
marily signed the order removing the Chief Justice, even as pro- government goons brandishing 
poles gathered outside her official residence to make sure she relinquished her post.
Rajapaksa’s authoritarian proclivities were especially evident when he forced through 
the 18th Amendment to the constitution, which was incorporated in September 2010. The 
amendment abolished the 17th Amendment, which Sri Lanka’s parliament passed unanimously 
in 2001 when Chandrika Kumaratunga was president. While it failed to achieve full enforce-
ment, the amendment mandated the creation of a Constitutional Council with sole powers to 
appoint and dismiss commissioners overseeing elections, public service, police, finance, human 
rights, and bribery and corruption. The Constitutional Council was further empowered to 
appoint the chief justice and other justices in the Supreme Court, president and judges of 
the Court of Appeal, members of the Judicial Services Commission (excepting its chairman), 
attorney general, inspector general of police, auditor general, parliamentary commissioner for 
administration (or ombudsman), and secretary general of parliament. This was a belated attempt 
to halt political interference and promote independent, impartial, and professional operations 
among and within these institutions that were consistent with horizontal accountability (ibid).
The 18th Amendment did away with the Constitutional Council and empowered the presi-
dent to appoint personnel to lead the institutions under its purview. The 18th Amendment also 
permitted the president to contest more than two terms, which President Rajapaksa utilized 
to run for a third term in January 2015. The president engineered crossovers from the oppos-
ition to ensure he commanded the requisite two- thirds majority to pass the amendment, and 
by some accounts some of these politicians were paid over half a million dollars to abandon the 
parties under whose banner they got elected.
Chauvinistic nationalists and their antisocial behavior can also play a major role in under-
mining democracy (Howe 2017), and Sri Lanka clearly has a fair share of these constituencies. 
The ethnoreligious strife in the island has been a boon for such elements, and politicians, busi-
nessmen, and religious bigots have eagerly used them for opportunistic purposes. Foremost 
among these in recent times is a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist group called the Bodu Bala Sena 
(Buddhist Power Force, or BBS) that gained prominence by resorting to Islamophobia. The 
attacks against the Muslim community, which led to businesses, houses, and mosques being 
destroyed, were possible because the Mahinda Rajapaksa government tolerated the BBS and its 
ilk. Politics and cultural considerations rooted in Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and economics 
have combined to unleash this Islamophobia (Haniffa 2017). But the ability of forces close to 
the government to operate with impunity was a big reason for the periodic, well- orchestrated 
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Under Mahinda Rajapaksa, the attempts to prevent institutions operating independently 
and fan anti- minority sentiment were deliberate. The civil war against the ruthless and terrorist 
LTTE made doing so easier. The literature on exceptionalism suggests that during “excep-
tional” periods of crisis or transformation institutionalized norms, rules, and laws can become 
irrelevant and countries can, consequently, veer toward authoritarianism. For crises provide 
opportunities to superimpose radical change that established social orders may otherwise oppose 
(Neal 2006). The exceptions can be instituted via extrajudicial and extraconstitutional means 
or by simply creating new laws that overturn extant laws (Ericson 2007). With the state mainly 
responsible for ensuring security and sovereignty, even new bad laws are easily legitimated and 
institutionalized. When this takes place in relatively democratized societies, the inevitable result 
is a move toward illiberalism and autocratization.
Exceptionalism is rooted in fear and insecurity and therefore predisposes people to violence 
(Huysmans 2006). During the ethnic conflict, ensuring security came at the expense of minor-
ities’ civil liberties and civil rights. A case in point is the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA), which remains on the books. The Act allows the security forces to arrest, detain, and 
leave incommunicado for eighteen months anyone suspected of terrorist activities. Thousands 
of Tamils were dragooned using the PTA and recently dozens of Muslims have also been taken 
into custody using its statutes.
The illiberalism associated with exceptionalism enables untrammeled executive power in 
ways that undermine the rule of law (Huysmans 2008). In this regard, too, Sri Lanka stands 
out. Indeed, the exceptionalism that undergirded the island’s ethnocentric and counter terror 
policies is part of the same narrative and logic that was used to legitimize autocratic politics 
since it easily justified extraconstitutional and extrajudicial practices to ensure security. Civil 
wars necessitate counter-terror practices, and the longer the conflict the more draconian these 
practices can become. The upshot is that ethnic conflicts end up compromising democracy and 
over the long term can lead to authoritarianism (Horowitz 1993).
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s unexpected defeat in January 2015 was considered a win for dem-
ocracy. Notwithstanding corruption scandals that tarnished the regime’s reputation early on, 
the national unity government that succeeded Rajapaksa certainly enabled a freer society. And 
despite the serious anti- Muslim rioting that took place in a couple of instances, minorities 
felt more secure under this national unity government compared to the Rajapaksa years. This 
government also sought to institute ethnic reconciliation mechanisms in accordance with Sri 
Lanka’s agreements with the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), although the 
progress made was halting and slow. It, however, bungled intelligence reports that might have 
averted the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombings by Islamist terrorists on Christian churches 
and hotels that killed nearly 270 people. This coupled with the inability of President Maithripala 
Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to get along allowed Gotabaya Rajapaksa, 
the former defense secretary and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother, to win the presidential election 
in November 2019.
Autocratization under Gotabaya Rajapaksa
Gotabaya Rajapaksa capitalized on the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks and his leadership during 
the civil war and promised to institute effective government. Leading Buddhist monks and 
mainly Sinhalese Buddhist professionals fed up with the previous regime’s directionless gov-
ernance played a leading role in supporting his candidacy. Prominent serving and retired mili-
tary personnel likewise supported him. Consequently, the vast majority of Sinhalese Buddhists 










Sri Lanka under Gotabaya Rajapaksa represents a militarized ethnocracy. This is reflected 
in how post- election spoils have been doled out. For instance, only three of 35 secretaries to 
ministries are ethnic minorities, while nearly all major appointees to leading state agencies are 
Buddhists. A number of military personnel accused of having perpetrated war crimes during 
the civil war were rewarded with prominent positions immediately after Gotabaya became 
president. Indeed, one former soldier who was court- martialed and whose death sentence, for 
killing eight Tamil civilians (including four children), was upheld by the Supreme Court was 
summarily pardoned by the new president. Some among such so- called ranawiru (war heroes) 
are now being encouraged to run for parliament (The Island 2020a) through the Rajapaksas’ 
Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (Sri Lanka People’s Front, or SLPP) even as the president has 
threatened to yank the country from international bodies that level war crimes charges against 
Sri Lankan military personnel (The Island 2020b). This was done after the government with-
drew co- sponsorship of the UNHRC resolution, which the previous regime had initiated to 
pursue ethnic reconciliation and accountability for alleged war crimes during the civil war.
All this fits a pattern of disregarding minorities’ concerns. For instance, when Sri Lanka 
celebrated its Independence Day in February 2020 and 2021, the Gotabaya Rajapaksa gov-
ernment prevented the national anthem being sung in Tamil, which the previous regime had 
reintroduced. Additionally, checkpoints were erected in some parts of Northern Province 
and surveillance of Tamil areas especially increased. On the one hand, military personnel and 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have genuinely feared a recrudescence of Tamil separatism and 
the surveillance regime that was put in place in Tamil areas— partly using rehabilitated ex- 
LTTE cadre— is understandable. On the other hand, it is also clear that the surveillance system 
was used to keep Tamils marginalized and insecure even as avenues were created for Sinhalese 
Buddhist forces to colonize hitherto traditional Tamil (and Muslim) lands.
The Presidential Task Force for Archeological Heritage Management in the Eastern 
Province that the president created in June 2020 appears geared for this task. The Secretary 
to the Ministry of Defense, another retired military personnel alleged to have perpetrated war 
crimes, heads the task force, which initially comprised eleven members including two Buddhist 
monks. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who has set up a Buddhist Advisory Council com-
prising leading monks and meets with the group every month, subsequently added four more 
Buddhist monks to the task force. Over 75 percent of the population in Eastern Province are 
Tamils and Muslims, yet not one member from either community was included in the task 
force. The group’s sinister agenda was made amply clear when a gazette authorizing the expan-
sion of the task force stated that the archeological heritage in Eastern Province is influenced by 
Buddhism and hence “the guidance and patronage of the Venerable Maha Sangha is … needed” 
to identify and manage the relevant areas (The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka 2020). Nationalists want all nine provinces to contain mainly Sinhalese Buddhists, 
and a policy of ethnic flooding à la that pursued in China’s Tibet and Xinjiang regions could 
expeditiously achieve this result. In this regard, the expanding tentacles of China in the island 
not only stand to promote autocracy, they likely will also encourage ethnocracy.
The same day the task force pertaining to Eastern Province was created, Gotabaya Rajapaksa 
also created The Presidential Task Force to Build a Secure Country, Disciplined, Virtuous 
and Lawful Society. This body is comprised of military, intelligence, and police officials and 
its mandates appear designed to usurp the functions of civilian officials. Indeed, it is mili-
tary personnel that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has appointed to superintend the Sri Lanka 
Ports Authority, Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, Sri Lanka Customs, Consumer 
Affairs Authority, and Disaster Management Center. The president, who served in the military 
before emigrating to the United States seeking after greener pastures, has long held the police 
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force in low esteem, and he has now placed the police and Criminal Investigation Division 
under the Defense Ministry.
The burgeoning autocratization amidst militarization does not bode well for civil society. 
For no sooner had Gotabaya Rajapaksa become president, NGOs began to be interrogated 
about personnel, funding sources, and individuals visiting them. And the defense ministry was 
also put in charge of registering NGOs. In the face of the COVID- 19 crisis, numerous civil 
society groups have assisted the military to provide services, but this now leaves their personnel 
more exposed should the regime crack down on associational activities.
The task forces noted above were created amidst the COVID- 19 pandemic, a clear indi-
cation that the economic crises stemming from the coronavirus hardly stopped the regime 
pursuing its autocratic and majoritarian trajectory. If anything, it has used the crisis to further 
militarize the country in ways that promote autocratization. Given that over 95 percent of the 
island’s military forces are Sinhalese and Buddhist, this militarization conveniently combines an 
ethnonationalist agenda that threatens minorities and expands autocratization. For instance, the 
president picked the army commander (and not a public health official) to head the COVID- 19 
task force. The alleged war crimes committed by this officer were the basis for United States 
officials banning him and his family from visiting their country. And on January 1, 2021, the 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa government appointed a Major General in each of Sri Lanka’s 25 districts 
to superintend coronavirus measures, thereby further expanding militarization.
In the early stages of the pandemic certain government personnel and pro- government 
media sought to blame Muslims for spreading COVID- 19, and the government appeared to 
deliberately traumatize the community by insisting that Muslims who died of the coronavirus 
had to be cremated. The dictum was contrary to World Health Organization recommendations 
practiced throughout the world (Saroor 2020). The government, when seeking the support of 
predominantly Muslim countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh at the UNHRC, did change its 
policy in March 2021, which proved that the ban on COVID- 19-related burials had less to do 
with science and more to do with humiliating and tormenting a Muslim community that voted 
overwhelmingly against both Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015 and Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2019.
Soon after Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected, his brother and former president Mahinda 
was made prime minister. In March 2020, in accordance with the constitution, the president 
dissolved parliament six months before its term expired and called for elections the following 
month. The COVID- 19 pandemic, however, forced the Elections Commission to postpone the 
polls twice. Article 70 of the country’s constitution requires a new parliament to be in session 
within three months of the previous body being dissolved. Yet Gotabaya Rajapaksa refused to 
recall parliament, and during this period government expenditures and other business, including 
policies dealing with the coronavirus, were conducted without parliamentary oversight. Such 
autocratic governance could easily be repeated when the regime faces major crises and it may 
initially at least be tolerated among large portions of a public fed up with parliamentary anomie 
and malfeasance.
Notwithstanding the economic crises created by COVID- 19 (Hewamanne 2021), Sri 
Lanka initially did well to curtail the spread of the virus. Sri Lankans across the ethnic divide 
appreciated the role the armed forces played in this regard. This, combined with the president’s 
popularity among Sinhalese Buddhists and a weak opposition, allowed the SLPP to win 145 
parliamentary seats and capture nearly 60 percent of the vote when elections were held in 
August 2020 (DeVotta 2021a).
Sri Lanka’s parliament has 225 representatives and following the election the SLPP and 
its allies were easily able to form a supermajority. This allowed the Rajapaksas to pass the 







put, reintroduced the 18th Amendment and most of its presidential prerogatives. If the 19th 
Amendment sought to limit presidential powers by empowering the prime minister, the 20th 
Amendment reverses this. Most Sinhalese Buddhists may associate a strong presidency and uni-
tary state structure with sovereignty, but it is the executive presidential system that has enabled 
the tilt towards autocracy.
Amidst the ongoing COVID- 19 crisis, the government set up a Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry into Political Victimization, which conveniently recommended the prosecution of 
lawyers associated with the Attorney General’s Department, Bribery Commission, and Criminal 
Investigation Department who filed various charges against members of the Rajapaksa family, 
their cronies, and certain military personnel. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister 
Mahinda Rajapaksa thereafter sought to use the commission’s report to pass a resolution in par-
liament that summarily dismissed most charges, including cases undergoing trial. The charges 
in these cases range from murder and abduction, to money laundering and abusing state funds. 
This blatant attempt to promote impunity ensued even as the government flirted with stripping 
some opposition members of their civic rights, which would effectively marginalize them pol-
itically just as J. R. Jayewardene defanged Mrs. Bandaranaike by canceling her civic rights.
Today President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is also the Minister of Defense and Minister of 
Technology. Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa is also the Minister of Finance; Economy and 
Policy Development; Buddhism and Cultural and Religious Affairs; and Urban Development, 
Water Supply and Housing Facilities. Chamal, another brother who was speaker of parliament 
during the previous Rajapaksa government, is Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Rural 
Development, Internal Trade, Food Security, and Consumer Welfare. A third brother, Basil, 
who is not a member of parliament, oversees two presidential task forces (Delivery of Essential 
Goods; and Economic Revival and Poverty Alleviation) and effectively uses the SLPP party 
network to channel COVID- 19 aid. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, Namal, is Minister of Youth and 
Sports. Altogether, the Rajapaksa clan controls around 140 of the 434 state institutions. Five 
years after being ousted from power, the family has recaptured the Sri Lankan state.
Conclusion
There can be no gainsaying that politicking rooted in ethnonationalism, the ensuing civil 
war, and the authoritarian predilections of leaders like Jayewardene and Mahinda Rajapaksa 
combined to undermine liberal democracy in Sri Lanka. None who worked closely with 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa associates him with pro- democracy either. Hitherto all Sri Lankan leaders 
matured politically within a parliamentary setting and the realization that parliament alone 
confers legitimacy forced them to seek the body’s imprimatur even when enacting oppor-
tunistic legislation. Gotabaya Rajapaksa has little experience and regard for parliamentary 
procedures and niceties.
Prior to becoming president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s service and career within govern-
ment was military related; and while defense secretary he was known to disregard norms and 
rules associated with democratic governance. He promoted himself as a disciplinary nation-
alist technocrat while defense secretary, and it is that reputation that led Sinhalese Buddhists 
to vote for him. It is indeed instructive that a prominent Buddhist monk who pronounced 
blessings on Gotabaya Rajapaksa when he contemplated running for president said “Some 
people have described you as a Hitler. Be a Hitler. Go with the military and take the leadership 
of this country” (Sri Lanka Brief 2018). His decision- making since becoming president clearly 
indicates that he is likely to be more authoritarian than his predecessors. This will especially 
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And the long- term challenges stemming from COVID- 19 will provide sufficient “exceptional” 
justifications for ruling autocratically.
Countries that have experienced democracy are more likely to want to change the regime 
than change the system. Even where autocracies have come to power amidst popular support 
(Pakistan is a case in point), people quickly sour on the autocrats. Consequently, the clamor to 
appear democratic is arguably stronger than ever. This normative power associated with democ-
racy is a big reason illiberal leaders prefer hybrid regimes to full- fledged autocracy (Mechkova, 
Luhrmann, and Lindberg 2017, 168; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019).
Hybrid regimes can endure for lengthy periods (Ottaway 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010), but 
elections can dethrone autocratic leaders and reverse autocratization (Lindberg 2006; Carothers 
2018). This is partly because autocratic populists like Gotabaya Rajapaksa are good at selling 
quick solutions to extant crises yet fail to solve problems upon gaining power. Thus, even 
flawed elections are better than no elections, because they provide a disgusted populace the 
chance to change leaders causing democratic erosion. In short, elections can produce autocrats, 
but elections also oust autocratic regimes. Sri Lanka did prove this when it ousted a seemingly 
unconquerable Mahinda Rajapaksa from power in 2015.
Furthermore, the longer a country has enjoyed the franchise, the harder it may be for a 
despot to get rid of it. As noted earlier, Sri Lankans have had universal franchise since 1931. 
While this combined with ethnoreligious nationalism undermined the potential for liberal 
democracy, it nevertheless created a culture that values the right to vote. As per the 2018 Values 
and Attitudes Survey, 74 percent of Sri Lankans prefer democracy over other forms of gov-
ernance (Center for Policy Alternative 2019, 36). This figure is high, and it is way above the 
66 percent threshold used to determine democratic consolidation status (Diamond 1999, 68– 9). 
Only time will tell whether this appreciation will remain or if heightened ethnonationalism and 
the allure of strongman rule will cement autocratization.
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EXTREMISM AND THE MUSLIM 
MINORITY IN SRI LANKA
Farah Mihlar
On 16 November 2019, nearly seven million people, or 52 per cent of registered voters, elected 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa as President of Sri Lanka. Only five years prior to this his brother Mahinda 
Rajapaksa had been voted out, with the people rejecting nearly a decade of the Rajapaksa 
family’s authoritarian rule, corrupt politics and nepotism (DeVotta, 2021). Gotabaya Rajapaksa 
was the defence minister at the time and largely responsible, in 2009, for ending three decades 
of armed conflict by destroying the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
who had been battling Sri Lankan armed forces for a separate state for the country’s ethnic 
Tamils. The Sri Lankan military’s handling of the last stages of war has drawn acute inter-
national criticism, including by two United Nations investigations which found credible evi-
dence of war crimes and crimes against humanity (UN, 2011; OHCHR, 2015). In 2019, the 
majority of the country’s population democratically elected the central person responsible for 
these crimes to the presidency, fundamentally on the basis that a strong, fearless leader was 
needed to guarantee security, primarily for the majority Sinhala Buddhist community.
There was little doubt that Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency would result in an autocratic 
turn, visible signs of which emerged quite early. A review of his first year shows an increased, 
centralised role for the military, especially in dealing with the Covid- 19 pandemic; executive 
powers were used without parliamentary oversight (Keenan, 2020a; Keenan, 2020b); and as 
soon as his party won a majority in parliamentary elections, he proceeded to appoint his brother 
Mahinda Rajapaksa as prime minister and swiftly introduced constitutional amendments 
to increase powers of the presidency (ICJ, 2020; CPA, 2020). Democratic decline was also 
witnessed through the loss of civic space, evidenced in the rapid decrease in public protests 
and civil resistance movements, such as those by family members of victims of enforced dis-
appearance, whilst many civil society activists and journalists have resigned themselves to self- 
censorship, fearing a return of the violent repression targeted at them during the previous rule 
of the Rajapaksas (Fernando, 2020; Satkunanathan, 2020).
The shift towards autocratization analyzed in this chapter is not unprecedented; Sri Lanka’s 
post- independence history is marked by waves of serious democratic decline, the most recent 
periods being in the late 1980s to early 1990s under the rule of President Ranasinghe Premadasa 








Buddhist extremism and the Muslim minority
299
enabled and necessitated as a response to a threat to the state and the arbitrary use of vast powers 
were sought, in the form of emergency and national security regulations, to deal with this 
threat (Coomaraswamy and de los Reyes, 2004). Both processes of autocratization associated 
the threat with an ‘enemy’ that had to be countered with the use of extreme violence and mili-
tary prowess resulting in gross human rights violations. Premadasa’s defeat of the Marxist insur-
gency by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s of the LTTE’s secessionism 
were both violent projects. Enacting mass atrocities then must also be considered a primary 
feature of autocratization in Sri Lanka.
This chapter assesses the return to autocratization in Sri Lanka and its effect on minorities, 
with specific focus on the country’s second largest minority group, its nine percent Muslim 
population. Insufficient consideration is paid to the role of identity politics in the conceptual-
isation of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019); where for instance change occurs 
not only because of the weakening of democratic indicators but also, as in the Sri Lankan case, 
as a result of ethnocracy (DeVotta, 2021). This article takes the position that religion rather 
than ethnicity is now the dominant identity of the ruling elite in Sri Lanka. Both Rajapaksa 
brothers have supported and thrived on Buddhist nationalist extremism, an off- shoot of Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism, more than any other head of state in independent Sri Lanka. In this 
chapter I will argue that such religio- nationalist extremism is fundamentally attached to this 
phase of autocratization, aligned on the ideology of Buddhist nationalism, which has as its 
objective the reinforcing of a Buddhist nation- state and thereby subjugating the religious other 
who is framed as a threat to reaching their common goal. The construction of a threat is the 
nucleus of the development of autocratization in Sri Lanka. For Gotabaya Rajapaksa this has 
a dual nature, because of his association to Buddhist extremism; a threat to state security and 
Buddhist nationalism.
I will begin by defining Sinhala Buddhist nationalist extremism and explain its relationship 
to autocratization. Critically engaging with Lewis’s (2020: 21) ‘friend, enemy’ framing, this 
chapter will analyze the association of this latest autocratization to minority relations in Sri 
Lanka, specifically to the Muslim population. It will explain how, for autocratization to survive 
and flourish, Muslims are repetitively identified as a threat and dealt with as an enemy. The 
chapter concludes with an exploration of the effects of autocratization on the Muslim minority 
population and their response to it.
Autocratization and Buddhist extremism: conjoined twins
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has co- existed with, utilised and exploited democratic politics in 
Sri Lanka since independence (Tambiah, 1986; Holt, 2016; Ismail 2005). Premised on identi-
fying nationhood on ethnic and religious lines, Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups have, over 
decades, engaged in parliamentary politics, influenced the executive and military and at times 
supported violence and resisted peace negotiations aimed at ending the armed conflict (Holt, 
2016; Schonthal, 2016). Rampton (2011) contends that irrespective of ‘elite instrumentality’ 
Buddhist nationalism is ‘deeply hegemonic’ in the majority population.
The origins of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lay in competing Tamil and Sinhalese 
nationalisms that later led to militancy and civil war. Through most of the civil war the state 
aligned with Sinhala, Buddhist nationalist ideology and forces, and the triumphant defeat of 
Tamil militancy and nationalism was a victory for both Buddhist extremists and autocracy, 











The post- war Buddhist nationalist state was one where ethnic and religious minorities were 
not only oppressed but dehumanised and subjugated. As victory celebrations were held in the 
capital city Colombo marking the end of the war, over 300,000 Tamil war survivors were held 
in internment camps, separated from their families, physically and emotionally injured and 
facing daily violations such as extra- judicial killings, abductions and sexual assault (Minority 
Rights Group, 2010; UN, 2011). When the survivors were eventually released many of them 
were prohibited from returning home, they faced abject economic difficulties in the areas 
where they were resettled and were acutely insecure in the presence of the Sri Lankan mili-
tary whose numbers had risen threefold in comparison to the civilian population (ICG, 2017). 
Most notably the violations they suffered, including allegations of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, were repetitively denied as was their quest for truth, justice and account-
ability (ICG, 2017). As Mahinda Rajapaksa grew in power, distinctly authoritarian in rule, the 
Tamil population in the north and east were left defeated, dejected and dehumanised, which he 
used to muster credibility and support among Buddhist nationalist forces (DeVotta, 2013; UN 
OHCHR, 2013; ICG, 2013).
Lewis (2020: 22) using the work of German Jurist Carl Schmitt, illustrates how Mahinda 
Rajapaksa constructed a ‘political community through the constant articulation of distinctions 
between “them” and “us,” between “friend” and “enemy”.’ He explains how the Rajapaksa 
regime since 2005 repeatedly differentiated between the LTTE and Tamil community singling 
out the former ‘as the existential public enemy’ and thereby denying its legitimacy and represen-
tation of the Tamil community. This in effect also negated legitimate Tamil grievances of pol-
itical and cultural autonomy that stood at the heart of the ethnic conflict (Lewis, 2020: 22).
I find Lewis’s ‘friend- enemy’ model of political society useful with the caveat that des-
pite Rajapaksa’s framing, from very early on, in practice and policy ‘the enemy’ included the 
Tamil population of the north. The speeches that Lewis references in his analysis were made 
by Mahinda Rajapaksa when the Sri Lankan government was facing international allegations 
of war crimes and to redeem his government, making such a distinction was crucial. Lewis 
recognises that as the construction of this political community was based on Sinhala nationalist 
discourse rather than ‘civic nationalism’ it ‘repeatedly foundered’ and ‘the discursive framing 
always permits the widening of this identification to include a much wider spectrum of pos-
sible enemies, both contemporary and historical, internal and external’ (Lewis, 2020: 22). 
Rajapaksa’s early rhetorical distinction between Tamils and terrorists enabled him to present his 
government as ‘saving’ the former whilst legitimately destroying the latter. However, as previ-
ously explained his degrading treatment of Tamil war survivors in the north, blatantly different 
from the superiority given to Sinhala Buddhists, suggested ambiguity in the boundaries of 
enmity. This shared anti- minority sentiment is critical to both Buddhist nationalist extremists 
and autocratization, which within an ‘enemy’ framework extends to damaging and defeating 
these groups.
Buddhist nationalist extremism referred to in this chapter is a derivative of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism with higher levels of extremism, violent tendencies and with a greater focus on 
religion over ethnicity. Arguably this level of extremism and virulence always existed but has 
gained greater legitimacy and opportunity after the war. Ethnicity and religion were intertwined 
in nationalism, but without the threat of further ethnic militancy the new strand has taken 
on more religious fervour. Either way, since 2009, Buddhist nationalist groups with strong 
extremist tendencies such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Mahasen Balakaya strengthened and 
began to structurally target Muslims and evangelical Christians (Schonthal, 2016; Imtiyaz and 
Saleem, 2015). Through well- executed, systematic hate campaigns in mainstream and social 
media both religious groups were attacked; the former accused of attempting to take over the 
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country through population growth and economic strength and the latter for proselytisation 
(Holt, 2016). In subsequent hate campaigns, attacks and violence against Muslims superseded 
those against evangelical Christians.
Resultantly, as Lewis (2020: 25) states ‘the lines of enmity were reproduced to target 
Muslims’ constructing them as I have stated in my previous work as the ‘new enemy’ (Mihlar, 
2018). Arson and violent attacks on Muslim business establishments started soon after the 
war and progressed into serious incidents of mob violence led by Buddhist extremist groups 
between 2013 and 2019 recorded in central and southern Sri Lanka (Mihlar, 2018). Attacks 
against Muslims were partly premised on accusations that the group enjoyed special legal status 
as they, together with other religious and caste groups, are governed by personal laws, and 
receive excessive freedom of religious practice leading to Islamic extremism. The call for prayer 
from mosques, celebration of religious festivals, public display of religious symbols, dress code 
for women, marriage and inheritance laws, halal stipulations and slaughter of cattle for religious 
sacrifice became subjects of virulent criticism on a daily basis in the mainstream and social 
media (Mihlar, 2018).
The autocratic Rajapaksa regime made minimal effort to limit the hate campaigns and attacks 
and Buddhist nationalist groups were largely unhindered and, at times, encouraged (DeVotta, 
2018). Previously powerful Muslim cabinet ministers and Members of Parliament were unable 
to wield influence and eventually Muslim religious and political leaders compromised on a 
number of aspects publicly and privately (Mihlar, 2019). Notable in this relationship between 
the then government and Buddhist extremists was the lack of protection to minorities offered 
by other organs of the state. The military and police notoriously delayed their response or failed 
to offer protection to Muslims on a number of occasions during the violent attacks (Mihlar, 
2018). Muslim lawyers and activists have also complained of the lack of judicial recourse in 
lower courts as well as the country’s Supreme Court tasked with hearing cases of fundamental 
rights violations (Mihlar, 2018).
When Mahinda Rajapaksa was defeated in 2015, Buddhist nationalist extremist groups 
lowered their profiles for a couple of years but structurally and organisationally remained intact 
to return when the coalition government weakened and the return of the Rajapaksas was 
imminent. The 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, when nine ISIS- inspired Muslim suicide bombers 
attacked Christian churches and Colombo hotels killing 270 people, was the turning point. 
Within hours of the bombings, hate campaigns accelerated and overnight the Muslim com-
munity came under siege through increased surveillance enabled by new national security laws 
(Satkunanathan, 2020). Religious establishments, madrasas and Islamic pedagogical centres 
were the main source of tension, many having to close (Satkunanathan, 2020). In May, 2019, 
the country saw one of the worst religiously targeted incidents of violence as mobs, with 
police and army complicity, went on a rampage in the north-west of the country damaging, 
burning and vandalising mosques and Muslim neighbourhoods (Bastian, 2019; Mihlar, 2019). 
In the same month then-President Maithripala Sirisena pardoned and released from prison 
the leader of the BBS, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, a move criticised by international human 
rights organisations and one clearly meant to appease influential extremists in his majority 
Buddhist voter base (Bastian, 2019). Another consequence of the Easter Sunday attacks was 
the targeting of Muslim political leaders for their previous association with one of the bombers 
and a religious group linked to the attacks. A hunger strike initiated by a Buddhist monk, 
Athuraliye Rathana, in front of the historic Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, calling for the 
sacking of some Muslim ministers coupled with rising crowd mobilisation and public protests, 







The Buddhist extremist violence which took place with some level of state complicity 
in 2019 presents a challenge to the thesis in this chapter as it occurred during the rule of a 
minority- friendly coalition government elected to reverse the democratic decline caused by 
their predecessors. Importantly, serious violations of minority rights and the minimal pro-
tection to Muslims were accorded during the rule of this coalition government, which was 
indeed incongruous given their reputation on this issue and their early policies in support of 
justice for war affected ethnic and religious groups. I would argue that there were two main 
reasons for this discrepancy. The first was that in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks 
evidence pointed to an intelligence failure and a breakdown between the coalition as being 
responsible for failing to prevent the attack (ICG, 2019). Relations between President Sirisena 
and his Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe were dysfunctional and Sirisena, aware of the 
threat to his rule and his increasing unpopularity, took these populist measures to attempt 
to win over the Buddhist majority voter base. The second argument I want to posit builds 
on the work of Singh (2014) who critiques most scholarly work for ‘assumptions that cen-
tral authority is definitive for authoritarian states.’ Through research in Laos, Singh discusses 
‘ritual governance’ where state-sponsored Buddhist rituals were used to maintain a coercive 
hierarchy. Though not through forms of religious rituals in previous research, I have found 
that power shifts that occurred in central government were not similarly reflected in the 
village structures (De Silva, Fonseka and Mihlar, 2019). In these peripheral political landscapes 
authoritarian power structures and what Glasius (2018) refers to as ‘authoritarian practices’ 
were difficult to dismantle and affiliation to autocrats continued to be periodically rekindled 
through patronage politics. A study in the villages bordering Sri Lanka’s conflict zone found 
the structures, practices and relationships the Rajapaksas had in place remained and were 
latently active (De Silva, Fonseka and Mihlar, 2019).
The period of autocratization under the Rajapaksas was intimately associated with Buddhist 
nationalist extremism; governed by its ideology, supported by its forces and in turn fuelled by 
political and financial power from the centre (DeVotta, 2018). This was a symbiotic relationship 
as the protagonists were distinct but shared a common ideological basis of Buddhist nationalism 
and a mutually beneficial agenda, pursued where necessary through the use of violence. The 
Rajapaksas’ politics taps into, thrives on and rekindles the ‘deep hegemony’ of Buddhist nation-
alism (Rampton, 2011) in the larger Buddhist population, most often together with, but when 
necessary independent of, Buddhist nationalist extremist groups. Both see Muslims as a threat 
to Buddhist nationalist objectives and have successfully constructed the minority group as an 
enemy of the Buddhist nation. Autocratization, however, requires a threat to the security of 
the state in addition to the commonly shared goal of Buddhist nationhood, which Muslims en 
masse were charged with following the Easter Sunday attacks.
Easter Sunday attacks – the aftermath
Buddhist extremist groups used the Easter Sunday bombings to validate their claims regarding 
Muslims and took the opportunity to galvanise and target Muslims more publicly. The threat 
of Islamic extremism, which was now seen as inseparable from Islam itself, was presented as 
a threat both to the security of the state and of the Buddhist nation and therefore had to be 
addressed. Meeting this purported new security threat and strengthening the Buddhist claim for 
nationhood required a different political leadership and when elections were called in late 2019 
there was little doubt that the return of the Rajapaksas was imminent.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his party were elected on a majority Buddhist vote in the parliamen-
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Lanka without the support of the minorities. Though some alliances with minority politicians 
were attempted in the run-up to both elections, both campaigns targeted and emerged victorious 
on the vote of the Buddhist majority. In a speech during his swearing in ceremony, President 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa acknowledged the lack of minority support for his victory, promised to 
provide state support to keep Sinhala and Buddhism at the helm of the country’s culture but 
guaranteed the maintenance of religious and cultural identity of minority groups (Francis, 
2019). Conspicuously he made this speech standing beside the statue of King Duttu Gemunu, 
considered to be one of Sri Lanka’s greatest Buddhist monarchs for brutally defeating a South 
Indian Tamil ruler and under whose rule Buddhism flourished (Francis, 2019). A few months 
into his presidency, Gotabaya appointed a new committee to re- investigate the Easter Sunday 
bombings suggesting there was more evidence implicating Muslims with the terror threat.
Though this chapter classifies the autocratic tendencies of both Rajapaksa brothers as similar, 
as political rulers they have differences that need acknowledgement. Mahinda Rajapaksa has 
a far longer history of politics having served as a member of parliament since 1970. Even 
though his presidency was marked by a shift to autocracy and repression of political dissent 
and civil society during much of his own political career, particularly in opposition he was a 
left- wing campaigner for human rights, ironically one of the biggest critiques and opponents 
of Premadasa’s authoritarianism. Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the other hand has a military back-
ground, spent part of his life in the United States and promotes capitalistic economic pol-
icies (DeVotta, 2021). Whilst Mahinda is considered more politically astute, works with and 
through networks of political actors at the local level and partakes in parliamentary politics; 
Gotabaya rules in a more centralised way with a small number of trusted individuals, in a regi-
mental manner with the military enjoying more prominence. During his brother’s presidency, 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa had a more significant role than Mahinda to play in the military onslaught 
that ended the war, in the gross violations of human rights and in supporting the ascendancy 
and dominance of Buddhist violent extremism (De Votta, 2021, 2018).
Forced cremation of Covid- 19 dead
This chapter argues that the present shift to autocracy in Sri Lanka is conjoined with Buddhist 
nationalist extremism. In spite of differences between the autocratic regimes of Mahinda and 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, they are both bound to Buddhist nationalist extremism with the current 
president seen to be more hard line (De Votta, 2018). Both autocratization and Buddhist 
nationalist extremism share the common agenda of consolidating Buddhist nationhood and the 
objective of giving Buddhism supremacy within the organs, culture and society of the nation- 
state. Consequentially, the autonomy and role within the state of other religious groups must be 
limited, especially when they are considered a threat to Buddhist nationhood.
To illustrate this point further, this chapter will analyze the case study of Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa’s government’s 2020 policy enabling only cremation as an option for disposal of 
Covid- 19 dead bodies, which unexpectedly materialised through a change in regulation by 
the Ministry of Health when the first Muslim Covid- 19 death was recorded on 1 April 2020 
(Joint Civil Society Statement, 2021). The policy adversely affected Muslims for whom burial 
is a strict religious criteria (Saroor, 2021; Mihlar, 2021). Additionally, from April to December 
2020, nearly half of the bodies cremated were those of Muslims, some of whom had not 
contracted the virus but were suspected of having done so (Saroor, 2021; Mihlar, 2021). World 
Health Organization guidelines stating that burial of Covid- 19 dead poses no potential risk 
of spreading the virus were dismissed by government claims that Sri Lanka possesses a higher 







UN Resident Coordinator in Sri Lanka, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief and nationally from civil society and religious leaders calling for the policy to be 
revoked was disregarded (Joint Civil Society Statement, 2021). As Muslim victims rejected 
cremation, bodies were forcibly taken away from homes causing immense suffering to families 
and terrifying the rest of the community who feared the possibility of cremation (Saroor, 2021; 
Mihlar, 2021).
The forcible cremation policy is a pertinent and strong example of the return to autocracy. 
Not only was it pursued against international and national expert scientific advice, including from 
an 11- member task force of eminent virologists and microbiologists appointed by the Ministry 
of Health in December 2020, whose report was later denied (Mihlar, 2021), but Judicial and to a 
lesser extent legislative scrutiny of the policy was also limited. On 4 December 2020, the country’s 
Supreme Court denied leave to proceed with a fundamental rights petition filed by 11 individ-
uals claiming their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion was being violated by 
the policy. A civil resistance campaign of tying white cloths at crematoriums and public spaces 
following the forcible cremation of a 20- day- old baby, was disbanded by police and numerous 
civil society statements on the matter were ignored. Parliamentary scrutiny had some effect; 
repeated questioning of the procedure by a few opposition and minority members led to Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa calling for the December expert review and eventually stating in 
parliament on 10 February 2021 that burial will be permitted. Gotabaya however remained silent 
on the matter, indicative of the dissimilar forms of autocratization pursued by the two brothers.
The eventual reversal of the policy came following a visit by Pakistan Prime Minister Imran 
Khan, whose visit was aimed at diverting Sri Lanka away from Indian influence towards that 
of China. Khan publicly invited Sri Lanka to join the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), whilst privately urging the Rajapaksas to do away with the forced cremation policy 
(newsin.asia, 2021). Khan’s intervention came as international pressure on the Rajapaksas 
reached a critical point with Sri Lanka facing a new resolution at the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC), following the expiry of the previous one calling for account-
ability for war time atrocities and reconciliation. Sri Lanka in 2015 supported this resolution 
but Gotabaya Rajapaksa had much earlier signalled he would withdraw support for it and the 
Rajapaksas needed to act swiftly to defuse rising anger by states belonging to the Organisation 
of Islamic Countries (OIC), most of whom have previously stood by Sri Lanka in the UNHRC. 
Irrespective of the external persuasion, the undermining of democratic structures and civil 
society in this particular case was palpable.
The initial resolve by the government to maintain a discriminatory policy, despite inter-
national pressure, was in line with its shared ideology and objective with Buddhist nationalist 
extremism (Mihlar, 2021). Campaigners working on this issue, interviewed by the author, have 
explained how representatives of Buddhist extremist groups have held that the policy of cre-
mating Covid- 19 dead aligned with their goal of one law for all Sri Lankans and in addition a 
few have claimed that Muslims could use Covid- 19 dead bodies as biological weapons. Such 
comments and views originating from members and supporters of Buddhist extremist groups 
were also popularised on social media. Strikingly, however, towards the end of 2020, a few 
prominent monks, including the BBS leader, called on the government to reconsider their 
policy based on expert advice (lankanewsweb.net, 2020). This demonstrates that even though 
conjoined by a common aim as explained in this article, Buddhist nationalist extremism and 
autocracy can have auxiliary political interests that may diverge at different times, perhaps based 
on constituency demands. Such divergence is usually only temporary and often superficial. In 
this case too Prime Minister Rajapaksa, reportedly, only publicly announced the government’s 
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The policy of cremating all persons infected with and suspected of having Covid- 19 provides 
an important case study in explaining the relationship between autocratization and Muslims. 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected largely on the vote of the Buddhist majority to ensure the 
physical security of the Buddhist population and the protection of the Buddhist nation- state. 
Together with his Buddhist nationalist extremist allies he sees Muslims as an enemy, but for 
the purposes of strengthening autocratization he needs to additionally maintain a threat to the 
security of the state. The Easter Sunday attacks made this briefly possible, but in the absence 
of an organised enemy similar to the LTTE, Rajapaksa needed to maintain the perception of 
threat. The repeat investigations of the bombings in part were to achieve this and then the pan-
demic provided a new opportunity where Muslims, even in death, were construed as a threat to 
public health. The persistence of a threat calls for the defeat of the enemy through, for example, 
the vehement pursuit of the cremation policy which results in the intimidation of and damage 
to Muslims.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resolve even momentarily without the support of Buddhist extremists 
suggests not only that the goal of building a Buddhist nationalist state and supressing minor-
ities is critical to autocracy, independent of its relationship to Buddhist violent extremism, but 
also that sustaining Muslims as the threat is vital for the survival of autocratization. Some have 
argued that rising frustration among Muslim youth over this policy may lead to extremism, 
validating claims of a threat and providing the autocrat with the credibility required to fur-
ther oppress Muslims through more extreme measures (Economynext, 2021). This last factor 
augments the argument made in this chapter on autocratization using Muslims to maintain a 
sense of threat whilst simultaneously damaging them in order to be perceived as ‘dealing with 
the enemy.’
The Muslim response
Forming conclusions of Muslims’ response to this latest turn is difficult considering its full effects 
on the community are yet to be seen, hence this analysis is based on autocratization in Sri Lanka 
since 2009. Wachtel (2013) posits that marginalisation of minorities is more acute in democratic 
rather than authoritarian states in Central Asia; since authoritarian leaders are unelected they do 
not need to ‘rally the majority population around ideas of the nation.’ In the Sri Lankan case, 
as democratic processes were used to usher in the autocratic regime, the majority population 
was indeed rallied around the idea of electing a strong leader who can promote and protect 
the Buddhist nation. Autocratization in Sri Lanka closely resembles ‘neopatrimonial authori-
tarianism’ which uses systems of patronage to ensure and sustain loyalties through influential 
networks (Ilkhamov, 2007). This patronage politics sustained loyalty through the 2015– 2020 
change in government and manifests both at the central and local levels. The democratic pro-
cess complicates this system of patronage which is accorded to both the head of government 
and the local MP; at times, especially in the case of minority politics, this can be competitive. 
The patronage that some stalwart Muslim MPs command exists irrespective of the MP’s own 
political patronage; whichever political grouping the MP decides to align with. This results in 
the frequent creation and destruction of alliances based on disparate reasoning ranging from 
protection of the group to individual wealth accumulation.
Beyond using their vote to prevent autocratization, Muslims have publicly done little to 
challenge it. A few political and civil society activists and victim groups have been critical of 
the Rajapaksas’ policies and practices, but often cautiously. During Mahinda Rajapaksa’s rule 
some Muslim political and civil society representatives condemned the state’s complicity with 








previously discussed, Muslim community and religious leaders privately held that the commu-
nity had not behaved as a minority group (Mihlar, 2019). These elites took deliberate measures 
to withdraw the externalisation of religious symbols and practices and hold back Muslim youth 
from retaliating to the religious violence. Their response was starkly submissive. On the issue 
of forced cremation there has been more public outcry by Muslim activists and commentators 
and few statements by political representatives, but here too their reaction can be described as 
subdued.
Fumagalli (2007) uses Gorenburg’s (2003) definition of frames as ‘interpretive schemes that 
condense and simplify a person’s experience by selectively highlighting and encoding certain 
situations, objects, events and experiences’ (2003:11) to explain the limited ethnic mobilisa-
tion in authoritarian regimes in Soviet- era central Asia. According to Fumagalli (2007: 568; 
570) ‘Frames do not emerge naturally, but are an essential tool used by political elites to mobilise 
or demobilise the broader community’ and ‘operate as the interface between background struc-
tural factors and the contingent choices of the elites.’ Muslims in Sri Lanka as the second largest 
minority have always had to navigate between the two conflicting dominant ethnic groups – 
Tamils and Sinhalese. Muslim political elites have fought to establish an ethnic, religious iden-
tity distinct from these groups, but have also led the community to cooperate, particularly with 
the majority Sinhalese rulers. As Farzana Haniffa (2016) has stated, Muslims have held on to the 
reputation of being ‘the good minority’ unlike the Tamils who preferred secession. Muslim pol-
itical and religious elites, in the face of religious violence, held fast onto this framing of shying 
away from resistance, avoiding confrontation and conflict. Following the Easter Sunday attacks 
violence and hate campaigns against Muslims increased, but Muslims were restrained, desperate 
to disown and isolate from the bombers and working with state forces, in spite of rising distrust 
due to the lack of protection, to cooperate and enable ‘counter- extremism.’ In my research in 
Kottarumulla, in the north-western province and Aluthgama in the south, Muslim youth have 
spoken in detail of their frustration and resentment with police and army who were complicit 
in the attacks stating that they were firmly restrained by community elders and religious leaders 
from responding.
The inhibited mobilisation of Muslims must be understood through this historical internal 
framing and the more recent external framing associating the group with extremism and 
terrorism. As the smaller minority Muslims have witnessed how extremism and terrorism 
among the larger minority, Tamils, was dealt with by the state, which will be avoided at all costs.
Conclusion
This chapter began by placing the current phase of autocratization in historical context and 
illustrated how such periods have emerged and developed based on elites leveraging a security 
threat to the state and mobilising popular sentiment to garner support so they can maintain 
their position. Previous autocratization, including the last which the current president was part 
of, was bolstered by dealing with such ‘threats’ with severity leading to mass atrocities. The 
chapter proceeds to argue that Sri Lanka’s present shift to autocratization is conjoined with 
Buddhist nationalist extremism, sharing a common ideology and objective of congealing a 
Buddhist nation- state. This was also the case in the previous authoritarian turn, which Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa was integral to. Following the end of the armed conflict, Muslims were framed as the 
‘new enemy’ posing a threat to both the physical security of the majority and the objective of 
achieving a Buddhist nation- state.
Utilising the case study of the government’s April 2020 policy to permit only the cremation 
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as one where the latter is maintained as a threat and attacked as an enemy. This subjugation of 
Muslims, which occurs even without the support of Buddhist nationalist extremism, indicates 
that consolidating the Buddhist nation- state and oppressing minorities is an independent goal 
of autocracy. The nature of relations between Muslims and this phase of autocratization will 
not remain static. As other challenges to the rule of the autocrat emerge, Muslim political 
elites may be wooed; such use and disposal, as previous patterns have shown, is part of dealing 
with the enemy. Muslims are necessary for this present form of autocratization, hence they 
cannot be annihilated but subjugating them is critical for the survival of autocratization. This 
can be achieved through the production of perceived and real physical threat to Buddhists and 
through working with Buddhist extremist groups on hate campaigns and violent means to 
eradicate the threat to the objective of Buddhist nationhood. The prevalence and progression 
of autocratization in Sri Lanka thereby threatens not only democratic, liberal values but also 
minority protection and rights, which in the post- war context have serious implications for 
conflict prevention and reconciliation.
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In May 2011, global assembly line workers in and around the Katunayake Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ) staged a massive political protest against a new pension scheme that sought to curtail 
their financial independence. The then government responded by ordering a police crack-
down that resulted in one death and serious injuries to hundreds of workers (BBC 2011; 
Samaraweera 2011) It thereafter resorted to varied underhanded ways to silence political 
protests demanding justice. This chapter analyzes the 2011 protest and, utilizing follow up 
research conducted among female global factory workers in 2016 and in 2020, assesses how 
suppression of this protest affected subsequent collective organizing among FTZ workers. It 
argues that the apathy resulting from such silencing damaged workers’ political voice just as 
much as physical violence and property destruction and influences more consolidation of state 
power. With the recent state response to the Covid- 19 pandemic in mind, this chapter further 
showcases how the 2011 scenario affected the global worker political organizing in particular 
ways, and highlights how the increasing autocratization and strong man politics in Sri Lanka 
has been accentuated today.
Autocratization and means of suppressing discontent
According to Cassani and Tomini (2018), autocratization is a process of regimes’ change toward 
autocracy. Such processes make the exercise of political power more arbitrary and restrict the 
space for public contestation, and political participation. These processes can manifest in many 
forms that are peculiar to social, economic, and cultural contexts where they unfold. Sometimes 
the strategies, tactics and tools of suppression work well with the social and cultural fabric of 
a given society, so that it becomes difficult for people to see that their democratic rights are 
being curtailed via these means. With the relative absence of appropriate conceptual and empir-










discern them (Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). This difficulty is exacerbated by the context of 
the specific intermingling of liberal and illiberal elements that leads to ambiguity as to whether 
a regime is autocratic or not. The ambiguities are further complicated by liberal enclaves such 
as universities, or women and youth movements, which have been able to flourish under highly 
illiberal and autocratic governments. In this context it becomes crucial to closely study situ-
ations where already existing repressive measures, and new and craftier measures exist hand in 
hand to suppress political voices. This chapter will study such a case in Sri Lanka to show how 
the government and its agents used payments, threats, fractioning and co- option, to render the 
protesting groups silent.
Throughout history varied forms of autocracy came to prominence and declined. According 
to Luhrmann and Lindberg (2019), a third wave of autocratization has been unfolding for 
quite some time. Studying all autocratization episodes since 1900, they show the divergent 
ways autocratization unfolds, but also how it always entails the gradual regressing of demo-
cratic values within formally democratic parameters. Many countries today are experiencing 
subtypes of authoritarianism, such as hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010) or soft authori-
tarianism (DeVotta 2010; Kamaludeen and Turner 2013). Another concept that is often used 
in Asian contexts is competitive authoritarianism. Within this type, regimes retain formal 
features of democracy such as elections and party competition. However, in day to day pol-
itics they do not meet the standards of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010). Croissant 
and Haynes (2020, p 4) note ‘democratic decoupling,’ whereby some aspects of democracy 
improve while others diminish. For example, some societies display highly improved elections, 
while civil and political rights diminish. Many of these concepts are easily applicable to South 
Asian countries in fluid combination of features. Sri Lanka, especially, had seen rapid ups and 
downs in democratic values during the last decade (DeVotta 2020) and displayed varied com-
binations of the features of the above sub types. Paul Staniland (2020) contends that there is a 
marked ascendancy of the state within South Asian countries. Showing how by 2020 major 
insurgencies have been squashed or co- opted by South Asian regimes, Staniland notes the 
ingenious ways the governments have established greater control of previously contested ter-
ritories. These creative ways include new technologies of surveillance, and new forms of state 
and non- state coercion, especially localized mob, militias and vigilante groups. Contesting 
voices have consistently been incorporated via state tools for controlling dissenting voices. 
However, Staniland still sees discontent emerging within these conventional and new forms 
of state power. In the last two decades Sri Lanka has seen similar co- option and creative 
use of surveillance and coercion increasing especially during the two previous Rajapaksha 
regimes. The Sirisena– Wickramasinghe coalition which came to power in 2015 promised to 
reinstate democratic values, but unfortunately, they have not been that successful in fulfilling 
these promises. The current Ghotabaya Rajapaksha regime confronted the global pandemic 
decisively with the use of the military in maintaining curfew and lockdown and managing 
quarantine centres. The heavy use of the military has accelerated the re- autocratization process 
even as contesting voices ebbed and flowed.
In fact, the Covid- 19 pandemic is accelerating the autocratization in Asia. Leaders of many 
countries have used the pandemic as a pretext to increase their power. Writing about Southeast 
Asia, Lorch and Sombatpoonsiri (2020) identify five trends emerging as a result of the pan-
demic. These include tougher government restrictions on civil society organizations, conten-
tious civil society action, new mutual aid initiatives, organized relief efforts, and repurposed 
advocacy groups. These five trends are in fact apparent in different combinations in many South 











As Youngs (2020) notes, although at the outset the virus responses seem to also have 
galvanized big government and autocratic politics, they also sharpened and intensified the 
importance of organized civil society action. He contends that if civil society is to be able 
to block autocratization, politically organized civic groups will need to form alliances with 
welfare- based groups, which have organically grown within local communities and are focused 
only on improving community welfare.
At this time of the specific dynamics created by the global pandemic, why is it important 
to re- visit a global garment worker protest that happened in 2011? Because, as I show below, 
the way the then government suppressed the protest and the subsequent collective organizing 
has a bearing on how global garment workers are now responding to the pandemic related 
infringements on their individual human rights, and labour rights (Hewamanne 2021). After a 
discussion of research methods, I will focus on the 2011 garment worker protest to show the 
means of suppression and the long- term effects of that suppression.
Researching gendered protests and responses
Research for this chapter was based on three field work seasons, 2011, 2016, and 2020. I was 
fortunate to be in Sri Lanka within three days of the May 2011 global factory worker protests 
and thus was able to conduct a group interview with 12 workers who took part in the pro-
test, including two workers who were injured in the brutal police suppression. Interviews 
with NGO and trade union officials also informed the research, especially on some of the less 
obvious ways in which the protest and follow up actions were suppressed. Photos, and mobile 
phone audio and video recordings made by the participants, were useful as well. In addition, 
the newspaper and TV reports of the protest and aftermath were used to compare and contrast 
as well as to triangulate. I have also interviewed several former global factory workers, now 
residing in their villages, to get a more complete picture of the causes and consequences of the 
protest.
Five years later in 2016, I conducted follow- up research with the factory workers and NGO 
officials to see how the 2011 protest and the means of suppression have shaped the factory 
worker collective organizing, and NGO support and ideologies. In- depth interviews with 
workers who have participated in the protest in 2011 (3), new workers (10), and NGO officials 
(3) were used to collect data.
The pandemic- related restrictions on worker rights during the second wave of the pan-
demic highlighted the need to extend the research to explore how global workers approached 
collective organizing in response to the arbitrary impingement on their freedom and mobility. 
This research utilized quite different methods for data collection than my earlier research. Just as 
livelihoods have been adversely affected by the pandemic, the research projects have also suffered 
setbacks. Universities have prohibited face to face research. Travelling for research, even on a 
private basis, has been next to impossible due to airport closures and quarantine requirements. 
As such the data was acquired via WhatsApp, Zoom, Skype, and phone interviews I conducted 
with six daily- hired workers, 11 home workers, three NGO officials, and one factory manager. 
Most of the crucial data was acquired through a Zoom focus group in which ten workers and 
two NGO staff members joined in from three locations.
During all three research seasons, I have considered the ethical issues carefully, and research 
questions were designed in association with NGO staff members and factory workers. Workers 
were informed of the research, and oral and written consent were obtained before the interviews 
and focus groups. Pseudonyms have been used in place of workers’ names, and their village and 







Protests, suppressions, and silences
“Don’t kill our dowry”
On May 24 the global factory workers in and around the Katunayake FTZ stopped working, 
and got out of their factories to join the protest marches that spread outside their factory prem-
ises to the city streets. The protest was in opposition to the government’s proposed private- 
sector pension scheme which sought to change the existing regulations regarding statutory 
welfare funds (BBC 2011). Under the existing labour law, FTZ workers can withdraw their 
Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees’ Trust Fund (ETF) savings at the time they 
get married, provided they are able to produce a marriage certificate within three months of 
leaving the factory. The underlying idea was that the women would leave work to get married. 
Thus the EPF and ETF savings together with the factory gratuity payments as a lump sum 
would be what they would be taking to the new union; in other words their dowry. In fact, at 
the beginning of FTZs in Sri Lanka in 1978, and later when another government initiated the 
‘500 global garment factories in 500 villages’ programme, this stipulation was touted as ‘young 
women earning their own dowry without being a burden to their poor parents.’ Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, this lump sum came to be unofficially known as the FTZ dowry among the factory 
workers. Many rural women came to work in the FTZ with the hope of working for five 
years, and then obtaining these savings together with the factory gratuity payments when they 
left. Unlike in the beginning of the FTZ work in Sri Lanka, men are now welcome to join as 
machine operators due to the current labour shortages. Still, men are less than ten per cent of 
the total worker population and thus the savings are referred to as the dowry, especially when 
mentioned by or with regard to women workers.
The stipulation of having to present a marriage certificate within three months of leaving 
the factories to get the EPF/ ETF savings galvanized the label of dowry. If the leaving workers 
missed this three- month window they could only withdraw these funds when they turned 
55 years of age or in case of serious illness such as cancer, or as a housing loan. Thus many 
women hasten to somehow meet the requirement and obtain their savings and gratuity together 
at the time of leaving the factory. Many envisioned starting an income generating activity 
once they got married by using this lump sum. In fact research had shown that many have 
succeeded in utilizing the savings together with other micro- credit opportunities available in 
their villages to become successful local entrepreneurs (Hewamanne 2019; 2020). This success 
further strengthens the hopes of young village women waiting to work in the urban FTZs, and 
existing workers placed on obtaining the FTZ dowry.
The new bill proposed a pension scheme that would distribute these savings as a small 
monthly pension, after they turn 60. They will have to work ten years before they are to be 
entitled to this pension. As many women in the FTZs only work for five to  six years they 
stand to lose their savings altogether. Moreover, the pension funds will be under the Central 
Bank and will charge 4 per cent (2 per cent from workers and 2 per cent from the employers) 
for maintenance. The monthly pension in fact is estimated to be only about 1,900 rupees 
($US17.27) per month for the low- paid garment workers (Geekiyanage 2011).
Thus it was no surprise that one of the more prominent and passionate protest cries in 2011 
was “don’t kill our dowry” (davaddata kellinepa). Female workers, especially, were furious about 
the new scheme, which they found economically disadvantageous to them. Not only was the 
bill crafted without consultation with workers, its hasty introduction took even the unions 
by surprise. Workers who were interviewed by the BBC (2011), Samaraweera (2011) and 








time they turn 55. I arrived on the island on May 28 and was able to participate in a meeting 
at Dabindu (an NGO working among FTZ workers), where 12 workers, some still sporting 
bruises from the police beatings, met with NGO officials to discuss future actions. I interviewed 
three of the injured workers (two female, and one male) in addition to group interviews with 
workers and NGO officials. One worker I interviewed explained,
what I can get today as FTZ dowry, will not be enough to even buy a vada and a cup 
of tea by the time I turn 55. According to this bill, even then we will only get small 
monthly payments. There’s no way I will support a bill that takes away the one good 
thing about FTZ work.
These interviews as well as newspaper reports, TV footage, and photos showed that the mar-
ches were characterized by emotional outbursts, angry shouting as well as tears. A photo of 
a large group of workers at the closed FTZ gates wailing showed their frustration about the 
bill as well as other impingements on their rights. About 70 per cent of FTZ factories had to 
be shut down due to walkouts. The second day of protests, police brutality was used to break 
the marches. This resulted in the death of one worker and injuries to more than 100 other 
workers. The footage of the police brutality on mainstream media shocked the general public, 
and the next day the police were called back and confined to their barracks. Instead, the mili-
tary was deployed to keep the peace. Now incensed by the sad loss of one of their comrades, 
the workers were even more emotional, angry and confrontational. Video footage and photos 
showed workers, mostly women, challenging military men who held heavy weaponry. They 
also evidenced that the soldiers showed remarkable patience by not reacting, yet holding the 
women off from restricted areas.
Although the walkout and loud marches seemed spontaneous, after the death of a worker, 
Roshane Shanaka, the protest shifted gear to focus on police brutality and the suppression of 
worker rights. Many trade unions, ones that have been working among the FTZ workers, as 
well as national unions, joined the marches. According to Chamila Thushari of Dabindu, the 
protest became much more organized and structured (Thushari 2011). Workers and unions 
were especially vocal in the days leading up to the funeral, and their banners loudly proclaimed, 
“Rest in Peace EPF/ ETF and Gratuity.” Specially designed black hats with EPF/ ETF embossed 
on them were also distributed. Both of these underlined how important this lump sum payment 
was for the mostly female worker population, and that for the first time in the FTZs’ history, 
the conventional unions were taking a gendered cause as a valid labour right concern. Workers 
were asked to come clad in white, the traditional mourning colours, and wearing the special 
black hats, to the funeral. The intention was to make the funeral a space for respectful protest. 
It was expected that the funeral procession would include shouting of slogans, and display of 
banners. The published time for the funeral was 4 p.m., and workers started lining up near the 
slain worker’s house from 3 p.m. They were outraged to hear that at 2 p.m. the military took 
the coffin to the cemetery for burial, thus pulling the rug from under the union plans for an 
emotionally charged protest that was sure to receive much media exposure.
By this time, the government had already announced that they were retracting the bill for 
the pension scheme. In other words, the workers had won their demands. However, not many 
were feeling jubilant. They were stunned by what happened at the funeral and the sudden 
silence that overcame the topic of the death of a protesting worker. Many days after the death, 
minor rallies happened (100– 200 and steadily declining) outside the FTZ gates to demand 
justice for Roshane Shanaka. His mother and family members were vocal participants of these 




they held posters and pumped their fists while shouting slogans. A few days after the hijacked 
funeral, the mother and family members of the victim stopped coming to these rallies, and 
talking to NGO and union members. Around the same time the TV and newspapers published 
footage and photos of Shanaka’s mother and brother visiting President Mahinda Rajapaksha 
in his official residence and receiving condolences and a compensation cheque. It was unclear 
how much money was given to them, but the popular belief among workers was that it was 
25 million rupees (approximately US$ 227,000). Apparently, it had come with a gag order, as 
the family members completely cut themselves off from all activities related to the incident. The 
gatherings continued for a couple more weeks, but with the absence of the victim’s mother, 
they lost their emotional anchor, and soon dwindled to just a few NGO and union protester(s).
The NGO activists I talked to were convinced that the Rajapaksha government, which was 
showing autocratic tendencies in several other political and judicial spheres, had deliberately 
undercut the burgeoning worker movement. Even though it started as a protest against the 
pension scheme, it evolved into a protest that was about many other important issues of worker 
rights and their livelihoods. Both the NGO activists and the workers I interviewed claimed that 
the unions had been bribed or threatened to undercut the movement. Their frustrations were 
mostly placed on one particular union. During the apex of the protest, workers showed ani-
mosity toward the leaders of this union for abandoning them when they most needed support. 
It stemmed from the last minute cancellation of a walkout called by a union collective just a 
day before workers defied the union and walked out on May 26 (Geekiyanage 2011). Within 
a week of the funeral, the national unions lost interest or deliberately cut ties with the FTZ 
worker protests.
An NGO official, whose name will be withheld to prevent any repercussions, said in an 
interview conducted in June 2011:
This could have been the beginning of a very good movement, starting with the 
dowry, but then moving onto protesting against government corruption, high cost of 
living, and trampling on people’s rights. But this government used bribery, threats, 
and military power to scare or buy off important stake holders. It is so cunningly done, 
that on one hand it seems like we won, but in the long run we have truly lost.
“This government had scared the hell out of union leaders, now there’s nobody to look after 
the interests of the injured workers who cannot go back to work for months. And some of 
us have been arrested and we have court cases pending. No one is helping with lawyer costs 
either,” a worker who was injured in the police beating lamented. One of her knees and a 
shoulder were injured and she needed at least two more months of recuperating, before she 
could go back to work. She had already been fired from her current FTZ factory by mid- June 
2011.
Most of the interviewees expressed frustrations that were part of broader narratives of 
critique against the Rajapaksha government. These included the widespread corruption, 
skyrocketing cost of living and the general fear of speaking up against the current govern-
ment. This fear was expressed as “we will be disappeared via a white van.” This was a refer-
ence to the reports of white vans, supposedly manned by government friendly para- military 
men, abducting journalists and others who dared to criticise the government. These abducted 
people would then just disappear without a trace. The disappearance of the journalist Pradeep 
Eknaligoda was mentioned as one reason why the workers now felt that neither the workers nor 
the union leaders wanted to take the spontaneously galvanized worker movement forward (see 





NGO activists as well as some news reports (Geekiyanage 2011) noted that the neighbours 
and general public who they have spoken to supported the worker protest. In 2011 my research 
was mainly focused on former global garment workers in their villages, and the women 
I interviewed in June and July of 2011 were very vocal in their support for the FTZ worker 
protest in Katunayake. They too were shocked by how quickly the protests ended, and how 
they did not achieve anything beyond the retracting of the bill. Some of the former workers 
utilized notions of karma and fate to explain the helplessness that came over the worker popu-
lation after the protest’s short- lived climax. “At the end the workers will always end up under-
foot, and defeated,” one said.
We are still silent
In 2016, I revisited the protest by conducting follow up interviews with the NGO activists and 
workers who have participated in the protests and new workers. NGO activists talked passion-
ately about how the government deployed nefarious means to break the back of a grassroots 
uprising that could have led to much transformative politics. They were especially surprised by 
the way the government denied them a locally meaningful emotional protest over the workers’ 
funeral and how the government managed to buy the silence of the slain workers’ family. 
However, they were also convinced to a certain extent that this protest was the beginning 
of the end for the then Rajapaksha government. In late 2014 many anti- government, anti- 
corruption forces joined hands to forward a common candidate, a defector from the existing 
government, Maithripala Sirisena, to run against the seemingly unstoppable President Mahinda 
Rajapaksha in the presidential election. This candidate unified many discontented elements 
of society leading to Rajapaksha’s defeat in January 2015. The new government was formed 
around the concept of good governance and in 2016, the NGO activists were still hopeful that 
their demands for strong worker rights would be addressed soon.
The workers, however, had forgotten that successful protest which allowed them to still 
enjoy the FTZ dowry. Even the workers who had participated in the protest now reminisced 
about it in a defeatist tone. “Actually I have forgotten about that. Because it was just like a soda 
bottle. We thought we won, but as always, we did not win,” one worker said. When I reminded 
her that they forced the government to retract the bill, and hence at a basic level they won, she 
smiled slightly and said,
True. I am glad we did it. But you know what happened with the funeral and 
Roshane’s mother refusing to talk to any of the unions or workers. They were bought 
by the government. Even the unions were bought, because they kept asking us to go 
back to work.
Another worker who participated in the protest said, “I was fine with the police beatings. 
That made us stronger. It’s sad Roshane died, but we became more united because of it. It’s all 
the underhanded stuff that made me feel hopeless about ever getting any justice.” Samudra, a 
worker who still has a pending court case arising from the protest, said he feels utterly let down 
by the unions.
Workers who had joined factories after the 2011 protests initially seemed unaware of the 
reasons, details or the consequences of the protest. Only after I had given much information did 
they remember hearing about it or seeing TV footage. Although all of them were very keen to 
obtain their FTZ dowry at the time they leave work, they have not thought much about the 





they feared consequences if they talked about the protest, such fear could have been a reason 
why they were reluctant to celebrate a protest against government policies. They were, instead, 
very vocal about the hopelessness of protesting and asking for more rights from FTZ factories. 
As Ruvini, a worker, said,
these factories belong to foreigners, and they don’t care about our rights. The govern-
ment has no powers over these owners. So what’s the point in asking the government 
to enforce labour laws? That is a way to lose these factories to other countries, and 
lose our own jobs.
Ruvini in fact was referring to the cascading global subcontracting system that subjects local 
workers to ‘just in time production,’ demands of the contemporary global production networks 
(Mezzadri 2014; Barrientos 2013; Hewamanne 2020). Transnational production comes with 
the threat of factories moving to countries with lower manufacturing costs at a moment’s 
notice. If workers are unwilling to work overtime and meet unreasonable production targets 
and ask for wage rises that cut into the profits of the buyers (companies in affluent countries, 
mostly located in the West), they shift their orders to lower- cost countries (Hewamanne 2008). 
A constructed myth of the disposability of global factory workers (Wright 2006), and the actual 
precarity of livelihoods associated with global assembly lines make workers reluctant to agitate 
for their rights. Thus even without government’s autocratic tendencies, police brutality and 
underhanded tactics, the global workers have reasons to feel hopeless about fighting for labour 
rights.
Since unionization is prohibited within FTZ factories, young women who come from 
rural areas do not have easy and fast ways of developing class consciousness or engaging in col-
lective organizing. By the Board of Investment (BOI) Sri Lanka stipulation, labour concerns 
within FTZ factories are dealt with by an outfit called the Joint Council of workers (JOC), 
which is comprised of management representatives and workers. Men dominated JOCs espe-
cially in the beginning. Factories now encourage women workers to join these councils as that 
makes factories look good in the buyers’ eyes. Most workers I interviewed felt that the JOCs 
discouraged collective organizing more than they encourage, as it works as a problem- solving 
mechanism and gives the impression that workers and managers are trying to achieve the same 
ends. With all these barriers to their collective organizing, workers, at least at the outset, seem 
to be waiting for the government and factories to present their rights on a platter rather than 
collectively organizing to achieve rights. In- depth interviews and focus groups conducted in 
2016, however, highlighted how the fears and helplessness created by the previous government’s 
extrajudicial actions in suppressing working class movements made them reticent in voicing 
their discontent, and fighting for rights. Again, the ‘white van disappearances’ were frequently 
mentioned as a reason for this reticence. All the interviewees mentioned how the government 
bought Roshane’s family and the unions to explain their current apathy. “No one wants to 
be disappeared via a white van,” four of them said. Although in 2016 the government was 
led by the Sirisena– Wickremasinghe duo who came into power promising good governance 
(improved democratic values), it was obvious that the previous government’s suppression of 
dissent created long lasting fears among the global factory workers.
Conclusion
As noted earlier, rural women who start work as young as 17 do not have opportunities to 








of unionizing within FTZ factories. Nevertheless, this did not prevent them from agitating 
for change within their own factories in a piecemeal fashion. 2011 marked a crucial point in 
which the workers showed that they were able to collectively organize on a common platform. 
However, although it was a successful protest, the government’s crafty means (in addition to 
the familiar police beatings) to prevent the protest leading to a broader workers’ movement 
had significant impact on the FTZ workers. It led to feelings of hopelessness with regard to 
changes, and an overall sense of betrayal by general trade unions. Since 2011 there has not 
been such a broadly organized agitation for rights among the FTZ workers. Even during the 
2015– 19 period, when the Sirisena– Wickremasinghe good- governance regime was in power, 
there were no collective protests within the global production sector, although the interviews 
clearly showed that there were several conditions at workplaces and in society that could have 
motivated protests.
Fast forward to the new Rajapaksha regime, when workers are still presented with appalling 
working conditions, they are more silent than ever. As of now in Sri Lanka, the NGOs in the 
area are mostly engaging in distribution of charity/ humanitarian aid to workers. Many workers 
I interviewed lamented that they have become charity recipients when the only thing they 
want to do is to work hard and earn enough for themselves and their families. However, there 
is no collective action to highlight their plight or to agitate for positive changes. The recently 
introduced pandemic- related laws and regulations and the heavy involvement of the military 
and the police in enforcing these rules seem to have further impacted a worker population that 
was already at a disadvantage when it comes to collective organizing. The new Rajapaksha 
government seems to revel in the conducive conditions of the pandemic anxieties to further 
consolidate their power via non- democratic means.
Throughout history governments have used violence against their own citizenry. This has 
taken many forms— physical, psychological, and cultural. This chapter highlights that psycho-
logical and cultural violence can in fact be even more effective in making gendered working- 
class groups silent. Psychological and cultural tools such as appeals to patriarchal values and 
loyalties, bribery, threat of disappearance, factioning and co- option have definitely made sub-
sequent groups of FTZ workers wary of collective protest. Even as sporadic resistance emerges 
and submerges within different sections of society, this case study thus points toward a general 
declining of democratic values in Sri Lanka which began in 2011, only two years after the 
war ended.
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IMPUNITY IN SRI LANKA
Øivind Fuglerud
In this chapter, I will review some political developments unfolding in Sri Lanka since the 
presidential election in November 2019 that brought Gotabaya Rajapaksa to power. Focusing 
on the increasingly important role in public administration given to officers of the armed forces, 
I will review these developments against the backdrop of the country’s long history of system-
atic human rights violations and a context of politically endorsed impunity for such violations. 
I argue that the 2019 presidential election represents a change towards autocracy in that military 
circles close to the president, supported by an ideology of ethnic majoritarianism, now openly 
assert control over civil government functions by way of presidential authority delegated to 
them. Let me begin with a brief contextualizing snapshot:
On 14 May 2020, the Sri Lankan secretary of defence and the two chiefs of the Sri Lankan 
army and navy paid an official visit to two archaeological sites, Muhudu Maha Vihara and 
Digavapi, both old Buddhist temples. Two of the three men, secretary of defence general (Rtd.) 
Kamal Gunaratne and commander of the army general Shavendra Silva, are widely known to 
the public as incarnations of the military might that in 2009 crushed the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and tens of thousands of Tamil civilians with it (see UN 2011: 41, 
also OHCHR 2015). By international human rights organizations, they are pointed to as war 
criminals (ITJP and JfD 2020; HRW 2021). In the words of the prominent Sri Lankan pol-
itical commentator Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka who watched the news item on TV, the dignitaries 
arrived in a
long convoy of glossy black four- wheel drives coming down a dusty road with a 
heat haze shimmering in the background. Elite guards in red berets and body- armor, 
sunshades and carrying Heckler- and- Koch MP6s dismount, escorting the Bosses, also 
in shades, one in civvies and tie, the others in uniform.
(Jayatilleka 2020a)
Both Muhudu Maha Vihara and Digavapi are located in the southern part of the Eastern 
Province where the three major ethnic communities in Sri Lanka – the Sinhalese, the Tamils, 
and the Muslims – live in close proximity and compete for resources. Access to the two sites 
and the use of the land surrounding them have for more than 60 years been contested by local 
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1994; Nuhman 2016). The visit came about due to complaints of Muslim destruction of 
temple ruins considered sacred by Sinhalese Buddhists, presented to the president himself by 
the leaders of the Buddhist order, the Sangha. Having supported Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election 
campaign, they presented the complaint during the first monthly meeting of the Buddhist 
Advisory Council established by the new president. In the second meeting, following the 
military leadership’s excursion, the president decided to entrust the survey and preservation of 
archaeological sites in the Eastern Province to a presidential task force headed by the defence 
secretary. Despite the complex demography of the Eastern Province, all members of the task 
force appointed by the president are Sinhalese (Gazette Extraordinary No. 2178/ 17). The presi-
dent also decided to establish a separate naval military sub- unit to maintain the security in the 
environs of the Muhudu Maha Vihara (Balachandran 2020).
Spokespersons for the Tamil and Muslim communities in Sri Lanka claim that consecutive 
governments for decades have used archaeological findings as a pretext to mark locations as 
Buddhist sites in order to promote ‘Sinhalization’ of areas traditionally dominated by minority 
settlements (Tamil Guardian 2020a; see also Oakland Institute 2021). One connection between 
the visit on 14 May 2020 and the theme of this chapter lies in the fact that the visit and the 
establishment of the naval unit to protect the Muhudu Maha Vihara shows that the military 
now has become a ‘first responder’ in civic disputes between the ethnic communities in the 
country (Jayatilleka 2020a). The message to the public conveyed by the media coverage of the 
event, and by giving the leadership of the presidential archaeological task force to the defence 
secretary, is that complaints brought forward by the Buddhist Advisory Council may now be 
rectified by military means. As pointed out by Jayatilleka, where one in a democratic country 
would expect the police to investigate complaints, or civil state institutions to find balanced 
solutions or settle disputed claims by the rule of law, the ‘current official discourse assumes 
that the matter is open- and- shut, and that the military arm of the state shall intervene on one 
side’ (Jayatilleka 2020a). Jayatilleka, Sri Lanka’s permanent representative to the United Nations 
in Geneva at the war’s end in 2009, former ambassador to France and Russia, has repeat-
edly warned against the recently elected president’s ‘openly Sinhala- Buddhist supremacist line’ 
(Jayatilleka 2020b) and the possibility of ‘a fanatical Sinhala- Buddhist military rule’ led by him 
(Jayatilleka 2018).
A new role for the armed forces
Providing a more prominent position to the military has been on top of the political agenda 
of the new president, who was secretary of defence between 2005 and 2015. In his election 
manifesto (Rajapaksa undated [2019]: 13), Gotabaya Rajapaksa pointed to the fact that under 
the previous government, in power between 2015 and 2019, ‘personnel in our intelligence 
agencies, armed forces and the police have been subjected to humiliation, victimization, intimi-
dation and imprisonment, which has resulted in a collapse of morale’, a situation he promised 
to rectify if elected. Similarly, his brother, prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, president from 
2005 until 2015, has argued that ‘members of the intelligence services were persecuted, 
harassed, and jailed by the previous government on false charges’ (Times online 2019). The 
‘false charges’ referred to are allegations of war crimes brought forward in several reports by 
the UN, but also allegations of corruption, torture, kidnappings and extrajudicial murders not 
directly related to the war.
The human rights situation in Sri Lanka in general and the conduct of the Sri Lankan army 
during the last phase of the civil war in particular, has been an issue in the UN’s Human Rights 











the High Commissioner for Human Rights to ‘undertake a comprehensive investigation into 
alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri 
Lanka’, and ‘to establish the facts and circumstances of such alleged violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring accountability’ (Human Rights 
Council 2014: 4). This request mandated the investigation resulting in the report from the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL, see 
OHCHR 2015), which was tabled in the Human Rights Council in 2015 and was followed by 
Human Rights Council Resolution 30/ 1 (Human Rights Council 2015). Mahinda Rajapaksa 
saw the fact that the joint SLFP – UNP government that came to power after he lost the presi-
dential election to Maithripala Sirisena in 2015 supported Resolution 30/ 1 as a direct affront to 
himself and his government as victors in the war against the LTTE. Consequently, this support 
was soon withdrawn after his brother Gotabya Rajapaksa was elected president and appointed 
Mahinda prime minister. One central proposal in Resolution 30/ 1 was the establishment of ‘a 
judicial mechanism … to investigate allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and 
violations of international humanitarian law’ in which members ‘of Commonwealth and other 
foreign judges, defence lawyers and authorized prosecutors and investigators’ were to participate 
(Human Rights Council 2015: 4). Resolution 30/ 1 is cast as a follow- up to the OISL- report, 
which among its many observations concluded that:
…  there are reasonable grounds to believe the Sri Lankan security forces and para-
military groups associated with them were implicated in unlawful killings carried 
out in a widespread manner against civilians and other protected persons during the 
period covered by OISL’s report.
(OHCHR 2015: 219, para 1116)
This is a very different version of what happened during the last phase of the civil war from 
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s, who in 2010 claimed that Sri Lanka’s military had won the war ‘carrying 
a gun in one hand and the Declaration of Human Rights in the other’ (Rajapaksa 2010).
During the first six to seven months of his presidency, Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother 
and appointed prime minister took a number of steps to provide the armed forces a new 
role in the governance of the country. One of their first political decisions was to establish a 
special presidential commission mandated to inquire into and collect information on inves-
tigative agencies falsely accusing public officers of criminal activities (Gazette Extraordinary 
No. 2157/ 44 & No. 2159/ 16). This ‘Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Allegations of 
Political Victimization During the Period Commencing 08th January 2015 and Ending 16th 
November 2019’ was given broad powers, and immediately used its authority to order the 
attorney general’s department not to proceed with several cases against politicians and security 
personnel pending in court. After the commission delivered its report in three volumes in 
early 2021, the president established another presidential commission to implement the 
recommendations of the former (Gazette Extraordinary No. 2212/ 53). This commission is 
authorized to recommend the imposition of civic disability on persons found guilty of political 
victimization, thereby bypassing established judicial institutions and mechanisms (CPA 2021a). 
According to Sri Lanka’s Imposition of Civic Disabilities (Special Provisions) Act, ‘civic dis-
ability’ disqualifies a person from voting at elections; from being a candidate at elections; for 
membership of any local authority; for membership of Parliament; and for employment as a 
public servant. If subject to the imposition of civic disability, a person would therefore also 
need to vacate his or her Parliamentary seat, leave any public position, or terminate employ-
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One case the commission on political victimization tried but failed to close down was the 
legal proceedings against fourteen naval officers for the abduction, torture, extortion and con-
spiracy to murder of eleven persons in 2008 and 2009, among them one child and six students. 
Among the 14 accused were one former chief of defence staff and one former commander of 
the navy and advisor to the president on national security. The victims, none of them with any 
record of terrorist activity, were allegedly kidnapped in Colombo for ransom, after which they 
were taken to the Trincomalee naval base where they were later murdered (for a presentation 
of the case, see ITJP 2019b). In this particular case, the attorney general withstood the pressure 
from the presidential commission and scheduled new court hearings. However, in June 2020 
proceedings were stayed by the court of appeal, raising doubts about the political independence 
of the judiciary. In April 2021, the prime minister tabled a resolution in Parliament seeking 
the acquittal of the accused and withdrawal of the indictment, as well as recommending that 
investigators and witnesses are charged under the Penal Code and Bribery Act for fabricating 
evidence. If accepted by Parliament such a Resolution would mean overriding the judicial 
process, in violation of the principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law in a con-
stitutional democracy (CPA 2021b). On 4 August 2021, the Sri Lankan Attorney General’s 
Department decided not to proceed with charges against former Navy commander Wasantha 
Karannagoda in the case (Amnesty International 2021).
Sensing which way the wind was blowing, Inspector Nishanthi Silva in the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID), who in the 2015 – 2019 interregnum investigated a number 
of high- profile cases involving members of the Rajapakasa regime and security personnel 
associated with them, soon after the presidential election fled the country, seeking asylum 
in Switzerland (Colombo Telegraph 2019). One of the cases in his portfolio had been the 
murder in 2009 of Lasantha Wickrematunge, founding editor of The Sunday Leader and 
influential critic of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government. When murdered, Wickrematunge’s 
newspaper was digging into a case of corruption involving the then defence secretary, and, 
reportedly, CID officer Silva had in an open court hearing pointed to Gotabaya Rajapaksa 
as the person responsible for the murder (Chandraprema 2018). Following Silva’s escape, 
the government removed the director of the CID who had backed the investigations, and 
relegated him to a menial job in the southern part of the country. He was later imprisoned, 
accused of fabricating evidence against a police officer who had worked closely with 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa during his time as defence secretary. This police officer was in 2015 
sentenced to death for murder. The will of the new president to uphold his campaign pledge 
‘to release war heroes languishing in prison over false charges and cases’ (Rajapaksa undated 
[2019]) was proven by his pardoning in March 2020 of former staff sergeant Sunil Ratnayake 
who was convicted in 2015 for the murder of eight Tamil civilians, including three chil-
dren, in Mirusuvil in April 2000. The conviction of Ratnayake, which was upheld by the 
Supreme Court only a few months before the pardon, is one of the very few exceptions to 
full impunity for military personnel in Sri Lanka for whatever crimes committed against 
members of the minorities.
In terms of public administration, a large number of civilian government services were soon 
after the instatement of the new president brought under the control of the Ministry of Defence, 
including the National Media Centre, the Secretariat for Non- Governmental Organizations, 
and the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority. This was part of a larger centralizing oper-
ation concentrating power in the hands of the president and the prime minister (News First 
2019). Between 25 January and 2 June 2020, the president established seven different presi-
dential task forces, several of them led by military officers. Common to all are their broad and 









democracy by operating outside government ministries’ normal chain of command. Several of 
the task forces’ fields of responsibility overlap with that of civilian agencies.
Especially worrying was the establishment in June 2020 of the ‘Presidential Task Force to 
build a Secure Country, Disciplined, Virtuous and Lawful Society’ (Gazette Extraordinary No. 
2178/ 18). This, like the archaeological task force mentioned above, is led by the secretary of 
defence. It includes among its members the commanders of the Sri Lanka army, navy and air 
force, chief of the National Intelligence Service, director of State Intelligence Service, and 
the directors of the army- , navy- and air force intelligence units. The task force has sweeping 
powers and reports directly to the president. It is mandated to take ‘necessary immediate steps 
to curb the illegal activities of social groups which are violating the law which is emerging as 
harmful to the free and peaceful existence of society at present’, and ‘to investigate and issue 
directions as may be necessary’ on all matters within its broad and vague mandate. A number 
of civil society organizations in Sri Lanka have questioned the legality of the task forces within 
the constitution of Sri Lanka (e.g. CPA 2020) and have construed the powers given to them as 
a step in the direction of authoritarianism and military dictatorship (Sri Lanka Campaign for 
Peace and Justice 2020; Friday Forum 2020).
In installing his military- dominated regime, the new president was helped by the Covid-19 
pandemic. When the pandemic struck in March 2020, the president’s response was to give the 
overall responsibility for fighting the disease to general Shavendra Silva, commander of the Sri 
Lankan Army. In preparation for a general election in April, the president dissolved Parliament 
with effect from 2 March. However, due to the pandemic, the election was postponed until 5 
August, and the Parliament remained dissolved for five months, two more months than the con-
stitution allows. This made organized opposition to presidential rule difficult. A full two months 
nation- wide ‘corona- curfew’ dampened political debate further. News agencies reported the 
official number of arrested for breaking the curfew to be more than 60,000 (Xinhua 2020; 
Tamil Guardian 2020b), providing rich opportunity also to clamp down on criticism. Thirty- 
two trade unions, press freedom organizations and civil society groups in a joint statement 
noted in April 2020 that ‘it appears, under the guise of the suppression of Covid- 19 epidemic 
the government is suppressing the right of people to express their views and their right to pro-
test’ (Sri Lanka Brief 2020). In a joint statement published in late July 2020, ten international 
human- and civil- rights organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and the International Commission of Jurists, pointed out that since the presidential election 
a campaign of fear has intensified. ‘Dissident voices and critics of the current government, 
including lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and victims of past abuses, are being 
targeted by the police, intelligence agencies and pro- government media’, the statement noted 
(Amnesty International 2020a).
With effect from January 2021, the president appointed 25 military officers, a majority with 
combat experience from the last phase of the war, as ‘chief coordinating officers’ to all districts 
to manage operations to control the spread of the coronavirus (ITJP and JfD 2021). While 
at the time of writing, the picture is not clear, according to one source the authority of the 
chief coordinating officers extends well beyond Covid- 19 and includes coordinating economic 
revival, poverty alleviation, disaster management, and even overseeing police operations (Lanka 
e- News 2021).
Militarization and disappearances
The new role of the military in Sri Lanka’s political landscape and the sabotaging of judicial 
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emerging over time. I will briefly discuss two aspects of this picture here, militarization and 
human rights violations:
Sri Lanka’s social fabric has since the late 1970s been gradually transformed by a process of 
militarization in the sense described by Cyntia Enloe (2000: 291) as a ‘step- by- step process by 
which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military 
as an institution or militaristic criteria’. Militarization is a multi- stranded socio- political process 
through which certain assumptions, values, and beliefs are rooted in society. Among the core 
ideas of militarism are the conceptions that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions, and 
that hierarchical relations and lines of command produce the most effective action.
One dimension of militarization in Sri Lanka is the securitization of territories and com-
munities. Throughout the civil war, the Tamil population in the conflict- affected areas were 
presented as a threat to the state that could be dealt with only through military means. The 
extended use of emergency powers and anti- terrorism legislation to govern during difficult 
times, has led to a state of exception remaining even after the state of emergency ceased to exist 
(Satkunanathan 2015: 374– 375). Several reports by international human rights organizations 
have told of continued surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and torture in the former war- zone long 
after the threat to the state represented by the LTTE was eradicated in 2009 (e.g. ITJP 2015; 
HRW 2018). In 2017, one study found that in Mullaithivu, the district where the last phase 
of the war was fought, there was, eight years after the war ended, at least one army soldier for 
every two civilian residents (Adayalaam Centre for Policy Research & PEARL 2017).
Another dimension of militarization consists of what Venugopal (2011) calls ‘military 
fiscalism’, in which state expenditure through the security apparatus has established a lifeline 
to impoverished and otherwise neglected rural areas. By the 1990s, the Sri Lankan army had 
become the single largest employer in the country, and that with a salary level of almost double 
what salaried private sector jobs pay. In the five districts focused on in Venugopal’s analysis, 
more than half of Sinhala Buddhist men between 18 and 30 in cash employment work in some 
branch of the military. In many of the poorest villages, almost every household has at least one 
member with either a salary, a pension, or some other financial bond to the military. The pol-
itical support mobilized through these linkages is one probable reason for the counter- intuitive 
rise in the number of soldiers recruited after the end of the war in 2009. According to World 
Bank data, the number of Sri Lankan armed forces personnel grew from 223,100 in 2009 to 
317,000 in 2017 (Macrotrends 2020). With this rise in numbers has come the encroachment 
of the military into almost every corner of civilian life from the production and retail of food 
to tourism, philanthropic undertakings, and leadership training for school principals and uni-
versity students.
Impunity for human rights violations committed by the country’s security forces has plagued 
Sri Lanka for many decades (for a discussion of legal provisions see International Commission of 
Jurists 2012). Since the 1970s, international and domestic human- and civil- rights organizations 
have continuously reported on abductions and unlawful killings committed by members of 
the country’s security apparatus and militias associated with them. Many of the victims were 
never found. In its preliminary observations at the conclusion of its visit to Sri Lanka in 2015, 
the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances observed that enforced 
disappearances have been used in Sri Lanka in a massive and systematic way. It also noted that 
both ‘during and after the war enforced disappearances were even used for purely economic 
extortion purposes by some State officials and affiliated paramilitaries’ (WGEID 2015). In 2016 
the leader of the government’s Office on National Unity and Reconciliation, former presi-
dent Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, acknowledged that Sri Lankan governments had 













International observes that Sri Lanka has one of the world’s highest number of disappearances, 
‘with between 60,000 and 100,000 people vanishing since the late 1980s’ (Amnesty International 
2020b).
Impunity and alliances
Enforced disappearances and military impunity in Sri Lanka are outcomes of irregular or 
non- institutional alliances between politicians, the military, and non- state armed groups. 
Such alliances became particularly noticeable during the suppression of the Sinhalese Maoist 
movement Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (‘People’s Liberation Front’), JVP for short. This 
movement, which developed independently of the armed Tamil groups in the northern and 
eastern parts of the country, staged two rebellions against the Sri Lankan state, the first in 
1971 and the second from 1987 onwards. By the end of 1988, Sri Lanka’s South was close to 
anarchy; roads were blocked, supply of electricity sabotaged, telephone lines cut, public ser-
vices closed down. Then, from 1989, the security forces changed their strategy and increas-
ingly fought JVP with their own brutal methods. Death squads with pompous names became 
part of everyday life: ‘Black Cats’, ‘Yellow Cats’, ‘Eagles of the Central Highlands’, ‘People’s 
Revolutionary Red Army’ (PRRA); masked men in civilian clothes, cars without number 
plates passing unhindered through security checkpoints, bodies with signs of torture burning 
on the roadside.
Central to these groups were networks of soldiers and intelligence officers operating apart 
from the formal chain of command, many of them personally marked by JVP’s violence. The 
exact number of persons killed during the second uprising is unknown. Amnesty International 
suggests ‘perhaps 30,000’, and mentions in its report that the government at the time attributed 
to the JVP a total of 6,517 killings between 1987 and mid- March 1990 (Amnesty International 
1990: 13). Politicians judging the brutal methods necessary backed those on the frontline, some-
times with private grudges thrown in. Inside sources have claimed that planned liquidations of 
JVP- members and their families were based on lists drawn up by powerful politicians and local 
dignitaries, some of them using the opportunity to solve private disagreements and animosities 
(Amnesty International 1990). After the war against the JVP was won, the methods developed 
were put to use in the war against the LTTE, prominent among them the use of irregular armed 
groups coordinated by military officers.
For understanding the present- day situation in Sri Lanka, it is significant that the current 
president himself and several of his close military associates cut their teeth in the fight against 
the JVP in the late 1980s. Current secretary of defence Kamal Gunaratna and army commander 
Shavendra Silva both served under president Gotabaya Rajapaksa during his time as commander 
of the Gajaba Regiment. The Gajaba regiment’s place of posting in 1989 was Matale, where 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was the security- coordinating officer until the end of the JVP insurrec-
tion. In Matale a mass grave with the remains of at least 154 people with signs of torture was 
discovered in 2013, believed by local forensic experts to be victims of the government’s fight 
against the JVP. However, before conclusive evidence could be collected, the investigation 
was taken away from the judiciary and handed over to a commission established by Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa’s president brother Mahinda Rajapaksa. In 2015, the commission concluded that 
the findings were not related to the JVP period (see ITJP 2019a). The two mentioned officers 
serving under Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the Gajaba Regiment went on to become among the 
most central military commanders during the end- fight against the LTTE, both of them sub-
sequently pointed to as suspected war criminals by international human rights organizations 






Militarization and impunity in Sri Lanka
327
of the war generously rewarded with military promotions and diplomatic or political postings, 
as were many of their colleagues also mentioned in the reports.
After the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa for president and the appointment of Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa as secretary of defence in 2005, the collective trauma left by the death squads of the 
late 1980s was reactivated. The phenomenon of ‘white van abductions’, the kidnapping by 
unknown groups travelling in unmarked white vans, commonly assumed to consist of operators 
with links to the armed forces, soon reached new heights. By September 2006, the human 
rights group University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR (J)) reported between three and 
eight killings per day in Jaffna. ‘Killer units of the state go about in white vans and with 
masks on motorcycles and are by now unconcerned about hiding their affiliations’, they noted 
(UTHR (J) 2006). A new trait now was that many abductions took place in areas controlled by 
the government, including Colombo. Many of those made to disappear from these areas had 
no discernible links to the LTTE (Jeyaraj 2016).
Unsurprisingly, the exact nature of who and what when it comes to disappearances and 
unlawful killings is shrouded in darkness. What is known is that the rise in numbers occurred at 
the same time as the security forces, under Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s leadership, were increasingly 
making use of the services of Tamil militants at war with the LTTE. This relationship between 
the armed forces and Tamil militias was as such not new. In the North, the militia of Eelam 
People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), at odds with the LTTE from the beginning of the civil war, 
had had a working relationship with the military for a long time. Now, after breaking away from 
the LTTE in 2004 the remaining forces of LTTE’s former commander in the Eastern Province, 
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka ‘colonel’ Karuna Amman, operating under the name of 
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), became the ‘running dogs’ of the military intelli-
gence (Jeyaraj 2016). The two militias of EPDP and TMVP now competed for the delivery 
of irregular military services to the army in the government- controlled part of the country. 
While initially commissioned to undermine LTTE’s networks and influence, their activity soon 
degenerated into profit- seeking crime. International Crisis Group points out that the reliance 
on paramilitaries to fight the government’s war while refusing to pay them for it blurred the 
lines between political and criminal violence (ICG 2007: 11). They also point to the existence 
of ‘hybrid groups’, military intelligence cadres and Tamil paramilitaries operating together, 
resulting in a dissolving of institutional command structures and lack of accountability. The 
UN OISL  report (OHCHR 2015: 81– 94, see also HRW 2007) confirms this general picture.
Seen against this backdrop accusations made by field marshal Sarath Fonseka, former com-
mander of the Sri Lankan Army, are interesting. In 2017, he claimed that the former defence 
secretary – the current president – personally supervised all security and intelligence operations 
in and around Colombo through a separate chain of command made up of loyalists, bypassing 
the normal organizational structures of the three - armed forces and the police. ‘It is through 
this group’, Fonseka stated on TV, that ‘the Rajapaksas put together a faction to plan high 
profile assaults, abductions and murders of media personalities and others, under the auspices 
of the targets being a threat to national security’ (Sri Lanka Brief 2017). After coming back to 
power in 2019, the president and prime minister have not forgotten their old Tamil paramilitary 
associates. Douglas Devananda, leader of EPDP, is a cabinet minister; the ex- LTTE commander 
Karuna Amman was in October 2020 appointed as district coordinator of prime minister 
Mahinda Rajapaksa for Batticaloa and Ampara in the Eastern Province (The Island 2020). His 
former deputy, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan aka ‘Pillayan’, was elected to Parliament in the 
2020 election while in remand prison suspected of murder. As the sole elected representative 
of TMVP Chandrakanthan is currently part of the president’s 2/ 3 majority in Parliament. In 










As indicated above, there is a continuity in human rights violations in Sri Lanka from the 
suppression of the second JVP rebellion of the late 1980s until today, both in terms of methods 
and in terms of individual organizers in the security apparatus (ITJP and JfD 2020). Currently, 
many of these organizers are filling political positions around the president and the prime 
minister.
Concluding discussion
What is unfolding in Sri Lanka after the presidential election in November 2019 is a qualita-
tively new development in the direction of autocratic rule. What appears is a democratically 
backsliding state in the shape of a hybrid between ‘the garrison society’ (Dibble 1966– 67) and 
‘the oligarchic- corporate state’ (Kapferer 2005). Dibble’s concept ‘garrison society’ emphasizes 
the coalescence of different social spheres under the dominance of the military; that is the 
social embeddedness of military force, rationality, and knowledge. Characteristic of a garrison 
society is a situation where institutions and elites holding military, economic, and political 
power have become dependent upon one another; in which their goals and interests are com-
plementary (Dibble ibid.: 106). In Sri Lanka, this development comes with a twist. Through 
their personalized control over state functions, and their alliances with business interests and the 
armed forces, the Rajapaksa clan between 2005 and 2015 provided the Sri Lankan state forma-
tion an increasingly ‘oligarchic- corporate’ character (Kapferer 2005). What this label denotes is 
rule by a body, a corporation, organized on the basis of personal association, patterns of patronal 
distribution, and loyalty to a leading family, coming together to pursue common interests, in 
this case power and profit. With the two Rajapaksa brothers back in power, this development 
has now entered a new and more militarized phase, consolidating a foundation of personal pol-
itical– military alliances for dynastic rule.
Following the August 2020 Parliamentary election, which provided their party SLPP and 
its allies a comfortable 2/ 3 majority, allowing them to pass in Parliament amendments to the 
constitution considerably strengthening the executive branch of government, the new cabinet 
that was established included president Gotabaya and prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s elder 
brother Chamal and Mahinda’s eldest son Namal Rajapaksa. In July 2021 the younger brother 
of the president and the prime minister, Basil Rajapaksa, often considered the family’s main 
strategist, was added to the list of cabinet ministers. Between them, the five family members 
currently hold nine ministerial posts, including minister of defence and minister of finance. 
Basil Rajapaksa also chairs the powerful Presidential Task Force for Economic Revival and 
Poverty Alleviation, bringing together under his authority a broad range of actors drawn from 
the sectors of public security, government regulation, banking, and private enterprise. Again, 
this task force reports directly to the president.
With universal franchise being implemented in 1931, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) is considered Asia’s 
oldest democracy. While bruised and battered by two Maoist uprisings and a long civil war 
the democratic structure still stands, if only barely. To what extent it will survive the structural 
changes in governance ushered in by the post- 2019 regime remains to be seen.
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IN SOUTH ASIA –  
AN UNDETERMINED PATH
Sten Widmalm
The contributions in this book have shown that South Asia is currently one of the world’s 
regions where the level of democracy is declining sharply. Although the Indian subcontinent 
and its surrounding states are difficult to delimit in relation to the rest of Asia, the trend concerns 
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Should we include Myanmar 
the impression would only deepen. Evidently, all states in this region either find it very hard 
to make significant gains in democratization, or have been caught in a seemingly unstoppable 
trend of autocratization. Are there more general explanations for the poor democratic perform-
ance of South Asia in addition to the country- specific chapters that have been presented here?
It is a truism that democracy means little if there is no economic growth. However, the regime 
trajectories described in the four countries in focus in this book, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka, provide further support for the claim that economic growth is not guaranteed to 
be accompanied by liberal democratic freedom. Instead, the familiar (Polanyi 2001) argument 
has been made here that when unchecked, economic expansion can rip through societies and 
leave gaps and conflicts behind, that may in turn support autocratization. To some extent non- 
governmental organization can mend immediate needs. Still, in the long run a well- governed 
state that respects universal rights is necessary to balance the needs of the citizens and to bridge 
gaps in society to make democracy work.
More is provided in the accounts here that tell us something about how perspectives on 
democracy have changed fairly recently. If the autocratization trend we see now was only 
about economic redistribution and sustainable development, party politics could have evolved 
where the fight for the support of the voters would have been played out along a left– right 
spectrum – by competing with different policy strategies and within a democratic framework. 
However, a substantial share of the political parties in this region has been caught in the wave 
of populism which increasingly defines politics in the world today. This region of the world has 
undoubtedly seen its share of this political phenomenon long before the most recent populist 
wave (Chatterjee 2020). However, the proliferation and intensity of populism is now unprece-
dented. The core feature is to declare political opposition in any shape and form as illegitimate 
(Müller 2016). But this standpoint is not only a cause of autocratization, it is a symptom of it. 








what is brought forward in this book. However, political leaders have understood that there is a 
strong support for populists as well as politically intolerant views among voters (Widmalm and 
Oskarsson 2013). Since autocratization occurs in countries where elections are held, can we not 
draw the conclusion that the political leaders are even without guilt if they mainly listen to the 
voices of the people? When we try to understand the present conditions in this region, as well 
as in other parts of the world, there is one line of thought that immediately presents itself which 
connects to this argument that will be discussed in this chapter. The focus will be on determin-
istic perspectives on the decline of democracy which claim, expressed in a simplified way, that 
although democracy was an interesting and commendable project for a while, history finally 
lost its patience with it. Sentiments and incentives more deeply rooted than ideologies – which 
evidently political leaders themselves find hard to believe in – were destined to make a come-
back. Eventually, culture, history, and economic forces, which always have had the strongest 
impact on how the world changes, would resurface and adjust development trajectories – no 
matter what political dramas that had played out at the centre stages of politics.
There are arguments located in deterministic perspectives that need to be taken seriously. 
Overlooking them would be a mistake. However, there is also a dangerous side to placing all 
the explanatory power on, for example, culture or economy as natural or unstoppable forces. 
The arguments speaking for them may be more seductive than true. The fact that several coun-
tries may behave in a similar way at one point in time may have other explanations than, for 
example, shared underlying historical conditions. Concerted political behaviour may be caused 
by high costs for individual states breaking away from a regime- context. There may be reasons 
and options that may be dictated by factors taught in the discourse on collective action for 
example, which decide regime trends. And accepting a deterministic explanation may entail 
taking an analytical shortcut which entails disregarding in- depth studies of political processes. 
Doing that may eventually provide legitimacy for the powers that promote autocracy. These 
dilemmas and questions are the focus of this chapter which is a part of the final section of this 
book which discusses how to comprehend autocratization in South Asia. By employing broad 
overviews, the three chapters discuss the role of historical factors, ideological currents and 
how the geopolitical context is influenced by China. The ambition is not to provide one big 
final argument which unites the contributions in this book. The idea is to take one step back 
and see what becomes apparent when a wider lens is used and how that may complement the 
perspectives in the previous contributions.
We begin with a discussion in this chapter on historical factors and agency. Then Johan 
Lagerkvist gives his view on how China affects its neighbours in this part of the world. And 
finally, David Lewis provides an analysis for understanding autocratization in South Asia via the 
writings of the influential illiberal political theorist Carl Schmitt.
Authoritarian regime convergence in South Asia
The trends described in general in Chapter one, and more in detail in the country specific 
chapters, show how the states in South Asia converge in the way they are governed to a place 
which has been described as electoral authoritarian (Alizada et al. 2021), or worse (see Chapter 
1 for definitions of autocratization and regime types). (Alizada et al. 2021), or worse (see 
Chapter 1 for definitions of autocratization and regime types). Therefore, the first question is, 
were they always on their way there? The trend since independence until 2020 is described 
in Figure 28.1 using V- Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index which was presented in Chapter 1.
After independence and throughout the Cold War, authoritarian government was the rule 
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and Sri Lanka, which managed to hold elections and to protect several of the basic liberties 
essential for democracy. A decline then set in, where both India and Sri Lanka joined their 
neighbours on the autocratic path. In India in 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed the 
Emergency in an effort to put down violent protests and to suppress opposition parties. In Sri 
Lanka, the relatively open politics of the Bandaranaike era declined as communal conflicts grew 
in intensity. The democratic decline in India however proved to be temporary. The country 
saw 22 months of semi- authoritarian rule – and for a limited time its government declined into 
the authoritarian category. However, Gandhi ended the Emergency and India steered back to 
democracy, in a manner unique for countries that had been recently decolonized. The down-
ward trend in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, led to civil war and ethnic purges. The time during 
which India’s democracy was in rapid decline, around 1976, was the first time when all of the 
states of South Asia converged on non- democratic rule.
Then, for almost four decades, India stood out as an exception to the authoritarianism of 
its neighbours. It bears stressing that, inasmuch as India has such a large share of the population 
of South Asia (today almost 75 per cent), it can be misleading to give equal weight to all of the 
countries in the region when measuring democratic performance. Since independence, after 
all, a majority of the population in South Asia has lived under imperfect but nonetheless demo-
cratic rule – mainly thanks, of course, to India.
After the Cold War ended, moreover, there was a clear shift in the general pattern, as several 
countries in South Asia joined what has been called ‘the third wave’ of democratization (see 
Figures 1.1, 1.10 and 28.1). India seemed to be on a steady democratic path and democratiza-
tion in Bangladesh was impressive. The general trend was greatly strengthened between 2004 
Figure 28.1 Electoral democracy (polyarchy) in South Asia, 1947– 2020





and 2011. These years were when Afghanistan left the bottom of the scale, a more modern 
constitution was adopted under the leadership of Hamid Karzai and Nepal ditched its mon-
archy and became a secular state with democratic institutions. The civil war in Sri Lanka ended 
and even Pakistan seemed to prepare itself for a new and more democratic era after military rule 
ended in 2007. For a while, it certainly seemed that South Asia might converge on a fairly high 
level of democratic performance.
For several countries during this period, however, the situation can be described as volatile. 
And eventually there was the general downturn in democratic performance which has been the 
focus of this book. Sri Lanka made significant democratic improvements from 2014 to 2017, 
and it has even outperformed India since 2016. Nevertheless, the upward trend on the island 
seems to have been broken since 2018, mainly due to a worsening vulnerability of minorities 
and a shrinkage in the space for freedom of opinion and expression. It has also been claimed 
in contributions in this book that the foundation for democracy was never strongly established 
after the civil war to begin with. Nepal too, finally, has begun a slow descent on the democracy 
scale in the last few years (Nayak 2020). The gains in democratic performance seen not long 
ago have ceased or have even started to become undone by recent developments as South Asia 
joined the ‘third wave of autocratization’ (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). The rapid decline 
of democracy in Bangladesh, a democratization process which was lost in Pakistan, a fragile 
democratization process in Sri Lanka, and Modi’s authoritarian measure since 2014 led to the 
ongoing Episode of Autocratization (see Chapter 1) which means that South Asia has again, for 
the second time since independence, converged to authoritarian rule.
It is perplexing and surprising how fast the recent decline came about. And since the demo-
cratic decline has been so widespread it is tempting to see the current state of democracy as 
something created by some common denominator. After all, the Mughal Empire tied together 
what is now Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. These three states share more history with each 
other than with other countries in South Asia. Most of the territories now within these states 
were also a part of the Maurya Empire (from the fourth to the second century BCE), the Gupta 
Empire (from the fourth to the fifth century CE), and the Maratha Empire (the eighteenth to 
the nineteenth century). Subsequently the British Empire took control over most parts of India, 
Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan and Bangladesh. And then the region decolonized in 1947 and 
1948. Much more recently, moreover, Bangladesh was part of Pakistan – from independence 
in 1947 until 1971.
This shared history is one of the main reasons why making comparisons between these 
countries has been such an attractive research strategy for understanding regime development. 
It is difficult to find study objects in the field of regime studies which can so readily be argued 
to constitute a natural experiment. The favourite cases for comparison in South Asia are India 
and Pakistan. Or, in the words of Maya Tudor in her research on regime development:
[T] he manifold structural similarities between India and Pakistan means that the com-
parison forms a rare social science approximation of a natural experiment in which 
many alternative explanations can be readily eliminated, thereby facilitating the task 
of drawing compelling causal inferences.
(Tudor 2013, p. 255)
The comparative literature reveals a number of institutional factors important for explaining 
different outcomes of democratization from 1947 until recently. For example the State 
Reorganization Act in India in 1956, which allowed state borders to more logically coincide with 
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Kohli 2001). And this paved the way for democracy. Although feudal structures remain in India’s 
North, land reforms have had some effect for lessening the deep inequalities that can destabilize 
democracies (Engelsen Ruud 1996; Bhattacharyya 1994). In Pakistan province borders still cut 
across ethnic communities and feudal orders have continued to dominate political alliances and 
systems of patronage (Tudor 2013; Shami 2012). At the time of partition, civilian leaders in India 
managed to shape the administrative systems and hierarchies so that the military was brought 
under the control of the defence minister. In Pakistan the military retained their control. All 
mattered for a relative success for democracy in India and hybrid regimes in Pakistan.
Most political historians also point to the importance of structures that were established 
before partition. The British Empire did not provide a uniform system of governance in South 
Asia as provinces were under direct rule and princely states were controlled indirectly. And even 
within these categories the style of governance and degree of autonomy varied greatly. Also, 
provinces varied greatly in size, and recruitment for the armed forces was carried out according 
to a system where groups were classified as different martial races which would distribute forces 
with different ethnic backgrounds unevenly in different areas. This also mattered for dem-
ocracy later (Wilkinson 2014; Tudor 2013; Tan 2005). Furthermore, political elites in very 
different political parties grew increasingly important in the nineteenth century and until parti-
tion which certainly affected the capacity to establish civilian rule and democratic traditions in 
India and not in Pakistan (Tudor 2013; Jalal 1995). Natural, financial, and institutional resources 
were distributed in such a way that gave a great advantage to India to create a more stable 
development compared to the conditions that Pakistan provided (Jalal 1995). And, Pakistan was 
also affected by the refugee crisis in 1947 in ways that differed from India’s experience (Talbot 
2020). Consequently, India and Pakistan were not identical twins separated in 1947. Political 
and civil life developed differently because of legacies tracing roots much further back in time.
Nevertheless, even though there are no perfect natural experiments – and South Asia is 
no exception – research with comparative perspectives has undoubtedly been able to pro-
vide a more thorough and systematic understanding of the different paths that states in South 
Asia have trodden – in particular those leading to or from authoritarian rule. Institutions and 
resources do matter, political culture does too.
And yet, states in South Asia are now mostly heading in the same direction. The question 
then is, have the comparisons of states in this region led us to the wrong conclusions? If most of 
South Asia now has ended up in the authoritarian category, was not the post- colonial era just 
an interlude while waiting for the recent convergence? It is tempting to draw this conclusion. 
However, there is variation within all the countries that complicates the issue.
As Figure 28.1 shows, Bangladesh is the most authoritarian state in South Asia currently. 
This reflects how the Awami League and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina have turned Bangladesh 
to what increasingly looks like a one- party state (Riaz 2019; Engelsen Ruud and Hasan 
Forthcoming 2021). The Awami League government has eliminated any free and effective pol-
itical opposition. This includes the largest opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 
the leader of which, Khaleda Zia, has been imprisoned. In addition, the proceedings at the 
International War Crimes Tribunal, and the convictions recently handed down by it, have been 
used effectively to suppress political opposition. Autocratization here is deeply rooted in pov-
erty, a ‘soft state’, and what happened at independence in 1971.
Pakistan takes second place from the bottom in Figure 1.1 and third place from the bottom 
in Figure 28.1. Pakistan has never managed to achieve a consolidated democracy. It never rad-
ically reformed its feudal economy or separated the military from the centres of power. This has 
always limited the scope for democratization. Furthermore, it has repeatedly become entangled 











South Asia. However, after its return to civilian rule in 2007, no less than three elections took 
place in that country, resulting in relatively peaceful shifts of power without any subsequent 
reversion to military rule. For several years there were clear improvements in Pakistan’s political 
life, signalling an unprecedented democratization process. The Pakistan Tehreek- e- Insaf (PTI) 
was clearly a part of this. Nonetheless, the past five years have seen a democratic setback, with 
restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association. Intimidation, torture, and the 
disappearance of journalists and civil- rights activists have substantially increased under the rule 
of Prime Minister Imran Khan and the PTI.
India shows the most important and dramatic change here, given its previous performance 
and its population of almost 1.4 billion. Sri Lanka thereby ranks higher than India currently – 
but its better democratic performance only benefits about 2 per cent of the population in the 
region. The decline in India in this regard has a profound effect on the whole region.
There was a slight downward trend in India’s democratic performance beginning around 
2013 – the final year of two consecutive Congress (I)- led governments. A much sharper down-
turn then got under way after the BJP came to power in 2014. Should the present trend con-
tinue, India’s political system may reach the ‘authoritarian’ level – even lower than the level in 
1975– 1977 – within just a few years (Widmalm 2019a, b).
It is important to recall that the Congress (I), due to its penchant for dynastic principles of 
organization and its unwillingness or incapacity to keep checks on corruption, opened the door 
to a rival for power like the BJP. An even larger problem, from a democratic perspective, is what 
that rival did to democracy when it came to power. The steep decline from 2014 on is largely 
the result of a planned and sustained dismantling of democratic institutions pursued by the BJP 
government. And the BJP is a part of the Sangh Parivar which has roots going back a century. 
Since independence this movement has transformed and shaped India in a unique way. In spite 
of this, India long defied all predictions (Moore 1993) about the demise of its democracy.
Political scientist Rajni Kothari, however, provided perspective on the situation when he 
described India as supported by a steel frame consisting of a highly educated public sector, a 
fairly well- governed military, and the Congress Party – which together provided the stability 
needed for democratic consolidation (Kothari 1970). Nevertheless, the decline in the organiza-
tional structure of the Congress Party in the late 1960s, together with high levels of corruption, 
have since lessened India’s capacity to absorb and channel the strong political engagement of 
its citizens and their demands for reform (Kohli 1990). Moreover, in more recent years parts 
of civil society with intolerant attitudes towards minorities have aligned themselves with like- 
minded forces at the level of India’s constituent states, and even at the national level (Basu 
2015; Widmalm 2016). The Hindutva movement is pursuing chauvinistic nationalist goals, 
while the Congress Party has withered dramatically. The BJP, by linking up effectively with 
actors in civil society, has acquired an unprecedented grip on the politics and political culture 
of India. Its outspoken ambition is to create a Hindu Rashtra – the Hindu version of an ethnic 
state. The contributions to this book provide detailed accounts of how the BJP  government has 
pursued policies which differentiate civic rights along ethno- religious lines, and Hindutva- tied 
organizations on the ground have provided the muscle power – intimidating and even killing 
journalists, defenders of civil rights, and members of minority religious groups (Basu 2015). 
The strategy pursued by the government of Prime Minister Modi consists mainly of mim-
icking the leadership styles of the Pakistani and Chinese regimes. Until recently, it was hard to 
imagine how this could be done in South Asia, with its great diversity. For it was actually India’s 
diversity, paradoxically enough, that was seen as the glue which kept it together, according to 
such scholars as Paul Brass (Brass 1990), Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1996), and Yogendra Yaday, 
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enough, evidently, to stop the country’s downward trajectory on the democratic scale. As some 
contributions to this book suggest, it may however be what brings India back on track to dem-
ocracy. But such changes are not in sight now.
Sri Lanka, just like India, had a successful start for its democracy. At independence, uni-
versal suffrage had been in place for sixteen years since the introduction of the Donoughmore 
Constitution. Although the early history of Sri Lanka had differed greatly from India’s, there 
were two decades after independence when the two countries seemed to travel on the same 
democratic path. Although they did separate themselves from each other, as India managed 
to keep its democracy alive while Sri Lanka did not, similarities remained. India experienced 
conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir, at the same time as Sri Lanka was increasingly plagued by a 
civil war. During these conflicts, in both countries, ethnic and chauvinistic nationalism took 
new forms which then shaped a new generation of political leaders which today are leading 
populist political campaigns in each respective country.
Evidently, even though comparative perspectives have shed light on different regime trajec-
tories during the last 70 years, we have no coherent explanation for why South Asia has for a 
second time converged on authoritarianism. But there is a contender.
After the end of British colonial rule, and then after the end of the Cold War, the influence 
of the West and of Russia respectively in the region dramatically diminished. China has taken 
centre stage. Once the Cold War alliances broke down, was it not obvious that clashes of interest 
would be manifested in a pattern whereby different actors mainly aligned themselves on the 
basis of identities – identities which, while previously suppressed, were deeply rooted historic-
ally and culturally? In this region, the salient cultural, religious, and historically rooted identities 
can be labelled Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Confucian. As Samuel Huntington claimed, 
moreover, the world can be seen as divided by borders delineating different regions with shared 
cultures, historical experiences, and above all religious traditions (Huntington 1993: 23– 24). 
Huntington argued that, after the Cold War, civilizations would re- emerge as the highest order 
of organization (Huntington 1993). From this perspective, the Cold War served to suppress 
basic characteristics, thereby creating a false image of the world in which civilizational fault 
lines were hidden. As soon as the different civilizations re- emerged, moreover, they would clash 
with each other, largely due to their inherent contradictions with one another. Huntington 
described the civilizations of South Asia as non- secular, and as animated by values and beliefs 
that are far from democratic. In these respects he drew an explicit contrast with the West:
Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, 
liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, 
often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or 
Orthodox cultures.
(Huntington 1993: 40)
It was thus expected that the West would lose its influence in South Asia eventually, and that 
states in the whole region would converge on a non- democratic political order – albeit perhaps 
in variable ways. Empirically, is that not what we see in Figure 28.1? Naturally, Huntington 
has been criticized for his generalizations and coarse categorizations, and for his penchant for 
portraying Western civilization as superior and morally most enviable. However, even if we 
steer clear of how Huntington ranked civilizations, we may find his controversial thesis troub-
ling when we seek to understand South Asia. Already in 1993, Huntington made some highly 
prescient warnings regarding India’s trajectory, and about the future role of Hindutva political 





The historic clash been Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now 
not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious 
strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India’s substan-
tial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 
brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state 
or become a Hindu one.
(Huntington 1993: 33– 34)
For all his faults, Huntington early espied a threat to India’s democracy which scholars of 
South Asia too long underestimated. Moreover, it is striking how leaders all over Asia have 
taken increasingly to emphasizing cultural identity to provide legitimacy for non- democratic 
behaviour. The Hindutva movement in India is a clear example hereof, as it is openly pro-
moting the creation of a ‘Hindu state’ – the Hindu Rashtra. Furthermore, China under Xi 
Jinping increasingly resembles the China of the 1960s, under Mao Zedong. In its efforts to 
achieve greater influence, moreover, China is increasingly relying on hard power (Nye 2000) 
and showing an open disdain for democratic values. There is one important difference, how-
ever, in how Xi Jinping portrays China’s culture. Mao Zedong rejected Confucius, whereas the 
Chinese Communist Party today hails him as an important ‘symbol of Chinese culture’ (Dhull 
2017). The West, on the other hand, is described in this context as ‘decadent’ (Stevens 2020). 
There are thus many current trends and political declarations that fit well with Huntington’s 
idea of a Clash of Civilizations. The political rhetoric deployed by leaders in South Asia is in 
no way encouraging their countries to move upwards on the democracy scale. China sets the 
tone as it is feared in the region, but it has also long been admired for its ability to ‘get things 
done’. Time and again, Xi Jinping is depicted as resolute and proud of his country’s identity, 
and as someone who does not get stuck in all the squabbles and time- consuming diversions that 
democracy creates. The two final chapters of this book will provide an analysis which is very 
relevant to this.
Nor is it just political leaders in South Asia who regard China’s regime culture as useful 
for providing legitimacy, and thus as worth mimicking. Populists in the West turn admiring 
eyes to China as ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ seems to become something which is desired less 
among intellectuals both on the left and right, and among the young (Mounk 2018; Krastev 
and Holmes 2019). In practice, those in power who at least officially find the Huntingtonian 
way of thinking compelling are also drawn away from democracy. And it is fairly easy to point 
to all the conflicts within and between countries of South Asia – where mobilization has been 
predominantly along ethnic lines – as phenomena that can be termed civilizational.
Nevertheless, while we must acknowledge that central political actors are embracing 
Huntington’s claims about how civilizations clash and that this appeals to electorates, there are 
several reasons not to accept Huntington’s world view or the logic it sets out regarding conflicts 
and autocratization. With regard to South Asia, the most compelling reasons to be sceptical of 
the civilizational hypothesis are provided in the studies mentioned earlier which have treated 
South Asia as the scene of several political natural experiments. These studies have shown that, 
for more than seventy years, India managed to perform relatively well as a democracy in spite 
of its ‘Hindutva’ heritage. The political history of Sri Lanka, moreover, has exhibited variations 
which do not correlate with changes in its ‘culture’. Furthermore, the fact that Nepal, and even 
Afghanistan have experienced dramatic changes in regime type, suggests that a deterministic 
approach here is problematic to say the least. In particular, the fact that democratic performance 
in Afghanistan could improve so quickly after 2001 was unexpected by many political scientists 
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To this picture should be added the fact that Pakistan’s strongest partner in the region is 
China. This relationship has thrived even though China is pursuing large- scale campaigns for 
the ethnic cleansing of religious minorities (including Muslims). China’s concentration camps 
for Muslims are located very close to the Pakistan border – a fact which furnishes a natural 
(and of course horrible) experiment that speaks against Huntington’s hypothesis. If Pakistan is 
supporting violent separatists crossing the Indian border into Kashmir mainly for cultural or 
civilizational reasons, then why is it not doing the same for Muslims in China’s Xinjiang prov-
ince? And if Hindus and Confucians see Muslims as a kind of ‘civilizational enemy’, how is it 
that India and China are not turning against Pakistan and Bangladesh together?
If we are to understand conflicts, we must indeed appreciate the importance of differences 
in values, culture, and views on history. It is another thing, however, to say that these are always 
the reason why conflicts arise or when democracy is failing. When Huntington formulated his 
Clash of Civilizations hypothesis, he did so on the basis of a very selective reading of history. 
In fact, his manner of proceeding – of making the civilizational explanation the overriding 
one simply by choice, rather than scientific support – resembles the arguments proffered by 
those who conduct nationalistic campaigns. Or, as the historian Eric Hobsbawm famously put 
it: ‘History is to nationalism what poppy is to an opium addict’. This by no means implies, be 
it noted, that all conflicts where groups are mobilized on the basis of their identity are simply 
constructed by populists. Ethnic identities are built by wars, struggles for freedom, gains and 
losses, and other highly complicated events and phenomena; they are not simply inserted into 
people’s minds as ‘constructions’. They are also lived experiences, or parts of a living memory. 
Even so, this scarcely proves the world is divided into crude civilizational units doomed to 
collide. Culture is a core feature of people’s identity, but it does not decree that everyone will 
clash – at least not by violent means. Kwame Ture thought overt conflict unavoidable, but 
Martin Luther King did not. And Nathuram Vinayak Godse did, but Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi did not. There is little proof ethnic identities are always the prime mover behind 
political outcomes. The Kashmir conflict in South Asia, for example, is commonly seen as 
an ethnic conflict in the sense that cultures clash in irreconcilable ways (Widmalm 2006). 
A deeper analysis shows that while ethnic mobilization has been important in the region, the 
conflicts over the years have roots in unresolved questions relating to autonomy since parti-
tion. It is evident, however, that political actors in South Asia, as in other parts of the world, 
find arguments relating to ethnicity, economics, culture and history serviceable not only for 
gaining support, but also for evading responsibility for having whipped up feelings that can 
escalate into violence. It becomes convenient in such cases to depict ‘the power of the people’ 
metaphorically as a ‘natural force’ which generates values and produces outcomes that leaders 
cannot control, or are ‘forced’ to follow (Gilmartin, Price, and Ruud 2020; Widmalm 2006). 
Rhetorical constructions of this kind – with the displacement of agency which they entail – 
are a part of politics.
When it comes to the Clash of Civilization- argument, Huntington’s argument is a kind 
of ‘just wait and see’ argument; he gave no sell- by date for his predictions. Since politics 
involves processes of change, he will likely prove right at some time and in some place. Even a 
broken clock is right twice a day. The main counter-argument here is that conclusions about 
the authoritarian turn in South Asia relying on deterministic perspectives would deliberately 
have to overlook counter- cases and counter-arguments provided by a variety of trajectories 
since independence. The civilizational hypothesis is not always irrelevant. It is rather that 
it becomes deterministic, because of how it overlooks far- reaching regime variations, and 







What can reverse autocratization in South Asia?
Democracy’s downward trajectory in South Asia is a disaster for human rights, minorities, 
free speech, media freedom, and academic freedom. For individuals on the ground, it means 
being attacked for belonging to the wrong religion, or being sent to prison for speaking truth 
to power. The Covid- 19 crisis has added to the suffering immensely and also made it easier 
for populists to push through autocratic policy measures. The convergence described here, 
therefore, deserves an analysis far less simplified than one where not only history and culture 
but also economics become residual categories. What is needed more of is an analysis which 
takes underlying causes of conflict into account, but then also combines them with in- depth 
studies of the reasons why leaders choose non- democratic political paths. Political leaders and 
their strategies are shaped by outside forces as well. In South Asia in general the most important 
influence now is from China. Its sphere of influence is continuing to expand, and the regime 
model which it advocated is not only authoritarian. Since the cost of technology for making 
use of surveillance and control systems has gone down dramatically, a sustainable totalitarian 
model of governance is more than ever before a realistic plan for leaders in Asia, as well as in 
other parts of the world. The threat to democracy is that it has become so easy to replace it. 
Not that civilizations inevitably must clash.
The country- chapters in this book, and previous research, show that South Asia is not 
predetermined to stay in the authoritarian category. All the protest movements described here 
that have turned against the forces of autocratization attest to this. It is however evident that 
breaking free from the current situation is very costly for a single state that wants to do so on 
their own. Either concerted actions from political parties in several states in South Asia could 
lead to a push for democratization. Or a single state, a very strong and influential one, well 
experienced already in how democratic governance works, could lead the way. India is the 
main contender. However, nothing along these lines is likely to happen as long as Narendra 
Modi is leading the BJP and the country. And it will not happen as long as the political oppos-
ition is in such a poor state as it is in now. If the opposition cannot learn to adapt to the new 
situation and coordinate its efforts with other political parties, this episode of autocratization 
will continue. And the longer it does, the harder it will be to revive democracy.
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OF AUTHORITARIAN CHINA 
IN SOUTH ASIA?
Johan Lagerkvist
A strong and worldwide wave of autocratization has gained much scholarly attention in recent 
decades (Diamond and Plattner 2002, Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). In many parts of the 
world, liberal democracies have become less liberal, while authoritarian regimes have become 
more entrenched. For a long time, researchers related international economic linkages between 
the United States and other countries to openness to influence of American political norms, 
such as competitive elections, rule of law, human rights – and in turn, to democratization 
(Levitsky and Way 2010). The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and other wealthy 
autocracies, as new economic power houses, however, has raised questions about the influ-
ence of authoritarian norms as a consequence of new economic partnerships and political 
engagements (Gat 2007). Since the early 2000s international linkages and norms also include 
non- Western alternatives – particularly China’s authoritarian developmental model.
Against the backdrop of an emerging cold war between the United States and China, many 
countries in all world regions are finding themselves under increasing pressure to choose sides, 
or find ways to cleverly cooperate with both, between a liberal- democratic and free- market 
capitalist US camp, or a Leninist- authoritarian and state capitalist Chinese camp. We may thus 
find countries to oscillate between professed political ideals and economic needs and realities. In 
a climate of cold war rhetoric, American policymakers and analysts argue that China’s govern-
ment seeks to replace the US- led liberal and democratic world order with its own authoritarian 
model. In a speech in 2020, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that “General 
Secretary Xi Jinping is a true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology. It’s this ideology, it’s 
this ideology that informs his decades- long desire for global hegemony of Chinese communism” 
(Pompeo 2020). An already bankrupt ideology should not scare anyone, and there is no belief 
in China that “Chinese communism” will prevail globally, as Chinese analysts have noted the 
declining attraction of the PRC and its president Xi Jinping among populations around the 
world. Nevertheless, Pompeo’s focus on ideology is important as it’s a rallying cry for conser-
vative Republicans and “China hawks” in the US Congress. Ideology can also be diffused in 
other ways than crude propaganda. More nuanced is the argument of Aaron Friedberg, who in 
Foreign Affairs argued that “Abandoning its past reluctance to be seen as an ideological challenge 
to the West, it now openly offers its mix of authoritarian politics and quasi- market economics 
as a model for nations that want to, in Xi’s words ‘speed up their development while preserving 
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and actually existing strategic security competition presents a challenge for small and medium- 
sized powers in all world regions. It is also troublesome for China, where analysts long have 
warned about turning geo- economic and geopolitical competition with the United States into 
an ideological battle, since this would mobilize diverse US interests against China. Arguably the 
Trump presidency managed to do just that, by labelling telecom firm Huawei as an agent of 
the Chinese party- state. For less affluent countries in Asia, the geographic proximity to rising 
China presents a particular set of opportunities and challenges. Regimes, ruling political parties, 
civil society, and opposition groups in neighbouring countries are affected, due to intensi-
fied political and economic relations with China under the framework of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), which will connect countries across the vast Eurasian landmass. China, no 
doubt, pursues geopolitical and geo- economical strategies on regional and global levels, but is 
there an ideological component to these strategies – perhaps even autocracy promotion – akin 
to the logic of democracy promotion of the United States and its allies? This chapter seeks to 
tentatively answer this question by reviewing some of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the subject, with a particular eye on developments in South Asia under the BRI- framework. 
Xi started to communicate his ideas of the BRI and his loose global plan for a “community of 
common destiny” immediately when taking office in March 2013, and he has since outlined the 
vision to global audiences at the United Nations headquarters in New York and at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos.
Autocracy diffusion and promotion
The worldwide turn towards authoritarianism has been conceptualized and studied as 
autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Skaaning 2020) and “democratic back- sliding”, 
(Bermeo 2016). Most studies focus on domestic transformation and formal institutional set- 
ups, but some scholars have theorized international linkages of authoritarian rule as autocracy 
diffusion (Ambrosio 2010), autocracy promotion (Burnell 2010; Bader 2015), and authoritarian 
policy transfer/ learning (Hall and Ambrosio 2017). The potential of creation and spread of non- 
Western norms has been scrutinized in international relations scholarship (Acharya 2004), and 
empirically studied in connection with Russian, Brazilian, and Chinese proposals to multi-
lateral institutions. This literature suggests that cross- national ties in political, economic, and 
social dimensions contribute not only to the process of democratic diffusion and democratiza-
tion of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010), but also to the autocratic diffusion and 
survival of incumbent autocratic leaders. International linkages may reduce the political space 
for democratic openings (Cameron and Orenstein 2012) but also protect and embolden auto-
cratic elites (Vanderhill 2013). Autocratization oftentimes takes place as a gradual process, while 
keeping the facade of democratic institutions, such as elections for the legislative and executive 
branches (Cianetti and Hanley 2021). It is manifest in the practice of state power, using new 
and innovative techniques of repression (Morgenbesser 2020). Instead of banning NGOs, the 
ruling elites create government- organized NGOs (GONGOs) to generate the impression that 
civil society actors support government and muddle the political discourse by inserting moral 
relativity. Instead of imprisonment of political dissidents, for example, they raise the costs of 
being dissident by filing defamation lawsuits. Moreover, increasing linkages between autocratic 
regimes do not only diffuse innovative autocratic techniques internationally, they also provide 
the material basis for autocratic regimes – through increasing mutual reliance in the policy areas 
of trade, migration, and diplomacy (Tansey et al. 2017). The spread of ideas from major authori-
tarian powers, on how to govern, is an important phenomenon since autocratization within a 














autocratic consolidation, can be facilitated by other autocratic regimes. Such processes can be 
intended or unintended, directly or indirectly, actively or passively. In an important interven-
tion, Oisin Tansey proposed that the concept of autocracy promotion should be used carefully 
to avoid conceptual overstretch. It is applicable when, and only when, there is “clear intent 
on the part of an external actor to bolster autocracy as a form of political regime as well as an 
underlying motivation that rests in significant part on an ideological commitment to autocracy 
itself ” (2016: 142). This strict definition is useful as it disaggregates intentions, targets, and 
motives from the overburdened concept. He also leaves out the effects- side from the definition, 
as effects are hard to ascertain and lead to unsubstantiated claims, as in the literature on dem-
ocracy promotion (Finkel et al. 2007). Policies without intention to spur autocratization can 
still have such effects, and policies with such clear intent can be ineffective. However, his key 
assertion about ideological commitment to a particular model of political regime as a “twen-
tieth century phenomenon” of the fascist and communist past has echoes of Fukuyaman’s “end 
of history”. It neglects or underestimates the Chinese communist party’s continuing adherence 
to the principles of Leninism, and pragmatic but firmly autocratic “Dengism” as is clear from 
former leader Deng Xiaoping’s statements and speeches (Deng 2006). On the other end of the 
spectrum, as illustrated by remarks in the US foreign policy community there’s overestimation 
and hyperbole regarding China’s intent to export authoritarianism. China has certainly been 
active in denigrating liberal democracy, highlighting its failures, and preventing democracy 
promotion/ diffusion in its regional neighbourhood (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea). 
But there is little, if any, evidence of the PRC actively involved in autocracy promotion to other 
countries. An open question, however, is if “authoritarian learning/ teaching” about China’s 
developmental model and the central tenets of its mode of governance can be said to take 
place in bilateral and multilateral channels. These channels include preparation and negoti-
ation of Chinese diplomatic proposals at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 
Geneva, where China has forwarded “anti- universalist” human rights proposals in recent years 
(Richardson 2020), and suggestions to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
that Western countries respect China’s and other developing countries’ “cyber sovereignty” and 
particularist conceptions of free speech (Segal 2020). But it can also take place on a bilateral 
basis. Thus, as a role model China can diffuse authoritarianism, but without having an explicit 
ideological content or intent, in line with Kneuer’s and Demmelhuber’s concept authoritarian 
gravity centre (2016), which lesser authoritarian states orbit around and learn from. For China it 
would be beneficial to see diffusion of its own norms and principles of governance to others. 
As Ambrosio has argued, authoritarian diffusion methods such as these serve to generally legit-
imate autocracy in the international system (2010: 377). Moreover, in concrete terms, the 
adoption of Chinese- made norms, technological standards and business practices could ease 
friction in multilateral and bilateral settings, serve to legitimate Chinese state capitalism, as well 
as increase economic opportunities for Chinese state- owned companies.
Authoritarian policy transfer/ learning from China
Before Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in the Chinese communist party, Yan Xuetong, a leading 
Chinese scholar of international relations, pondering China’s increasing soft power, hoped that 
China would be able to “narrow the gap in these areas [sic!] within four to five years” (Yan 
and Xu 2008). Yet during the recent decade, and particularly after the failed containment of 
the Covid- 19 virus in China, the attraction of the PRC among publics in the more affluent 
democracies has declined significantly (Silver et al. 2020). The advent of a strategically and dip-
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this decline in public opinion worldwide. There is emerging scholarly consensus that the ascent 
to power of Xi Jinping has propelled a more assertive shift in Chinese foreign policy. In a time 
when Chinese efforts at soft power in the Global North are abandoned, there is a concerted 
push for advocating the successes of Beijing’s developmental model in the Global South and at 
the United Nations (Liu 2018). Under the umbrella of the vision of Community of Common 
Destiny and the BRI, new forums of “South– South Cooperation” have also been created 
to better communicate China’s developmental experience and policy successes (Peng 2017). 
Chinese state media, for example, has expanded globally and broadcast in many local languages. 
From around the world, journalists and educators, and GONGOs are invited to China to 
study the prerequisites of China’s phenomenal economic growth. There are also new efforts 
at joint party- building exercises between the CCP and political parties in the Global South, 
as well as regular visits between parliaments and court systems. The Beijing- based Africanist 
He Wenping has argued that Africa is a “proving ground [sic!] for Beijing’s community with a 
shared future doctrine” (2020: 40). Furthermore, she holds that: “African leaders are turning 
to Beijing for valuable lessons in not only traditional development issues like poverty reduction 
and economic growth but also government efficiency and ruling party building” (2020: 44). 
But not only African elites are impressed, as many citizens find China’s developmental model 
attractive (Lekorwe 2016). The argument about party- building is in line with extant research, 
which argues that since Xi Jinping took office, the international department of the Chinese 
Communist Party has become more active, and is a “vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing 
experiences of its modernization and authoritarian one- party regime” (Bader and Hackenesch 
2019: 10). And as has been argued by Kneuer and Hemmelhuber, these kinds of “collaborative 
networks constitute the channels of communication (horizontal and vertical), which enhance 
the spread of ideas and institutional or policy innovations” (2016: 781). And Morgenbesser 
has likewise argued that “stransnational alliances between ruling parties are formal agreements 
to provide mutual support for the maintenance of autocratic rule”, and that this “increasing 
cooperation between autocratic ruling parties around the world means opposition parties 
will suffer the consequences of innovation” (2020: 5). A case in point was the revelation that 
Chinese company Huawei’s techniques of digital surveillance have aided governments to spy 
on opposition parties in African countries (Parkinson et al. 2019). This phenomenon warrants 
further study, as research by Bader showed that economic cooperation with China contributed 
to regime durability in those authoritarian countries that were party- based regimes (2015: 672). 
Political, economic, security and technological elites are arguably attracted to China’s model of 
“technocratic developmentalism” with its focus on stability, order through digital surveillance 
techniques, and emerging standards and modes of data- driven algorithmic governance. More 
research focus on government- to- government authoritarian policy transfer/ learning is needed 
as autocrats strengthen governance and party institutions through sharing experiences. The 
idea that authoritarian gravitation centres play “a role as an important pull factor for emulation, 
imitation or policy transfer” (Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2016: 777) – and influence institu-
tional, policy, ideational, and administrative techniques in other countries – is gaining more 
importance.
Diluting democracy and redefining human rights
Over time China has moved from defence of the PRC’s policies “with Chinese characteristics”, 
to normative defence of states in the Global South and their right more generally to choose 
their own path of development, without interference of Western countries and their universalist 











common destiny for mankind, China has taken one more step. As elucidated in a key speech at the 
United Nations in 2017 (Hua 2017) and as outlined in a speech on a more active foreign policy 
at the 18th Party Congress, this vision showcases “Chinese solutions” to all the grave issues 
facing humanity, such as climate change and socioeconomic inequality. The PRC has since 
become more involved in authoritarian teaching of its developmental model and particularist 
values and norms. Thus, China has entered a new phase of more confidently transferring ideas 
of a specific Chinese model of development, and successfully made policy inroads in multilat-
eral settings, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. I would argue that the fundamental 
tenets of this governance model consist of:
1) socio- political stability (including what in India is called “majoritarianism” and what some 
scholars have labelled “authoritarian peace” within a country)
2) subnational experimentation to enhance economic growth and social stability
3) promoting the right to choose developmental alternatives according to cultural context
4) non- interference in domestic sovereign politics
5) defence of particularism against what China’s government frame as “so- called universal human 
rights”.
Yet the overall modicum is still mostly defensive and related to China’s core interests of sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, and non- interference. However, there is also a rising and troub-
ling tendency in Western academia, especially among scholars trained at Chinese universities, 
to redefine the very meaning of democracy through describing China’s autocracy as “vertical 
democracy” (Guo 2020). Similar academic tricks of moving goalposts are also used to over- 
emphasize creativity and under- emphasize censorship in China’s digital economy. It is prob-
able that these efforts to reject (Western) universalism and instead offer “Chinese solutions” 
to global governance will increase in the post- pandemic phase, when score- cards over the 
failures of the largest Western democracies, the United States and the UK, are measured 
with China’s health protection and sustained economic growth. It can be foreshadowed that 
in its vison of a “community of common destiny” China will advocate that collective safety 
and order and state sovereignty of states in the Global South must come before individual 
liberties.
In a world characterized by a declining United States, under conditions of mulitipolarity, 
China’s normative arguments could propel the world into “ideational anarchy” where concepts 
of democratic human rights are diluted or even redefined. In the marketplace of ideologies and 
ideas, countries may freely choose developmental alternatives: liberal democracy or authori-
tarian “vertical democracy”; universal human rights or particularist rights that are cultur-
ally context- specific. On the one hand the results of China’s governance have an impact by 
“speaking for themselves”, on the other these objective results can be amplified by tailored 
information to target countries in the Global South.
China in South Asia
The existence of autocracy promotion by China in Southeast Asia has been investigated and 
refuted by Bader (2014) and Noesselt (2021). China’s role in this regard as a force promoting 
autocratization has been studied by Vanderhill in Central Asia (2013) and Brautigam in Africa 
(2009) with similar results. On South Asian countries there is limited research on China’s 
authoritarian influence. Discussion of China’s relations with countries in this region mostly 
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or Beijing as a prop for incumbent autocrats. According to Kneuer and Hemmelhuber, an 
authoritarian gravity centre “constitutes a pull factor in the regional environment: as a country 
that has the kind of leverage to promote autocratic elements or a country that is an attractive 
model for countries in geopolitical proximity, as it provides policy solutions that are perceived 
as suitable” (2016: 780). Whether China is seen as an attractive model in South Asia depends 
on what national setting, and which social group, a person belongs to. Since the announcement 
in 2013 of the BRI, the presence of activities fuelled by Chinese capital investment is keenly 
felt in the region. The initiative amounts to the Chinese state’s monumental undertaking to 
connect countries via physical, digital and financial infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass 
and through the “Indo- Pacific region” to East Africa.
Among the South Asian countries, only Pakistan is a long time “all- weather friend” of 
China. However, not even this country has proven easy to cooperate with under the BRI- 
framework. For the success of the BRI, its flagship project the China– Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) has been judged as crucial. However, there’s been a heated debate in Pakistan 
and criticism of Chinese investments since 2017 (Dorsey 2019: 193). The foreign policy risks 
for Beijing and the vulnerabilities of rising China in connection with BRI (Cooley 2016), 
should not be underestimated as the tortuous progress of the CPEC has shown. Islamabad’s 
arch- enemy India, on the other hand, has quite predictably remained suspicious of the BRI 
and China’s long- term intentions. Partly because of Indian and American suspicion, Chinese 
analysts have also been prudent in their strategic assessments, not wishing through their writings 
to initiate a process that might shift the geopolitical and military balance in the Indian Ocean. 
Chinese caution is evident also in the limited military connections with other equally cautious 
small South Asian countries that avoid upsetting India’s military (Samaranayake 2019: 8). 
It is one thing to provoke border skirmishes along the contested Sino- Indian border in the 
Himalayas, and quite another to patrol the sea around India with naval vessels and submarines. 
Instead, China has over the last decade sought to bolster good impressions through economic 
activities. Yet these attempts, and an ambition to increase Beijing’s soft power, have been self- 
defeating, especially in the case of its longstanding adversary India (Jain 2017). And according 
to an informant in Ghiasy’s study on Indian perceptions of China’s geopolitical strategy under 
the BRI: “China is using micro- steps to encroach on and make advancements in South Asia’s 
security realm: first through diplomacy, then through the economy, and then into security. 
Over time, in the aggregate, these micro- steps become major strides” (2021: 273). Yet, policy 
transfer and authoritarian learning from China can take place outside the realm of security 
strategy. In India’s move towards “majoritarianism” (Sahoo 2020), for example, and its exclu-
sionary practices regarding Muslim and other non- Hindu minorities, the ideational pull of 
China as an “authoritarian gravitational centre” on countries where democratic regression 
is ongoing should not be ruled out. Whereas Western democracies have condemned China’s 
treatment of its Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region, many states in the Global South 
have abstained from such criticism. The reasons may vary, but autocrats or elites in ethnic-
ally diverse countries could ponder harsher minority policies to achieve political stability and 
economic development. In non- consolidated democracies such as Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
and in even more entrenched autocracies, such as Vietnam, leaders could follow the Chinese 
example of high- tech control in Xinjiang to enable a domestic “authoritarian peace”. Jain 
notes that China’s rise has afforded smaller nations in South Asia, such as Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, opportunities to swing out of India’s sphere of 
interest. Aid and investments from China under BRI, as well as wishes to unhook from Indian 
tutelage, have propelled smaller South Asian countries to edge closer to China, to further their 









Yet, these economic and political motivations are offset by increasing Chinese assertiveness 
in the South China Sea and along the disputed border with India. It is especially the 99- year 
lease of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota deep- sea port that has received attention in South Asian coun-
tries. Many observers have accused Beijing of conducting “debt trap diplomacy”. The policies 
of China’s state- owned policy banks do deserve scrutiny. Yet, as Sri Lanka’s debt to China is 
only 5.9 per cent of all its foreign debt (Samaranayake 2019), such terminology lends itself to 
exaggeration. Nonetheless it is argued that concerns about the Hambantota affair in the region 
after 2017 “have not been eased by Chinese insistence that the investments are purely com-
mercial in nature [and have] seriously damaged China’ s BRI soft power drive in South Asia” 
(Garlick 2018: 530).
China exerts significant influence in Dhaka due to its long- term support of Bangladesh’s 
military. With Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh in 2016, this influence was expected to grow, 
as huge Chinese investments under the BRI agenda were promised. It was seen as evidence 
for China’s expanded foothold in South Asian countries (Kumar 2019: 150). Yet, most of the 
projects and billions Xi earmarked for Bangladesh, worth USD 24 billion, have not materialized, 
as only three projects totalling USD 1.2 billion have been initiated. The overall impression is 
that initial grandiose ambitions and promises of the BRI have not materialized on the ground. 
Domestic backlashes against China’s economic influence, as in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as well 
as the Covid- 19 pandemic, can explain some of the delays.
Uncertainty surrounding Beijing’s long- term and far from transparent strategy should also 
be factored into the equation. Clouded in secrecy and contradictory as its diplomacy oscillates 
between assertiveness and prudence, Chinese foreign policy is notoriously hard to interpret. 
According to Pu Xiaoyu, China’s diplomatic Janus face should be understood as China’s 
leaders signalling to both domestic and international audiences, but also as a fundamental 
uncertainty about its changing role in world politics (Pu 2019). Several important empirical 
studies from around the world have refuted the Chinese party- state’s direct involvement in 
autocracy promotion. However, more subtle diffusion of autocratic practices could be an out-
come of China’s growing influence as a role model. It can come as a by- product of economic 
leverage such as investment, trade, foreign aid, loans, technological standards, statecraft, and 
role- modelling in educational programmes and state visits. And as noted recently by Bader and 
Hackenesh (2019), the limited evidence of Chinese autocracy promotion is mainly manifest 
from the period before the 18th Communist Party Congress in 2017. At this important con-
gress, Xi Jinping announced a strategic shift to actively communicate China’s developmental 
experience. This has to date taken form, more as authoritarian learning than actual autocracy 
promotion. And as discussed above, China’s vigorous defence of its authoritarian polity and 
attacks on universal human rights and re- defining of democracy are contributing to a global 
trend of ideational anarchy.
One avenue of future research in this field of communicating China’s developmental experi-
ence concerns political relations, especially ties between the international department of the 
Chinese Communist party and political parties in South Asia. Chinese aid in party- to- party 
dialogues is underway with political parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh (Dawn Newspaper 
2019). Notwithstanding nationalist resistance in South Asian countries against China’s advance 
of geopolitical and geo- economical interests under the BRI, its mode of governance may still 
inspire, especially compared to recent perceptions of failings of Western democracies. This phe-
nomenon especially warrants studies in countries such as Bangladesh, with a social memory of 
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Concluding remarks
Despite the transformation to a more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, China’s strategy 
remains relatively reactive, notwithstanding more vehement responses to statements about 
human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region. China is sensitive to arguments of not being a 
responsible stakeholder in the liberal world order and criticism of its human rights record. At 
the same time, China also responds to stimuli from states in the Global South to shoulder more 
responsibility to lead, and take political, not just geo- economic, initiatives. If governments, 
in Asia and Africa for example, express views that China act more decisively on the inter-
national stage, China may be nudged to act, and also should act as a role model, for states 
in the Global South. Thus, it is logical that Chinese foreign policy shift gears. China usually 
protest against democracy promotion by the United States and other liberal democracies, but 
do not actively have a programme to frustrate democracy promotion on the ground (Bader 
2014, 2015; Noesselt 2021). Incremental changes have led to a more assertive China under 
Xi Jinping. Under Xi’s rule China has initiated a process to move away from Deng Xiaoping’s 
foreign policy tenet to “lie low and bide time” for ideas to “do some things” internationally 
(Yan 2008). As yet, however, this is not an ideologically assertive China, as US analysts and 
policymakers increasingly claim. One needs to distinguish between China’s security- related, 
geo- economic, and political interests and influences. Nonetheless, the fundamental pillars 
underpinning Chinese technocratic and autocratic practices may come to inspire and exert 
attraction among autocrats elsewhere. Even in the absence of clear autocratic promotion, as 
no ideological “push factors” exist, it’s still feasible that China’s developmental technocracy 
and tenets on hierarchy, political stability, and minority policies may resonate with other coun-
tries’ elites, civil servants, and technical experts. As a “pull factor” it could thus contribute to 
domestic processes of autocratization. The outcome of such processes is likely to differ across 
the spectrum of authoritarian settings, fragile democracies, and consolidated democracies. 
Autocrats in firm autocratic settings are emboldened by China, in less- than- consolidated dem-
ocracies autocratic forces in society are energized. Autocrat- minded leaders even in Chinese- 
sceptical democracies such as India and Japan could perhaps be swayed by China- made norms 
and principles. Thus, the issue of a gravitational pull of authoritarian China is likely to grow 
in importance on the research agenda of autocratization in South Asia and beyond. However, 
autocratization can also come as a by- product of Chinese push- factors unrelated to its own gov-
ernance model. If China would abandon strategic caution in the Indo- Pacific as it has done in 
the South  China Sea, Premier Modi in India could as a response to Chinese assertiveness argue 
that civil liberties be curtailed to unify the country to withstand China. In light of persistent 
border skirmishes between India and China in recent years, and Modi’s repeated attempts to 
reap electoral benefits by pointing to the military threat from Pakistan, such a scenario is not a 
foregone conclusion (Singh 2021).
Empirical research shows that China is not intentionally and actively exporting its particular 
political system overseas. Yet there are central tenets and principles of China’s state- capitalist 
governance model that are taught to countries in the Global South, and forcefully defended in 
multilateral forums and argued as superior to Western democracy in diplomatic rhetoric and 
state- propaganda. These tenets are: socio- political stability, subnational experimentation to enhance 
economic growth and social stability, promotion of the right to developmental choice according to cultural 
context, non- interference in domestic sovereign politics, defence of particularism against what China’s 
government frame as “so- called universal human rights”. It would be negligent to believe that 
arguments about the logic and superiority of these tenets will fall on deaf ears, especially since 







speaks louder than words. According to Tansey’s strict criteria and definition, these arguments 
hardly belong to active and intentional “autocracy promotion”. Nevertheless, China’s rhet-
oric in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings and negotiations carries subtle ideological 
weight and erodes belief in the liberal and democratic principles of governance. Over time 
the gravitational pull of authoritarian China may propel autocratization, without it being the 
intended goal of autocracy promotion. Future empirical studies should, as argued by Kneuer 
and Hemmelhuber, explore “which mode of influence used by the authoritarian gravity centre 
(active intentional export or unintentional diffusion) is more effective in reality”. Recent trends 
of authoritarian learning from, and teaching of, China’s developmental model indicate that 
gravitational pull of China and intentional diffusion of governance practices are becoming 
real-world phenomena. This may not be overtly exporting world revolution from a Stalinist 
Soviet Union, which according to Oisin Tansey, amounts to real autocracy promotion having 
an explicit ideological commitment. Yet China’s twenty- first century “authoritarian learning” 
and policy transfers may prove to be more effective precisely because they are so covert.
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AUTOCRATIZATION AS AN 
IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT
Carl Schmitt’s anti- liberalism in South Asia
David G. Lewis
This volume provides evidence of a clear trend of autocratization in South Asian politics, 
which forms one strand of a much broader global process of ‘democratic recession’ since 2006 
(Diamond 2021). In this chapter I argue that this process should not only be interpreted as a 
decline in the effectiveness of democratic institutions, as suggested by terms such as ‘democratic 
backsliding’ (Bermeo 2015). Autocratization should also be understood as the construction of a 
new form of governance, a political system that reasserts hierarchy and authority at the centre 
of political life while claiming to reflect the will of the people. In this chapter I use the work 
of the anti- liberal political theorist Carl Schmitt to demonstrate a theoretical coherence to this 
illiberal model of political governance that helps us to think comparatively about the ideational 
framework of autocratization, not only across South Asia, but on a global scale.
Attempts to explain the new wave of authoritarianism in Asia have largely overlooked the role 
of ideas and political theory. Croissant and Haynes (2021), for example, identify seven factors 
driving ‘democratic regression’ in Asia, but focus primarily on institutional weaknesses, such 
as the role of political parties and civil society and the extent to which power is concentrated 
in a presidency. Ding and Slater (2021) also explore the institutional aspects of autocratization, 
pointing to the structural tensions between electoral and rights institutions in democracy. 
Diamond highlights the agency of ‘elected political leaders, greedy for power and wealth, who 
knock away various types of constraints on their power and enlarge and entrench it in undemo-
cratic ways’ (Diamond 2021: 30). Their success – or otherwise – is down to the resilience – or 
otherwise – of political institutions such as parties, civil society, and the judiciary.
These explanations tend to overlook ideational and normative aspects of autocratization, 
including those embedded in processes of globalisation. When the political impact of globalisa-
tion is discussed, scholars of comparative authoritarianism tend to focus on the disruptive effects 
of economic globalisation on communities. But it is also worth emphasising that liberal norms 
and liberal ideas – both those deliberately promoted by governments and non- governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and norms spread by contemporary culture, global travel and educa-
tion – also provoke resistance and revanche in many communities. When authoritarian leaders 
weigh in against ‘liberal elites’ and their cosmopolitan ideas, this is not simply a populist device 
to mobilise populist support, but an ideological campaign informed by illiberal ideas. This 









of many aspects of post- Cold War international liberalism – a set of ideas that emphasised a 
pluralism of actors, the deconstruction of authority, a spaceless internationalism, and fluid and 
contingent identities (Bettiza and Lewis 2020). In opposition to liberal norms, autocratization 
in South Asia has been informed by a set of illiberal ideas, reasserting notions of authority, 
reifying boundaries of the political community, and seeking a new fixity of identity, defined by 
essentialised understandings of gender, sex, race, religion, and nation.
Carl Schmitt as a theoretician of autocratization
To explain the ideological framework of contemporary autocratization, I turn to the work of 
Carl Schmitt. Described as the ‘twentieth century’s foremost critic of liberalism’ (McCormick 
1998: 830), Schmitt achieved notoriety through his support for the Third Reich, his advocacy 
of Nazi expansionism, and his virulent anti- Semitism (Mehring 2014). Schmitt was a jurist by 
training; his work is at heart a foundational critique of liberalism and an argument in favour 
of authoritarian forms of political order as both more sustainable and – in Schmitt’s particular 
understanding – as more democratic than the liberal, parliamentary state. Despite his reprehen-
sible personal biography, Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism and US foreign policy have inspired 
followers both among radical right- wing movements and on the European left (Müller 2003). 
In recent years his work has spread to other parts of the world, particularly Russia (Lewis 2020a) 
and China (Zheng 2015; Libin and Patapan 2020), where his anti- liberal thought has been 
hugely influential. In South Asia Schmitt’s reach remains more limited, but his political theory 
has been deployed recently in discussions of the politics of Hindutva in India (Basu 2020) and 
the conflict in Sri Lanka (Lewis 2020b). Here I explore four of Schmitt’s ideas that help us 
to interpret autocratization’s third wave and to develop a comparative theoretical framework 
to identify and interpret many common and overlapping trends across very distinct political 
contexts.
Sovereign power
Schmitt’s understanding of politics was informed by his experience of the Weimar republic, 
which he viewed as a weak polity fatally undermined by pluralist politics and liberal ideas. His 
response was a radical rejection of political pluralism and an assertion that political order is only 
possible when all decision- making power is concentrated in a fully sovereign political leader. 
Schmitt defines sovereignty not as ‘the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to 
decide’ (Schmitt 1985a: 13). The true sovereign is an unconstrained political leader, who can 
take any necessary decisions to respond to existential threats to the state, without needing to con-
sult parliament, follow laws or comply with constitutional constraints. The sovereign is defined 
by Schmitt as ‘he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt 1985a: 5); the sovereign power is the 
leader who can declare an exceptional situation in which normal laws and rules do not apply 
and take any necessary decisions to address the emergency. In Schmitt’s world, sovereigns are 
not despots – they do not act on a whim or take arbitrary decisions, nor do they monopolise 
decision- making on everyday issues, where norms and rules still apply. But in the extraordinary 
case, the sovereign can make any necessary decisions unconstrained by law or constitution.
The Schmittian sovereign is an ideal type, but the personalised dictatorship is a global trend, 
with the percentage of authoritarian states defined as personalist almost doubling to 40% 
between 1988 and 2017 (Kendall- Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017: 8). South Asia is no excep-
tion to this trend. In Sri Lanka President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has continued the drive of the 
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and the judiciary to the regime’s will and perpetuate strongman politics (Lewis 2020b; Mihlar, 
Chapter 25 of this volume). In Bangladesh, what was once a contested political system, in 
which political power was fought over by two major parties, has deteriorated into a de facto 
one party system, dominated since 2009 by the personalised political leadership of Awami 
League leader Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (Riaz 2020; Ruud, Chapter 22 of this volume). 
As Riaz comments, ‘The demands for her intervention in solving any problems, from capital 
market […] to school- level examinations, only reaffirms that there is no other power center in 
the country’ (Riaz: Chapter 18 of this volume). In India Narendra Modi has sought a similar 
monopoly of decision- making powers in the office of the Prime Minister, achieved through 
the marginalisation of other government agencies and ministries, parliament and the courts. 
Critics argue that the government pushes laws through parliament without proper scrutiny. 
After a controversial ten- day parliamentary session in September 2020, in which the govern-
ment rushed through controversial new laws, Pratap Bhanu Mehta wrote that the parliament is 
moving ‘from being the custodian of the dignity of legislation to being a site for the acclamation 
of authoritarianism’ (Mehta P. B. 2020).
Schmitt’s sovereign is defined by his or her ability to declare the exception, to define a par-
ticular situation as one in which the normal rules no longer apply. But there are no precon-
ceived criteria to determine when this state of exception might be invoked: it is the sovereign 
who decides when there is an emergency and how to respond to it. A culture of exceptionalism 
has long been a familiar feature of South Asian politics, particularly in securitised environments 
and counter- insurgency campaigns. But the exception – declared in response to an emergency 
situation or an existential threat to the state – too easily becomes the norm, an everyday mech-
anism of governance, not a limited and time- bound aberration from the rules. In Sri Lanka 
emergency rule introduced temporarily in 1958 has continued in force for much of its modern 
history. Together with the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), these emer-
gency regulations severely limit civil rights in sharp contradiction to international standards 
(Coomaraswamy and de Los Reyes 2004). In India the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 
(AFSPA) – also introduced in 1958 in the North- East – gives the government the right to 
declare that a particular area is ‘disturbed’ (in Schmittian terms, to declare it ‘exceptional’). The 
declaration is not subject to judicial review, but the act effectively gives impunity to security 
forces to act as they see fit (HRW 2020).
But the Schmittian sovereign is not bound even by the very limited constraints of emer-
gency regulations. The culture of exceptionalism extends even outside these limited legal 
frameworks. In Sri Lanka there is a long history of extrajudicial killings and disappearances, 
which was revived during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa (DeVotta 2011). A series of 
notorious ‘White Van’ disappearances punctuated the war against the LTTE in 2006– 2009 
(Lewis 2020b). In Bangladesh, according to human rights defenders, between 2009 and 2018 
at least 1,921 people became victims of extrajudicial killings and 109 were victims of enforced 
disappearances (Riaz, Chapter 18 of this volume). Indian policing demonstrates how easily 
the exception becomes the norm: critics argue that in everyday policing in India, poorer and 
marginalised social groups face police and security forces that suffer from an ‘infamous record 
of systematic brutality, disappearances, systemic corruption and a chronic lack of investigative 
capacity’ (Hansen 2019: 24). Extrajudicial killings have been commonplace historically, particu-
larly in areas of conflict such as Assam and Kashmir. Police ‘encounter’ killings remain frequent 
against alleged criminals. In India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, police killed at least 
119 suspects in such incidents in 2017– 2020 (Mehta T. 2020). These extrajudicial killings are 
often celebrated by the public, rather than condemned, confirming Schmitt’s instinct that the 








wrangling in a flawed and corrupted court system. Schmittian decisionism becomes alluring to 
the populace when the alternative is a radical dispersal of power and authority in such a way 
that institutions become ineffectual.
Rule of law
An obvious corollary of the idea of sovereign power is that it excludes the possibility of the 
supremacy of law. Schmitt’s understanding of law is diametrically opposed to the liberal con-
cept of a rule of law, in which the judiciary stands aside and above the political fray. ‘All law’, 
argues Schmitt, ‘is situational law’: the law must be rooted in the concrete order, the cultural 
and political realities of the time, and not rely on universal norms promoted without regard 
to the political context. Schmitt rejects the idea of a positivist legality based on ‘free- floating’ 
norms: instead, ‘[l] ike every other order, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm’ 
(Schmitt 1985a: 10). Schmitt opposes any idea that courts could be decision- making subjects 
in political affairs – for example, through processes of judicial review – because that line of 
reasoning produces an ‘ersatz sovereign’ which destabilises the political order (Meierhenrich 
and Simons 2016: 30). Schmitt contrasts what he views as the weak liberal idea of legality with 
political legitimacy. The danger, according to Schmitt, is that legality undermines the legit-
imacy of a sovereign leader, which is derived from the ‘people’s plebiscitarian will’ (Schmitt 
2004: 9). Ultimately, it is not for the judiciary to resolve or decide major political questions – 
these are the preserve of the sovereign. A normal, functioning judiciary must exist, but it cannot 
act as a counterbalance or constraint on sovereign power.
This assertion of political legitimacy over legality echoes across contemporary South Asian 
politics, where political leaders have often worked to undermine an already fragile independ-
ence of the judiciary. In Sri Lanka the impeachment of the Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake 
in 2013 was an important indicator of an illiberal turn in Sri Lankan democracy and interpreted 
at the time as ‘the latest step in the gradual but systematic dismantling of the rule of law’ 
(Crisis Group 2013). In Bangladesh in 2017 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court retired 
and left the country, but he later claimed that he had been forced out after several rulings he 
had made against the government. The Awami League launched a campaign of politically 
motivated prosecutions against opposition leader Khaleda Zia and many of her associates: in 
2018 she was sentenced to 17 years in prison. In India, human rights defenders accused the 
government of using the law for political ends. Human Rights Watch claimed that the gov-
ernment ‘increasingly harassed, arrested, and prosecuted rights defenders, activists, journalists, 
students, academics, and others critical of the government or its policies’ (HRW 2021). The 
government’s critics claimed that the Indian Supreme Court no longer acted as an effective 
check on executive power. A.P. Shah, a former chief justice of the Delhi high court, warned of 
the decline of the Supreme Court as part of ‘a larger, deliberately- crafted strategy on the part of 
the executive to seize control of the arms of the state, in ways that would benefit its own pol-
itical agenda’ (Shah 2020). This pattern of assaults on the rule of law across the region reflects 
the ascendancy of a generation of political leaders who view the judiciary not as an important 
mechanism of constraint on the executive, but as an obstacle to sovereign decision- making and 
a potential instrument of political power against their opponents.
Friend/ Enemy
Schmitt makes a critical distinction between ‘politics’ – the everyday competition among parties 
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distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ that in Schmitt’s view defines the political community. 
In Schmitt’s well- known aphorism: ‘The specific political distinction to which political actions 
and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 2007a: 26). This appar-
ently simple idea has far- reaching consequences. It defines the political community not on the 
basis of citizenship, or even ethnicity or nationality, but on something more elusive – a col-
lective decision to define the enemy. This constructs an external boundary to the community 
that marks a constitutive dividing line between friend and enemy.
But the politics of enmity not only defines an external boundary to the community. It also 
effectively delegitimises pluralism within the community. Schmitt firmly rejects any suggestion 
that ‘within one and the same political entity, instead of the decisive friend- and- enemy grouping, 
a pluralism could take its place without destroying the entity and the political itself ’ (Schmitt 
2007: 45). The people must be united in their identification of the enemy, but it is inevitable 
that the search for an external enemy also identifies internal enemies. Schmitt’s own bitter 
personal biography, haunted by his role in the rise of anti- Semitism in Nazi Germany, should be 
sufficient warning about the potential consequences of a politics defined by the friend/ enemy 
distinction. The ‘political enemy’ is ‘the other, the stranger; […] he is, in a specially intense way, 
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are 
possible’ (Schmitt 2007: 27). But this leaves the identity of the enemy open to multiple inter-
pretations and leaves the definition of the boundary line of the community (them/ us) as open 
to contestation. The enemy can be anybody – a religious or sexual minority, a political party, a 
religious sect, a group of migrants or foreigners. It is the enmity line itself – not the identity of 
the enemy – that becomes politically relevant.
Across South Asia, attempts to forge identity through the identification of the enemy are not 
new. Indeed, many patterns in the modern politics of South Asia can be traced to an original, 
foundational division – the 1947 Partition between India and Pakistan. That dividing line con-
tinues to shape regional geopolitics and political identity in both countries. Nevertheless, across 
the region a process of contemporary autocratization has also been accompanied by an intensi-
fying trend towards the construction of political communities through difference – the constant 
drawing of dividing lines between friend and enemy, between Sinhala and Tamil, Buddhist 
and Muslim, Hindu and Muslim, Indian and Pakistani. These historical cleavages have been 
compounded further by new divisions in society, evident in the campaigns against Pakistan’s 
‘Aurat Azadi March’ (Women’s Freedom March), for example, or Islamist views of atheists and 
urban women in Bangladesh, which to varying degrees have been accommodated by national 
governments. The intensity of these campaigns to define enemies and to draw boundaries 
within and around communities surely reflects much wider anxieties about identity in an era of 
global change, in communities disrupted by mobility, economic upheavals and powerful new 
social trends. Schmitt understood only too well how defining the enemy could act as a powerful 
driver of identity formation. In his own phrase: ‘Tell me who your enemy is and I will tell you 
who you are’ (Schmitt 1991: 243).
The friend/ enemy distinction is primarily invoked through discourse, but in India critics 
of the BJP government view new legislation as contributing to this divisive agenda. The 2019 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act in India appears to be just such a boundary- producing mech-
anism, accelerating citizenship – membership of the political community – for non- Muslim 
immigrants from neighbouring states. Critics claim that the planned creation of a National 
Population Register (NPR) risks stripping citizenship from Muslims who do not have the 
required documentation (Basu, Chapter 3 of this volume). These legislative innovations were 
preceded by a sharp rise in sectarian violence, in which pro- BJP vigilante groups were given 





campaigns and other cultural issues (Ding and Slater 2021). In September 2019 the government 
imposed a lockdown in Kashmir and revoked the constitutional right of Kashmir to political 
autonomy. In so doing the government further evoked Kashmiri Muslims as a kind of repre-
sentative other: Mrido Rai argues that ‘Kashmiri Muslims are made to serve as contrapuntal 
symbols— of terrorist violence, illegitimate religious impulses, sedition— for contriving a myth-
ical Hindu nation’ (Rai 2019: 259).
Schmitt’s search for the enemy always has this counterpoint: the construction of the united, 
homogeneous nation, a community defined by lines of difference. The image of this whole 
nation often refers back to an imagined, lost past. Anustup Basu argues that Hindu nation-
alism seeks a period of lost unity – an ‘idealisation of the nation as a singular Samaj (society)’, 
which ‘takes the shape of an organismic Varna harmony rather than a contractual social order’ 
(Basu 2020: 48). Hindu nationalists conjure up an idea of a ‘spectral country in- essence’, an 
imagined pure nation, which must ‘be “taken back” from time to time, in extreme cases, from 
minorities, the bureaucratic government, or the legal and constitutional order itself ’ (Basu 
2020: 13– 14).
In the Sri Lankan context, David Rampton points to the ever- present frontier articulated 
in Sinhala nationalist discourse between the imagined nation and its external enemies. While 
the identity of enemies may change, the frontier ‘remains a key element in fuelling a nation-
alist desire for […] the reinvigoration of the lost glory of Buddhist kingdoms; of the ancient 
past through the reunification of the island as a Sinhala Buddhist state and society’ (Rampton 
2012: 379). There is little room for minorities to define their own identity within this anti- 
pluralist vision of unity. In a speech by President Rajapaksa in 2009, he claimed that ‘We have 
removed the word minorities from our vocabulary. … No longer are there Tamils, Muslims, 
Burghers, Malays and any other minorities’. Instead, claimed Rajapaksa, there were only two 
groups in the country: one was the ‘people that love this country’; the other comprised people 
‘that have no love for the land of their birth’ (Rajapaksa 2009). In articulating such a dividing 
line, political leaders seek to construct a new, united political community. But what emerges is 
not a new, inclusive unity, but a majoritarian polity, informed by the politics and culture of the 
majority group and too often characterised by violence against minorities. In the Sri Lankan 
case, after the war against the LTTE came to an end, there was an increase in violent attacks on 
the minority Muslim community (Mihlar 2019).
Democracy
Ding and Slater make the important point that indicators of autocratization do not all trend 
in the same direction. They point to a ‘gap that has emerged between two core features of 
democracy: elections and rights’ (Ding and Slater 2021: 65). Varieties of Democracy data 
demonstrates that ‘electoral quality widely advanced on a global scale over the decade from 
2007 to 2017, while rights and freedoms for individual citizens generally receded’ (Ding and 
Slater 2021: 68). They identify cases in South Asia – notably India and Sri Lanka – as rep-
resentative of this global trend. Ding and Slater use an institutionalist approach to interpret 
the divergent paths of electoral and rights institutions in a pattern which they term ‘demo-
cratic decoupling’, where ‘a decline in rights may coexist with elections of consistent or 
even improving quality’ (Ding and Slater 2021: 67). But much can also be learnt by applying 
Schmitt’s theoretical approach to understand the potential tension between liberal rights and 
democratic elections.
Schmitt argued that the combination of liberalism with democracy was a fatal oxy-
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contradiction that always threatens to undermine the political order. Schmitt, versed in the 
shortcomings of the Weimar republic, was highly critical of parliamentary democracy, of any 
attempts to mediate the popular will through representative institutions and constitutional 
norms. Schmitt complains that ‘modern mass democracy rests on the confused combination 
of both [liberalism and democracy]’ (Schmitt 1985b: 13). His aim is to split apart ‘democracy’ 
and ‘parliamentarism’, and to recover a version of democracy in which the popular will is no 
longer constrained by liberal norms, the rule of law and mediating institutions, but is united 
in its acclamation of support for a sovereign leader. In short, he argues that ‘democracy can 
exist without what one today calls parliamentarism and parliamentarism without democracy; 
and dictatorship is just as little the definitive antithesis of democracy as democracy is of dicta-
torship’ (Schmitt 1985b: 32).
This attempt to pull apart liberalism and democracy is at the heart of the majoritarian politics 
of autocratization in South Asia, in which elections have often enabled rather than constrained 
democratic regression. Despite the pressure on liberal norms and civil rights, the BJP fur-
ther increased its parliamentary majority at the May 2019 election and Prime Minister Modi 
enjoyed high approval ratings of 74% in January 2021 – only 8% of those polled considered that 
he had done a bad job as prime minister (India Today 2021). In Sri Lanka, Gotabaya Rajapaksa 
enjoyed an easy victory at the polls in November 2019, winning 52% of the votes cast to his 
opponent’s 41%, and garnering big majorities in the Sinhala heartland. In Bangladesh the 
opposition boycott of the 2014 election led to complete domination of the parliament by the 
Awami League (AL). In Pakistan Imran Khan’s victory at the polls in July 2018 also represented 
a populist shift in the Pakistan establishment’s search for support among a new, aspirant middle 
class (Akhtar 2021). Majoritarian democracy now represents the default political logic across 
South Asia.
Hansen explores how the political idea of representing majorities, as opposed to political 
parties that gained votes across different constituencies, became increasingly dominant in India 
after the 1990s. This was not merely electoral calculation, but something deeper, in which 
‘The notion of majority itself— bahumat— began to acquire a stronger affective and moral force’ 
(Hansen 2019: 30). The emergence of majoritarianism in India has specific roots in post-
colonial, linguistic and regional politics, but it also reflected a global trend, in which populist 
and authoritarian leaders frequently invoked the idea of a natural conservative majority stifled 
by the minority views of liberal elites (Lewis 2020a: 93– 99). Liberalism, argued conservative 
thinkers, is not designed to represent the majority but to contain it. Schmitt’s authoritarianism, 
by contrast, claims to liberate the voice of the majority in support of the sovereign leader and 
in denunciation of their enemies. Similar thinking is often evident in Sri Lanka, where Sinhala 
nationalists prioritised the democratic process as part of a wider legitimation strategy for a 
majoritarian politics and viewed democracy as a mechanism by which the voice of the Sinhala 
majority – too often stifled historically by minority groups or foreign powers – could finally be 
heard (Lewis 2020b).
While Schmittian authoritarianism claims to offer a way for the popular will to 
be articulated, Schmitt is also candid about how that popular will might be shaped and 
manipulated. On the one hand, Schmitt expects the state to reflect and channel some kind of 
submerged popular understanding about a people’s place in the world. But at the same time, 
Schmitt is also clear that everything depends on ‘who has control over the means with which 
the will of the people is to be constructed: military and political force, propaganda, control 
of public opinion through the press, party organisations, assemblies, popular education, and 
schools’ (Schmitt 1985b: 29). Schmitt’s thinking is summarised by the contradictory thought 








will in the first place’ (Schmitt 1985b: 29). Hansen echoes this thinking in his argument that 
‘the mightiest socio- political force in India today is neither the state nor the law but deeply 
embedded vernacular ideas of popular sovereignty’, in which the category of ‘the people’ is 
not pre- given but ‘needs to be continuously filled and performed in order to remain potent’ 
(Hansen 2019: 35). In other words, governments and their allies must work hard to police 
discourse and undermine alternative views through new forms of censorship and control over 
freedom of speech. Autocratization in South Asian politics is most evident in the growing 
crackdown on dissent across the region, even in countries such as India, where freedom 
of speech and plurality of opinion have a long tradition. At the same time, governments 
work hard to develop and maintain a ‘hegemonic discourse’ – circulating ideas, tropes and 
narratives in society to promote the ruling elite’s values and norms and to legitimise their 
hold on power (Lewis 2016).
Conclusion
Autocratization in South Asia is not divorced from global trends. Its specific contextual frame-
work does little to disguise an underlying set of principles that reflects a wider, global backlash 
against liberalism. The democratic recession in the region is not simply the consequence of 
domestic institutional weaknesses or the decline of Western power, but reflects a global ideo-
logical challenge to the dominant norms and ideas of post- Cold War liberalism. The work 
of the anti- liberal thinker Carl Schmitt helps to interpret these trends and locate them in a 
coherent, ideological framework. Schmitt’s authoritarian state is an abstracted, ideal type, and 
the reality of present- day autocratization is a messy reflection of his vision. South Asian states 
contain pluralistic societies which continue to contest many aspects of the current wave of 
autocratization. Yet states in the region are also experiencing profound challenges to liberal 
democracy that Schmitt would have recognised: the affective allure of majoritarian politics; the 
simplicity of a world divided into friends and enemies; the appeal of the leader who can cut 
through bureaucracy and special interests to make a decision. These are all powerful ideas that 
have remarkable emotional reach in a complex and threatening world. They reflect new ideo-
logical forces that are driving South Asia’s autocratization and to which liberals in the region 
have yet to find a convincing answer.
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